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Note	on	terminology	
	
The	'official'	nuclear	weapon	states	(NWS)	under	the	nuclear	non-proliferation	treaty	
(NPT)	 are	 China,	 France,	 Russia,	 the	 UK	 and	 US.	 The	 NPT	 (United	 Nations,	 2000)	
defines	an	NWS	as	one	‘which	has	manufactured	and	exploded	a	nuclear	weapon	or	
other	nuclear	explosive	device	prior	to	1	January	1967’.	Members	of	the	NPT	without	
nuclear	weapons	are	known	as	non-nuclear	weapon	states	(NNWS).	The	designation	
of	 former	 nuclear	 weapon	 states	 (FNWS)	 is	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 NWS	 that	 in	 future	
complete	the	disarmament	process,	for	the	political	and	technical	reasons	explained	
below.	 The	 four	nuclear-armed	 states	 (NAS)	 that	 are	not	members	of	 the	NPT	are	
North	Korea,	India,	Pakistan	and	Israel.	NWS	and	NAS	collectively	are	referred	to	as	
nuclear	weapon	possessor	states	(NPS).		
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Abstract	
	
	
This	 thesis	 examines	 what	 political	 conditions	 must	 be	 established	 and	 what	
obstacles	 overcome,	 nationally	 and	 internationally,	 in	 order	 for	 the	 five	 'official'	
nuclear	 weapon	 states	 (NWS)	 under	 the	 nuclear	 non-proliferation	 treaty	 (NPT)—
China,	France,	Russia,	the	UK	and	the	US—to	abolish	their	nuclear	weapons.	In	order	
to	 assess	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	 existing	 mainstream	 and	 realist	 perspectives	
regarding	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 NWS	 nuclear	 possession	 and	
disarmament,	 a	 substantial	 evidence	 base	 is	 utilised.	 Academic,	 advocacy	 and	
government	 documents,	 as	well	 as	 interviews	with	 a	 range	 of	 practitioners	 in	 this	
field,	are	drawn	on	to	develop	an	institutional-historical	analysis	of	nuclear	politics	in	
and	between	NWS.	From	this	assessment	of	the	existing	literature,	it	is	argued	that	
whilst	mainstream	and	realist	works	have	some	value,	there	are	several	gaps	in	and	
problems	with	their	analysis	that	need	to	be	addressed.	For	example,	such	works	do	
not	 provide	 a	 full	 account	 of	 nuclear	 politics	 because	 they	 mainly	 focus	 on	 the	
international	 level,	so	that	the	role	domestic	politics	plays	in	nuclear	matters	is	not	
properly	 considered.	 In	 order	 to	 rectify	 this	 deficiency,	 I	 adopt	 a	 critical	 and	
normative	approach	and	develop	the	domestic	politics	model	of	nuclear	possession	
to	 better	 imagine	 the	 political	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament.	
The	approach	adopted,	which	 I	 term	 institutional	democratisation,	proposes	that	 if	
nuclear	weapons	are	to	be	permanently	eliminated	then	legitimate	forms	of	power,	
including	 popular,	 democratic	 movements	 driven	 by	 principles	 of	 equality	 and	
justice,	need	to	be	developed	in	NWS	that	are	capable	of	controlling	and	eliminating	
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the	 bomb.	 This	 is	 necessary	 because	 the	 behaviour	 of	 nuclear	 weapon	 decision-
making	elites	across	NWS—and	the	institutions	they	inhabit	and	maintain—present	
the	principal	barrier	to	meaningful	progress	on	eliminating	nuclear	weapons.	Nuclear	
disarmament	 will	 thus	 both	 contribute	 to	 reformed	 domestic,	 regional	 and	
international	political	orders	and	benefit	from	wider,	progressive	change	at	each	of	
these	levels.		
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Introduction		
	
Why	nuclear	disarmament?	
	
Despite	humanity	having	accumulated	a	range	of	relevant	knowledge	and	experience	
the	 project	 of	 eliminating	 nuclear	 weapons—the	 most	 powerful	 weapons	 ever	
invented—will,	 for	 the	 nuclear	 possessor	 states	 (NPS)	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 world,	
essentially	 be	 a	 voyage	 into	 the	 unknown.	 For	 those	 who	 believe	 that	 nuclear	
weapons	bring	security,	stability	and	freedom	to	their	nations,	 including	prominent	
strategic	analysts	such	as	Frank	Miller	(2009),	Brad	Roberts	(2015)	and	Bruno	Tertrais	
(2011	 i),	 this	 voyage	 is	 unappealing	 because	 it	 is	 fraught	 with	 costs,	 risks	 and	
uncertainty	 given	 the	 high	 stakes	 and	 limited	 benefits	 involved.	 Opponents	 of	
disarmament,	 such	 as	 former	 senior	White	House	officials	Harold	Brown	and	 John	
Deutch	 (2007),	also	claim	that	 the	nuclear	 ‘genie’	cannot	be	put	back	 in	 the	bottle	
and	that	nuclear	weapons	cannot	be	disinvented.		
	
Yet	for	those	who	reject	nuclear	weapons	as	illegal,	 immoral	and	insane—including	
prominent	 voices	 in	 the	 global	 nuclear	 disarmament	movement	 such	 as	 Desmond	
Tutu,	 David	 Krieger	 (2014)	 and	 the	 Women’s	 International	 League	 for	 Peace	 and	
Freedom	 (2011)—this	 voyage	 is	 essential	 if	 humanity	 is	 to	 reach	 safe	 haven	 and	
liberate	itself	from	the	dominance	of	the	overly	powerful	and	the	continued	threat	
of	 annihilation.	 From	 the	 latter	 perspective,	 the	 risks	 involved	 in	 disarming	 are	
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manageable	 and	 ultimately	 negligible	 compared	 to	 those	 of	 the	 status	 quo.	 The	
nuclear	 genie	 can	 thus	 be	 dealt	 with	 by	 delegitimising	 the	 bomb	 so	 that	 it	 is	 as	
socially	 unacceptable	 as	 cannibalism	 or	 slavery	 (Lee,	 1996:	 319).	 In	 addition,	
sensitive	nuclear	weapons	information	may	be	destroyed	and	related	knowledge	and	
skills	may	 be	 allowed	 to	 atrophy	 (Datan	 et	 al	 2007,	 139).	Whichever	 position	 one	
takes	on	this	issue,	mapping	out	as	far	as	possible	the	terrain	that	will	likely	need	to	
be	traversed	in	order	to	move	towards	abolition	is	a	useful	task	if	governments	and	
people	everywhere	are	to	make	informed	decisions	regarding	the	future	of	nuclear	
weapons—both	for	their	own	nations	and	the	world.		
	
As	we	shall	 see,	 the	 idea	and	 imagery	of	 time	 is	as	 important	 to	 this	discussion	as	
that	of	space	given	that	nuclear	disarmament	is	a	social	and	political	process	without	
a	 final	end	point.	For	Jonathan	Schell	 (2000:	108)	this	 therefore	requires	a	political	
solution	 that	 is	 ‘global	 and	everlasting’.	According	 to	 this	 speculative	 logic,	 even	 if	
the	voyage	of	discovery	for	each	NPS	ends	with	zero	nuclear	weapons	this	state	will	
need	to	be	maintained	through	good	relations	between	nations,	anchored	in	durable	
institutions,	given	that,	as	Ian	Anthony	(2011:	11)	points	out,	‘the	knowledge	needed	
to	 rebuild	 nuclear	 weapons	will	 never	 be	 forgotten,	 and	 by	 extension	 there	 is	 no	
exclusively	technical	guarantee	against	nuclear	re-armament’.		
	
Time	 is	 also	 important	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 nuclear	 disarmament	may	 be	 seen	 as	 an	
urgent	 necessity	 because	 of	 the	 significant	 risk	 of	 nuclear	 detonation	 that	 would	
likely,	 in	 most	 scenarios,	 have	 catastrophic	 consequences.	 Seth	 Baum	 (2014)	 has	
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therefore	 argued	 that	 ‘Nuclear	war	 is	 the	 black	 swan	we	 can	never	 see,	 except	 in	
that	 brief	moment	when	 it	 is	 killing	 us.	We	 delay	 eliminating	 the	 risk	 at	 our	 own	
peril.’	 Concern	 over	 nuclear	 proliferation	 and	 rising	 international	 tensions	 led	 the	
Bulletin	of	the	Atomic	Scientists	 (2017)	to	announce	 in	2017	that	the	world	 is	 ‘two	
and	a	half	minutes	to	midnight’	because	‘over	the	course	of	2016	the	global	security	
landscape	 darkened	 as	 the	 international	 community	 failed	 to	 come	 effectively	 to	
grips	with	humanity’s	most	pressing	existential	threats,	nuclear	weapons	and	climate	
change.’		
	
Given	 the	 continuing	 threat	 posed	 to	 humanity	 by	 nuclear	 weapons	 and	 the	
instability	 and	 fallibility	 of	 deterrence,	 this	 study	 therefore	 engages	 with	 the	
argument	 that	 nuclear	 disarmament	 is	 both	 vital	 and	 realisable	 as	 a	 global	 public	
good.	The	need	for	fresh	and	clear	thinking	on	this	issue	is	also	important	because,	
as	 the	Weapons	of	Mass	Destruction	Commission	 (2008)	notes,	despite	hopes	of	a	
peace	dividend	following	the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	disarmament	is	today	‘in	disarray’	
as	 the	 US	 pursued	 ‘absolute	 global	 superiority’	 and	 denigrated	 ‘international	
institutions	 and	 instruments’.	 Furthermore,	 as	 Catherine	 Kelleher	 (2011:	 7)	
highlights,	there	has	been	an	‘unknowing’	of	previous	disarmament	efforts	so	that	a	
new	 generation	 of	 officials	 and	 students	 are	 unfamiliar	 with	 the	 relevant	 history.	
Similarly,	 Lawrence	 Wittner	 (2010:	 7)	 identifies	 the	 1980s	 as	 the	 ‘heyday’	 of	 the	
nuclear	disarmament	movement	and	argues	that	today’s	movement	is	‘considerably	
weaker’.	 From	 these	 salutary	 observations	 flows	 the	 proposal	 that	 academia,	 civil	
	 18	
society	 and	 governments	 in	NPS	 need	 to	 devote	 far	more	 resources	 to	 create	 the	
ideas,	time	and	space	for	disarmament.		
	
It	 is	 perhaps	 necessary	 to	 state	 at	 this	 point	 that	 those	 who	 adopt	 a	 normative	
position	and	advocate	nuclear	disarmament,	may	be	said	to	follow	natural	historians	
such	as	Peter	Kropotkin	(1939),	in	taking	an	optimistic	view	of	human	nature	and	the	
potential	 for	 people—given	 the	 presence	 of	 favourable	 social	 conditions—to	 use	
their	intelligence,	creativity	and	skills	towards	cooperative	and	peaceful	rather	than	
hostile	and	warlike	ends	as	suggested	by	social	Darwinism	(Hofstadter,	1992).	Yet,	as	
Bertrand	Russell	 (1961:	12)	 argued,	 the	 ‘division	of	man	 into	 competing	and	often	
hostile	 nations’	 and	 the	 emergence	 of	 ‘scientific	man’	 capable	 of	 creating	 nuclear	
weapons	 has	 led	 to	 humanity	 facing	 the	 question—‘Shall	 we	 put	 an	 end	 to	 the	
human	race;	or	shall	mankind	renounce	war?’	Russell’s	observations	may	lead	us	to	
consider	 not	 only	 who	 and	 what	 stands	 in	 the	 way	 of	 more	 equitable	 and	 just	
societies	but	who	and	what	stands	in	the	way	of	the	prospects	for	decent	survival	on	
this	planet.	
	
This	study	addresses	these	questions	by	seeking	to	understand	what	the	existence,	
use	 and	 abolition	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 means	 for	 the	 world	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
principles	of	equality	and	justice.	It	is	argued	that	these	issues	can	only	be	dealt	with	
through	an	assessment	of	each	state’s	strategic	power	and	behaviour.	To	begin	with,	
there	 is	 a	much	greater	 concentration	of	 such	power	 in	NPS,	 held	 in	 the	hands	of	
small	 elite	 groups.	 To	 properly	 map	 these	 power	 structures	 and	 differentiate	 the	
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types	 and	 degree	 of	 power	 held	 between	 different	 actors	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 ask	
several	 further	 questions.	 For	 example,	 which	 people,	 groups	 and	 institutions	
legitimate,	 value	 and	 reproduce	 nuclear	 weapons	 and	 resist	 demands	 for	
disarmament?	 Why	 do	 they	 do	 this?	 What	 impact	 do	 nuclear	 weapons	 have	 on	
domestic	and	international	politics	and	what	drives	nuclear	proliferation?	And	what	
is	 the	 current	 state	 of	 the	 national	 and	 international	 movements	 for	 nuclear	
abolition?			
	
In	 seeking	 to	answer	 these	questions,	 this	 study	has	 itself	been	bound	by	 limits	of	
time	and	 space	 that	 raise	 certain	practical	 and	 theoretical	 problems.	 For	 example,	
whilst	 there	 are	 nine	 NPS	 and	 180	 NNWS,	 this	 study	 principally	 focuses	 on	 the	
politics	of	nuclear	disarmament	in	the	five	NWS	so	that	neither	the	four	NAS	nor	the	
NNWS	are	 addressed	 in-depth.	 In	 order	 for	 the	 politics	 of	 a	 nuclear	weapons	 free	
world	 (NWFW)	 to	 be	 fully	 explored	 the	 obstacles	 to	 and	 opportunities	 for	
disarmament	in	and	between	all	the	NPS	and	NNWS	would	need	to	be	included.	The	
intention	 here	 is	 thus	 to	 contribute	 to	 the	 existing	 literature	 and	 lay	 some	 of	 the	
initial	groundwork	for	such	future	studies.	In	any	case	it	is	reasonable	to	focus	solely	
on	the	NWS	as	a	grouping	given	their	obligations	to	disarm	under	the	NPT,	the	fact	
that	Russia	and	the	US	possess	93%	of	the	world’s	16,000	nuclear	weapons	and	the	
immense	 literature	 on	 nuclear	 matters	 which	 this	 thesis	 has	 attempted	 to	 select	
from	and	discuss	as	judiciously	as	possible.	
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Even	 for	 the	 limited	 scope	 of	 this	 study	 the	 exclusion	 of	 the	 NAS	 and	 NNWS	 is	
problematic	 given	 that	 moves	 towards	 disarmament	 involving	 NWS	 will,	 at	 some	
stage,	also	have	 to	consider	how	NAS	and	NNWS	can	and	should	be	 involved.	This	
again	raises	the	question	of	where	responsibility	for	NWS	disarmament	lies	and	how	
it	may	be	differentiated	between	relevant	actors	both	internal	and	external	to	NWS.	
The	 approach	 I	 have	 taken	 to	 this	 issue	 is	 to	 highlight	 where	 appropriate	 the	
relationships	between	NWS	and	NAS/NWS	and	NNWS	so	as	 to	give	a	 sense	of	 the	
role	 nuclear	 weapons	 play	 in	 shaping	 the	 wider	 international	 order.	 I	 do	 this	
primarily	 in	 Part	 Two	when	 discussing	 the	 nuclear	 politics	 of	 each	 of	 the	NWS.	 In	
doing	 so	 I	 argue	 that	 NWS	 have	 a	 responsibility	 for	 both	 national	 nuclear	
disarmament	and	to	act	in	ways	that	support	the	creation	of	a	NWFW—which	covers	
a	 much	 wider	 range	 of	 behavior	 including	 non-proliferation,	 conflict	
prevention/resolution	 and	 demilitarisation.	 Moreover,	 I	 posit	 that	 the	 US	 has	 a	
particularly	 great	 responsibility	 here	 given	 its	 immense	military	might	which	 has	 a	
singular	impact	on	all	other	nation’s	strategic	thought.	
	
Situating	this	thesis	in	the	literature	
	
Whilst	 there	 is	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 works	 from	 academic	 and	 non-academic	 authors	
addressing	 the	 topic	 of	 abolishing	 nuclear	 weapons,	 many	 just	 focus	 on	 juridical	
and/or	 technical	 aspects,	 excluding	 substantive	 political	 discussions	 on	 a	 domestic	
and	 international	 level.	 Examples	 of	 the	 former	 include	 studies	 regarding	 the	
possible	 legal	 instruments	 supportive	 of	 disarmament,	 whilst	 studies	 in	 the	 latter	
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category	 include	 discussions	 of	 the	 different	 levels	 of	 irreversibility	 or	 verification	
requirements	 involved	 in	 disarmament.	 Furthermore,	 many	 of	 those	 taking	 a	
political	 approach	 to	 disarmament	 tend	 to	 limit	 themselves	 for	 one	 reason	 or	
another.	 This	 can	occur,	 for	 example,	when	 studies	 are	partisan	and	 insensitive	 to	
the	 subjective	nature	of	 nuclear	 disarmament	 so	 that	 their	 treatment	of	 the	 issue	
becomes	prone	to	narrow	and	Western-centric	assumptions.	Other	studies	suffer	by	
omitting	important	types	of	information,	whether	legal,	technical	or	political.	In	the	
case	 of	 several	 mainstream	 studies	 this	 includes	 the	 part	 domestic	 politics—for	
example,	public	opinion,	the	role	and	nature	of	the	state	and	political	economy—has	
and	might	play	in	nuclear	weapons	decision-making,	past,	present	and	future.		
	
It	 will	 be	 argued	 below	 that	 this	 state	 of	 affairs	 has	 led	 to	 academics,	 activists,	
experts	 and	 government	 officials	 often	 talking	 past	 one	 another	 when	 discussing	
nuclear	matters	because	they	start	from	different	underlying	assumptions	and	thus	
use	 and	 understand	 ideas	 and	 language	 around	 nuclear	 disarmament	 in	 quite	
different	ways.	The	result	is	that	there	is	no	shared	grammar	of	nuclear	disarmament	
and	 what	 it	 might	 mean	 in	 practice.	 We	 might	 speculate	 on	 the	 causes	 of	 this	
problem—the	 lack	of	public	awareness,	engagement	and	understanding	of	nuclear	
issues—particularly	 after	 the	 Cold	War,	 the	 fact	 nuclear	 disarmament	 is	 in	 several	
aspects	‘unknowable’,	or	the	way	in	which	nuclear	disarmament	is	seen	as	taboo	for	
some	given	its	political	implications,	thus	becoming	a	site	of	ideological	contestation.		
	
	 22	
To	get	a	general	sense	of	how	nuclear	disarmament	has	been	conceived	it	 is	useful	
to	sketch	out	and	compare	two	of	the	more	prominent	current	schools	of	thought	on	
the	 issue.	 For	 example,	 a	 view	 held	 amongst	many	 pro-disarmament	 activists	 and	
campaigners	(Nystuen	&	Eide,	2013,	Johnson,	2014;	Fihn,	2015),	is	that	banning	the	
bomb	is	mainly,	if	not	all,	about	just	getting	rid	of	nuclear	arsenals	and	that	all	these	
weapons	 are	 equally	 abhorrent.	 According	 to	 this	 universalist	 view,	 which	 is	
primarily	driven	by	a	moral	and	humanitarian	impulse,	using	legal	instruments	to	ban	
nuclear	weapons	would	 not	mean	 significant	 changes	 to	 the	 current	 international	
order,	 would	 be	 relatively	 straightforward	 in	 terms	 of	 costs	 and	 technical	
requirements	 and	 should	 be	 isolated	 from	 debates	 about	 national	 and	 regional	
security	 to	 focus	 on	 common	 human	 needs.	 Many	 within	 the	 disarmament	
movement,	 including	those	from	more	radical	political	 traditions,	also	highlight	the	
domestic	 impact	of	nuclear	possession,	particularly	the	undemocratic	and	secretive	
nature	 of	 nuclear	 weapons,	 and	 argue	 that	 disarmament	 and	 demilitarisation	 is	
necessary	for	social	justice	at	home	and	abroad.	
	
A	 different	 view,	 held	 typically	 by	 academics,	 government	 officials	 and	 policy	
professionals	 working	 within	 mainstream	 bodies	 in	 both	 East	 and	 West,	 is	 that	
nuclear	 deterrence	 is	 highly	 valuable	 as	 a	 means	 of	 preventing	 war	 between	 the	
great	 powers	 and	 ensuring	 international	 stability.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 nuclear	
revolution	 ensures	 that	 no	 matter	 how	 powerful	 a	 nation’s	 military	 is,	 nuclear	
weapons	 are	 impossible	 to	 defend	 against.	 A	 nuclear	 possessor	 may	 therefore	
prevent	 an	 attack	 by	 an	 otherwise	 stronger	 aggressor.	 The	 issue	 of	 nuclear	
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disarmament	 is	 thus	 bound	 up	with	military	 and	 state	 power	more	 broadly,	 since	
conventional	 and	 nuclear	 weapons	 have	 important	 qualitative	 differences	 with	
strategic	consequences	 (Acton	&	Perkovich,	2010;	Primakov	et	al,	2010).	According	
to	 this	 differentiating	 view,	 which	 is	 primarily	 driven	 by	 political	 and	 security	
concerns,	a	NWFW	would	entail	a	 transformed	 international	order,	would	 likely	be	
costly,	destablising	and	 technically	 complex	and	cannot	 therefore	be	 isolated	 from	
debates	 about	 security.	 Moreover,	 this	 school	 of	 thought	 largely	 marginalises	 or	
ignores	 the	domestic	 political	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 nuclear	 possession	 and	
disarmament.	 Nuclear	 deterrence	 is	 often	 also	 presented	 as	 being	 an	 unfortunate	
necessity	 to	 ensure	 national	 survival	 in	 a	 dangerous	 and	 uncertain	 world	 and	
disarmament	a	noble	but	distant	ambition.	Notably,	such	thinking	is	as	often	found	
amongst	 elite	 circles	 in	 nuclear	 possessors	 with	 formally	 liberal	 and	 democratic	
regimes	as	it	is	in	authoritarian	states.	
	
These	 brief	 sketches—of	 what	 might	 be	 termed	 idealist	 and	 realist	 approaches—
whilst	 simplified,	 illustrate	 important	 truths	 about	 the	 different	 ways	 nuclear	
disarmament	is	seen.	Yet	there	is	little	commerce	or	interaction	between	these	two	
schools	 of	 thought,	 which	 tend	 to	 exist	 in	 their	 own	 institutions	 and	 circuits.	 The	
reason	such	an	engagement	would	be	important	is	that	each	school	contains	gaps	in	
its	 evidential	 base,	 and	 thus	 its	 reasoning,	 that	 tends	 to	 limit	 the	 veracity	 of	 its	
conclusions	 regarding	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 disarmament.	 Moreover,	
there	 are	 aspects	 of	 both	 schools	 that	 are	 complementary	 and	 could	 be	 brought	
together	 to	 produce	 an	 approach	 to	 disarmament	 including,	 as	 Stephen	 Cimbala	
	 24	
(2009:	 29)	puts	 it,	 ‘a	 compelling	moral	 imperative	 and	a	policy	prescription	 that	 is	
strategically	sound’.	As	I	shall	discuss	further	below,	for	the	purposes	of	this	thesis	I	
shall	 adapt	 and	 update	 ideas	 from	 the	 disarmament	 movement,	 particularly	 its	
1980s	heyday,	which	take	a	more	radical	view	of	the	nuclear	disarmament	debate,	
and	apply	 their	approach	to	 the	technologically	advanced	strategic	environment	of	
today.	A	key	argument	of	this	more	radical	view	is	that	if	nuclear	disarmament	is	to	
advance	 then	 democratic	 and	 popular	 movements	 need	 to	 become	 capable	 of	
influencing	 or	 controlling	 state	 institutions	 so	 that	 illegitimate	 power	 structures	
supporting	and	reproducing	nuclear	weapons	can	be	dismantled.	
	
Contributions	to	the	literature	
	
In	order	to	address	the	gaps	in	the	literature	identified	above	this	study	has	sought	
to	cast	a	wide	net	 to	unearth	and	question	 the	different	political	assumptions	and	
positions	of	those	engaged	in	nuclear	weapons	issues,	to	create	an	approach	which	
draws	on	legal	and	technical	knowledge	and	integrates	idealist	and	realist	visions	of	
disarmament.	 In	 conducting	 the	 research	 for	 this	 study,	 both	 through	 studying	
official	and	non-governmental	publications	and	interviewing	high	profile	academics,	
campaigners	 and	 officials	 it	 became	 clear	 that	 it	 was	 necessary	 to	 create	 such	 a	
debate	 and	 conceptual	 synthesis	 for	 several	 reasons.	 Firstly,	 because	 as	 noted	
above,	 those	 currently	 working	 on	 these	 issues—including	 some	 of	 the	 most	
knowledgeable	and	committed	practitioners—tend	not	to	be	familiar	or	engage	with	
arguments	from	sources	outside	their	professional	and	social	circle.		
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Secondly,	whilst,	following	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	and	then	the	arrival	in	office	of	
Barack	 Obama	 as	 US	 President	 in	 2009,	 there	 was	 a	 proliferation	 of	 studies	
presenting	 action	 plans	 for	 NPS	 to	 eliminate	 nuclear	 arsenals,	 including	 lengthy	
reports	 by	 the	 Canberra	 Commission	 (1996),	 the	Middle	 Powers	 Initiative	 (Green,	
1999),	the	International	Commission	on	Nuclear	Non-Proliferation	and	Disarmament	
(Evans	&	Kawaguchi,	2009)	and	Global	Zero	(2010)—to	name	but	a	few—there	was	a	
conspicuous	 lack	 of	 hard	 analysis	 concerning	 the	 political	 meaning	 of	 NWS	
disarmament.	Despite	the	many	valuable	insights	regarding	the	necessary	steps	and	
processes	 involved	 in	 disarmament,	 there	 was	 a	 tendency	 for	 these	 works	 to	
significantly	 underappreciate	 the	 transformative	 nature	 of	 abolition	 for	 domestic,	
regional	 and	 international	 power	 structures	 with	 the	 sources	 and	 scale	 of	 the	
requisite	political	movements	for	reform	sidelined	or	ignored.	The	problem	for	works	
that	become	overly	technocratic	in	their	approach	is	that	they	end	up,	in	Lawrence	
Freedman’s	 (2009:	 143-144)	 words,	 as	 ‘geopolitical	 engineering	 enterprises’	
disengaged	from	the	social	movements	necessary	for	progressive	change.		
	
Moreover,	whilst	 the	Stimson	Center’s	Unblocking	 the	Road	 to	Zero	 (2009)	project	
provided	accessible	 and	detailed	political	 analyses	of	 the	NPS	 and	nuclear	 capable	
nations,	 the	 perspective	 of	 citizens	 and	 the	 more	 transformative	 vision	 of	 the	
disarmament	 movement	 was	 again	 absent.	 The	 national	 analyses	 were	 also	
presented	separately	rather	than	being	brought	together	to	consider	the	structural	
implications	of	nuclear	weapons	for	international	order.	This	thesis	therefore	brings	
together	 a	 range	 of	 data	 concerning	 public	 attitudes	 to	 nuclear	 weapons	 and	
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abolition	as	well	as	economic	and	foreign	policy	to	fashion	a	more	democratic	way	of	
thinking	about	disarmament.	Ultimately,	this	necessitates	a	second	meaning	for	the	
nuclear	 revolution	 to	be	proposed,	which	 focuses	on	 the	domestic	 political	 causes	
and	consequences	of	states	acquiring	and	developing	the	bomb.	The	corollary	of	this	
proposition	 is	 that	 nuclear	 disarmament	 requires	 a	 theory	 of	 domestic	 political	
change,	based	on	the	need	for	popular	and	democratic	control	of	state	 institutions	
as	 a	 prerequisite	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 an	 idea	 that	 I	 refer	 to	 as	 institutional	
democratisation.	
	
Thirdly,	 this	 thesis	 aims	 to	 inform	 the	 wider	 political	 and	 international	 relations	
literature	 by	 emphasising	 the	 importance	 of	 nuclear	 matters	 to	 today’s	 global	
political	 order.	 For	 example,	 a	 reconsideration	 of	 both	 the	 meaning	 of	 nuclear	
weapons	 and	 disarmament	 can	 enrich	 and	 shed	 new	 light	 on	 key	 debates,	
particularly	 concerning	 the	 nature	 of	 the	modern	 state,	 conflict,	measurements	 of	
democracy	 as	 well	 as	 interstate	 cooperation.	 The	 world	 is	 facing	 a	 series	 of	
interlocking	and	 formidable	challenges,	 including	climate	change,	conflict,	 resource	
depletion,	 hunger,	 poverty	 and	 terrorism,	 so	 that	 new	 insights,	 such	 as	 this	 thesis	
aims	to	provide,	concerning	how	to	manage	and	ultimately	dispense	with	the	power	
of	nuclear	arsenals	and	develop	a	democratic,	just	and	sustainable	power	transition	
towards	a	NWFW	will	have	implications	across	subject	areas	and	disciplines.	
	
Fourthly,	 through	 investigating	 the	domestic	 political	 drivers	 of	 nuclear	 possession	
and	 disarmament	 this	 study	 aims	 to	 contribute	 to	 theoretical	 debates	 concerning	
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how	 politics	 at	 the	 domestic	 level	 interacts	 with	 and	 determines	 states’s	
international	behaviour.	Prominent	critics	of	realist	theory	such	as	Phillip	Gourevitch	
(1978)	 and	 Ethan	 B.	 Kapstein	 (1995),	 have	 highlighted	 the	 need	 for	 greater	
discussion	 and	 research	 in	 this	 area.	 Such	 authors	 argue	 that	 the	 limitations	 of	
realism,	for	example,	concerning	the	agent-structure	problem	and	its	explanation	of	
political	change	requires	further	study,	to,	in	Kapstein’s	(Ibid:	754)	words,	‘articulate	
an	 explicit	 model	 of	 how	 a	 given	 set	 of	 domestic	 factors	 can	 produce	 particular	
international	outcomes,	the	most	important	being	war	and	peace’.	
	
Thesis	overview	
	
The	 thesis	 consists	 of	 eight	 chapters	 spread	 over	 two	 parts—Part	 One	 comprises	
Chapters	One	and	Two	whilst	Part	Two	comprises	Chapters	Three	to	Eight.	Overall,	
the	first	two	chapters	are	focused	on	providing	an	introduction	to	the	main	problems	
of	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 discussing	 both	 its	 meaning	 and	 significance	 and	 the	
different	 ways	 it	 has	 been	 conceptualised	 and	 situating	 the	 study	 within	 the	
literature	 on	nuclear	weapons	 and	disarmament	 as	well	 as	 political	 theory.	 This	 is	
done	 to	 enable	 the	 development	 of	 an	 appropriate	 methodology	 to	 examine	 the	
domestic	 and	 international	 politics	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 concerning	 NWS.	 More	
specifically,	the	first	chapter	begins	by	investigating	the	meaning	and	implications	of	
nuclear	disarmament,	 surveying	key	works	 in	order	 to	 consider	how	 it	 and	 related	
terms	 have	 been	 used	 in	 theory	 and	 practice	 from	 a	 legal,	 political	 and	 technical	
viewpoint.	In	particular	the	importance	of	cooperation	is	highlighted,	both	in	terms	
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of	 easing	 international	 tensions	 to	 create	 a	 suitable	 environment	 for	 disarmament	
and	 in	 terms	 of	 developing	 the	 monitoring	 and	 verification	 regime	 needed	 to	
support	the	phases	of	restraint	and	elimination	on	the	path	to	zero.		
	
This	 discussion	 lays	 the	 foundation	 for	 the	 definition	 or	 theory	 of	 nuclear	
disarmament	that	is	carried	throughout	the	thesis.	Both	technically—so	that	nuclear	
disarmament	 is	 conceived	 as	 a	 process	 with	 different	 levels	 of	 irreversibility	
requiring	 different	 levels	 of	 resource	 commitments,	 as	 a	 way	 of	 seeing	 political	
structures	 past	 and	 present—and	 as	 a	 means	 of	 identifying	 relevant	 sources	 and	
forms	of	data	 to	help	 imagine	 the	political	 conditions	 for	 and	 shape	of	 alternative	
non-nuclear	 futures.	 This	 chapter	 makes	 clear	 that	 the	 findings	 produced	 by	 this	
thesis	 need,	 in	 particular,	 to	 be	 intelligible	 to	 supporters	 of	 the	 global	 nuclear	
disarmament	movement	so	that	it	may	inform	their	campaign	strategies.		
	
As	noted	above,	there	are	powerful	objections	to	the	elimination	of	nuclear	arsenals,	
for	example,	concerning	the	stability	of	regional	and	international	relations	following	
disarmament	and	 the	apparent	 security	dilemmas	 that	 this	would	generate.	 These	
issues,	 it	 is	 argued,	 present	 formidable	 barriers	 to	 achieving	 disarmament	 and	 in	
particular	a	nuclear	weapons	free	world.	Given	the	weight	and	prominence	of	these	
arguments	in	mainstream	thought	it	is	appropriate	for	a	study	of	this	nature,	which	
seeks	to	examine	the	politics	of	nuclear	disarmament	from	a	critical	and	normative	
perspective,	 to	 fully	 engage	with	 such	 established	 literature	 to	 provide	 a	 rounded	
and	nuanced	investigation.	
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In	order	to	address	the	arguments	presented	by	works	with	a	more	traditional	bent,	
Chapter	Two	discusses	existing	approaches	to	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament	
in	 realist	 thought	 and	 scholarly	 critiques	 of	 realism,	 with	 three	 main	 purposes	 in	
mind.	 The	 first	 is	 to	 assess	 the	extent	 to	which	 such	works	provide	useful	 insights	
into	the	conditions	and	indicators	of	nuclear	disarmament,	which	may	be	applied	to	
the	problem	of	how	to	eliminate	nuclear	weapons	in	and	between	NWS.	The	second	
is	 to	 address	 what	 several	 scholars	 see	 as	 the	 major	 issue	 of	 how	 international	
anarchy	 drives	 conflict	 and	 stifles	 cooperation	 between	 states.	 According	 to	 this	
perspective,	 because	 nuclear	 disarmament	 requires	 significant	 international	
cooperation,	 the	 substantial	 obstacles	 to	 this	 posed	 by	 anarchy—such	 as	 fear	 and	
uncertainty—need	 to	 be	 addressed.	 The	 third	 is	 to,	 where	 necessary	 and	 useful,	
improve	 on	 existing	 approaches	 and	 positions	 by	 developing	 a	 new	 theoretical	
approach	that	can	better	explain	and	respond	to	the	challenges	of	achieving	nuclear	
disarmament	in	and	between	NWS.	
	
Having	 identified	 the	 key	 gaps	 in	 and	 problems	 with	 the	 mainstream	 literature,	 I	
propose	that	in	order	to	improve	on	it,	we	need	to	develop	a	new	approach,	which	I	
term	 institutional	 democratisation.	 This	 approach,	 which	 is	 based	 on	 a	 normative	
stance	supportive	of	nuclear	disarmament,	draws	on	insights	from	global	governance	
and	 civil	 society	 literatures	 as	 well	 as	 social	 and	 political	 theory.	 Institutional	
democratisation	can	be	summarised	as	the	idea	that,	given	the	present	condition	of	
domestic	and	international	politics,	the	democratic	deficit	in	the	five	NWS—including	
crucially	 the	 United	 States	 given	 its	 singular	 influence,	 power	 and	 global	 reach—
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needs	to	be	addressed	in	order	for	there	to	be	any	prospect	of	the	NWS	embracing	
nuclear	disarmament.	
	
In	order	 to	elaborate	on	 the	previous	discussion	of	 the	 importance	of	 institutional	
democratisation	and	the	practicalities	of	abolition,	Chapters	Three	to	Seven	of	Part	
Two	present	a	series	of	in-depth	analyses	of	the	nuclear	weapons	systems	of	each	of	
the	five	NWS	in	order	of	their	acquiring	the	bomb:	US,	Russia,	UK,	France,	China.	This	
is	done	through	assessing	the	prospects	for	each	NWS	to	transition	to	former	nuclear	
weapon	 state	 (FNWS)	 status	 via	an	analytical	 approach	 informed	by	 the	work	of	 a	
variety	 of	 scholars,	 including	 Beatrice	 Heuser	 (1998)	 Harald	 Muller	 (2009),	 Nick	
Ritchie	(2012)	and	William	Walker	(2012).	This	approach	includes	an	assessment	of	
the	economic,	social,	political	and	technological	meanings,	ideological	underpinnings	
and	 institutions	 that	 make	 possible	 the	 production	 and	 deployment	 of	 nuclear	
weapons	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 both	 the	 significance	 and	 value	 assigned	 to	 the	
bomb	by	elites	and	 the	wider	society,	and	how	the	elimination	of	nuclear	arsenals	
may	be	accomplished.		
	
Emphasis	is	placed	on	the	concentration	of	nuclear	weapons	decision-making	in	each	
NWS	in	the	hands	of	a	very	small	number	of	military	and	political	officials.	Moreover,	
nuclear	weapons	systems	have	their	own	bureaucratic	and	technological	momentum	
so	that	modernisation	often	occurs	outside	of	political	control.	It	 is	argued	that	the	
high	secrecy	surrounding	the	development	and	reproduction	of	these	weapons	along	
with	 the	 highly	 centralised	 decision-making	 structures	 regarding	 their	 use,	 is	
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incompatible	with	and	highly	 corrosive	 to	 the	 spirit	 and	 functioning	of	democracy.	
With	 the	 possible	 exception	 of	 China,	 given	 its	 history	 of	 nuclear	 restraint	 and	
authoritarian	 political	 system,	 nuclear	 disarmament	 for	 each	 NWS	 will	 therefore	
likely	 require,	 and	 certainly	 benefit	 from,	 a	 domestic	 power	 transition	 involving	
citizens	 forming	 popular	 movements	 to	 gain	 control	 of	 state	 institutions	 that	 can	
manage,	 restrain	 and	 ultimately	 dismantle	 nuclear	 weapons	 systems.	 Institutional	
democratisation,	 as	 a	 driver	 of	 disarmament,	 will	 also	 benefit	 from	 other	
developments	that	reduce	the	salience	of	and	reliance	on	nuclear	weapons,	such	as	
awareness	 of	 these	 weapon’s	 economic	 and	 social	 costs	 or	 technological	
advancements	that	may	reduce	these	weapon’s	credibility	and	utility.	
	
In	terms	of	methodology,	the	analysis	presented	in	Part	Two	was	greatly	enhanced	
by	insights	gathered	from	the	wide	range	of	interviews	(30	in	total)	conducted	with	
notable	academics,	campaigners	and	former	or	serving	officials	from	each	of	the	five	
NWS.	Many	of	 these	 interviews	were	conducted	 in	New	York	during	 the	2014	NPT	
Preparatory	 Committee.	 Several	 interviewees	 wished	 to	 remain	 anonymous	 given	
their	 official	 positions	 so	 I	 have	 not	 included	 a	 full	 list	 of	 interviewees	 in	 this	
document.	Gaining	access	to	such	experienced	practitioners	in	the	nuclear	weapons	
field	and	integrating	their	insights	into	this	thesis	provided	a	wealth	of	primary	data,	
supporting	the	development	of	an	original	contribution	both	to	the	nuclear	weapons	
and	the	wider	international	relations	and	political	literature.1		
																																								 																					
1	Such	 data	 gathering	 from	 amongst	 elite	 and	 prestigious	 communities	 was	 made	 possible	 by	 the	
collaborative	 studentship	provided	by	 the	British	American	Security	 Information	Council	 (BASIC)	 for	
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Chapter	 Eight	 of	 Part	 Two	 summarises	 the	 relationships	 and	 interactions	 between	
NWS	outlined	in	Chapters	Three	to	Seven,	contextualising	this	in	terms	of	the	wider	
sphere	of	global	nuclear	order	 (including	NAS	and	NNWS)	and	major	socio-political	
trends,	 as	 well	 as	 discussing	 how	 institutional	 democratisation	 might	 be	 taken	
forward	 at	 a	 national	 level.	 This	 is	 done	 to	 integrate	 the	 insights	 and	 conclusions	
reached	 in	 the	previous	parts	of	 this	study	 in	order	 to	produce	 ideas	on	how	NWS	
can	 transition	 to	 FNWS	 status,	 cooperate	 to	 eliminate	 their	 nuclear	 arsenals,	 and	
support	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 NWFW.	 This	 chapter	 addresses	 these	 questions	 by	
reviewing	 the	 primary	 obstacles	 to	 and	 opportunities	 for	 nuclear	 disarmament	 in	
and	 between	 NWS,	 as	 outlined	 in	 Chapters	 Three	 to	 Seven,	 before	 considering	
appropriate	political	 responses	 (involving	 the	state,	 civil	 society	and	 the	public,	 for	
example),	 how	 these	 responses	 may	 be	 developed	 to	 support	 the	 proposed	
disarmament	measures	and	where	 the	political	will	 to	 realise	 these	proposals	may	
be	found	now	and	in	future.		
	
These	processes	concern	the	NWS’s	dual	responsibilities	to	achieve	the	elimination	
of	 their	 own	 nuclear	 arsenals	 and	 to	 act	 in	 ways	 supportive	 of	 the	 creation	 of	 a	
NWFW.	The	ideas	and	proposals	included	in	this	section	thus	cover	the	domestic	and	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 														
this	thesis.	This	relationship	enabled	me	to	attend	a	series	of	high-level	conferences	on	nuclear	issues	
in	 Russia,	 the	 UK	 and	 US—as	 well	 as	 secretarial	 and	 research	 work	 for	 the	 BASIC	 Trident	
Commission—over	the	course	of	my	research	and	allowed	me	to	interact	with	and	develop	a	stronger	
understanding	of	NWS	nuclear	policy-making	communities	and	civil	society	groups.	My	 involvement	
with	BASIC	builds	on	my	previous	campaign	and	research	work	with	several	UK-based	NGOs	focusing	
on	 peace	 and	 disarmament	 issues	 and	 has	 directly	 informed	my	 current	work	 on	 nuclear	 issues	 at	
Oxford	Research	Group.		
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international	 levels,	 with	 some	 consideration	 of	 how	 these	 levels	 interact.	 The	
discussion	 is	 also	 informed	 by	 the	 principles	 of	 democracy,	 transparency	 and	
accountability—which	 are	 essential	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 effective	 and	 legitimate	
processes	and	structures	and	if	timely	progress	is	to	be	made	on	eliminating	nuclear	
weapons	in	and	between	NWS.		
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PART	ONE		
Understanding	nuclear	disarmament:	theory	and	practice		 	 	 	
Chapter	One:	Conceptualising	nuclear	disarmament	
Introduction	
	
How	can	we	best	 start	 to	understand	 the	challenges	NWS	 face	 in	eliminating	 their	
nuclear	arsenals?	Specifically,	how	do	we	 identify	whom	or	what	 is	 responsible	 for	
the	NWS’s	 continued	 possession	 and	modernisation	 of	 nuclear	weapons	 and	 their	
refusal	 to	 disarm	 and	 how	 might	 this	 situation	 change?	 Having	 reached	 such	
understandings,	what	progressive	ideas	and	action	supportive	of	NWS	being	able	to	
eliminate	 their	 nuclear	 arsenals	 should	 we	 recommend?	 Moreover,	 do	 such	
investigations	 require	 us	 to	 develop	 a	 theory	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 and,	 if	 so,	
what	 would	 such	 a	 theory	 look	 like?	 In	 order	 to	 answer	 these	 and	 other	 related	
questions,	 it	 is	 perhaps	 best	 to	 begin	 by	 exploring	 existing	 theories	 of	 nuclear	
possession	 and	 disarmament,	 highlighting	 which	 areas	 remain	 problematic	 and	
which	 require	 further	 investigation	 and	 explanation.	 Following	 this	 discussion	 we	
might	expect	to	be	able	to	suggest	the	methods	and	knowledge	necessary	to	create	
a	 more	 complete	 theory,	 incorporating	 these	 insights	 into	 our	 research	 design.	
Before	embarking	on	 this	approach,	however,	 there	are	 several	 issues	 to	 take	 into	
consideration.		
	
Firstly,	we	must	recognise	that	because,	in	the	field	of	nuclear	weapons,	definitions	
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of	 both	 the	material	 and	 ideational	 can	be	hotly	 contested	 and	 are	 the	 subject	 of	
much	political	wrangling,	we	should	critically	examine	how	nuclear	disarmament	has	
been	 defined	 and	 consider	 whether	 it	 is	 necessary	 or	 sensible	 to	 settle	 on	 one	
particular	 definition.	 Secondly,	 existing	 scholarly	 theories	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	
seek	to	answer	either	one	or	more	of	the	following	questions:		
	
i)	 how	 and	 why	 did	 South	 Africa	 and	 the	 three	 former	 Soviet	 states	 (Belarus,	
Kazakhstan	and	Ukraine)	relinquish	their	nuclear	arsenals?		
	
ii)	how	and	why	were	Iraq	and	Libya’s	nuclear	weapons	programmes	dismantled?	
	
iii)	should,	and	if	so,	how	could	and	why	would	the	nine	NPS	relinquish	their	nuclear	
arsenals?		
	
Studies	of	the	first	two	questions	attempt	to	explain	things	that	have	happened	and	
are	 thus,	naturally,	based	on	empirical	discussions	of	evidence.	 In	contrast,	 studies	
addressing	 the	 third	 question	 attempt	 to	 explain	 how	 something	 that	 has	 not	
happened	and	is	not	happening	(including	nuclear	disarmament	by	NWS)	could	take	
place,	and	thus	deploy	both	an	empirical	and	speculative	approach.		
	
Given	that	my	study	is	of	the	latter	type,	it	is	necessary	to	consider	what	evidence	I	
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should	base	the	empirical	part	of	my	study	on	and	how	this	evidence	should	be	used	
to	inform	the	speculative	and	transformative	element	of	my	study.	For	example,	to	
what	extent	are	studies	of	NPS	nuclear	possession,	nuclear	disarmament	by	former	
NAS,	 or	 states	 that	 had	nuclear	weapons	 programmes,	 useful	 to	 considerations	 of	
NWS	 disarmament	 and	 how	 useful	 are	 findings	 from	 other	 studies	 of	 nuclear	
weapons	decision-making,	such	as	non-proliferation	and	restraint,	that	focus	on	the	
experience	of	NNWS?	
	
Thirdly,	 it	 should	be	acknowledged	at	 the	outset	 that	 this	 study	has	a	pronounced	
normative	element	because	I	am	not	just	trying	to	explain	NWS	decision-making	past	
and	present,	but	wish	to	contribute	to	a	discussion	of	how	NWS	could	act	in	future	in	
order	 to	 become	 FNWS	 based	 on	 the	 threefold	 assumption	 that	 nuclear	
disarmament	 is	 desirable,	 justifiable	 and	 possible.	 It	 is	 thus	 necessary	 to	 consider	
what	 the	 methodological	 and	 theoretical	 implications	 are	 of	 this	 stance.	 For	
example,	it	is	possible	to	make	a	heuristic	suggestion	at	this	point	that	my	study	will	
require	 a	means	of	 analysing	NWS	behaviour	 that	 can	 identify	 the	 forces	 enabling	
the	 production	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 systems	 and	 that	 treats	 these	 processes	 as	
contingent,	dynamic	and	open	to	substantial	change	even	if	present	conditions	make	
such	change	seem	distant	and	unlikely.	Indeed,	this	work	will	have	failed	if	it	cannot	
reasonably	demonstrate	that	such	change	and	the	realisation	of	NWS	disarmament	
is	 possible.	 Before	 beginning	 to	 review	 and	 assess	 existing	 theories	 of	 nuclear	
disarmament	it	is	worth	discussing	each	of	these	three	issues	in	more	depth,	both	to	
explore	their	significance	and	to	try	and	reach	some	conclusions	about	the	best	way	
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to	proceed	through	this	complex	terrain.	
	
1.1	What	is	nuclear	disarmament?	
	
On	 the	 face	 of	 it	 answering	 the	 question	 ‘what	 is	 nuclear	 disarmament?’	 seems	
straightforward.	For	example,	we	may	refer	to	the	consensus	Final	Document	of	the	
2010	Nuclear	Non-Proliferation	Treaty	(NPT)	Review	Conference	(RevCon),	agreed	to	
by	the	189	state	parties	to	the	treaty,	which	includes	a	series	of	'concrete	steps	for	
the	 total	 elimination	of	nuclear	weapons'.	Despite	 the	 clear	 language	 contained	 in	
this	 and	 other	 intergovernmental	 (such	 as	 United	 Nations)	 documents,	 nuclear	
disarmament	 remains	 a	much-contested	 term,	 principally	 due	 to	 NWS	 and	 NNWS	
having	quite	different	 interpretations	of	what	 it—and	 the	NPT	 itself—means,	both	
from	a	political	and	technical	point	of	view.2		
	
For	example,	NWS	have	together	argued	that	there	is	a	need	for	a	common	language	
on	disarmament,	announcing	in	2012	a	‘P5	Working	Group	on	Glossary	of	Definitions	
for	Key	Nuclear	Terms’.	This	group,	chaired	by	China,	submitted	the	glossary	to	the	
2015	 NPT	 Review	 Conference,	 in	 order	 to	 ‘promote	 mutual	 understanding	 and	
contribute	 to	 confidence	 building’	 (PRC,	 2013:	 4;	 P5,	 2015:	 3).	 Yet	 representatives	
																																								 																					
2	Furthermore,	it	is	worth	noting	the	difficulty	that	often	arises	in	disentangling	the	political	from	the	
technical	 in	 this	 field	given	that	preferences	on	either	side	can	raise	problems	for	 the	other	to	deal	
with.	
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from	 civil	 society	 point	 out	 that	 progress	 towards	 nuclear	 disarmament	 must	 be	
measured	by	the	13	Practical	Steps	agreed	by	NPT	states	parties	at	the	2000	RevCon	
for	 the	 ‘systematic	 and	progressive	disarmament	of	 the	world's	 nuclear	weapons’.	
The	2010	Final	Document	reaffirmed	these	13	steps	and	included	a	64-point	action	
plan	 in	 order	 to	 move	 forward	 on	 achieving	 the	 treaty’s	 goals,	 including	 a	
commitment	by	NWS	to	reduce	the	salience—meaning	the	role	and	significance—of	
nuclear	weapons	 in	 their	national	security	policy.3		Efforts	by	NWS	to	present	 their	
glossary	as	a	‘tangible	effort’	towards	achieving	nuclear	disarmament	have	thus	been	
dismissed	as	totally	inadequate	by	activists	from	civil	society	(Fihn,	2013:	5).	
	
Importantly,	 Action	 2	 of	 the	 2010	 Final	 Document	 states	 that	 all	members	 of	 the	
treaty	'commit	to	apply	the	principles	of	irreversibility,	verifiability	and	transparency	
in	relation	to	the	implementation	of	their	treaty	obligations'	(United	Nations,	2010:	
20).	These	three	principles	are	designed	to	increase	confidence	between	states	and	
convince	the	 international	community	 that	NWS	have	taken	the	 legal,	political	and	
technical	measures	required	for	them	to	disarm.	Nuclear	disarmament	here	can	thus	
be	taken	to	mean	a	process	leading	to	an	end	point,	requiring	universal	participation,	
where	 there	 are	 no	 nuclear	 weapons	 in	 existence.	 The	 aforementioned	 NPT	
agreements	 can	 also	 be	 said	 to	 form	 the	 strongest	 existing	 basis	 for	 international	
discussions	on	nuclear	disarmament.	This	is	because	of	the	number	of	participating	
states	and	the	fact	that	NWS	and	NNWS	reached	consensus,	lending	the	NPT	process																																									 																					
3	This	 64-point	 action	 plan	 contained	 three	 parts,	 corresponding	 to	 the	 three	 pillars	 of	 the	NPT.	 In	
total	there	were	22	actions	pertaining	to	nuclear	disarmament,	24	on	nuclear	non-proliferation,	and	
18	on	peaceful	uses	of	nuclear	energy,	as	well	as	decisions	concerning	the	Middle	East.	
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significant	 legitimacy.	 Furthermore,	 in	 1996	 the	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice	 (ICJ)	
unanimously	endorsed	the	legal	obligation	of	all	states,	under	Article	VI	of	the	NPT	
‘to	 pursue	 in	 good	 faith	 and	 bring	 to	 a	 conclusion	 negotiations	 leading	 to	 nuclear	
disarmament	 in	 all	 its	 aspects	 under	 strict	 and	 effective	 international	 control’	
(Burroughs,	1998).	
	
However,	as	the	respected	NGO	Reaching	Critical	Will	(RCW)	points	out,	there	are,	in	
reality,	 several	 problems	 with	 the	 current	 approach.	 This	 is	 firstly	 because,	 they	
argue,	 the	 NPT	 agreements	 on	 nuclear	 disarmament	 are	 actually	 weak,	 providing	
‘very	 few	 benchmarks	 to	measure	 progress’.	Moreover,	 ‘time	 lines	were	 removed	
and	 the	 language	 used	 is	 vague	 and	 leaves	 most	 disputed	 actions	 open	 for	
interpretation’	 (Fihn,	 2013:	 4).	 Secondly,	 efforts	 to	 fulfill	 the	 requirements	 of	 the	
action	plan	have	so	far	been	‘significantly	lacking’	(Reaching	Critical	Will,	2014).	Who	
or	 what	 is	 responsible	 for	 the	 current	 impasse?	 Beatrice	 Fihn	 of	 RCW	 (2013:	 5)	
speaks	for	many	NNWS	when	she	argues	that	responsibility	lies	with	the	five	'official'	
NWS	under	the	NPT:	China,	France,	Russia,	the	UK	and	the	US.	For	Fihn,	the	problem	
is	that	NWS	‘somehow	interpret’	Article	VI	of	the	NPT	as	allowing	them	‘to	possess	
nuclear	weapons	until	they	eventually	decide	to	get	rid	of	them’.		
	
As	observers	such	as	William	Potter	(1994)	have	noted,	the	inequality	inherent	to	the	
NPT	was	a	result	of	the	bipolar	order	 imposed	by	the	USSR	and	US	at	the	time	the	
treaty	was	agreed.	The	superpowers	thus	decided	it	was	 in	their	shared	interest	to	
preserve	 the	 status	 quo	 by	 preventing	 nuclear	 proliferation	 through	 technology	
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denial.	Opposing	this	settlement	were	the	members	of	the	Non-Aligned	Movement	
(NAM),	a	loose	collective	of	developing	nations	from	the	southern	hemisphere,	and	
other	 progressively-minded	 NNWS,	 which	 actively	 pushed	 for	 the	 inclusion	 of	
nuclear	disarmament	obligations	in	the	NPT.	
	
Countries	that	interpret	Article	VI	as	an	obligation	to	negotiate	nuclear	disarmament	
are	 thus	 seen	by	NWS	as	 ‘upsetting	 the	strategic	balance	and	even	sometimes	are	
blamed	 for	 not	 focusing	 enough	 on	 non-proliferation’	 (Fihn,	 2013:	 5).	 As	
Mukhatzhanova	 and	 Potter	 (2011:	 40)	 point	 out	 however,	 non-proliferation	 was	
‘never	a	central	tenet’	of	the	NAM,	since	its	members	wanted	to	preserve	their	right	
to	access	nuclear	technology	and	focus	on	abolishing	nuclear	weapons,	as	symbols	of	
discrimination	 and	 inequality	 (Muller	 et	 al,	 1994:	 5).	 Based	on	 Fihn’s	 analysis,	 one	
may	conclude	that	if	progress	towards	the	shared	goal	of	nuclear	disarmament	is	to	
occur,	 then	 the	attitudes	and	behavior	of	NWS	will	 need	 to	 significantly	 change	 in	
order	to	produce	truly	‘concrete’	next	steps,	whether	at	NPT	meetings	or	elsewhere,	
which	must	then	be	swiftly	enacted.		
	
In	principle,	each	of	 the	NWS	supports	the	goal	of	a	NWFW	but	each	has	different	
views	on	the	path—for	example,	 the	 form	and	content	of	multilateral	negotiations	
required	to	achieve	this—based	on	their	political	aims	and	objectives.	One	response	
by	NWS	to	criticism	from	civil	 society	and	NNWS,	has	 therefore	been	to	meet	as	a	
group	 (known	 as	 the	 ‘P5’)	 to	 discuss	 the	 implementation	 of	 their	NPT	 obligations.	
Four	meetings	have	been	held	 since	2009,	 covering	 subjects	 such	as	 transparency,	
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mutual	confidence	building	and	disarmament	verification.	More	widely,	the	NWS	are	
each	committed	to	the	‘step	by	step’	approach,	which	consists	of	negotiations	on	a	
series	 of	 initial	 steps	 towards	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 including	 further	 bilateral	
reductions	in	nuclear	weapons	stockpiles	between	the	US	and	Russia,	the	agreement	
of	 a	 Fissile	Material	 Cut-Off	 Treaty	 (FMCT)	 and	 a	 Comprehensive	 Test	 Ban	 Treaty	
(CTBT).		
	
Whilst	this	approach	is	cast	by	its	supporters	as	the	most	effective	means	of	reducing	
nuclear	dangers,	critics	argue	that	it	is	has	failed	to	bear	fruit	since	the	1960s	and	is	
‘encountering	 serious	 difficulties’	 owing	 to	 its	 ‘indefinite	 and	 contingent	 timeline’	
making	 it	 ‘vulnerable	 to	 geopolitical	 tensions	 and	 disruptive	 events	 like	 wars	 and	
further	proliferation’	(Acheson,	2012;	Burroughs,	2013:	13).	In	addition,	independent	
analysts	 note	 how	 NWS	 have	 acted	 to	 render	 such	 agreements	 redundant.	 For	
example,	 Rebecca	 Johnson	 (2009:	 231)	 observes	 that	 whilst	 the	 CTBT	 remains	 an	
important	 milestone	 on	 the	 road	 to	 disarmament,	 ‘technological	 advances	 in	
computer	 modeling	 and	 hydrodynamic	 experiments’	 may	 have	 ‘diminished’	 the	
treaty’s	‘significance	for	preventing	the	modernization	of	arsenals’.	
	
Thus	on	the	one	hand	NWS	declare	that	they	are	earnestly	engaged	in	discussions,	
behind	closed	doors,	to	create	the	political	conditions	that	will	allow	them	to	realise	
their	 Article	 VI	 disarmament	 obligations.	 Yet,	 given	 the	 high	 salience	 nuclear	
weapons	still	have	in	security	policies	and	the	significant	investments	being	made	to	
modernise	 nuclear	 arsenals,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 nuclear	 weapons	 remain	 ‘deeply	
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embedded	 elements	 of	 their	 strategic	 calculus’,	 as	 analysts	 from	 the	 Stockholm	
Institute	Peace	Research	Institute	(2014	ii)	note,	despite	the	potentially	catastrophic	
risks	of	nuclear	conflict	and	the	continuing	mistrust	and	tension	between	Russia	and	
NATO.	 It	 is	 thus	 not	 surprising	 that	 observers	 such	 as	 Maria	 Looney	 (2013)	 have	
argued	 that	 'there	 is	 still	 very	 little	 evidence	 of	what	 has	 been	 achieved’	 by	NWS	
meetings	in	the	last	four	years.	
	
Such	 contemporary	 disagreements	 are	 useful	 not	 only	 to	 highlight,	 if	 it	 was	 at	 all	
necessary,	 the	 controversial	 nature	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	 but	 also	 to	 begin	 a	
discussion	of	how	this	study	will	approach	such	controversies,	given	that,	as	Robert	
Cox	(2010)	points	out,	‘there	is	no	theory	for	itself;	theory	is	always	for	someone,	for	
some	purpose.’	The	question	of	whom	a	 theory	of	nuclear	disarmament	 is	 for	and	
what	 its	 purpose	 is	 may	 seem	 straightforward.	 Efforts	 to	 ban	 the	 bomb	 have,	
historically,	consisted	of	popular	struggles	led	by	people	of	all	nations,	including—on	
a	national	level—NAM	members	and	may	be	said	to	comprise,	after	Wittner	(2009),	
the	‘world	nuclear	disarmament	movement’.		
	
The	 historic	 purpose	 of,	 what	 I	 shall	 hereafter	 refer	 to	 as	 the	 disarmament	 first	
approach	 to	 the	 abolition	 debate,	 is	 the	 elimination	 of	 nuclear	 arsenals	 for	
principally	moral	reasons.	Whilst	abolitionists	may	disagree	on	several	questions,	for	
example,	 which	 strategy	 should	 be	 adopted	 to	 build	 momentum	 for	 nuclear	
disarmament	 and	 the	 organisation	 of	 domestic	 and	 international	 politics,	 they	
commonly	 argue	 that	 any	 use	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 would	 result	 in	 indiscriminate	
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suffering	and	destruction	of	life	on	a	huge	scale—as	experienced	in	the	US	bombings	
of	 Hiroshima	 and	 Nagasaki	 in	 1945	 (Campaign	 for	 Nuclear	 Disarmament,	 2012).	
Abolitionists	 also	 draw	 on	 a	 variety	 of	 other	 evidence,	 using	 humanitarian,	 legal,	
security,	 environmental	 and	 economic	 arguments	 as	 well	 as	 national	 and	 global	
public	opinion	in	order	to	explain	why	nuclear	disarmament	is	 justifiable,	realisable	
and	necessary.	
	
There	 are	 several	 areas	 of	 agreement	 within	 disarmament	 first	 regarding	 the	
purpose	and	requirements	of	nuclear	disarmament.	The	first	of	these,	as	described	
above,	is	the	moral	and	humanitarian	justification	for	abolishing	nuclear	weapons	as	
the	necessary	precursor	to	the	establishment	of	common	security	amongst	nations	
(Ibid).	Secondly,	given	their	moral	rejection	of	nuclear	weapons,	proponents	of	this	
approach	 advocate	 a	 range	 of	 unilateral	 and	 multilateral	 nuclear	 disarmament	
measures,	placing	the	responsibility	for	such	urgent	action	squarely	on	the	shoulders	
of	each	NPS.4	Thirdly,	nuclear	disarmament	is	seen	as	a	permanent	end	state.	Today,	
campaigners	from	several	groups	and	coalitions	thus	engage	in	activism	to	pressure	
governments	 to	 support	 a	 nuclear	 weapons	 convention	 or	 ban	 treaty	 for	 nuclear																																									 																					
4 William	Walker	 (2012:	 190)	 has	 summarised	 both	what	 this	would	 entail	 and	 the	 necessary	 prior	
processes,	 providing	 a	 useful	 representation	 of	 the	 general	 technical	 and	 legal	 approach	 of	
disarmament	first	advocates	that	is	worth	reproducing	in	full.	As	he	describes	it,	nuclear	disarmament	
would	involve:	the	phased,	verified	reduction	and	dismantlement	of	nuclear	arsenals,	displacement	of	
nuclear	deterrence	in	the	security	policies	of	states,	negotiation	and	entry	into	force	of	a	global	treaty	
banning	 all	 possession	 and	 usage	 of	 nuclear	 weapons,	 agreement	 on	 means	 of	 preventing	 future	
break-out,	and	conclusion—once	and	for	all—that	the	existence	of	nuclear	weapons	is	 incompatible	
with	 the	 humanitarian	 impulse	 and	 with	 related	 bodies	 of	 law.	 The	 weapons	 would	 become	
illegitimate	and	illegal	in	all	hands,	for	all	time	and	in	every	place,	and	the	edifices	constructed	around	
them	 would	 be	 dismantled,	 never	 to	 be	 reassembled.	 This	 outcome	 would	 be	 expressed	 in	 a	
universal,	eternally	binding	Nuclear	Weapons	Convention.		
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weapons.	 In	doing	so	they	emphasise	the	 importance	of	the	1996	judgment	by	the	
ICJ	 that	 international	 humanitarian	 law	 (IHL)	 does	 apply	 to	 the	 use	 of	 nuclear	
weapons	and	that	their	use	would	generally	be	contrary	to	IHL’s	principles	and	rules	
(ICJ,	1996).5		
	
The	 International	 Campaign	 to	 Abolish	 Nuclear	 Weapons	 (Fihn:	 2016)	 therefore	
argues	 that	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 legal	 prohibition	 of	 nuclear	 weapons,	 even	
without	the	participation	of	NWS,	would	 ‘allow	nations	 in	any	part	of	 the	world	to	
formalize	 their	 rejection	 of	 nuclear	weapons	 and	 help	 create	 a	 clear	 international	
legal	 norm	against	 the	 possession	 of	 nuclear	weapons’.	 Such	 a	 norm,	 it	 is	 argued,	
would	 then	 build	 pressure	 on	 NWS	 to	 take	 progressive	 action	 on	 nuclear	
disarmament.	 Civil	 society	 groups	 such	 as	 ICAN	 have	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	
networking	 and	 strategising	 with	 NNWS,	 seeking	 to	 highlight	 the	 humanitarian	
consequences	 of	 a	 nuclear	 detonation	 as	 a	 means	 both	 of	 building	 momentum	
towards	a	ban	treaty	and	an	alternative	to	what	they	see	as	the	failed	step-by-step	
approach	 (comprising	 negotiations	 on	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 initial	 steps	 towards	
nuclear	disarmament)	favoured	by	NWS	(Datan	et	al,	2007:	22).		
																																								 																					
5	This	means	 that	 any	 threat	 or	 use	of	 nuclear	weapons	must	 not	 be	 targeted	 at	 civilians,	must	 be	
capable	 of	 distinguishing	 between	 civilian	 and	 military	 targets,	 and	 must	 not	 cause	 unnecessary	
suffering	to	combatants,	or	harm	greater	than	that	unavoidable	to	achieve	military	objectives.	Given	
these	criteria,	any	use	of	nuclear	weapons	would	 involve	war	crimes	and,	moreover,	crimes	against	
humanity,	because	of	the	fact	that	the	effects	of	nuclear	weapons	are	uncontrollable	(Committee	on	
International	Security	and	Arms	Control,	1997:	87).	Furthermore,	the	court	unanimously	endorsed	a	
legal	obligation	on	all	states	‘to	pursue	in	good	faith	and	bring	to	a	conclusion	negotiations	leading	to	
nuclear	 disarmament	 in	 all	 its	 aspects	 under	 strict	 and	 effective	 international	 control’	 (Burroughs,	
1998).	
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It	is	important	to	highlight	the	disarmament	first	approach	at	the	outset	of	this	study	
since	a	scholarly	 investigation	of	the	political	conditions	necessary	for	NWS	nuclear	
disarmament	 cannot	 ignore	 the	 history	 that	 preceded	 it	 and	which	 it	 is	 a	 part	 of.	
Such	 a	 study	 should	 therefore	 aim	 to	 produce	 knowledge	 that	will	 be	 of	 use	 and	
accessible	to	anyone	interested	in	NWS	nuclear	disarmament	and	the	realisation	of	a	
NWFW.	 Yet	 this	 issue	 is	 complicated	 by	 the	 fact	 that,	 in	 recent	 years,	 prominent	
figures	from	across	the	political	spectrum	in	NWS	have	voiced	support	for	the	idea	of	
a	NWFW.	Most	notable	is	the	apparent	change	of	heart	regarding	nuclear	weapons	
by	several	former	statesmen	and	women	(mainly	representing	British	and	US	elites)	
who	 could	be	described	as	Cold	Warriors,	 hawks	or	political	 realists.6	In	particular,	
the	 phenomenon	 whereby	 figures	 from	 the	 US	 political	 establishment	 such	 as	
George	Schulz,	William	Perry,	Henry	Kissinger,	Sam	Nunn—and	many	others—have	
come	 out	 in	 favour	 of	 ‘a	 world	 without	 nuclear	 weapons’	 requires	 close	 critical	
examination	 (Nuclear	 Security	 Project,	 2011).	 This	 is	 not	 least	 because	 the	 term	
‘nuclear	disarmament’	only	appears	once	 in	 the	 five	op-eds	 they	collectively	wrote	
on	 the	 subject	 for	 the	 Wall	 Street	 Journal	 (Nuclear	 Security	 Project,	 2014).7	The	
absence	 of	 this	 term,	 around	 which	 the	 aforementioned	 popular	 struggles	 have	
rallied	for	decades,	is	surely	significant	and	requires	further	investigation.	
Recent	 elite	 contributions	 to	 the	 debate	 regarding	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 NWFW	 are	
																																								 																					
6	There	have	been	a	few	French	political	and	military	figures	 joining	this	cause,	such	as	Alain	Juppe,	
Michel	 Rocard,	 Alain	 Richard,	 and	 Bernard	 Norlain	 (2009).	 However,	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 French	
political	elite	remains	strongly	devoted	to	retaining	their	nation’s	independent	nuclear	arsenal.	
7	The	 phrase	 appears	 in	 the	 first	 of	 the	 five	 op-eds,	 published	 in	 January	 2007	 as	 follows:	 ‘John	 F.	
Kennedy,	seeking	to	peak	the	logjam	on	nuclear	disarmament,	said,	"The	world	was	not	meant	to	be	a	
prison	in	which	man	awaits	his	execution."’	
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largely	based	on	a	recognition	that	nuclear	weapons—once	exclusively	the	weapons	
of	 the	 strong—have	become	potential	weapons	of	 the	weak,	 thus	 threatening	 the	
great	 powers	 and	 changing	 international	 power	 dynamics.	 Indeed,	 David	 Cortright	
and	Raimo	Vayrnen	(2009)	have	observed	that	the	proliferation	of	nuclear	weapons	
‘is	both	a	cause	and	consequence	of	the	growing	decentralisation	and	multipolarity	
of	 international	 relations’.	 The	 ‘effectiveness	 of	 deterrence	 and	 the	 old	 bipolar	
international	 order	 centred	 on	Russia	 and	 the	United	 States’	 is	 thus	 crumbling,	 so	
that	where	there	was	once	stability	there	is	now	uncertainty.		
	
Similarly,	 Alistair	 Young	 (2010:	 3)	 points	 out	 that	 whilst	 the	 US	 has	 preponderant	
power	 ‘across	 the	 range	 of	 key	 power	 resources-	 military,	 economic	 and	
technological’,	since	the	‘latter	part	of	the	2000s’	the	distribution	of	power	appears	
to	be	shifting,	following	the	US’s	disastrous	occupations	of	Iraq	and	Afghanistan,	the	
2008	 financial	 crisis	 and	 the	 ‘increased	 economic	 importance	 and	 greater	
assertiveness	of	China,	Russia,	 India	and	Brazil’.	Nuclear	proliferation	 is	also	 feared	
because	it	 increases	the	risk	that	non-state	actors	will	acquire	nuclear	weapons	for	
terrorist	purposes.	Recent	calls	 for	action	on	nuclear	disarmament	 from	within	 the	
US	and	other	NWS	elites	have	therefore,	in	large	part,	been	driven	by	the	realisation	
that	 nuclear	 dangers	 must	 be	 reduced	 to	 prevent	 the	 possible	 use	 of	 nuclear	
weapons	against	their	nations.	Furthermore,	in	the	1990s,	senior	US	political	figures	
such	 as	 Paul	H.	Nitze	 (1999)	went	 so	 far	 as	 to	 argue	 that	 the	 accuracy	 of	modern	
conventional	munitions	should	lead	Washington	to	consider	unilateral	disarmament.	
It	is	worth	noting	at	this	point	that	Russian	and	US	governments	have,	since	nuclear	
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weapons	 were	 first	 produced,	 discussed	 plans	 for	 abolition.	 These	 include	 the	
unsuccessful	Acheson-Lillenthal	report	and	the	subsequent	Baruch	plan,	proposed	by	
the	US,	and	the	Soviet	Gromyko	plan—all	from	the	beginning	of	the	Cold	War—and,	
more	 recently,	 as	 the	 Cold	War	 was	 ending,	 the	 Reykjavik	meetings	 between	 the	
United	States	and	Soviet	Union	that	led	to	massive	reductions	in	both	sides’	nuclear	
arsenals.	 Raymond	 Garthoff	 (1994:	 285)	 argues	 that	 Reykjavik	 can	 be	 seen	 as	 a	
‘spectacular	 missed	 opportunity’	 for	 the	 final	 realisation	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament.	
Similarly,	former	US	General	Lee	Butler	has	described	the	period	following	the	end	of	
the	 Cold	War	 as	 a	 ‘priceless	 opportunity’	 for	 the	 US	 and	 Russia	 to	 deal	 with	 the	
problems	 posed	 by	 nuclear	weapons	 but	 one	which	 ‘got	 stepped	 all	 over’	 (Schell,	
1998:	207).		
	
Clearly	there	is	much	one	might	learn	from	these	historical	episodes,	both	to	avoid	
repeating	past	mistakes	and	better	understand	the	present.	For	example,	what	are	
the	 differences	 between	 advocacy	 for	 nuclear	 disarmament	 stemming	 from	
grassroots	social	movements	on	the	one	hand	and	elite	groups	on	the	other?	What	
are	 these	 group’s	 respective	 strengths	 and	 weaknesses,	 how	 are	 they	 distributed	
across	NWS	and	beyond	and	what	have	been	their	successes	and	failures	regarding	
nuclear	 disarmament?	 Moreover,	 how	 can	 we	 characterise	 these	 groups	 past	
relationships	 and	 can	 and,	 if	 so	 how,	 might	 they	 work	 together	 to	 build	 political	
momentum	for	action	on	nuclear	disarmament	now	and	in	the	future?		
Whilst	 recognising	 the	 importance	 of	 such	 questions,	 I	 will	 leave	 them	 to	 be	
addressed	later	 in	this	study.	This	 is	principally	because,	however	we	view	the	past	
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and	its	successes	and	failures,	we	must	first	 identify	which	contemporary	problems	
require	attention.	The	principal	 issue	 for	 this	 study	being	 that	whilst	opportunities	
for	 nuclear	 disarmament	 remain	 open,	 momentum	 is	 currently	 in	 the	 opposite	
direction	 given	 the	 continual	 modernisation	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 by	 all	 NWS.	
Recognising	the	urgency	of	this	situation	and	the	need	to	provide	intellectual	weight	
to	 the	 debate,	 several	 scholars,	 including	 George	 Perkovich	 and	 James	 M.	 Acton	
(2009)	 and	 David	 Cortright	 and	 Raimo	 Vayrynen	 (2009),	 have	 produced	 detailed	
works	discussing	the	interlinking	political	conditions,	legal	instruments	and	technical	
requirements	of	nuclear	disarmament	and	a	NWFW.		
	
To	revisit	Cox’s	point,	it	is	pertinent	to	consider	whom	these	and	other	theories	are	
for.	Are	they,	for	example,	addressing	a	technocratic,	military	or	political	elite	or	are	
efforts	being	taken	to	reach	a	global,	public	audience?	 In	order	to	properly	answer	
questions	about	the	practical	and	political	significance	of	such	studies,	it	is	necessary	
to	 provide	 some	 context	 and	 discuss	 the	 wider	 theoretical	 aspects	 of	 nuclear	
disarmament.	 To	 begin	 doing	 so	 I	 return	 now	 to	 the	 question	 ‘what	 is	 nuclear	
disarmament?’	 simply	because	 if	we	do	not	have	a	clear	grasp	of	 the	 term	and	 its	
varied	 usage	 and	 meanings,	 it	 will	 not	 be	 possible	 to	 understand	 the	 changes	 in	
attitudes	and	behavior	potentially	required	from	decision-makers	and	institutions	in	
NWS.	
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Getting	rid	of	nuclear	weapons:	a	review	of	terms	and	their	function	
	
In	order	to	enrich	our	understanding	of	this	issue	it	is	necessary	to	look	beyond	the	
official	documents	of	the	NPT	and	United	Nations	and	delve	into	the	wide	and	varied	
literature	 concerning	 the	 enigma	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament.	 This	 literature	 serves	
either	one	or	both	of	 the	 following	 functions:	 i)	 to	 review	 the	history	of	efforts	 to	
eliminate	 nuclear	 weapons	 from	 1945	 to	 the	 present	 ii)	 to	 speculate	 on	 possible	
future	efforts	 to	eliminate	nuclear	weapons.	Given	 this	enquiry’s	 focus	on	 the	 five	
NWS	 and	 limits	 of	 time	 and	 space,	 this	 study	 will	 principally	 concentrate	 on	
comparing	 and	 contrasting	 works	 that	 primarily	 fulfill	 the	 latter	 function.	 As	 will	
become	 apparent,	 since	 the	mid-2000s	 there	 has	 been	 a	 notable	 upsurge	 in	 such	
publications,	the	causes	and	consequences	of	which	shall	be	considered.	In	any	case,	
the	 history	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	 will	 not	 be	 neglected	 as	 many	 of	 the	 recent	
analyses	examine	the	historical	record,	so	that	this	will	form	a	significant	part	of	our	
discussion.		
It	 is	 worth	 noting	 at	 this	 stage	 that	 works	 with	 both	 historical	 and	 speculative	
functions	may	focus	on	one	or	more	of	the	following	interlinking	aspects	of	nuclear	
disarmament:	 legal;	 political;	 technical.	 As	 previously	 discussed,	 the	 meaning	 of	
nuclear	disarmament	is	contested	in	each	of	these	three	aspects.	Indeed,	we	should	
acknowledge	 that	 the	 term	nuclear	disarmament	 is	one	of	 several,	albeit	 the	most	
common	 and	widely	 known,	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 eradication	 of	 nuclear	weapons.	
Consideration	 of	 the	 different	 terms	 and	 definitions	 associated	 with	 this	 topic	 is	
particularly	 relevant	 to	 an	 effort	 to	 achieve	 the	 elimination	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	
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because	some	type	of	shared	understanding	(whether	at	a	national	or	international	
level)	 of	what	 the	purpose	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	 is	will	 be	 essential	 in	 order	 to	
create	requisite	norms,	rules	and	institutions	and	utilise	legitimate	forms	of	counter-
power.	We	 therefore	need	 to	 review	both	 the	historical	 and	 speculative	 literature	
with	this	consideration	in	mind.		
	
Returning	to	the	question	of	terminology,	the	terms	used—with	varying	degrees	of	
frequency—within	the	literature	to	describe	the	idea	of	eradicating	nuclear	weapons	
include:		
	
- Denuclearisation:	a	term	which	is	also	used	to	refer	to	removing	or	banning	
nuclear	weapons	possessed	by	a	state.		
- Nuclear	abolition:	a	widely	used	term	which	may	be	said	to	carry	a	particular	
‘moral	dimension’	(Tertrais,	2009	ii:	2),	not	least	because	of	the	connection	to	
the	abolition	of	slavery	(Kelleher,	2011:	5).		
- Nuclear	 elimination:	 a	 term	used	 in	 the	 first	 resolution	 adopted	by	 the	UN	
General	Assembly	in	1946.	
- Nuclear	 zero:	 a	 term	 recently	 used	 by	 the	 Global	 Zero	 (2010)	 campaign’s	
disarmament	action	plan.	
- Nuclear	Weapons	Free	World	(NWFW):	an	end	state	term	widely	used	across	
the	literature.	
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- Transarmament:	a	much	 less	commonly	used	term	referring	to	 ‘an	effort	to	
obtain	 disarmament	 in	 offensive	 weapons	 through	 transarmament	 to	
defensive	weapons’	(Galtung,	1984:	184).	
Without	going	into	a	detailed	comparison	of	how	each	of	these	terms	has	been	used	
(often	 interchangeably,	 with	 the	 exception	 of	 transarmament)	 and	 their	 strengths	
and	weaknesses	relative	to	our	discussion,	we	should	appreciate	the	particular	value	
of	the	term	nuclear	disarmament.	This	is	especially	necessary	if	we	are	to	use	it,	as	I	
do	 in	 this	 study,	 as	 the	 primary	 means	 of	 referring	 to	 the	 eradication	 of	 nuclear	
arsenals	by	NWS.	 Firstly,	 of	 the	 terms	presented,	nuclear	disarmament	 is	 certainly	
one	 of—if	 not	 the—best	 known	 and	mostly	 widely	 used,	 whether	 in	 public,	 non-
governmental	or	governmental	discourse.	Secondly,	nuclear	disarmament	has	been	
used	to	refer	to	several	different	‘levels	of	goals’	including:	i)	freezing	ii)	reducing	iii)	
eliminating	nuclear	weapons	iv)	the	end	state	of	a	NWFW,	and	thus	provides	a	more	
comprehensive	coverage	of	relevant	processes	(Galtung,	1984:	125).8		
	
The	 first	 three	 of	 these	 goals	 can	 also	 be	 conducted	 amongst	 several	 different	
collections	 of	 states.	 For	 example,	 unilateral	 disarmament	 involves	 one	 state	
eliminating	 its	 nuclear	 weapons	 without	 seeking	 equivalent	 concessions	 from	 its	
actual	 or	 potential	 rivals.	 Beyond	 unilateral	 initiatives,	 disarmament	 negotiations																																									 																					
8	On	the	other	hand,	the	term	abolition	carries	the	ring	of	finality	to	it,	whereas	disarmament	is	more	
ambiguous	and	has	often	been	represented	by	NWS	elites	to	mean	reductions	to	nuclear	arsenals,	the	
glacial	 pace	 of	which	 has	 long	 angered	many.	 This	 is	why,	 for	 example,	 campaigners	 in	 the	 1990s,	
seeking	a	name	for	their	new	international	coalition	pushing	for	a	global	treaty	to	eliminate	nuclear	
weapons,	chose	Abolition	2000	(Interview:	AS).	
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resulting	in	participating	states	eliminating	their	nuclear	arsenals	could	take	place—
separately	 or	 together—at	 a	 bilateral	 (involving	 two	 NWS/NAS/NPS),	 plurilateral	
(among	more	than	two	NWS	and/or	NAS/NPS)	or	multilateral	level	(involving	several	
NWS/NAS/NPS/NNWS).	 These	 technical	 points	 are	 of	 considerable	 importance	 for	
my	study	given	that	I	am	investigating	the	particular	contribution	the	five	NWS	could	
make	 to	 a	 NWFW	 by	 eliminating	 their	 nuclear	 weapons.	 In	 this	 sense	 nuclear	
disarmament,	as	a	 term,	provides	 flexibility	when	discussing	 this	 topic	as	 it	 can	be	
contracted	or	expanded	as	required,	for	example,	to	include	NAS	and	NNWS	and	the	
different	phases	of	elimination,	as	will	be	necessary	for	the	transition	to	a	NWFW.	
	
Processes	and	indicators	of	nuclear	disarmament	
	
It	 is	 appropriate	 to	 note	 here	 that	 Johann	Galtung	 (1984:	 125),	 discussing	what	 a	
‘general	theory	of	disarmament’	would	look	like,	considers	that	alongside	goals,	the	
other	 two	 key	 distinctions	 that	 need	 to	 be	 made	 are	 between	 disarmament	
processes	and	 indicators.	With	regard	to	nuclear	disarmament,	each	of	these	three	
areas	need	to	be	investigated	from	a	legal,	political	and	technical	viewpoint,	with	the	
understanding	 that	 the	 limits	 and	 requirements	 of	 each	 will	 have	 important	
implications	 for	 the	 others.	 A	 Chatham	 House	 study	 published	 in	 2000	 entitled	
Nuclear	Weapons	 Policy	 at	 the	 Crossroads	 argued	 that	 ‘little	 detailed	 analysis	 has	
been	 undertaken	 to	 determine	 precisely	 what	 a	 world	 without	 nuclear	 weapons	
would	 involve’	 and	 that	 a	 ‘consensus’	 on	 how	 a	 NWFW	 could	 be	 achieved	 was	
necessary	if	NWS	were	to	move	‘below	a	minimal	deterrent’	(Howlett	et	al,	2000:	47-
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49).	 It	 is	 pleasing	 to	 note	 that	 since	 then	 a	 variety	 of	 studies,	 some	 of	 which	 are	
discussed	 below,	 have	 been	 produced	 that	 begin	 to	 develop	 the	 knowledge,	
including	 the	 technical	 understanding	 and	 legal	 instruments,	 required	 by	 nuclear	
disarmament.		
	
What	 is	principally	 lacking	therefore,	as	has	been	widely	recognised,	 is	the	political	
determination	 in	 and	 amongst	 NWS	 to	 drive	 the	 project	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	
forward	 both	 domestically	 and	 through	 international	 cooperation	 (Perkovich	 &	
Acton,	 2009;	 Cortright	 &	 Vayrynen,	 2009).	 Whilst	 covering	 all	 three	 aspects	 of	
nuclear	disarmament	in	this	study,	the	contemporary	political	challenges	of	nuclear	
disarmament	thus	form	its	principal	focus	and	begin	to	be	explored	in	Chapter	Two.	
Yet,	in	order	not	to	neglect	the	importance	of	technical	perspectives	on	this	question	
and	 to	 be	mindful	 of	 how	 expert	 practitioners	 have	 defined	 nuclear	 disarmament	
and	 the	 political	 implications	 of	 this,	 it	 is	worth	 now	briefly	 outlining	 some	of	 the	
work	 that	 groups,	 including	 VERTIC—a	 leading	 verification	 and	monitoring	 NGO—
have	done	on	this	issue.	
	
In	their	report	Irreversibility	in	Nuclear	Disarmament-	Practical	Steps	Against	Nuclear	
Rearmament,	 VERTIC	 researchers	 define	 nuclear	 disarmament	 as	 a	 state	 in	 which	
‘the	process	of	disarming	has	been	fully	completed	and	no	nuclear	weapons	remain’	
and	consider	how	this	state	can	be	‘locked-in’	(Cliff	et	al,	2011:	6).	The	early	stages	of	
disarmament	will	need	to	develop	verification	systems	covering	warheads,	delivery	
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systems	and	fissile	materials	(Howlett	et	al,	2000:	52).	There	are	potential	scales	of	
irreversibility	here	so	that	a	considerably	‘higher’	level	of	disarmament	would	involve	
measures	 directed	 toward	 both	 a	 state’s	 warhead	 stockpile	 and	 its	 supporting	
nuclear	warhead	production	complex	 (Cliff	et	al,	2011:	16).	Overall	 the	question	of	
irreversibility	 is	 important	because,	as	Scott	 Sagan	 (2009:	166)	argues,	 in	a	NWFW	
former	possessor	states	would	be	‘more	latent’	than	states	which	‘did	not	have	their	
technological	 expertise	 or	 operational	 experience’.	Owing	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 five	
NWS	 will	 always	 be	 NWS	 according	 to	 the	 NPT	 it	 therefore	 makes	 sense	 to	 use	
Sagan’s	recommended	designation	of	FNWS	for	NWS	that	in	future	fully	realise	the	
nuclear	 disarmament	 process.	 Secondly,	 rather	 than	 focusing	 on	 scrapping	 a	
particular	 weapons	 system,	 FNWS	 status—as	 an	 objective—conveys	 more	
appropriately	the	wider	political	 implications	for	NWS	if	they	are	to	 live	up	to	their	
international	responsibilities	and	disarm	irreversibly,	verifiably	and	transparently.	
	
Every	 level	 up	 the	 irreversibility	 scale	makes	 rearmament	more	 difficult,	 requiring	
more	resources	and	time—equally,	more	money,	time	and	equipment	is	required	to	
attain	 a	 higher	 disarmament	 level.	 For	 Justin	 Alger	 and	 Trevor	 Findlay	 (2009:	 3),	
there	is	a	lack	of	precise	information	concerning	the	costs	of	disarmament—a	‘void’	
which,	 they	 claim,	 needs	 to	 be	 filled	 to	 ‘advance	 the	 discussion	 about	 nuclear	
disarmament	beyond	the	philosophical	to	the	practical’.	Despite	this	gap,	 it	 is	clear	
to	 them	 that	 such	 costs	 will	 be	 spread	 over	 several	 decades	 and	 be	 incurred	 at	
different	points,	so	that	’dismantlement	and	disposition	costs	will	come	in	the	early	
stages,	along	with	strengthening	of	nuclear	safeguards,	while	verification	costs	will	
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ramp	 up	 as	 the	 process	 nears	 zero	 and	 becomes	 politically	 and	 strategically	more	
sensitive’.		
	
As	 Findlay	 (2003)	 points	 out,	 the	 verification	 and	 compliance	 regime	 for	 a	NWFW	
‘will	 need	 to	 be	 more	 effective	 than	 any	 disarmament	 arrangement	 hitherto	
envisaged’.	This	is	necessary	to	cope	with	fears	of	breakout,	which	is	when	a	state	is	
suddenly	 revealed	 to	 have	 a	 previously	 hidden	 nuclear	 arsenal,	 produced	 new	
weapons	 or	 sufficient	weapons-usable	 fissile	material	 (highly	 enriched	 uranium	 or	
plutonium).	 The	 authors	 of	 the	 report	 Unmaking	 the	 Bomb-	 A	 Fissile	 Material	
Approach	to	Nuclear	Disarmament	and	Nonproliferation	(Feiveson	et	al,	2014)	argue	
that	 because	 a	 fissile	 material	 free	 world	 would	make	 a	 NWFW	more	 stable	 it	 is	
necessary	for	the	international	community	to	engage	in	a	step-by-step	process	to:	
	
cap,	reduce,	and	eventually	eliminate	the	global	stockpile	of	about	1,900	tons	
of	weapon-usable	fissile	material	including	material	in	weapons	or	recovered	
from	 dismantled	 weapons,	 the	 plutonium	 used	 in	 civilian	 nuclear	 power	
programs,	and	the	HEU	in	military	and	civilian	research	and	naval	reactor	fuel	
stockpiles.	
	
Findlay	 (2003:	 2)	 notes	 that	while	meeting	 the	 technical	 requirements	 for	 nuclear	
disarmament	and	a	NWFW	is	a	‘tall	order’,	practical	experience	of	disarmament	and	
improving	 technologies	 mean	 that	 it	 is	 possible.	 Examples	 here	 include	 the	
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International	 Atomic	 Energy	 Agency’s	 (IAEA)	 verification	 of	 the	 dismantlement	 of	
South	 Africa’s	 nuclear	 arsenal	 and	 technical	 collaboration	 on	 warhead	
dismantlement	 verification	between	 the	UK	and	Norway	 and	between	 the	UK	and	
US—which	considered	 the	key	question	of	how	 to	balance	 ‘information	protection	
and	information	sufficiency’	in	an	‘effective	monitoring	and	verification	regime’	(UK	
Government,	2010	 i;	Feiveson	et	al,	2014;	NNSA,	2015:	2).	Findlay	also	argues	that	
the	 ‘good	 relationships’	 between	 states	 that	 will	 facilitate	 the	 negotiation	 of	 a	
nuclear	 disarmament	 treaty	 will	 also	 permit	 the	 construction	 of	 an	 appropriate	
verification	and	compliance	system.		
	
Elsewhere	 the	 Canberra	 Commission’s	 report	 (1996:	 10)	 on	 eliminating	 nuclear	
weapons	 argues	 that	 disarmament	 should	 be	 approached	 ‘as	 a	 series	 of	 phased	
verified	 reductions	 that	 allow	 states	 to	 satisfy	 themselves,	 at	 each	 stage	 of	 the	
process,	 that	 further	 movement	 toward	 elimination	 can	 be	 made	 safely	 and	
securely’.	 Michael	 J.	 Mazarr	 (1997:	 4)	 and	 other	 scholars,	 in	 a	 publication	
complementing	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 Canberra	 Commission	 report,	 propose	 that	
‘removing	 all	 nuclear	 weapons	 from	 operational	 status	 and	 placing	 them	 in	 a	
dismantled	 “virtual”	 condition’	 would	 be	 an	 important	 initial	 phase,	 prior	 to	
disarmament,	 in	 ‘pushing	 nuclear	 weapons	 to	 the	 margins	 of	 world	 politics’. 9																																									 																					
9	Mazarr	 (1997)	 outlines	 how	 NPS	 could	 transition	 to	 virtual	 nuclear	 arsenals	 to	 that	 ‘no	 nuclear	
weapons	were	assembled	and	ready	for	use’.	NWS	could	thus	gradually:	
dismantle	 all	 assembled	 nuclear	 devices	 and	 place	 the	 resulting	 parts—perhaps	 including	
warheads,	 delivery	 vehicles,	 and	 fissile	 material—under	 bilateral,	 multilateral,	 and/or	
international	inspection.	The	weapons	would	be	separated	from	the	delivery	systems	in	such	a	
way	that	any	attempt	to	marry	the	two	would	be	verified.	
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Quantitative	and	qualitative	reductions	for	NWS,	covering	the	numbers	and	salience	
of	 their	 nuclear	weapons	are	 thus	 important	 to	 consider	 together,	 for	 example,	 in	
terms	of	considering	how	they	can	meet	their	NPT	disarmament	obligations.		
	
Aspects	 of	 NWS’s	 current	 nuclear	 policies	 which	 could	 be	 changed	 to	 reduce	 the	
salience	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 (also	 potentially	 as	 moves	 towards	 a	 virtual	 nuclear	
arsenal	 as	 part	 of	 the	 transition	 to	 disarmament)	 concern:	 i)	 acquisition:	meaning	
what	 kit	 is	 bought	 and	 owned—a	 particularly	 important	 issue	 when	 each	 NWS	 is	
pursuing	nuclear	modernisation	 ii)	declaratory:	public	statements	about	the	role	of	
nuclear	weapons	iii)	deployment:	how	nuclear	weapons	are	arranged	and	positioned	
iv)	employment:	the	circumstances	and	ways	in	which	the	government	plans	to	use	
nuclear	weapons	to	achieve	strategic	aims.	An	examination	of	how	each	of	the	five	
NWS	might	engage	in	such	steps	is	presented	in	Chapters	Three	to	Seven,	suffice	to	
say	here	that	disarmament	can	thus	also	be	seen	as	a	learning	process,	involving	far	
greater	 transparency	 regarding	 military	 capabilities	 and	 intentions,	 so	 that	 states	
gradually	 ‘abandon	 secrecy’,	 reduce	 uncertainty	 and	 continually	 improve	 their	
appreciation	 and	 knowledge	 of	 the	 legal	 and	 technical	 requirements	 of	 getting	 to	
zero	(Schaper	&	Muller,	2008:	155).		
	
What	this	brief	foray	into	the	technical	aspects	of	nuclear	disarmament	shows	us	is	
that,	given	the	 implications	of	these	decisions	for	national	sovereignty,	not	 least	 in																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 															
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terms	of	how	highly	sensitive	information	should	be	handled,	one	or	more	political	
agreements,	applicable	to	all	states,	will	need	to	be	reached	on	the	appropriate	scale	
of	 irreversibility	 and	 the	 accompanying	 transparency,	 verification	 and	 compliance	
regime	 in	 order	 for	 NWS	 to	 eliminate	 their	 nuclear	 arsenals.	 Furthermore,	 if,	 as	
Findlay	argues,	amicable	international	relations	are	a	necessary	condition	both	of	the	
process	 leading	 to	 disarmament	 and	 the	 maintenance	 of	 a	 NWFW,	 we	 should	
investigate	 the	 form	 these	 relationships	 might	 need	 to	 take.	 As	 I	 shall	 discuss	 in	
Chapter	Two,	several	authors	have	addressed	this	question,	some	considering	how	
co-operation	 and	 trust	may	 be	 developed	 between	NWS,	whilst	 others	 emphasise	
the	need	for	some	form	of	political	agreement,	union	or	concert	between	the	great	
powers,	alongside	disarmament	action.	 In	addition,	NWS	governments	will	need	to	
be	 persuaded	 that	 the	 benefits	 of	 disarming	 outweigh	 the	 costs	 and	 ensure	 their	
citizenries	are	well	informed	about	these	matters.		
	
1.2	Nuclear	weapons	decision-making:	past,	present	and	future	
	
The	 purpose	 of	 the	 theory	 under	 consideration	 here	 is	 to	 contribute	 to	 an	
understanding	 of	 the	 challenges	 involved	 in	 the	 five	 NWS	 achieving	 nuclear	
disarmament.	 The	 question	 then	 is,	 how	wide	 should	we	 cast	 our	 net	 in	 order	 to	
develop	such	a	theory?	By	this	I	mean,	what	data	do	we	need	and	what	case	studies	
should	be	used?	This	is	a	methodological	problem	because	the	literature	on	nuclear	
weapons	 is	 vast,	 covering	 several	 decades	 and	 a	wide	 range	of	 actors.	 In	 order	 to	
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more	 easily	 navigate	 through	 the	 literature	 and	 identify	 what	 areas	 need	 to	 be	
covered	and	in	what	depth,	we	may	split	the	literature	into	two	sections.		
	
Firstly,	as	 identified	above,	there	 is	a	 large	selection	of	historical	studies	of	nuclear	
weapons,	 which	 mainly	 consider	 what	 has	 happened.	 These	 theories	 can	 differ	
significantly	 in	 their	methods	and	conclusions	but	 share	 the	good	 fortune	of	being	
able	to	build	concepts	from	quantitative	and	qualitative	data	regarding	the	past	and	
present	 behaviour,	 ideas	 and	 preferences	 of	 a	 range	 of	 actors.	 The	 four	 main	
categories	within	 this	 first	 section	 includes	 theories	 of:	 i)	 nuclear	 possession:	 how	
and	 why	 NPS	 acquire,	 manage	 and	 use	 nuclear	 weapons	 as	 they	 do	 ii)	 nuclear	
restraint:	 how	and	why	NNWS	 choose	not	 to	 acquire	 nuclear	weapons	when	 they	
have	the	opportunity	and	incentive	to	do	so	iii)	nuclear	arms	control:	how	and	why	
NPS	and	NNWS	place	restrictions	on	the	development,	production,	stockpiling,	use	
and	proliferation	of	nuclear	weapons	iv)	nuclear	disarmament:	how	and	why	former	
NAS	and	states	with	nuclear	weapons	programmes	eliminated	their	nuclear	weapons	
or	were	disarmed.10			
	
Secondly,	 there	 is	 a	much	 smaller	 selection	of	 studies	discussing	 the	 challenges	of	
nuclear	 disarmament	 and/or	 a	 NWFW,	 including	 whether	 this	 is	 a	 desirable	 and	
realisable	goal	(Howlett	et	al,	2000;	Perkovich	&	Acton,	2009;	Cortright	&	Vayrynen,	
2009;	 Stimson	 Centre,	 2009).	 These	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	 particular	 NPS,	 pairings	 or																																									 																					
10	Nuclear	 proliferation	 includes	 both	 how	 and	 why	 nuclear	 weapons	 spread	 (horizontal)	 and	 new	
types	are	created	(vertical).	
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groups	 of	 NPS	 or	 NPS	 as	 a	 whole,	 considering	 the	 problems	 posed	 by	 nuclear	
disarmament	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	wider	 international	 political	 environment.	 Such	
studies	 are	 based	 on	 empirical	 research	 but	 are,	 albeit	 to	 a	 different	 degree,	
unavoidably	speculative.	They	are	empirical	because	they	tend	to	draw	on	evidence	
and	 theories	both	 regarding	nuclear	possession	and	arms	control	directly	 involving	
NPS	 and	 nuclear	 possession,	 restraint,	 arms	 control	 and	 disarmament	 involving	
NNWS.	They	are	speculative	because	they	propose	future	courses	of	action	by	NPS,	
for	example,	behavior	that	is/is	not	conducive	to	nuclear	disarmament.		
	
Such	conjecture	concerning	nuclear	disarmament	is	problematic	because,	as	Harald	
Muller	 (2009:	 174)	 points	 out,	 the	 evolving	 interaction	 between	 several	 different	
actors	 over	 time	 cannot	 be	 reliably	 predicted:	 ‘as	 conditions	 change,	 so	 do	 the	
structures	 of	 opportunity.	 New	 options,	 unthinkable	 at	 the	 beginning,	 become	 a	
serious	possibility’.	It	 is	thus	vital	to	develop	ideas	and	proposals	that	are	rooted	in	
evidence	 and	 experience	 and	 which,	 as	 Muller	 suggests,	 are	 flexible	 and	 able	 to	
adjust	to	changing	realities,	in	order	to	look	‘far	ahead’	but	not	spoil	the	process	by	
‘fixing	 strategies	 that	 should	 be	 subject	 to	 continuous	 adaptation	 because	 of	
changing	circumstances’	(Muller,	2009:	177).	
	
In	order	to	draw	on	the	widest	empirical	base	to	inform	justifiable	speculation	on	the	
political	conditions	necessary	for	NWS	nuclear	disarmament	and	the	means	by	which	
it	may	then	be	realised,	this	thesis	would	ideally	review	studies	representing	each	of	
the	four	main	categories	 in	the	first	section	 in	order	to	get	a	rounded	sense	of	the	
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subject.	However,	because	 this	 study	has	 certain	 limits	of	 time	and	 resources,	 it	 is	
also	necessary	 to	 impose	boundaries	on	 such	a	 review.	 I	 therefore	use	discussions	
concerning:	 i)	 nuclear	 possession	 by	 NAS	 ii)	 restraint	 iii)	 arms	 control	 iv)	 nuclear	
disarmament—	such	as	how	and	why	NAS	have	eliminated	their	nuclear	weapons—
as	secondary	material	to	highlight	conceptual	differences	as	and	when	necessary	in	
order	to	principally	focus	in	this	study	on	works	discussing	NWS	nuclear	possession	
and	 development.	 The	 case	 for	 a	 consideration	 of	 the	 literature	 on	Ukrainian	 and	
South	 African	 disarmament	 was	 perhaps	 the	 strongest.	 Ultimately	 however,	 I	
decided	that	the	unique	nature	of	these	cases	and	the	fact	that	NWS	disarmament	
will	be	on	a	much	greater	scale	limited	the	extent	to	which	political	conclusions	can	
be	drawn	from	these	cases	of	relevance	to	NWS,	so	justifying	their	omission.	
	
With	regard	to	the	second	section	of	the	nuclear	weapons	literature,	concerning	the	
contemporary	challenges	of	nuclear	disarmament	and/or	a	NWFW,	this	is	a	question	
of	selecting	from	an	expanding,	but	still	small	collection	of	works,	some	of	which	are	
of	much	 greater	 depth	 and	 significance	 than	 others.	 This	 section	 of	 the	 literature	
principally	 considers	 historical	 case	 studies	 in	 order	 to	 inform	 contemporary	 and	
future	 challenges	 associated	 with	 nuclear	 disarmament.	 Of	 these,	 as	 previously	
mentioned,	 two	 recent	 and	 seminal	 works	 are	 Perkovich	 and	 Acton’s	 Abolishing	
Nuclear	Weapons:	A	Debate	and	Cortright	and	Vayrynen’s	Towards	Nuclear	Zero.	The	
former	 is	 also	 notable	 for	 including	 a	 wide-ranging	 selection	 of	 responses	 from	
eminent	 former	 or	 current	 academics,	 government	 officials,	 senior	 military	
personnel	and	other	experts	on	the	subject	of	nuclear	weapons.		
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I	begin	my	substantive	discussion	of	both	sections	of	the	nuclear	weapons	literature	
in	 Chapter	 Two,	 primarily	 in	 order	 to	 begin	 assessing	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	
existing	theories	of	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament.	Before	embarking	on	this	
task	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 provide	 a	 brief	 consideration	 of	 how	 the	 nuclear	 disarmament	
debate	 relates	 to	 a	 third	 and	 highly	 important	 section	 of	 the	 relevant	 literature—
namely,	political	theory.	
	
1.3	How	does	nuclear	disarmament	relate	to	political	theory?	
	
As	discussed	above,	nuclear	disarmament	exists	 in	many	works	as	a	practical	 issue	
that	raises	a	number	of	political,	legal	and	technical	challenges	requiring	appropriate	
solutions.	 These	 works	 are	 produced	 by	 authors	 attached	 to	 different	 types	 of	
institutions—both	 governmental	 and	 non-governmental—including,	 in	 the	 latter	
area,	campaign	groups,	 research	bodies	and	academia.	Yet	nuclear	disarmament	 is	
also	 the	 subject	 of	much	 controversy	within	 another	 field,	 that	 of	 political	 theory.	
Discussions	 of	 political	 theory	 almost	 exclusively	 take	 place	 within	 academia,	 and	
generally	debate	nuclear	issues	in	terms	of	how	they	relate	to	the	dominant	schools	
of	 thought	 in	 international	 relations	 (IR).	 For	 example,	 as	we	 shall	 see	 in	 Chapter	
Two,	 nuclear	 issues	 are	 mainly	 discussed	 in	 relation	 to	 explanations	 of	 state	
behaviour	at	the	international	level	based	on	the	assumptions	of	realist	theory.		
	
Before	outlining	the	meaning	and	significance	of	realist	and	other	theory	in	Chapter	
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Two,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 outline	why	 this	 study	will	 discuss	 nuclear	 disarmament	 in	
relation	 to	 political	 and	 IR	 theory	 at	 all.	 The	 first	 reason	 is	 that	 it	 is	 important	 to	
review	 the	 theoretical	 literature	 in	 order	 to	 identify	 what	 claims	 and	 approaches	
already	 exist	 regarding	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	 and	
then	assess	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	these	different	knowledge	claims.	This	
is	also	an	 important	task	given	that	there	are	strong	criticisms	of	and	objections	to	
nuclear	 disarmament,	 on	 moral,	 political	 and	 practical	 grounds,	 within	 the	
theoretical	 literature.	 Given	 the	 social	 and	 political	 influence	 and	weight	 of	 these	
objections,	it	is	important	for	a	study	of	this	type—based	on	a	normative	interest	in	
nuclear	disarmament—to	provide	a	 coherent	and	well-evidenced	critique	of	works	
that	 support	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 question	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 nuclear	
disarmament.	 Furthermore,	 engaging	 with	 ideas	 from	 across	 the	 political	 and	
theoretical	spectrum	should	enable	us	to	craft	a	more	coherent	and	robust	theory	of	
NWS	nuclear	disarmament	and,	more	widely,	provide	a	contribution	to	political	and	
IR	theory	by	highlighting	any	gaps	and	problems	within	it.	
	
In	order	 to	assess	whether	existing	political	and	 IR	theories	are	able	to	explain	the	
current	 disarmament	 impasse	 and	 propose	 effective	 action	 supportive	 of	
disarmament	 Chapter	 Two	 therefore	 conducts	 an	 in-depth	 discussion	 of	 realist	
thought	 and	 scholarly	 critiques	 of	 realism.	 Having	 identified	 the	 strengths	 and	
weaknesses	of	existing	 theory	 concerning	 the	 causes	and	 consequences	of	nuclear	
possession	and	disarmament,	 I	 then	propose	alternative	ways	of	 analysing	nuclear	
politics	as	a	basis	 for	pinpointing	what	political	change	 is	necessary	 if	NWS	nuclear	
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disarmament	is	to	be	realised.		
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Chapter	Two:	Assessing	theories	of	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament	
	
Introduction		
	
This	chapter	will	discuss	existing	approaches	to	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament	
in	 realist	 thought	 and	 scholarly	 critiques	 of	 realism	 with	 three	 main	 purposes	 in	
mind.	 The	 first	 is	 to	 assess	 the	extent	 to	which	 such	works	provide	useful	 insights	
into	 the	 causes	 of	 nuclear	 possession	 as	 well	 as	 the	 conditions	 and	 indicators	 of	
nuclear	 disarmament,	 which	 may	 be	 applied	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 how	 to	 eliminate	
nuclear	 weapons	 in	 and	 between	 NWS.	 The	 second	 is	 to	 address	 what	 several	
scholars	 see	 as	 the	 major	 issue	 of	 how	 international	 anarchy	 drives	 conflict	 and	
stifles	 cooperation	 between	 states.	 According	 to	 this	 perspective,	 because	 nuclear	
disarmament	requires	significant	international	cooperation,	the	substantial	obstacles	
to	this	posed	by	anarchy—such	as	fear	and	uncertainty—need	to	be	addressed.	The	
third	 is	 to,	 where	 necessary	 and	 useful,	 improve	 on	 existing	 approaches	 and	
positions	 by	 developing	 a	 new	 theoretical	 approach	 that	 can	 better	 explain	 and	
respond	to	the	challenges	of	achieving	NWS	nuclear	disarmament.	
	
The	 former	 two	 areas	will	 be	 addressed	 in	 the	 following	way.	 Firstly,	 this	 chapter	
reviews	 key	 relevant	 works	 from	 the	 realist	 tradition	 and	 scholarly	 critiques	 of	
realism	 that	 elucidate	 what	 has	 been	 termed	 the	 ‘nuclear	 revolution’.	 As	 Robert	
Jervis	 (1986:	690)	explains,	 the	nuclear	revolution	refers	to	the	fact	that	no	matter	
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how	 powerful	 a	 nation’s	 military	 is,	 nuclear	 weapons	 are	 impossible	 to	 defend	
against.	What	 is	significant	for	Jervis	about	nuclear	weapons	 is	thus	the	concept	of	
‘mutual	 kill’	 whereby	 ‘the	 side	 that	 is	 "losing"	 by	 various	 measures	 of	 military	
capability	 can	 inflict	 unprecedented	 destruction	 on	 the	 side	 that	 is	 "winning"	 as	
easily	 as	 the	 "winner"	 can	 do	 this	 to	 the	 "loser."’	 Given	 the	 extreme	 and	 singular	
power	of	 these	weapons,	 the	nuclear	 revolution	 thus	means	 that	 ‘brute	 force’	has	
been	 replaced	 ‘by	 coercion,	 or,	 as	 it	 is	 more	 frequently	 put,	 of	 defense	 by	
deterrence’	(Ibid:	689).	To	properly	review	the	meaning	of	the	nuclear	revolution	for	
disarmament,	a	range	of	works	on	international	relations	will	therefore	be	discussed,	
including,	 in	 non-chronological	 order:	 i)	 Offensive	 Realism	 in	 the	 work	 of	 John	
Mearsheimer	ii)	Defensive	Realism	in	the	work	of	Robert	Jervis	and	Charles	Glaser	iii)	
Structural	 Realism	 in	 the	 work	 of	 Kenneth	 Waltz	 iv)	 Institutional	 theory	 and	
International	 Cooperation	 in	 the	 work	 of	 Robert	 Keohane	 and	 Nicholas	 Wheeler	
respectively	 v)	World	 Government	 and	 Republican	 Security	 Theory	 in	 the	work	 of	
Campbell	Craig	and	Daniel	Deudney	respectively.		
	
I	 discuss	 these	 approaches,	 which	 are	 placed	 together	 within	 a	 section	 where	
appropriate,	 by	 first	 reviewing	 their	 general	 approach	 to	 international	 relations,	
focusing	 on	 their	 understanding	 of	 how	 the	 anarchic	 international	 state	 system	
functions	 and	 relating	 this	 to	 the	meaning	of	 the	nuclear	 revolution.	 For	 example,	
the	former	three	realist	groups	in	particular	could	be	said	to	broadly	fit	within	what	
Scott	 Sagan	 (1996:	 57)	 terms	 the	 ‘Security	 Model’,	 which	 focuses	 on	 how	
‘international	 threats’	 to	 state’s	 ‘sovereignty	 and	 national	 security’	 drive	 decision-
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makers	to	seek	the	bomb.	For	some	authors—such	as	Mearsheimer	and	Waltz—the	
demands	of	anarchy	thus	naturally	leads	great	powers	to	see	nuclear	possession	as	
essential	 for	 their	 security	 and	 survival. 11 	According	 to	 this	 logic,	 nuclear	
disarmament	 is	 undesirable	 and	 unrealisable,	 both	 because	 it	 threatens	 existing	
peace	 and	 stability	 and	 necessitates	 unachievable	 degrees	 of	 international	
cooperation.		
	
Other	authors	that	shall	be	reviewed,	such	as	Craig	and	Deudney,	observe	that	the	
nuclear	revolution	poses	a	deep	challenge	to	the	traditional	tenets	of	realist	thought	
because	NWS	rely	on	nuclear	weapons	for	security	yet	these	weapons	threaten	the	
existence	 of	 these	 and	 all	 other	 states	 given	 the	 extreme	 dangers	 they	 pose.	
According	 to	 this	 position,	 the	 nuclear	 revolution	 therefore	 requires	 international	
relations	 theory	 to	move	beyond	realism	and	accept	 that	nation	states	need	 to	be	
transcended	 by	 some	 form	 of	 global	 political	 organisation.	 However,	 critics	 have	
replied	 that	 the	 idea	 of	 replacing	 global	 anarchy	 with	 global	 hierarchy	 is	
unacceptable	 because	 this	 threatens	 to	 introduce	 tyranny,	 so	 that	 some	 other	
solution	 must	 be	 sought.	 The	 work	 of	 Robert	 Keohane	 and	 Nicholas	 Wheeler	 is	
relevant	here	as	they	propose	that	states	may	avoid	the	conflict	so	prevalent	under	
anarchy	 through	 adopting	 cooperative	 measures.	 Keohane	 focuses	 on	 the	
development	 of	 international	 institutions	 as	 a	 way	 of	 motivating	 states	 to	 work	
together	 to	 solve	 common	 challenges,	 including	 those	 with	 a	 ‘military-security’	
																																								 																					
11	I	take	the	term	great	powers	to	mainly	refer	to	China,	Russia	and	the	US	but	also	France	and	the	UK	
as	part	of	the	five	NWS.	
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dimension,	whilst	Wheeler	 examines	 how	 states	may	 develop	 trust,	 to	 facilitate—
amongst	other	things—progress	on	nuclear	abolition.	
	
In	addition	to	focusing	on	the	international	state	system,	I	pay	particular	attention	to	
how	 each	 author	 under	 discussion	 treats	 the	 US,	 including	 in	 relation	 to	 nuclear	
issues.	This	 is	necessary	given	the	US’s	singular	power,	the	fact	that	all	of	the	main	
authors	 reviewed	 are	 US-based	 academics	 and	 because	 each	 devotes	 significant	
space	 in	 their	 analysis	 to	 the	US’s	 strategic	 behaviour.	 I	 then	 review	 how	 each	 of	
these	 authors	 have	 viewed	 the	 project	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 for	 example,	
whether	they	see	it	as	a	desirable	and	realistic	enterprise,	the	political	and	security	
problems	they	see	it	posing	and	any	ideas	or	proposals	they	discuss	which	could	be	
supportive	 of	 it.	 In	 addition,	 at	 appropriate	 points	 in	 the	 analysis,	 I	 draw	 on	 the	
thought	of	other	key	international	relations	thinkers,	such	as	John	Herz	and	Thomas	
Schelling,	to	explore	particularly	relevant	ideas	and	debates.	
	
Having	 reviewed	 these	 different	 approaches	 to	 the	 nuclear	 revolution,	 I	 identify	
several	significant	problems	in	the	thinking	of	the	constituent	authors	on	nuclear	and	
security	 issues,	 including	 disarmament.	 Some	 of	 these	 problems,	 which	 are	 more	
common	and	more	pronounced	than	others	for	each	author,	include:		
	
- The	adoption	of	a	nationalistic	approach	that	prioritises	US	security	interests	
above	all	others,	leading	to	support	for	continued	nuclear	possession	by	the	
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US	in	some	shape	or	form.	
- A	normative	bias	in	favour	of	nuclear	possession	that	precludes	a	substantive	
consideration	of	the	need	for	and	benefits	of	nuclear	disarmament,	including	
a	 failure	 to	 properly	 consider	 the	 substantive	 legal,	 moral	 and	 security	
arguments	for	disarmament	and	the	popular	support	for	disarmament	action.	
- The	absence	of	a	political	analysis	that	considers	the	domestic	impact	of	the	
nuclear	 revolution,	 and	 which	 relates	 domestic	 politics	 to	 state’s	
international	behaviour	on	nuclear	issues.	
	
Such	absences	and	deficiencies	raise	several	analytical	gaps	that	need	to	be	filled	in	
order	to	develop	a	compelling	theory	of	nuclear	disarmament,	including:	
- The	 need	 for	 detailed	 empirical	 data	 concerning	 nuclear	 possession	 in	 and	
between	the	NWS	to	support	an	analysis	of	why	these	states	persist	in	their	
possession	of	the	bomb	that	addresses	domestic	political	dynamics.	
- The	 need	 to	 identify	 a	 corresponding	 theory	 of	 change	 for	 nuclear	
disarmament	 that	 is	 legitimate	 and	 based	 on	 principles	 of	 democracy,	
transparency	 and	 accountability	 and	 that	 also	 specifies	 the	 actors	 and	
processes	that	will	be	able	to	realise	such	change.	
- The	need	for	an	objective	approach	to	the	politics	of	nuclear	possession	and	
disarmament	e.g.	with	an	outlook	based	on	justice	and	universalism	that	can	
appropriately	 differentiate	 between	 each	 NWS’s	 responsibility	 for	 nuclear	
disarmament.	
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Having	 identified	 the	 key	 gaps	 in	 and	 problems	 with	 the	 mainstream	 literature,	 I	
propose	that	in	order	to	improve	on	it,	we	need	to	develop	a	new	approach,	which	I	
term	 institutional	 democratisation.	 This	 approach,	 which	 is	 based	 on	 a	 normative	
stance	supportive	of	nuclear	disarmament,	builds	on	insights	from	global	governance	
and	 civil	 society	 literatures	 as	 well	 as	 social	 and	 political	 theory,	 including	 Scott	
Sagan’s	domestic	politics	model,	which	 focuses	on	 the	domestic	drivers	of	 nuclear	
acquisition.	 Institutional	 democratisation	 can	 be	 summarised	 as	 the	 idea	 that	 the	
democratic	 deficit	 in	 the	 five	 NWS—including	 crucially	 the	 United	 States	 given	 its	
singular	influence,	power	and	global	reach—needs	to	be	addressed	in	order	for	there	
to	be	any	prospect	of	NWS	nuclear	disarmament.	This	approach	is	necessary	because	
nuclear	weapons	systems	can	be	seen	as	a	shared	scientific	and	technological	culture	
amongst	nuclear	elites	 in	 the	global	north,	with	highly	 centralised	decision-making	
structures	for	nuclear	threats	and	detonation.	The	secrecy	surrounding	the	policies	
guiding	 these	 systems	 is	 thus	 incompatible	with	 and	 deeply	 corrosive	 to	 the	 spirit	
and	 functioning	of	democracy.	Nuclear	disarmament	 therefore	 requires,	 to	varying	
degrees,	popular	social	movements	to	democratise	the	state	in	each	NWS.	This	could	
mean	different	 things	 in	practice	according	 to	 the	domestic	 circumstances	of	 each	
NWS,	but	centres	around	the	need	to	democratically	reform	or	take	control	of	state	
institutions	 so	 that	 defence	 and	 foreign	 policy	 generally	 and	 nuclear	 weapons	
decision-making	in	particular	is	guided	by	the	will	of	the	people.	Questions,	such	as	
whether	 democratisation	 would	 automatically	 lead	 to	 disarmament,	 will	 also	 be	
important	 to	 consider	 here	 as	 will	 the	 types	 of	 civil	 society	 and	 other	 popular	
activism	 that	would	best	 support	disarmament.	 For	example,	how	does	 the	 recent	
rise	of	populist	movements	in	France,	the	UK	and	US	relate	to	nuclear	issues	and	do	
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such	political	 formations	 take	 an	 interest	 in	 nuclear	 issues,	whether	 for	 or	 against	
the	bomb?	
	
Having	 developed	 the	 theoretical	 position	 of	 institutional	 democratisation	 in	 this	
chapter,	in	Part	Two	I	identify	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	this	theory’s	ability	to	
explain	nuclear	politics	by	conducting	a	historical	investigation	of	nuclear	possession	
and	 disarmament	 in	 and	 between	 the	 NWS.	 As	 well	 as	 providing	 some	means	 of	
testing	institutional	democratisation	as	a	theory,	evidence	and	ideas	are	gathered	on	
the	necessary	 indicators	and	conditions	 for	nuclear	disarmament.	This	process	also	
identifies	and	responds	to	the	different	political	setups	of	each	NWS	so	that	each	of	
their	unique	nuclear	and	political	histories	and	regimes	are	taken	into	account	when	
developing	recommendations	and	conclusions.		
	
It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 state	 at	 the	 outset	 that	 in	 carrying	 out	 this	 investigation,	 I	
directly	engage	with	the	methodological	problem	of	how	to	judge	whether	a	theory	
may	 perform	 better	 than	 another	 given	 the	 speculative	 nature	 of	 nuclear	
disarmament—as	something	that	has	not	happened	and	 is	not	happening.	When	it	
comes	to	 the	conditions	and	 indicators	of	nuclear	disarmament,	 the	main	problem	
we	therefore	have	 is	 that	our	 ideas	and	proposals	are	unavoidably	 incomplete	and	
speculative.	Any	demand	that	existing	positions	 relating	 to	 the	question	of	nuclear	
disarmament	be	analysed	and	then	alternative	models	or	theories	be	developed	as	
rival	positions	to	show	how	one	performs	better	than	the	other,	may	thus	be	useful,	
but	only	to	a	limited	extent,	for	the	reasons	outlined	above.			
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2.1	Approaches	to	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament	
Offensive	realism:	John	Mearsheimer	
	
John	Mearsheimer	(2001:	43;	2006:	114)	described	his	self-confessedly	‘pessimistic’	
approach	to	politics	in	an	interview	with	International	Relations,	stating	that	‘I	am	an	
offensive	 realist	who	believes	 that	war	 is	a	 legitimate	 instrument	of	 statecraft	and	
that	 states	 should	 maximize	 their	 relative	 power.’	 Mearsheimer	 (2001:	 80-81)	
developed	his	‘descriptive’	and	‘prescriptive’	theory	of	offensive	realism	in	his	major	
work,	The	Tragedy	of	Great	Power	Politics.	In	this	work,	it	is	argued	that	international	
conflict	 has	 been	 so	 prevalent	 because	 great	 powers	 are	 power	maximisers,	 each	
sharing	 ‘hegemony	as	 their	 final	 goal’.	 This,	 for	Mearsheimer	 (Ibid:	144)	 is	how	he	
believes	such	states	not	only	mostly	do	but	also	should	act	 in	order	to	survive	and	
thrive.	 Status	 quo	 powers	 thus	 only	 exist	when	 a	 hegemon	 ‘wants	 to	maintain	 its	
dominating	 position	 over	 potential	 rivals’	 (Ibid:	 47).	 He	 explains	 this	 power	
competition	by	outlining	five	‘bedrock	assumptions’	about	the	international	system	
(Ibid:	 148-153).	 Firstly,	 as	 with	 other	 structural	 realists,	 Mearsheimer	 sees	 this	
system	 as	 ‘anarchic’,	 which	 stems	 from	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 ‘central	 organizing	 power’.	
Secondly,	 ‘great	 powers	 inherently	 possess	 some	 offensive	 military	 capability’.	
Thirdly,	 ‘states	 can	 never	 be	 certain	 about	 other	 states’	 intentions.’	 Fourthly,	
‘survival	 is	 the	 primary	 goal	 of	 great	 powers’.	 Fifthly,	 ‘great	 powers	 are	 rational	
actors.’	The	result,	according	to	the	author,	 is	 ‘three	general	patterns	of	behavior’,	
namely	‘fear,	self-help,	and	power	maximization’	(Ibid).		
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In	 addition,	 Mearsheimer	 (Ibid:	 168)	 follows	 John	 Herz	 (1951)	 in	 arguing	 that	
international	anarchy	creates	 the	 ‘security	dilemma’,	which	 ‘reflects	 the	basic	 logic	
of	 offensive	 realism’	 and	 whose	 essence	 is	 that	 ‘the	 measures	 a	 state	 takes	 to	
increase	 its	 own	 security	 usually	 decrease	 the	 security	 of	 other	 states’	 so	 that	
‘ceaseless	 security	 competition	 ensues’.	 Inspired	 by	 Herz’s	 work,	 Ken	 Booth	 and	
Nicholas	 Wheeler	 (2008:	 1-9)	 have	 written	 at	 length	 on	 the	 security	 dilemma,	
describing	 it	 as	 the	widely	 shared	 sense	 of	 uncertainty	 regarding	 the	motives	 and	
intentions	of	 states	 that	acts	as	 the	prevailing	existential	 condition	 in	 international	
relations.	 States	 are	 thus	 presented	with	 a	 two	 level	 strategic	 predicament:	 i)	 the	
dilemma	 of	 interpretation	 i.e.	 the	 unresolvable	 uncertainty	 regarding	 the	motives	
and	 intentions	 of	 states	 ii)	 the	 dilemma	 of	 response.	 This	 situation	 is	 driven	 by	 a	
combination	 of	 material	 and	 psychological	 phenomena—primarily	 the	 'ambiguous	
symbolism'	of	weapons	and	 the	psychological	dynamic	known	as	 the	 'other	minds'	
problem.	 As	 a	 result	 a	 security	 paradox	 can	 develop,	 whereby	 actors	 who	 only	
sought	 to	 ensure	 their	 own	 security	 ‘provoke	 through	 their	 words	 or	 actions	 an	
increase	 in	 mutual	 tension,	 resulting	 in	 less	 security	 all	 round’.	 Despite	 their	
potentially	 catastrophic	 risks,	 nuclear	weapons	 are	 thus	 often	 justified	 by	NWS	 as	
being	their	ultimate	insurance	policy	in	an	uncertain	world.		
	
As	we	shall	 see	 in	our	discussion	below,	different	authors	assign	different	 levels	of	
importance	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 security	 dilemma	 and	 what	 states	 can	 do	 to	
manage	 its	 impact.	 For	 example,	 Mearsheimer	 argues	 that	 little	 can	 be	 done	 to	
ameliorate	the	security	dilemma,	primarily	because	of	state’s	 inability	to	overcome	
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the	 problems	 of	 anarchy	 and	 eliminate	 uncertainty,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 fear	 that	
relative	gains	can	be	achieved	by	states	cheating	on	their	commitments.	The	author	
thus	 acknowledges	 that	 he	 is	 applying	 a	 Hobbesian	 analysis,	 based	 around	 ‘the	
absence	of	central	authority’	to	the	international	state	system	(Mearsheimer,	2001:	
1515).	This	raises	a	number	of	questions	with	relevance	to	the	challenges	posed	by	
nuclear	 disarmament.	 For	 example,	 how	 and	 why	 have	 deep	 and	 complex	 civil	
societies	evolved	domestically	to	prevent	civil	war	whilst	global	civil	society	is	much	
less	able	to	constrain	power	and	prevent	conflict?	Moreover,	would	it	be	possible	to	
create	 a	 central	 authority	 at	 the	 international	 level	 that	 could	 support	 the	
elimination	of	nuclear	arsenals	and	maintain	disarmament	and/or	a	NWFW,	and,	 if	
so,	what	would	the	causes	and	consequences	of	this	be?		
	
We	shall	address	these	questions	below,	suffice	to	note	for	now	that	Mearsheimer	
(2006	i:	118-123)	sees	bipolarity	and	nuclear	weapons	as	having	provided	peace	and	
stability	 during	 the	 Cold	 War,	 following	 which	 the	 US	 has,	 at	 times,	 acted	 as	 a	
‘pacifier’	and	‘offshore	balancer’	 in	Europe.	Importantly,	Mearsheimer	(2001:	1224)	
notes	that	the	internal	dynamics	and	thus	stability	of	anarchy	aren’t	fixed,	but	vary	
according	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 balance	 of	 power,	 including	 the	 presence	 of	 nuclear	
weapons,	 and	 the	 number	 of	 great	 powers.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 as	 noting	 the	
importance	 of	 these	 factors,	 he	 admits	 that	 the	 central	 problem	 he	 and	 other	
theorists	working	 in	this	 field	face	 is	that	 it	 is	not	possible	to	definitively	prove	the	
relative	 influence	 of	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 and	 nuclear	 weapons	 in	 influencing	
developments	 in	 international	 relations,	 including	 what	 John	 Lewis	 Gaddis	 (1986)	
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referred	 to	 as	 the	 ‘long	 peace’	 between	 the	 major	 powers	 during	 the	 Cold	 War	
(Mearsheimer,	 2001:	 1302).	Moreover,	 he	makes	 the	wider	 point	 that	 insufficient	
time	has	passed	 for	analysts	 to	determine	whose	 theory	 is	 right	and	whose	wrong	
regarding	the	stabilising	effects	of	the	nuclear	revolution	(Ibid).	
	
In	addition	to	advancing	his	own	offensive	realist	worldview,	Mearsheimer	critiques	
what	he	sees	as	 rival	positions	and	 ideas,	 such	as	defensive	 realism	and	neoliberal	
institutionalism.	For	example,	he	claims	that	he	developed	his	approach	in	response	
to	the	defects	of	defensive	realism,	which	he	argues	is	a	‘good	normative	theory’	but	
‘not	a	good	descriptive	theory’,	disagreeing	in	particular	with	Kenneth	Waltz’s	view	
that	 states	 ‘should	 not	maximize	 their	 power’	 (Mearsheimer,	 2006	 i:	 111).	 As	 for	
neoliberal	institutionalism,	regarding	the	likelihood	of	reconciling	the	great	powers,	
Mearsheimer	(2001:	229;	2006	ii:	233)	argues	that	whilst	‘adversaries	can	cooperate,	
and	that	adversarial	relationships	can	be	transformed	into	friendly	ones’	cooperation	
is	 ‘sometimes	 difficult	 to	 achieve	 and	 always	 difficult	 to	 sustain’.	 This	 is	 because	
cooperation	 is	 inhibited	by	 ‘considerations	 about	 relative	 gains	 and	 concern	about	
cheating’	(Mearsheimer:	2001:	229).	Moreover,	great	powers	are	unable	to	commit	
to	the	‘pursuit	of	a	peaceful	world	order’	because	‘states	are	unlikely	to	agree	on	a	
general	formula	for	bolstering	peace’	and	‘policymakers	are	unable	to	agree	on	how	
to	create	a	 stable	world’	 (Ibid:	224-224).	 Indeed,	as	well	 shall	 see,	 such	pessimism	
regarding	 the	 prevalence	 of	 competition	 and	 the	 difficulty	 of	 cooperation	 plays	 a	
central	 role	 in	 much	 of	 mainstream	 realism’s	 general	 concerns	 about—and	
objections	to—nuclear	disarmament.	
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Turning	 to	 Mearsheimer’s	 (1990;	 2001:	 866)	 views	 on	 the	 nuclear	 revolution,	 he	
claims	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 ensures	 global	 peace,	 with	 Mutual	
Assured	Destruction	 (MAD)	making	 for	 a	 ‘highly	 stable’	world,	helping	 to	 ‘alleviate	
the	vexed	problem	of	miscalculation	by	leaving	little	doubt	about	the	relative	power	
of	states.’	Other	benefits	of	nuclear	possession	highlighted	in	his	work	include	these	
weapons’	 ability	 to	 make	 states	 more	 cautious	 in	 their	 behavior	 and	 ‘dampen	
nationalism’	 by	 shifting	 ‘the	 basis	 of	 military	 power	 away	 from	 mass	 armies	 and	
toward	 smaller,	 high-technology	 organizations’	 (Mearsheimer,	 1990).	 Whilst	
Mearsheimer	 (2001:	 1332)	 thus	 argues	 that	 ‘there	 is	 no	 question	 that	 nuclear	
weapons	significantly	reduce	the	likelihood	of	great-power	war’	he	also	admits	that	
‘war	between	nuclear-armed	great	powers	is	still	a	serious	possibility.’	Despite	this,	
and	as	we	shall	see	with	other	authors	who	are	either	supportive	of	or	ambivalent	
about	 the	 nuclear	 revolution,	 Mearsheimer	 values	 nuclear	 weapons	 so	 highly	
because	he	sees	them	as	uniquely	valuable	in	maintaining	the	necessary	conditions	
for	 human	 survival.	 Given	 this	 belief,	 it	 is	 hardly	 surprising	 that	 he	 is	 strongly	
sceptical	 about	 the	 possibility	 or	 desirability	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 noting	 that	
‘there	is	little	evidence	that	world	disarmament	is	in	sight’,	so	that	he	does	not	think	
it	 fit	 to	 explore	 the	 conditions	 and	 indicators	 of	 disarmament	 in	 any	 depth	 (Ibid:	
1316).	
	
As	well	as	being	a	pessimist,	one	of	 the	other	principle	 reasons	 for	Mearsheimer’s	
nuclear	enthusiasm	and	disdain	for	disarmament	is	that	he	is	a	convinced	nationalist.	
Mearsheimer	(2006	ii:	237)	has	boldly	promoted	this	stance,	noting	in	one	interview	
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that,		
	
speaking	 as	 an	 American,	 there	 would	 be	 only	 one	 state	 with	 nuclear	
weapons	 in	 an	 ideal	 world	 –	 the	 United	 States.	 Thus,	 if	 I	 could	 easily	 take	
away	 every	 other	 state’s	 nuclear	 weapons	 and	 nip	 the	 Iranian	 and	 Iraqi	
nuclear	programmes	in	the	bud	I	would	do	so	without	hesitation.		
	
He	has	also	argued	that	the	US	has	and	should	aspire	to	nuclear	superiority	as	this	
will	 ‘likely’	 make	 it	 more	 secure	 (Mearsheimer,	 2001:	 567).	 Yet,	 according	 to	 his	
wider	understanding	of	 the	conditions	 for	 international	peace	and	stability,	 the	US	
should	 remain	 an	 ‘offshore	 balancer,	 not	 the	 world’s	 sheriff’,	 and	 thus	 a	 regional	
rather	 than	 global	 hegemon,	 because	 balanced	 multipolarity—as	 an	 international	
system—is	much	more	 conducive	 to	 the	 avoidance	of	war	 (Ibid:	 1424).	Given	 that	
many—in	particular,	defensive	realists—believe	that	a	proper	understanding	of	the	
nuclear	 revolution	should	mean	ruling	out	 the	pursuit	of	nuclear	primacy	owing	 to	
the	dangers	of	pre-emption	this	would	raise,	Mearsheimer’s	apparent	advocacy	of	it	
for	the	US	 is	particularly	controversial	and	poses	real	problems	for	the	prescriptive	
part	 of	 his	 analysis.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 he	 also	 appears	 to	 agree	 with	 defensive	
realists	when	stating	that	nuclear	weapons	are	‘more	useful	for	self-defense	than	for	
aggression’,	 whilst	 again	 not	 ruling	 out	 their	 use	 in	 an	 aggressive	 capacity	
(Mearsheimer,	1990).	
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Further	 evidence	 for	 the	 reasoning	 behind	 Mearsheimer’s	 (Ibid)	 opposition	 to	
disarmament	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 such	 statements	 as	 ‘a	 nuclear-free	 Europe	 has	 the	
distinction	 of	 being	 the	 most	 dangerous	 among	 the	 envisionable	 post-Cold	 War	
orders’,	with	 the	danger	here	being	 that	 ‘the	 Soviet	Union	and	a	unified	Germany	
would	 likely	 be	 the	most	 powerful	 states	 in	 a	 nuclear-free	 Europe.’	 Mearsheimer	
(Ibid)	 thus	 advocates	 the	 ‘carefully	 managed	 proliferation	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 in	
Europe,’	also	noting	that	he	is	not	as	‘sanguine’	about	the	spread	of	nuclear	weapons	
as	 Kenneth	 Waltz.	 Moreover,	 soon	 after	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 he	 argued	 for	
Germany	 to	 alone	 acquire	 the	 bomb	 alongside	 the	 US	maintaining	 its	 continental	
presence	 as	 the	 ‘pacifier’	 that	 ‘maintains	 order’	 and	 thus	 ‘peace’	 (Mearsheimer,	
1990;	 2006:	 121).	 It	 is	 clear	 here	 then	 that	 the	 continuation	 of	 a	 US-led	 security	
order,	 and	 attempts	 to	 pursue	 goals	 beyond	 state	 survival	 are,	 for	 this	 author,	
acceptable	 so	 long	 as	 they	 focus	 on	 preventing	 the	 emergence	 of	 ‘a	 potential	
hegemon	 in	Asia	or	Europe’	 that	could	rival	 the	US	and	don’t	upset	 the	balance	of	
power	(Mearsheimer,	2015:	35).		
	
Mearsheimer’s	focus	on	the	prudent	maximisation	of	US	power,	may	be	contrasted	
with	the	more	universalist	viewpoint	proposed	by	scholars	such	as	Herz	(1966:	331-
335).	For	example,	Herz	argued	for	a	response	to	the	nuclear	revolution	that	moved	
on	 from	 ‘particular	 national	 interest’	 towards	 an	 approach	 based	 on	 a	
‘universalist…world-embracing	 feeling	 of	 responsibility’.	 Thus,	 whilst	 he	 strongly	
believed	that	the	security	dilemma	‘has	never	before	asserted	itself	more	poignantly’	
than	in	the	‘bipolar	and	nuclear	world’	of	the	Cold	War’,	he	equally	strongly	believed	
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that	a	‘realist	liberal”,	“universalist”	solution	of	world	problems’	was	the	alternative	
to	power	politics	and	‘literally	a	matter	of	life	or	death’	(Ibid;	Herz,	1959:	v).	Yet	Herz	
also	 asserted	 that	 as	 long	 as	 ‘effective	 nuclear	 disarmament’—which	 would	
‘ultimately’	be	necessary—was	not	achieved,	nuclear	deterrence	(with	a	general	no	
first	use	policy)	must	be	relied	on	‘to	prevent	a	nuclear	holocaust’	(Herz,	1966:	197,	
339).	Whilst	we	may	disagree	with	elements	of	 this	 last	point,	we	may	note	that	a	
normative	 approach	 based	 on	 such	 ‘moral-political	 universalism’	 is	 surely	 more	
conducive	 to	 an	 investigation	 of	 the	 indicators	 and	 conditions	 of	 NWS	 nuclear	
disarmament	than	one	based	on	Mearsheimer’s	narrow	nationalism	(Ibid:	335).	
	
Notably,	 the	 focus	on	 the	 international	 state	 system	 in	Mearsheimer’s	 (2001:	103)	
work	is	such	that	there	is	an	absence	of	substantial	domestic	analysis,	which	he	puts	
down	 to	 the	 superior	 importance	 of	 structural	 factors	 on	 state’s	 decision-making	
calculus.	Secondly,	he	 is	dismissive	of	the	value	of	basing	policy	 in	this	area	on	the	
popular	will,	because	‘public	opinion	on	national-security	issues	is	notoriously	fickle	
and	responsive	 to	manipulation	by	elites	as	well	as	 to	changes	 in	 the	 international	
environment’	 (Ibid).	 Yet,	 as	with	 some	of	 the	other	authors	we	will	 discuss	below,	
Mearsheimer	 does	 recognise	 both	 how	 domestic	 politics	 can	 affect	 state’s	
international	 behavior	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 nuclear	 possession	 on	 domestic	 political	
processes.	Exhibiting	a	keenness	for	consistency	in	his	argumentation,	he	notes	that	
the	problem	of	nuclear	possession	harming	democratic	politics	would	not	disappear	
in	 a	 NWFW	 if	 conventional	 weapons	 were	 relied	 on	 for	 deterrence	 because	 a	
substantial	 security	 establishment	would	 still	 be	 required	 (Hardin	&	Mearsheimer,	
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1985:	422).	This	observation	 is	useful	 in	 that	 it	highlights	again	 for	us	 the	 fact	 that	
nuclear	disarmament	poses	challenges	relating	to	 liberty	and	democracy	that	need	
to	be	dealt	with	concurrently	at	the	domestic	and	international	levels.		
	
Additionally,	 whilst	 Mearsheimer	 (2001:	 1334,	 1479)	 credits	 democratic	 peace	
theory,	which,	he	observes,	 is	based	on	 the	argument	 that	 ‘democracies	are	more	
peaceful	than	non-democracies,	regardless	of	the	regime	type	of	their	adversary’	as	
posing	 ‘among	 the	 strongest’	 challenges	 to	 realism,	 he	 argues	 that	 ‘it	 has	 serious	
problems	 that	ultimately	make	 it	 unconvincing’.	 This	 is,	 for	 him,	both	because	 the	
theory	is	poorly	evidenced	and	that	‘stronger	evidence	exists	for	the	claim	that	the	
pacific	 effects	 of	 democracy	 are	 limited	 to	 relations	 between	 democratic	 states’	
(Ibid).	Moreover,	 he	 argues	 that	 even	 if	 an	 authoritarian	 and	 illiberal	 great	 power	
moved	 in	 a	 democratic	 direction,	 this	 would	 not	 ensure	 a	 pacifistic,	 ‘status	 quo’	
attitude	to	international	relations	because	the	demands	of	the	anarchic	international	
system,	which	 determines	 all	 states	 behaviour,	 no	matter	 the	 regime	 type,	would	
remain	 in	 place	 (Ibid:	 1335).	 Several	 scholars	 have	 also	 added	 to	 the	 critique	 of	
democratic	 peace	 theory	 by	 pointing	 to	 evidence	 from	 the	 nuclear	 age	 suggesting	
that	 authoritarian	 great	 powers	 do	 not	 go	 to	war	with	 one	 another	 (Peceny	 et	 al	
2002;	 Rosato	 2003). 12 	Overall	 then,	 an	 approach	 to	 disarmament	 drawing	 on	
democratic	 ideas	 and	 ideals,	 as	 this	 study	 aims	 to	 do,	 would	 benefit	 both	 from	
																																								 																					
12	Although	China	and	the	Soviet	Union	engaged	 in	a	border	conflict	 in	1969	which	officials	on	both	
sides	feared	could	escalate	to	the	nuclear	level	(Burr,	2001).		
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explaining	how	 it	 relates	 to	theories	of	authoritarian	and	democratic	peace	and	by	
responding	 to	 the	 claim	 that	 progressive	 internal	 political	 changes	 will	 be	
superseded	by	 the	external	pressures	of	anarchy	 in	determining	 the	character	of	a	
state’s	international	behaviour.		
	
2.2	Approaches	to	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament	
Defensive	Realism:	Charles	Glaser	and	Robert	Jervis	
	
An	alternative	to	the	pessimism	of	offensive	realism	has	been	developed	by	authors	
such	as	Charles	Glaser	and	Robert	Jervis,	and	is	often	termed	defensive	realism.	This	
approach	agrees	that	anarchy	is	the	primary	characteristic	of	the	international	state	
system	and	a	highly	 significant—though,	 importantly,	not	 the	 sole—driver	of	great	
power	behaviour	 in	 that	arena.	Defensive	 realism	 thus	gives	much	more	analytical	
space	 than	 offensive	 realism	 to	 the	 role	 domestic	 politics	 plays	 in	 state	 decision-
making.	In	addition,	whilst	this	approach	accepts	that	anarchy	encourages	conflictual	
behaviour,	it	also	emphasises	that	it	prevents	states	from	achieving	goals	that	are	in	
their	 ‘common	 interest’	 (Jervis,	 1978:	 167).	 For	 Jervis	 (1998:	 986),	 the	 difference	
between	 the	 two	 realisms	 is	 thus	 that	whilst	offensive	 realists	 ‘see	aggression	and	
expansionism	 as	 omnipresent’	 or	 ‘believe	 that	 security	 requires	 expansion’,	
defensive	realists	believe	that,		
	
much	 of	 international	 politics	 is	 a	 Prisoners’	 Dilemma	 or	 a	 more	 complex	
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security	 dilemma.	 The	 desire	 to	 gain	 mixes	 with	 the	 need	 for	 protection;	
much	 of	 statecraft	 consists	 of	 structuring	 situations	 so	 that	 states	 can	
maximize	their	common	interests.		
	
The	key	point	Jervis	(1978:	187),	as	a	defensive	realist,	identifies	here	in	relation	to	
the	security	dilemma	is	that	it	may	pertain	in	some	but	not	all	situations	and	can	vary	
in	 intensity,	being	more	or	 less	 ‘vicious’,	depending	on	the	circumstances.	For	him,	
where	 the	 security	 dilemma	 does	 operate,	 a	 ‘Spiral	 Model’	 can	 result,	 whereby	
interactions	 between	 security-seeking	 states	 fuels	 competition	 and	 conflict	 (Jervis,	
1976:	 62).	 For	 Glaser	 (1997:	 189)	 meanwhile,	 defensive	 realism	 has	 identified	
variables	that	cause	the	‘variation	in	countries’	behaviour’.	In	The	Security	Dilemma	
Revisited,	he	draws	on	Jervis’s	work	to	explain	‘how	the	magnitude	and	nature	of	the	
security	dilemma’	depends	on	‘two	variables’,	namely	‘the	offense-defense	balance	
and	 offense-defense	 differentiation’	 (Ibid:	 171).	 Importantly,	 a	 world	 where	 it	 is	
possible	to	differentiate	‘between	offensive	and	defensive	systems’	allows,	for	Jervis	
(1978:	214),	 ‘a	way	out	of	 the	security	dilemma.’	Yet	 in	 the	past,	as	he	also	notes,	
difficulties	distinguishing	between	offensive	and	defensive	weapons	have	meant	that	
arms	 control	 treaties	 ‘have	 been	 rare’,	 something	 that	 is	 also	 partly	 due	 to	 states	
‘not	always’	being	‘willing	to	guarantee	the	security	of	others’	(Ibid:	201).		
	
In	addition,	Glaser	(1997:	174,	189),	who	prefers	the	label	‘contingent	realist’	for	his	
ideas,	 given	 that	 the	 availability	 of	 security	 for	 states	 depends	 on	 ‘empirical	
assessments	 of	 the	 offense-defense	 balance’,	 notes	 that	 information	 sharing	 is	
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important	 to	 help	 distinguish	 between	 ‘greedy	 states’	 i.e.	 those	 with	 ‘motives	
beyond	security’	and	‘security	seekers’.	According	to	this	analysis,	‘the	magnitude	of	
the	security	dilemma’	 is	 influenced	by	 the	 ‘extent	of	 the	adversary's	greed…and	of	
the	 adversary's	 unit-level	 knowledge	 of	 the	 state’s	 motives’.	 Glaser	 (Ibid:	 192)	
develops	this	point	by	proposing	that	in	cases	where	‘democracies	are	believed	not	
to	have	greedy	motives’	a	democracy	engaged	in	a	‘military	buildup’	won’t	be	seen	
to	be	as	threatening	as	an	authoritarian	state	acting	in	the	same	way.	The	result	for	
him	 is	 thus	 that,	 ‘the	 democracy	 faces	 a	 less	 severe	 security	 dilemma;	 and	
interactions	 between	 democracies	 could	 result	 in	 a	 democratic	 peace	 instead	 of	
intense	competition’	(Ibid:	193).	Moreover,	to	the	extent	that	states	can	depend	on	
reliable	 information	 sources,	 Glaser	 claims	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 them	 to	 ‘reduce	
uncertainty’	and	‘mitigate	the	security	dilemma’,	enabling	a	move	to	policies	that	are	
more	cooperative	(Ibid:	192).	
	
The	 idea	 of	 defence-offence	 differentiation	 also	 informs	 Jervis’s	 (1979:	 618)	
argument	 that	 the	 nuclear	 revolution	 ‘sapped’	 the	 driving	 force	 of	 the	 security	
dilemma—and	was	thus	of	major	historical	importance—by	making	defence	central	
and	overcoming	the	supremacy	of	offence.	More	precisely,	Jervis	(Ibid:	198)	sees	the	
advent	of	nuclear	weapons	as	marking	a	 shift	 from	 ‘defense	 to	deterrence’,	 in	 the	
context	 of	 which,	 ‘offensive	 weapons	 are	 those	 that	 provide	 defense’.	 The	
expansionist	 ambitions	of	 greedy	great	powers	 therefore	became	 impossible	given	
the	dangers	 of	MAD.	 For	 him,	 the	 ‘high	 cost	 of	war’,	which	nuclear	weapons	help	
ensure,	have	thus	today	contributed	to	the	creation	of	a	security	community	‘among	
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the	leading	states’	i.e.	the	US,	Western	Europe	and	Japan		(Jervis,	2009:	201).		
	
Moreover,	 Jervis	 (1978:	 198,	 206)	 claims	 that	 nuclear	 strategy	 cannot	 work,	 as	
despite	the	fact	that	‘at	best’	nuclear	possession	‘will	keep	the	nuclear	peace’	it	will	
‘not	prevent	and,	indeed,	may	even	facilitate-	the	use	of	lower	levels	of	violence’	so	
that	 ‘military	 victory	 is	 impossible’.	 According	 to	 this	 logic,	 MAD	 may	 therefore	
weaken	the	security	dilemma	at	the	level	of	nuclear	weaponry,	but	not	necessarily	at	
the	level	of	conventional	weaponry,	depending	on	the	policies	pursued.	Jervis	(1986:	
695)	 goes	 on	 to	 claim	 that	 ‘if	 we	 date	 the	 Soviet	 acquisition	 of	 second-strike	
capability	 in	 the	 mid-1960s,	 it	 is	 noteworthy	 that	 the	 age	 of	 mutual	 assured	
destruction	has	seen	no	serious	crises’.	The	most	obvious	objection	(of	which	there	
are	several)	to	the	assertion	that	the	Cold	War	was	so	tranquil	is	the	Cuban	Missile	
Crisis,	 which	 several	 prominent	 authors	 and	 statespeople	 now	 accept	 was	 the	
moment	of	greatest	peril	for	human	civilization	(Perry,	2015:	5).	
	
Despite	the	comments	outlined	above,	 Jervis	 (1986:	702)	has	also	stated	that	he	 is	
‘deeply	 ambivalent’	 about	 the	 costs	 and	 benefits	 of	 the	 nuclear	 revolution.	 He	
therefore	notes	that	it	has	brought	both	‘great	security	and	insecurity’,	because	‘on	
the	one	hand,	mutual	second-strike	capability	means	that	a	major	war	is	extremely	
unlikely;	on	the	other	hand,	it	means	that	if	such	a	conflict	should	erupt,	it	is	likely	to	
destroy	our	civilization.’	This	raises	the	question	of	what	policies	will	prevent	such	a	
conflict	erupting?	 In	 response,	 Jervis	 (1978:	214)	outlines	 several	 scenarios,	one	of	
which	‘in	the	nuclear	era’	is	where	the	superpowers	rely	on	invulnerable	Submarine	
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Launched	Ballistic	Missiles,	Anti-Submarine	Weapon	technology	is	‘not	up	to	its	task’	
and	‘limited	nuclear	options’	are	‘not	taken	seriously.’	
	
Yet	 despite	 such	 scenarios	 promising	 stability	 and	 peace,	 nuclear	 conflict	 remains	
possible,	 with	 the	 ‘basic	 question’	 of	 whether	 the	 nuclear	 revolution	 enhances	
security	 or	 not	 remaining	 ‘unanswered,	 if	 not	 unanswerable’—a	 sentiment	 we’ve	
previously	encountered	in	Mearsheimer’s	work—so	that,	for	Jervis	(1986:	702),	‘it	is	
not	surprising	that	so	many	arguments	rage’.	To	complicate	matters	further,	and	as	
we	 shall	 see	 later	 in	 this	 chapter,	when	 seeking	 to	address	 Jervis’s	 conundrum	we	
need	to	consider	additional	consequences	of	the	nuclear	revolution,	including	on	the	
domestic	front,	that	authors	such	as	Campbell	Craig	and	Daniel	Deudney	have	begun	
to	highlight.	
	
Moving	on	to	the	question	of	nuclear	disarmament,	as	with	John	Herz	writing	in	the	
1950s,	 Jervis	 writing	 in	 the	 1980s	 could	 not	 see	 the	 development	 of	 the	 political	
conditions	supportive	of	nuclear	disarmament	in	the	near	future.	The	priority	for	the	
latter	during	the	Cold	War	was	thus	a	restrained	security	approach	to	ensure	results	
that	were	mutually	acceptable	for	the	great	powers	(Jervis,	1989:	257).13	Moreover,	
in	 terms	of	precisely	why	meaningful	disarmament	processes	are	gridlocked,	 Jervis	
(1986:	 695)	 makes	 the	 important	 observation	 that	 ‘to	 the	 extent	 that	 America's																																									 																					
13	Similarly,	Herz	(1966:	244)	wanted	a	 ‘holding	operation’	to	be	put	 in	place	to	ensure	stability	and	
avoid	nuclear	armageddon.		
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major	 interest	 is	 in	 preserving	 the	 status	 quo,	 nuclear	weapons	 have	 brought	 the	
United	States	a	real,	although	nonmilitary,	victory’.	Owing	to	the	fact	that	the	US	has	
security	 concerns	 beyond	 its	 national	 territory—which,	 according	 to	 Glaser’s	
definition,	would	make	 it	a	 ‘greedy’	 state—‘American	 resolve	and	will’	 come	to	be	
seen	as	‘primary’	(Ibid:	701).	The	consequence	of	this	for	arms	control	agreements,	
according	 to	 Jervis,	 is	 that	 they	have	been	 treated	by	 some	 in	 the	US	as	 ‘bad…not	
because	they	produce	a	less	favorable	military	balance	than	would	otherwise	result,	
but	because	they	produce	psychological	demobilization	and	disarmament’	(Ibid).	
	
These	points	complement	Mearsheimer’s	nationalistic	agenda	by	suggesting	that	the	
‘status	quo’	and	the	nuclear	revolution	supports	Pax	Americana.	This	logically	means	
both	 that	nuclear	disarmament	would	 jeopardise	such	a	 ‘victory’	and	explains	why	
those	 that	 support	 US	 state	 power	 and	 believe	 its	 security	 requirements	 include	
regional	 and/or	 global	 hegemony	 oppose	 nuclear	 abolition.14	The	 claim	 that	 the	
‘peace	 and	 stability’	 of	 the	 Cold	 War,	 which	 offensive	 realism	 contends	 was	
principally	 ensured	 by	 MAD	 and	 bipolarity	 alone,	 is	 thus	 challenged	 by	 defensive	
realism,	 which	 emphasises	 the	 diplomatic	 cooperation	 built	 between	 the	 Soviet	
Union	 and	 the	 US,	 alongside	 other	 factors	 such	 as	 ‘the	 increased	 pain	 of	 war’	
following	World	War	2	(Jervis,	1989:	25).	
																																									 																					
14	At	 the	 same	 time,	 as	 noted	 in	 Chapter	 One,	 there	 are	 a	 number	 of	 senior	 former	 military	 and	
government	officials	who	both	support	US	power	projection	and	the	goal	of	nuclear	abolition.		
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Whilst	 pessimistic	 regarding	 the	 prospects	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 defensive	
realism	 is	 more	 optimistic	 than	 offensive	 realism	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 international	
cooperation,	promoting	the	idea	that	uncertainty	can	be	overcome	if	the	incentives	
and	motivations	of	states	and	their	leaders	are	understood.	The	possibility	of	sharing	
information	 in	 this	 way,	 it	 is	 argued,	 allows	 decision-makers	 to	 move	 beyond	
escalating	 threats	 (as	 per	 deterrence)	 and	 arms	 races	 in	 order	 to	 focus	 on	
compromises,	 reassurances	 and	 rewards.	 Furthermore,	 statespersons	 are	
encouraged	 to	 use	 diplomatic	 and	 political	 tools	 in	 order	 to	 develop	 transparency	
and	empathy	and	signal	their	intentions.	As	discussed	above,	for	Glaser,	regime	type	
matters	here	since	democracies	are	more	likely	than	authoritarian	states	to	be	seen	
as	security	seekers,	thus	weakening	the	security	dilemma.	Ultimately	this	all	means	
that	with	the	right	approach	and	circumstances,	mutual	restraint	can	be	achieved	as	
a	means	of	preventing	conflict	and,	particularly	in	the	current	age,	nuclear	war.		
	
Returning	 to	 the	 perspective	 defensive	 realism	 takes	 on	 these	 issues,	 as	 well	 as	
highlighting	 divergent	 views	 within	 realism,	 Jervis	 has	 sought	 to	 explain	 the	
differences	between	realists	and	neoliberal	institutionalists.	In	doing	so,	he	proposes	
that	 the	 two	school’s	 ‘disagreement	over	conflict	 is	not	about	 its	extent	but	about	
whether	 it	 is	unnecessary,	given	states'	goals’	 (Jervis,	1999:	42).	Neoliberalism	thus	
‘does	 not	 see	more	 cooperation	 than	 does	 realism;	 rather,	 neoliberalism	 believes	
that	 there	 is	 much	 more	 unrealized	 or	 potential	 cooperation	 than	 does	 realism’,	
which	can	‘at	least	in	part’	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	‘they	study	different	worlds’	
(Ibid:	 45).	 Drawing	 on	 what	 he	 sees	 as	 the	 analytical	 strengths	 of	 neoliberalism,	
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Jervis	(Ibid:	61)	thus	notes	that,	
	
perhaps	 the	 most	 important	 path	 by	 which	 institutions	 can	 change	
preferences	is	through	domestic	politics.	Drawing	on	liberalism,	neoliberalism	
holds	that	states	are	not	all	alike	and	that	preferences	in	part	arise	internally.	
To	 the	 extent	 that	 this	 is	 correct,	 international	 arrangements	 can	 alter	 the	
power,	beliefs,	and	goals	of	groups	in	society	in	ways	that	will	affect	foreign	
relations.	
	
Whilst	 Jervis	 (Ibid:	 45)	 here	 accepts	 the	 neoliberal	 focus	 on	 how	 international	
institutions	affect	a	state’s	internal	politics	and	thus	their	foreign	policy,	he	does	not	
himself	analyse	the	workings	of	domestic	regimes,	 though	he	does	note	that	other	
scholars	 have	 explored	 how	 ‘the	 shape	 of	 domestic	 institutions	 affects	 both	 the	
chance	of	international	agreement	and	the	distribution	of	the	benefits’.		
	
As	with	 the	 ‘different	worlds’	which	 realism	and	neoliberalism	study,	 the	domestic	
political	sphere	may	thus	be	seen	as	another	world	which	defensive	realism	is	aware	
of	but	does	not	study	 in	any	significant	depth.	The	 implications	of	this	will	be	seen	
with	our	subsequent	discussion	of	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament,	given	that	
theory	 in	 this	area	needs	to	be	constructed	from	an	analysis	of	both	domestic	and	
international	sources	of	state	behaviour.	For	example,	we	need	to	better	understand	
how	 a	 state’s	 relative	 strategic	 power	 and	 regime	 type	 affects	 its	 international	
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goals—and	ability	to	achieve	them—in	relation	to	nuclear	issues.	
	
In	addition	to	defensive	realism’s	interest	in	the	neoliberal	emphasis	on	institutions,	
Jervis	and	Glaser	are	very	sympathetic	to	democratic	peace	theory.	Jervis	(1994:	872)	
explains	 his	 enthusiasm	 by	 arguing	 that	 democracies	 with	 strong	 institutions	 are	
‘very	likely	to	remain	at	peace	with	each	other	and	to	cooperate	more	readily	than	is	
true	 for	 autocracies	 or	 revolutionary	 regimes.’	 Elsewhere,	 the	 same	 author	 notes	
that,	
	
if	 arms	are	positively	valued	because	of	pressures	 from	a	military-industrial	
complex,	 it	 will	 be	 especially	 hard	 for	 status-quo	 powers	 to	 cooperate.	 By	
contrast,	 the	 security	 dilemma	 will	 not	 operate	 as	 strongly	 when	 pressing	
domestic	 concerns	 increase	 the	 opportunity	 costs	 of	 armaments	 (Jervis,	
1974:	178).			
	
This	 is	 a	 rare	 case	 of	 Jervis	 outlining	 a	 domestic	 variable,	 i.e.	 whereby	 a	military-
industrial	 complex	 or	 other	 political	 ‘concern’	 exerts	 an	 enabling	 or	 restraining	
influence	 over	 a	 state’s	 defence	 and	 foreign	 policy,	 thus	 making	 it	 a	 source	 of	
international	conflict	or	cooperation.	In	this	case,	the	author	identifies	the	state	as	a	
‘status	quo	power’,	which,	based	on	his	other	comments,	would	probably	make	it	a	
democracy.	If	we	accept	this	analysis,	it	is	logical	to	extend	it	and	propose	that	there	
may	be	 lower	or	higher	 levels	of	democratic	practices	and	processes	within	a	state	
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and	 that	 these	 may	 influence	 and	 correspond	 with	 the	 type	 of	 behaviour,	 for	
example	 cooperative	 or	 non-cooperative,	 a	 state	 engages	 in	 on	 an	 international	
level.	 Moreover,	 it	 seems	 reasonable	 to	 suggest	 that	 identifying	 the	 domestic	
political	actors	that	enable	or	restrain	action	supportive	of	nuclear	disarmament	may	
both	 reveal	 to	us	 important	 sources	of	a	 state’s	 international	behaviour	as	well	 as	
helping	us	understand	 the	 internal	political	 changes	 that	may	be	 required	 in	order	
for	a	state	to	become	a	greater	champion	of	disarmament.		
	
Turning	now	to	 the	specific	question	of	how	defensive	 realism	approaches	nuclear	
disarmament,	 Glaser	 has	 done	 a	 significant	 amount	 of	 work	 imagining	 what	 this	
might	entail,	including	its	political	and	military	requirements.	Notably,	as	with	other	
US-based	realists	we	have	encountered,	his	starting	point	 for	opposing	the	 ‘flawed	
case	 for	 nuclear	 disarmament’	 is	 whether	 this	 initiative	will	 ‘enhance’	 US	 security	
(Glaser,	1998:	112).	Similarly,	Michael	E.	O’Hanlon	(2010:	83)	has	argued	that	nuclear	
disarmament	 efforts	 should	 only	 be	 endorsed	 if	 they	 are	 focused	on	meeting	 ‘the	
security	 of	 the	 United	 States	 and	 its	 many	 friends	 and	 allies	 around	 the	 world’.	
Moreover,	upsetting	‘American-led	great	power	stability’	with	‘the	wrong	approach’	
to	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 O’Hanlon	 argues,	 could	 lead	 to	 regional	 proliferation	
amongst	 US	 allies	 should	 the	 ‘American	 deterrent	 seem	 to	weaken’	 (Ibid:	 72).	 He	
therefore	argues	for	a	‘middle-ground	position’,	whereby	‘the	right	time	horizon	for	
seriously	 pushing	 a	 new	 nuclear	 accord	 is	 after	 the	 world’s	 half	 dozen	 or	 so	 key	
territorial	and	existential	issues	involving	major	powers	are	resolved’	(Ibid:	86).		
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As	 for	Glaser	 (2007:	 222),	 the	 other	 key	 question	 for	 him	 concerns	 in	what	world	
nuclear	war	would	be	more	likely,	to	which	he	concludes	that	 ‘disarmament	would	
not	reduce	the	probability	of	nuclear	war,	so	it	would	not	provide	what	is	commonly	
understood	 to	be	 its	 key	benefit.’	Overall,	whilst	 like	 Jervis,	Glaser	 (1990:	11,	181-
183)	 is	 sceptical	 regarding	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 nuclear	 revolution	 given	 the	 risks	
involved,	 his	 reading	 of	 the	 literature	 on	 cooperation	 under	 anarchy	 leads	 him	 to	
conclude	that	the	prospects	for	disarmament	are	‘extremely	poor’	and	that	there	are	
also	a	‘variety	of	imposing	domestic	political	barriers’	that	need	to	be	overcome,	not	
least	 for	 the	US.	Moreover,	he	argues	 that	 there	are	 significant	dangers	 in	 shifting	
from	what	he	sees	as	the	current	stability	in	the	international	state	system—where	
the	security	dilemma	is	strongly	mitigated	by	the	war	preventing	effects	of	MAD	and	
responsible	 arms	 control	 is	 in	 place,	 facilitating	 reductions	 towards	 small	 nuclear	
forces.	Overall,	Glaser	and	O’Hanlon	may	therefore	be	said	to	represent	a	school	of	
thought	where	 security—particularly,	 in	 their	 case,	 for	 the	US—must	 come	before	
disarmament,	 which	 fits	 in	 what	 may	 be	 termed	 a	 security	 first	 approach	 to	
eliminating	nuclear	weapons.	
	
According	to	this	view,	arms	control	measures	may	also,	if	further	developed,	make	
nuclear	disarmament	possible,	if	not	very	likely.	Glaser	(1998:	117)	thus	critiques	the	
notion	 that	we	 should	move	 to—what	 he	 claims	would	 be—an	 unpredictable	 and	
potentially	 very	 volatile	 disarmed	 world	 that	 would	 ‘reinforce’	 a	 spiral	 down	 in	
relations,	where	the	possibility	of	accidental	or	deliberate	nuclear	use	would	persist,	
the	potential	for	proliferation	would	become	‘far	more	threatening’	than	today	and	
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where	‘states’	security	would	be	very	sensitive	to	cheating.’	Glaser	(2007:	222)	also	
makes	the	point	that	 if	 international	relations	sufficiently	 improve	to	make	nuclear	
disarmament	possible	it	will	not	then,	in	any	case,	be	necessary	and	might	even	be	
counter-productive	 by	 reducing	 ‘the	 prospects	 for	 preserving	 such	 near-perfect	
major	power	relations’.	
	
Leading	 arms	 control	 theorist	 Thomas	 Schelling	 has	 made	 several	 similar	 points,	
beginning	 with	 the	 argument	 that	 nuclear	 (and	 other)	 weapons	 cannot	 be	
disinvented.	The	main	question	he	poses	is,	‘why	should	we	expect	a	world	without	
nuclear	 weapons	 to	 be	 safer	 than	 one	 with	 (some)	 nuclear	 weapons?’	 (Schelling,	
2009:	125).	For	him,	a	NWFW	cannot	be	one	 in	which	the	great	powers	see	 ‘every	
crisis’	as	a	‘nuclear	crisis’	so	that	‘any	war	could	become	a	nuclear	war’	(Ibid:	127).	
Such	a	scenario	would	cause	 ‘responsible	governments’	 to	race	to	build	 the	bomb,	
after	which	 states	 could	 respond	 in	 several	 different	ways,	 including	using	nuclear	
strikes	 to	 disarm	 their	 opponents	 to	 prevent	 them	 from	 achieving	 strategic	
dominance	 (Ibid:	 126).	 Elsewhere,	 Schelling	 (1962:	 401)	 discusses	 other	 problems	
associated	with	‘total	disarmament’,	arguing	that	‘some	form	of	world	government’	
would	 be	 required	 to	 ‘police	 the	world	 and	 ensure	 against	war	 and	 rearmament’.	
The	 ‘monopoly’	of	military	power	 in	such	a	centralised	world	authority	would	then	
have	to	find	a	way	to	‘improve’	and	‘stabilise’	deterrence	so	that	there	is	a	‘balance	
of	prudence’,	whereby	states	see	maintaining	a	NWFW	as	preferable	to	rearmament	
(Ibid:	406).	
	
	 93	
Jervis	 complements	Glaser’s	 and	Schelling’s	 view	of	disarmament,	 asking	what	will	
replace	 nuclear	 weapons	 in	 terms	 of	 deterrence?	 For	 Jervis,	 the	 important	 thing	
about	nuclear	weapons	 is	 the	 ‘political	effects’	 that	 they	produce,	 ‘not	 the	physics	
and	chemistry	of	the	explosion’	so	that	analysts	therefore	need	to	‘determine	what	
these	 effects	 are,	 how	 they	 are	 produced,	 and	 whether	 modern	 conventional	
weapons	 would	 replicate	 them’	 (Jervis:	 1988:	 83).	 Where	 Glaser’s	 analysis	 differs	
from	 Schelling’s,	 in	 particular,	 comes	 in	 the	 former’s	 focus	 on	 the	 importance	 of	
domestic	 political	 barriers	 to	 nuclear	 disarmament.	 Glaser	 (1997:	 183)—in	 a	 way	
similar	to	Jervis	and,	for	that	matter,	Herz,15	thus	discusses	the	role	of	the	military-
industrial	 complex	 and	 other	 ‘powerful	 interest	 groups’	 in	 promoting	 conflict,	 yet	
does	 this	 without	 going	 into	 much	 detail	 about	 these	 groups	 and	 how	 they	
function—an	 important	 gap	 in	 his	 thinking	 and	 the	 defensive	 realist	 project	
generally.		
	
Moreover,	 Glaser	 (1998:	 119)	 notes	 that	 if	 nuclear	 disarmament	 is	 ever	 going	 to	
make	 progress	 then	 a	 detailed	 plan	 is	 required	 because	 a	NWFW	would	 involve	 a	
‘permanent	 revolution’	 in	 international	 relations—as	 the	 mirror	 image	 to	 the	
immense	 impact	 of	 the	 nuclear	 revolution	 itself.	 Echoing	 Schelling,	 Glaser	 (2007:	
219)	 points	 out	 that	 such	 a	 plan	 would	 need	 to	 deal	 with	 the	 problem	 of	
																																								 																					
15	For	 example,	 Herz	 (1966;	 210)	 notes	 how	 ‘nuclear	 facts	 affect	 domestic	 affairs’	 and	 ‘in	 turn,	
domestic	affairs,	so	affected	react	on	the	nuclear	world	situation’.	He	then	moves	on	to	discuss	the	
importance	 of	 elite	 attitudes	 to	 nuclear	 issues,	 noting	 that	 if	 nuclear	 possession	 leads	 to	 the	
‘concentration	 of	 power	 in	 a	 few	 leaders	within	 nations’,	 then	 how	 these	 leaders	 perceive	 nuclear	
issues	 and	 respond	 to	 them	 ‘may	 be	 vital	 for	 nuclear	 strategies,	 foreign	 policies,	 and	 international	
relations	in	general’.	
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rearmament	given	‘the	coercive	potential’	of	a	state	gaining	a	lead	‘in	a	rearmament	
race’	 so	 that	 ‘states	 would	 have	 to	 coordinate	 their	 potential	 for	 nuclear	
rearmament,	 including	 their	 nuclear	 energy	 facilities’.	 This	 observation	 again	
highlights	how	several	authors	from	the	defensive	realist	tradition	see	global	nuclear	
disarmament	as	encompassing	a	range	of	issues	beyond	the	disposal	of	the	weapons	
themselves.	The	role	of	domestic	political	groups	in	pushing	for	the	reproduction	of	
the	bomb,	the	potential	need	for	world	government,	the	recreation	of	deterrence	in	
a	NWFW	to	ensure	peace	and	stability,	and	the	international	management	of	atomic	
power	are	thus	all	concerns	that	defensive	realism	argues	need	to	be	engaged	with	
or	 resolved	 if	 great	 power	 nuclear	 disarmament	 is	 to	 have	 any	 chance	 of	 being	
realised.	
	
2.3	Approaches	to	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament	
Structural	Realism:	Kenneth	Waltz	
	
As	 with	 the	 other	 realist	 authors	 discussed	 above,	 Kenneth	 Waltz’s	 theoretical	
approach	to	international	relations	(generally	referred	to	as	neorealism	or	structural	
realism)	centres	on	the	contention	that	state	behaviour	is	driven	by	the	demands	of	
the	anarchic	international	political	system,	which	he	says	is	‘politics	in	the	absence	of	
government’	(Waltz,	2010:	89).	As	we	have	seen,	in	this	system,	which	is	one	of	‘self-
help’,	 structural	 realism	 posits	 that	 a	 state’s	 main	 priority	 is	 ‘to	 maintain	 their	
position	 in	 the	 system’	whereas	 offensive	 realism	 underscores	 the	 draw	 of	 power	
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maximisation,	 arguing	 that	 ‘the	 international	 system	 provides	 great	 powers	 with	
good	 reasons	 to	 act	 offensively	 to	 gain	 power’	 (Waltz,	 1979:	 126,	 2008:	 42;	
Mearsheimer,	2001:	111).		
	
For	 Waltz,	 the	 system	 has	 a	 structure	 that	 was	 formed	 by	 ‘like	 units’	 i.e.	 states,	
acting	 together	 so	 that	 it	 is	 ‘individualist	 in	 origin,	 spontaneously	 generated	 and	
unintended’	(Waltz,	2010:	91).	Importantly,	the	system	operates	in	such	a	way	that	
‘structures	 and	 units	 interact	 and	 affect	 each	 other’	 (Ibid:	 100).	16	Whilst	 states	
within	the	system	are	the	same	in	terms	of	being	‘autonomous	political	units’	(Ibid:	
95)	and	perform	similar	 functions,	 they	are	also	 ‘differently	placed	by	 their	power’	
(Ibid:	97)	so	that	‘great	powers’	have	an	increased	ability	to	perform	similar	actions.	
For	 example,	 following	 the	 nuclear	 revolution,	 ‘states	 relate	 to	 one	 another	
differently,	yet	each	state	still	has	to	take	care	of	 itself	as	best	 it	can’,	with	nuclear	
possessors,	so	Waltz	(2008:	41)	claims,	using	their	weapons	‘in	the	service	of	peace’	
via	deterrence.	
	
For	 Randall	 Schweller	 (1996:	 90-93),	 ‘insecurity’—in	Waltz’s	 thinking—is	 therefore	
driven	not	by	‘greedy	actors	but	by	the	inescapable	self-help	nature	of	the	system’,	
so	that	states	seek	maximum	security	rather	than	maximum	power,	as	proposed	by	
offensive	realism.	This,	 for	Schweller	 (Ibid),	as	well	as	Glaser	and	Jervis,	 is	an	error																																									 																					
16	Waltz	 (1986:	 44)	 also	 notes	 that	 ‘any	 theory	 of	 international	 politics	 requires	 also	 a	 theory	 of	
domestic	politics,	since	states	affect	the	system’s	structure	even	as	it	affects	them’.		
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which	must	 be	 corrected	 by	 bringing	 ‘the	 revisionist	 state’—meaning	 those	which	
have	nonsecurity,	expansionist	goals—‘back	in’	so	that	‘differences	in	state	goals’	are	
studied	alongside	‘anarchy	and	the	distribution	of	capabilities’.	Waltz	(1986:	91)	does	
note	that	states	have	‘endlessly	varied’	goals	beyond	survival,	and	does	differentiate	
between	states	according	to	national	power,	for	example,	by	discussing	at	length	the	
US’s	dominance	 in	his	work	and	how	 its	behavior	affects	 the	 threat	perceptions	of	
other	states.	However,	as	with	other	US-based	analysts	of	a	realist	persuasion	that	
we	have	encountered,	Waltz	 (2000:	23,	28)	 is	keen	to	present	the	US	as	a	 ‘benign’	
manager	of	the	international	state	system,	and	as	a	‘liberal	dominant	power’.	As	we	
shall	 see,	Waltz’s	 ‘status	 quo	 bias’,	where	 he	 fails	 to	 distinguish	 between	 ‘greedy’	
and	 ‘security-seeking	 states’—as	Glaser	 does—helps	 him	 to	 sustain	 the	 belief	 that	
when	it	comes	to	the	spread	of	nuclear	weapons	‘more	may	be	better’	and	nuclear	
disarmament	is	neither	desirable	or	realisable.		
	
For	Waltz	(2010:	161-163),	the	character	and	nature	of	anarchy	varies	according	to	
the	number	of	great	powers	in	the	system—and	thus	whether	the	system	is	unipolar,	
bipolar	 or	 multipolar.	 As	 with	 Mearsheimer,	 Waltz	 (1993)	 believes	 that	 bipolar	
relations	are	the	most	stable	of	the	three	alternative	systems	so	that	over	the	course	
of	 the	Cold	War	 ‘the	 longest	peace	yet	known	rested	on	two	pillars:	bipolarity	and	
nuclear	 weapons.’	 After	 the	 Cold	War,	 the	 world	 moved	 away	 from	 bipolarity	 to	
unipolarity	 as	 the	 US	 became	 the	 world’s	 only	 superpower.	 Now,	 however,	
Washington’s	power	is	being	challenged	and	multipolarity	is	‘developing	before	our	
eyes’.	 For	Waltz	 (2000:	 28,	 38),	 this	 is	 entirely	 natural	 given	 how	 the	 ‘balance	 of	
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power’	operates,	so	that	‘some	states	try	to	increase	their	own	strength’	or	‘ally	with	
others	 to	bring	 the	 international	distribution	of	power	 into	balance’	 in	an	effort	 to	
ensure	their	autonomy	and	survival.		
	
In	terms	of	Waltz’s	response	to	neoliberal	institutionalism,	as	with	offensive	realism,	
(2010:	196)	anarchy	is	perceived	as	making	‘collective	action	for	the	common	good	
hard	to	achieve’.	This	 is	because	of	problems	such	as	multilateral	coordination	and	
free	 riding.	Moreover,	 if	 great	 power	 cooperation	 is	 to	be	 viable,	 the	US	needs	 to	
lead	the	way	given	that	‘international	institutions	are	created	by	the	more	powerful	
states,	 and	 the	 institutions	 survive	 in	 their	 original	 form	as	 long	 as	 they	 serve	 the	
major	 interests	of	 their	 creators,	or	are	 thought	 to	do	so’	 (Ibid:	210).	Waltz	 (2000:	
18-20)	 also	 argues	 that	 neoliberal	 institutionalist	 proposals	 that	 states	 try	 to	
ameliorate	 or	 escape	 the	 security	 dilemma	 by	 practicing	 costly	 signaling	 and	
participating	in	institutions,	remain	dependent	on	underlying	power	relations,	which	
will	 always	 provoke	 fear	 and	 uncertainty	 amongst	 states,	 thus	 dampening	
cooperative	efforts.	
	
As	for	democratic	peace	theory’s	potential	contribution	to	world	peace,	Waltz	raises	
several	 concerns.	 For	 example,	 according	 to	 him,	 proponents	 of	 this	 theory	 argue	
that	 only	 ‘democracies	 of	 the	 right	 sort’	 can	 bolster	 the	 cause	 of	 peace,	 yet	
‘democratic	states,	like	others,	have	interests	and	experience	conflicts’	(Waltz:	1993:	
77).	A	state	may	thus	try	to	become	a	democracy	and	 live	 in	peace,	but	so	 long	as	
the	 international	environment	 remains	 the	same	 i.e.	anarchic,	 this	won’t	count	 for	
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much	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 state’s	 international	 behavior,	 because	 ‘external	
behavior…bears	little	relation	to	state’s	internal	political	composition’	(Waltz,	2008:	
xii).	 Democracies	 may	 therefore	 exist	 in	 peace	 with	 one	 another,	 but	 even	 if	 ‘all	
states	 became	 democratic,	 the	 structure	 of	 international	 politics	 would	 remain	
anarchic’	meaning	that	the	threat	of	war	would	remain	(Waltz,	2000:	10).		
	
Jervis	 (2014:	500)	has	 responded	 to	Waltz’s	arguments	by	positing	 that	he	 ignores	
‘regime	type’	and	‘narrow	domestic	interests	and	how	they	are	aggregated	through	
domestic	 institutions’.	 Jervis’s	 argument	 here	 is	 that	 we	 need	 to	 consider	 how	 a	
state’s	 internal	 politics	 and	 regime	 varies	 if	 we	 want	 to	 explain	 international	
behavior,	which	corresponds	with	Schweller’s	point	about	the	need	for	a	differential	
analysis	of	state’s	goals.	Yet	 if	we	look	more	closely	at	Waltz’s	(2000:	13)	work,	we	
can	 see	 that	 in	 several	 places,	 he	 does	 note	 the	 important	 role	 domestic	 politics	
plays,	stating	that	‘the	causes	of	war	lie	not	simply	in	states	or	in	the	state	system;	
they	are	found	in	both’.	The	issue	here,	as	with	Mearsheimer,	is	which	factor—agent	
or	structure—plays	a	bigger	role.	
	
On	 the	 one	 hand,	 Waltz	 (2008:	 xii)	 notes	 that	 ‘small	 internal	 changes’	 cannot	
compare	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 ‘international	 structure’	 so	 that	 ‘external	
behaviours	 bear	 little	 relation	 to	 internal	 political	 composition’.	 Yet	 elsewhere	 he	
claims	that	a	change	in	this	order	will	require	a	‘major	domestic	power	shift’	and	(as	
we	 saw	 with	 Glaser	 and	 Jervis)	 also	 identifies	 how	 ‘internal	 military	 and	 political	
pressures’	 can	 drive	 arms	 races	 between	 nations	 (Waltz,	 1990:	 741).	 We	 may	
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conclude	 from	 such	 statements	 that	 Waltz	 believes	 that	 changes	 to	 international	
behavior	and	order	within	the	current	system	is	possible	and,	to	some	extent,	driven	
by	domestic	developments	whereas	changes	to	the	structure	of	the	system	itself	 is	
much	more	 difficult.	 This	 aspect	 of	Waltz’s	 work	 is	 highlighted	 by	 Campbell	 Craig	
(2003:	169-170)	who	notes	how	 ‘Waltz	conceded	that	unit-level	phenomena	affect	
international	politics	in	three	ways’	i.e.	i)	ideas	can	have	an	impact	on	‘questions	of	
great	power	war	and	peace’	ii)	national	leaders	can	manage	systemic	stability	iii)	fear	
of	 nuclear	war	 engenders	 caution	by	decision-makers.	 This	 discussion	 is	 important	
for	the	purposes	of	this	study	because	of	our	need	to	identify	drivers	of	the	requisite	
changes	to	domestic	and	international	politics,	which	may	include	a	transition	from	
anarchy	to	a	different	structure,	supportive	of	nuclear	disarmament	action.	In	order	
to	 begin	 doing	 this	 and	 consider	 how	 Waltz’s	 views	 on	 unit-level	 behaviour	 i.e.	
domestic	 factors	 and	 international	 structure	 relate	 to	 questions	 of	 nuclear	
disarmament,	 it	 is	 first	 necessary	 to	 review	 his	 justification	 for	 nuclear	 possession	
and	his	arguments	in	favour	of	the	spread	of	nuclear	weapons.	
	
The	arrival	of	nuclear	weapons	at	the	end	of	WW2	is	presented	by	Waltz	(2000:	5)	as	
one	 the	 ‘greatest…within-system	 changes’	 to	 take	 place	 ‘in	 modern	 history,	 or	
perhaps	in	all	of	history’.	The	invention	of	the	bomb	was	thus	epoch-making	but	did	
not	alter	the	anarchic	structure	of	the	international	political	system	itself.	Moreover,	
for	Waltz,	 since	 structural	 forces	 lead	 to	 the	 logic	 of	 self-help	 and	 power	 politics,	
great	 powers	 value	 nuclear	weapons	 because	 they	 secure	 their	 vital	 interests	 and	
uphold	 the	 international	 order.	 According	 to	 this	 view,	 nuclear	 deterrence	 thus	
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successfully	 ‘kept	 the	 peace’	 between	 the	 superpowers	 during	 the	 Cold	 War	 by	
inducing	‘great	caution	in	international	politics’	(Lieber	&	Press,	2006:	42).	
	
Waltz	 presents	 his	 defence	 of	 continued	 nuclear	 possession	 in	 terms	 that	 are,	 in	
several	ways,	similar	to	the	arguments	outlined	above	by	Mearsheimer,	Glaser	and	
Jervis.	 Firstly,	 nuclear	 weapons	 are	 ‘useful’	 for	 great	 powers	 in	 dealing	 with	 the	
security	 dilemma	 because	 they	 ‘make	 the	 waging	 of	 war	 among	 them	 unlikely’	
(Waltz,	2010:	187).	Secondly,	nuclear	weapons	are	low	cost	compared	to	large-scale	
conventional	forces.	Thirdly,	they	are	only	needed	for	deterrence—meaning	a	secure	
second-strike	capability—because	nuclear	weapons	‘are	useless	for	fighting	wars	and	
even	 for	 threatening	 blackmail’	 (Waltz,	 1997:	 154).	 Fourthly,	 nuclear	weapons	 are	
the	 ‘only	 peacekeeping	 weapons	 the	 world	 has	 ever	 known’,	 being	 ‘inherently	
stable’	given	that	they	 ‘induce	caution’	 in	their	possessors	(Sagan	and	Waltz,	2013:	
220-224).		
	
Waltz	has	also	embraced	the	gradual	spread	of	a	nuclear-armed	crowd,	celebrating	
nuclear	weapons	for	lessening	the	‘intensity	as	well	as	the	frequency	of	war	among	
their	 possessors’	 (Sagan	 and	 Waltz,	 2013:	 36).	 Moreover,	 his	 argument	 for	 the	
spread	of	nuclear	weapons	 considers	why	 states	 targeted	by	 the	US—such	as	 Iran	
and	 North	 Korea—	might	 seek	 the	 bomb,	 stating	 that	 ‘conventional	 defense	 and	
deterrence	strategies	have	historically	proven	 ineffective	against	the	United	States,	
so,	logically,	nuclear	weapons	are	the	only	weapons	capable	of	dissuading	the	United	
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States	from	working	its	will	on	other	nations’	(Sagan	and	Waltz,	2013:	221).17	Several	
scholars	 have	 critiqued	 Waltz’s	 position	 on	 the	 spread	 of	 nuclear	 weapons.	 For	
example,	T.V.	Paul	 (2000:	8)	posits	 that	Waltz’s	arguments	do	not	correspond	with	
political	reality,	noting	that	the	number	of	countries	that	acquired	nuclear	weapons	
after	the	original	five	‘is	so	small	that	these	cases	seem	more	like	an	anomaly	than	
the	norm’.	Maria	Rost	Rublee	 (2009:	10)	also	 concludes	 that	 ‘neorealism’	 tends	 to	
‘overpredict	proliferation’	and	does	not	convincingly	explain	why	so	few	states	have	
developed	nuclear	weapons.		
	
With	 regard	 to	 the	 conditions	 and	 indicators	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 whilst	
accepting	 the	potential	of	arms	control	as	a	 form	of	cooperation,	Waltz	has	stated	
that	‘it	would	be	strange’	for	him	to	support	the	elimination	of	nuclear	weapons	‘as	
they	have	made	wars	all	but	impossible’	and,	in	any	case,	‘it’s	impossible’	to	get	rid	
of	 these	 weapons	 ‘entirely’	 (Keck,	 2012).	 According	 to	 structural	 realist	 logic	 in	
general,	non-proliferation,	nuclear	disarmament	or	rollback	may	occur	 if	a	threat	 is	
removed	 or	 following	 the	 state	 receiving	 security	 guarantees	 from	 the	 US	 (Waltz,	
1995:	 13).	 Thus,	 despite	Waltz	 (Ibid:	 14),	 arguing	 that	 international	 efforts	 should	
‘concentrate	 more	 on	 making	 large	 arsenals	 safe’	 and	 less	 on	 preventing	 weaker	
states	 obtaining	 small	 nuclear	 forces,	 he	 also	 observes	 that	 ‘we	 should	 be	 careful	
																																								 																					
17	Waltz	(2012:	2)	has	even	gone	so	far	as	to	claim	that	a	nuclear-armed	Iran	would	be	the	result	‘most	
likely	to	restore	stability	to	the	Middle	East’.	He	justifies	this	position	by	stating	that	‘if	the	leaders	of	
a	 country	 understand	 the	 implications	 of	 nuclear	 weapons,	 they	 will	 see	 that	 with	 them	 they	 can	
enjoy	a	secure	peace	at	reasonable	cost’	(Waltz,	1993:	54).		
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about	conveying	military	threats	to	weak	states’	given	that	 leader’s	of	these	states	
‘fear’	of	losing	power	may	drive	them	to	seek	the	bomb	(Ibid:	8).		
	
Whilst	 being	 generally	 enthusiastic	 about	 the	 peacekeeping	 qualities	 of	 nuclear	
weapons,	when	 properly	managed,	Waltz	 does	 admit	 (like	 other	 authors	we	 have	
reviewed	above)	that	their	possession	contributes	to	authoritarian	government	and	
secrecy	at	home	(Sagan	and	Waltz,	2013:	10).	However,	his	treatment	of	this	topic	is	
brief	and	not	presented	as	a	problem	requiring	a	solution—presumably	because	he	
believes	such	 issues	are	a	side	effect	of	what	he	describes	as	states	 ‘taking	care	of	
their	own	security’	(Ibid:	37).	It	also	needs	to	be	recognised	that,	rather	than	nuclear	
weapons	 providing	 a	 ‘cheaper’	 strategy	 for	 NWS,	 as	 former	 US	 Defense	 Secretary	
William	S.	 Perry	 (2015:	 81)	 and	British	Vice	Admiral	 Jeremy	Blackham	 (2013)	 have	
noted,	 nuclear	 powers	 have	 sought	 strong—and	 thus	 very	 costly—conventional	
militaries	to	ensure	the	credibility	of	their	nuclear	arsenals,	for	example,	in	terms	of	
escalatory	 threats	 moving	 from	 conventional	 to	 nuclear	 use.	 In	 this	 sense,	 when	
estimating	 the	 costs	 of	 nuclear	 possession	we	need	 to	 take	 into	 account	 both	 the	
expense	 of	 maintaining	 sufficiently	 powerful	 military	 establishments	 and	 their	
domestic	implications	for	liberty	and	democracy.	
	
Elsewhere,	Waltz	engaged	in	a	high-profile	debate	with	Scott	Sagan	concerning	the	
desirability	of	horizontal	proliferation.	Sagan	(2013:	77)	countered	Waltz’s	claim	that	
more	nuclear	weapons	states	‘may	be	better’	by	arguing	that	such	moves	would	be	
potentially	destabilising,	given	the	problems	of	command	and	control	and	the	risks	
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of	‘deterrence	failures	and	accidental	use’.	Whilst	Sagan	argues	that	nuclear	zero	is	
the	‘best	option’,	Waltz	(1997:	160)	countered	that	the	recent	‘vogue	of	abolition’	is	
driven	 by	 experts	 in	 the	 US	 who	 are	 concerned	 that	 nuclear	 proliferation	 to	 ‘the	
weak’	will	‘limit	what	the	strong	can	do	to	them’.	Furthermore,	as	with	Glaser,	Waltz	
(1993:	73)	is	concerned	about	the	stability	of	a	disarmed	world,	arguing	that	with	the	
disappearance	of	bipolarity,	it	is	necessary	to	‘compare	the	problems	of	balancing	in	
conventional	and	nuclear	worlds’.	Waltz	therefore	argues	that	nuclear	disarmament	
would	 raise	 the	 likelihood	of	conventional	war,	particularly	given	both	 the	 issue	of	
miscalculation—which,	 he	 claims,	 is	much	 higher	 in	 a	 conventional	 than	 a	 nuclear	
world—and	the	US’s	predilection	for	global	dominance,	so	that	the	problems	of	war	
and	how	to	balance	 rival	military	 forces	need	 to	be	solved	before	abolition	can	be	
contemplated.		
	
In	 addition,	Waltz	 argues	 that	 even	 if	 a	 nuclear	ban	 could	be	 agreed,	 it	 ‘would	be	
impossible	 to	police	and	enforce’	 given	 the	ease	with	which	 states	 could	 cheat	on	
their	 commitments	 and	become	 involved	 in	 a	 rearmament	 race	 (Sagan	and	Waltz,	
2013:	223).	Moreover,	he	posits	that,	‘controlling	and	moving	toward	the	elimination	
of	nuclear	weapons’	would	require	‘nothing	short	of	an	unimaginably	competent	and	
despotic	 international	 regime’,	 a	 scenario	 equating	 to	 a	 ‘world	 tyranny’	which,	 he	
argues,	no	one	would	want	(Waltz,	2012:	9).	Disarmament	is	thus	finally—in	Waltz’s	
eyes—a	 clash	 between	 national	 sovereignty	 and	 international	 priorities,	 with	 the	
former,	for	the	foreseeable	future,	always	winning	out.	
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2.4	Approaches	to	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament	
Cooperation	under	anarchy:	Robert	Keohane	and	Nicholas	Wheeler	
	
In	contrast	to	the	pessimism	of	those	whose	acceptance	of	realist	ideas	leads	them	
to	emphasise	the	prevalence	of	competition	and	conflict	in	international	relations,	a	
number	 of	 scholars	 take	 a	 more	 optimistic	 view.	 For	 example,	 Robert	 Keohane	
(1988:	6)	contends	that,	contrary	to	realism,	conflict	between	states	is	not	inevitable	
and	 that	 states	 can,	 ‘when	 complementary	 interests	 exist’,	 construct	 international	
institutions	to	alleviate	security	dilemmas	and	enable	 long-term	cooperation	to	the	
benefit	 of	 all.	 As	 Keohane	 (1984:	 26)	 explains,	 this	 approach	 may	 thus	 be	
distinguished	 from	 Waltz’s	 structural	 realism	 ‘by	 its	 emphasis	 on	 the	 effects	 of	
international	institutions	and	practices	on	state	behavior’.	
	
Keohane	also	describes	how	his	work	on	cooperation	and	the	design	of	institutions	is	
‘infused’	 with	 normative	 intent	 in	 order	 to	 solve	 ‘the	 most	 pressing	 practical	
problems’—including	 the	 need	 for	 humanity	 to	 avoid	 a	 nuclear	 conflagration.	
Reviewing	the	meaning	of	realism,	he	therefore	asserts	that	it,	
	
sometimes	seems	to	imply,	pessimistically,	that	order	can	be	created	only	by	
hegemony.	 If	 the	 latter	 conclusion	 were	 correct...at	 some	 time	 in	 the	
foreseeable	 future,	 global	 nuclear	 war	 would	 ensue...No	 serious	 thinker	
could,	therefore,	be	satisfied	with	Realism	(Keohane,	1983:	532).	
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His	 ‘liberal	 institutionalist’	 theory	 sees	 international	 co-operation	 as	 requiring	 that	
‘the	 actions	 of	 separate	 individuals	 or	 organizations	 which	 are	 not	 in	 pre-existent	
harmony-	be	brought	into	conformity	with	one	another	through	a	process	of	policy	
coordination’	 (Keohane,	 1984:	 51).	 According	 to	 this	 approach,	 rather	 than	
international	 order	 being	 an	 inevitable	 result	 of	 power	 struggles,	 it	 may	 be	
deliberately—and	more	productively—shaped	by	states	that	are	able	to	realise	their	
potential	to	cooperate.		
	
Whilst	Keohane	does	not	directly	discuss	the	types	of	interstate	relations	conducive	
to	 disarmament,	 his	 argument	 that	 cooperation	 under	 anarchy	 is	 possible	 and	
necessary	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 world	 government	 supports	 the	 idea	 that	 states	 can	
together	 create	 an	 international	 environment	 that	 suits	 their	mutual	 interests	 and	
which	enables	 them	 to	 take	disarmament	action.	Moreover,	he	explores	problems	
related	 to	 nuclear	 issues	when	 outlining	 the	 difficulties	 states	 face	 in	 constructing	
institutions	 in	the	‘military-security’	arena.	This	area	can	be	particularly	challenging	
because	 of	 the	 ‘high	 cost	 of	 punishing	 defections,	 the	 difficulties	 of	 monitoring	
behavior	 and	 the	 stringent	 demands	 for	 information	 that	 can	 be	 imposed	 when	
successful	defection	can	dramatically	shorten	the	shadow	of	the	future’	(Axelrod	&	
Keohane,	 1985:	 236).	 The	 design	 of	 effective	 institutions	 therefore	 requires	 the	
systematic	 working	 out	 of	 ‘how	 to	 get	 the	 incentives	 right	 in	 constructing	
institutions,	and	what	scope	global	institutions	should	have’	(Keohane,	2009:	10).	As	
a	 result,	 regimes	may	 be	 created	 with	 ‘rules’	 that	 ‘may	 provide	 opportunities	 for	
governments	 to	 bind	 their	 successors,	 as	 well	 as	 to	 make	 other	 governments'	
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policies	more	predictable’	(Keohane,	2005:	13).	The	uncertainty	prevalent	in	military-
security	cooperation	might	therefore	be	overcome	if	state’s	behaviour	 is	altered	to	
take	into	account	the	‘preferences	of	others’	so	that	‘policy	coordination’	is	achieved	
between	them	(Axelrod	&	Keohane,	1985:	226).	
	
Other	 useful	 ideas	 regarding	 how	 problems	 of	military-security	 cooperation	 under	
anarchy	 can	 be	 overcome	 may	 be	 found	 by	 engaging	 with	 the	 wider	 social	 and	
political	science	literature	on	this	topic.	For	example,	Robert	Axelrod	(2006:	viii)	has	
investigated	how	cooperation,	involving	action	taken	towards	a	shared	and	collective	
goal	 and	 to	 promote	 collective	 welfare,	 can	 develop	 ‘amongst	 egoists	 without	 a	
central	authority’.	Axelrod	(Ibid)	uses	the	Prisoner's	Dilemma	game	to	argue	that	the	
strategy	of	'tit	for	tat'	or	simple	reciprocity,	whereby	an	actor	cooperates	on	the	first	
move	and	then	does	whatever	the	other	player	did	on	the	previous	move,	yields	the	
highest	 payoffs	 over	 time.18	In	 addition,	 in	 a	 world	 populated	 by	 ‘meanies’,	 i.e.	
greedy	actors	that	defect,	cooperation	can	be	initiated	through	more	modest	actors	
‘clustering’	 to	 protect	 ‘alternative	 strategies’	 (Ibid:	 63).	 Other	 suggestions	 Axelrod	
(Ibid:	126-141)	provides	regarding	the	cultivation	of	cooperation	include:	i)	enlarging	
the	 shadow	of	 the	 future	 to	 ensure	 durable	 and	 frequent	 contact	 ii)	 changing	 the	
payoffs	 for	 players	 iii)	 teaching	 the	 players	 values,	 facts	 and	 skills	 to	 promote	
cooperation.	Moreover,	when	the	creation	of	a	 ‘central	authority’	 is	 ‘impossible	or	
																																								 																					
18	Elsewhere,	 Lindskold	 and	 Collins	 (1978),	 found	 that	 a	 strategy	 of	 Graduated	 and	 Reciprocated	
Initiatives	 in	Tension-Reduction	 (GRIT)	 induced	most	cooperation.	GRIT	was	created	 in	 the	1960s	to	
achieve	mutual	nuclear	arms	 reductions	and	was	proposed	as	a	means	of	easing	 tensions	between	
the	US	and	USSR	during	the	Cold	War.	
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too	expensive’	he	argues	that	cooperation	‘based	on	reciprocity’	that	is	self-policing	
is	the	best	option	(Ibid:	174,	186).		
	
Such	 strategies	 could	be	applied	 to	arms	control	 and	disarmament	negotiations	as	
well	 as	 the	 reformation	 and	 construction	 of	 institutions	 to	 both	 ensure	 mutually	
beneficial	outcomes	and	consider	how	the	political	environment	suits	different	types	
of	initiatives.	Indeed,	Axelrod	and	Keohane	(1985:	250)	point	out	that	a	key	benefit	
of	 ‘international	 regimes’	 is	 that	 they	 ‘reinforce	 and	 institutionalize’	 reciprocity,	
making	 ‘defection’	 less	 acceptable	 and	 more	 costly.	 Yet,	 as	 they	 also	 note,	 in	 a	
passage	which	has	particular	 relevance	 for	 this	 study	 and	 its	 focus	on	 institutional	
democratisation,	 ‘arms	control	negotiations	involve	not	merely	bargaining	between	
governments,	but	within	societies	as	well’	(Ibid:	241).		
	
The	result	is	that	‘political	institutions’	follow	the	‘preferences’	of	domestic	actors	by	
design,	 yet	 such	 institutions	 can,	 Keohane	 argues,	 ‘also	 have	 independent	 effects’	
because	they	‘create	rules	for	decision	making,	help	to	structure	agendas,	and	offer	
advantages	 to	 certain	 groups	 while	 disadvantaging	 others	 (Keohane	 and	 Milner,	
1996:	4).	Over	time,	strong	institutions	may	even	shape	actors'	policy	preferences.’	
The	 overall	 point	 is	 that	 national	 and	 international	 institutions	 each	 contain	
‘constraints’	 which	 ‘interact’	 in	 varying	 ways	 according	 to	 prevailing	 ‘political-
economic	 conditions’	 (Ibid:	 6).	 Thus,	 ‘international	 developments	 could	 affect	 the	
coalitions	 that	 form	 in	domestic	politics’—an	observation	which	may	be	applied	 to	
the	purposes	of	 this	 study	 in	 several	ways,	 by,	 for	 example,	 considering	how	 such	
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developments	 may	 cause	 an	 NWS	 to	 move	 towards	 institutional	 democratisation	
and/or	nuclear	disarmament—or	not	(Ibid:	7).	
	
Elsewhere	a	 range	of	 scholars,	 including	George	Perkovich	and	 James	Acton,	David	
Cortright	and	Raimo	Vayrynen,	Harald	Muller,	William	Walker	and	Nicholas	Wheeler	
have	 investigated	 how	 nuclear	 disarmament	 may	 be	 advanced	 through	 states	
cooperating,	 an	 approach	 I	 shall	 hereafter	 term	 cooperation	 with	 disarmament.	
Whilst	the	work	of	these	authors	is	recognisably	distinct,	it	is	sufficiently	compatible	
to	be	grouped	 together	 in	 this	way.	The	main	area	of	agreement	across	 these	and	
other	 authors	 is	 that	 the	 US,	 Russia	 and	 China	 must	 engage	 in	 geostrategic	
cooperation	as	part	of	a	political	process	 in	which	they	move	gradually	to	diminish	
their	 reliance	 on	 nuclear	weapons	 (Cortright	&	Vayrynen,	 2009:	 93;	Walker,	 2012:	
163;	Muller,	2009).	
	
Of	 the	 recent	works	within	 the	 cooperation	with	 disarmament	 category,	 Cortright	
and	Vayrynen’s	Towards	Nuclear	Zero	provides	a	detailed	and	thorough	set	of	ideas	
and	proposals.	Of	particular	importance	is	their	conclusion	that	nuclear	disarmament	
must	 be	 understood	 fundamentally	 as	 a	 political	 process.	 This	 necessitates	 the	
resolution	 of	 conflict	 and	 the	 development	 of	 ‘cooperative	 political	 and	 economic	
relations’	to	make	NWS	feel	secure	enough	to	disarm.	For	example,	policies	such	as	
the	‘institutionalisation	of	democracy,	economic	 interdependence	and	participation	
in	multilateral	 institutions’	are	proposed	as	 ‘steps	 in	the	direction	of	 increasing	the	
prospect	 and	 sustainability	 of	 disarmament’	 (Cortright	 &	 Vayrynen,	 2009:	 161).	 A	
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similar	series	of	proposals	can	be	found	in	Perkovich	and	Acton’s	Abolishing	Nuclear	
Weapons	 (2009:	 15),	which	 begins	 by	 asking	 how	 the	 ‘security	 conditions	 which	
would	permit	nuclear	weapons	 to	be	 safely	prohibited	be	 created,	 and	how	might	
measures	to	implement	such	a	prohibition	be	verified	and	enforced?’	Perkovich	and	
Acton	 (2009:	 23)	 state	 that	 nuclear	 abolition	 should	 be	 ‘approached	 as	 a	 ‘co-
evolutionary’	process	of	reciprocal	step-by-step	progress,	 in	which	nonproliferation	
and	 arms-reduction	 measures	 emerge	 from	 changed	 political	 and	 security	
environments	and	vice	versa’.	
	
Differences	occur	amongst	authors	advocating	cooperation	with	disarmament	when	
it	 comes	 to	 the	emphasis	placed	on	 the	process	by	which	a	balance	of	 interests—
rather	than	a	balance	of	power	between	the	major	states—might	be	achieved.	For	
example,	 Wheeler	 (2009)	 emphasises	 trust	 building	 between	 the	 great	 powers,	
whereas	 Perkovich	 and	 Acton	 focus	 on	 regional	 conflict	 resolution.	 Wheeler’s	
approach	 thus	 goes	 some	way	 to	 addressing	 the	 problems	 previously	 discussed	 in	
Chapter	One	 regarding	 the	 technical	 requirements	of	nuclear	disarmament.	 This	 is	
because	he	explores	how	the	‘good	relationships’	Findlay	identified	as	being	vital	for	
an	effective	verification	and	compliance	regime	in	the	creation	and	maintenance	of	a	
NWFW	might	be	established.	For	example,	Wheeler	argues	that	governments	must	
base	their	security	on	mutual	 trust	 rather	 than	mutual	 fear—as	exemplified	by	the	
possession	 of	 nuclear	 weapons.	 Contrary	 to	 the	 ‘standard	 contention’,	 Wheeler	
(2009:	 3;	 2010;	 2011;	 2012)	 argues	 that	 states	 can	 do	 this	 by	 using	 mutual	 co-
operation	 and	 trust-building	 measures	 to	 move	 away	 from	 competitive	 or	
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individualistic	conceptions	of	security	towards	more	cooperative	systems	within	the	
anarchic	 international	 system.	States	may	thus,	he	posits,	mitigate	uncertainty	and	
build	initiatives	supportive	of	nuclear	non-proliferation	and	disarmament	efforts.		
	
A	 key	 point	 raised	 here	 is	 that,	 even	 if	 it	 were	 possible	 to	 reach	 zero	 in	 an	
atmosphere	of	fear	and	distrust,	a	non-nuclear	world	would	be	a	far	more	dangerous	
place	 to	 live	 than	 our	 current	 one.	 This	 is	 because	 of	 the	 problem	 of	 ‘hedging’	
whereby	a	state	might	secretly	maintain	or	acquire	the	bomb,	either	out	of	fear	that	
others	were	doing	the	same,	or	that	they	might	do	so	in	the	future.	Wheeler	(2009:	
5)	 therefore	 argues	 that	 global	 nuclear	 disarmament	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 more	 secure	
world,	 but	 on	 the	 critical	 condition	 that	 ‘each	 step	 on	 the	 road	 to	 ‘global	 zero’	 is	
conceived	as	a	process	of	trust-building’.		
	
The	 connection	 between	 the	 problems	 associated	 with	 anarchy	 and	 nuclear	
disarmament	identified	in	this	approach	stems	from	Wheeler’s	previously	mentioned	
work	with	Ken	Booth	(2008)	on	the	security	dilemma.	In	this	book,	whilst	not	directly	
critiquing	nuclear	possession	or	advocating	nuclear	disarmament,	the	authors	argue	
that	although	future	uncertainty	is	an	inescapable	problem	for	human	society,	it	can	
be	mitigated	or	possibly	even	transcended	 if	states	strengthen	 international	norms	
of	 co-operation	 and	 trust.	 When	 states	 trust	 one	 another	 sufficiently	 they	 can	
develop	 security	 communities—characterised	by	 high	 levels	 of	 integration	 and	 the	
delegitimisation	of	force—to	 live	 in	peace	and	avoid	war,	the	European	Union	(EU)	
being	an	example	of	a	‘mature	security	community’	(Ibid:	190).	
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In	his	work,	Wheeler	draws	on	Aaron	M.	Hoffman’s	(2002)	definition	of	trust	as	an	
attitude	involving	a	willingness	to	place	the	fate	of	one’s	interests	under	the	control	
of	 others. 19 	In	 Building	 Trust	 Hoffman	 (2006),	 outlines	 how	 distrust	 may	 be	
overcome	through	protecting	actors	from	the	costs	of	opportunism	by	transforming	
the	 institutional	 environment	 in	which	 they	 interact.	 Trusting	 relationships	 require	
strategies	 that	 guard	 rivals	 from	 one	 another	 at	 the	 international	 level	 and	 from	
opposition	 groups	who	 object	 to	 trusting	 relations	 at	 the	 domestic	 level.	 Decision	
makers	 can	be	 shielded	 against	 the	 fear	 of	 betrayal	 and	opportunism	 through	 the	
provision	of:	i)	‘effective	voice’	in	group	decisions,	meaning	reliable	opportunities	to	
participate	in	and	influence	collective	choice	over	the	long-term	ii)	‘breathing	space’,	
whereby	 counterparts	 help	 structure	 agreements	 in	 ways	 that	 protect	 leaders	
against	 their	 domestic	 political	 opponents.	 This	 also	 diminishes	 the	 prospect	 of	
leaders	being	removed	from	power,	which	could	lead	to	a	new	regime	that	does	not	
want	to	honour	previous	agreements.	
	
In	more	 recent	work,	Wheeler	 (2010;	2011)	 investigates	how	such	 insights	may	be	
applied	to	nuclear	questions,	organising	two	recent	symposiums	entitled	'Challenges	
to	Trust-Building	in	Nuclear	Worlds'.	Presentations	at	these	events	explored	different	
approaches	to	moving	beyond	stalemate	in	diplomatic	negotiations	in	order	to	build	
constructive	 dialogue,	 including:	 utilising	 a	 'trust	 wheel'	 which	 connects	 reason,	
																																								 																					
19	As	previously	noted,	this	willingness	is	based	on	a	belief,	for	which	there	is	some	uncertainty,	that	
potential	 trustees	 will	 avoid	 using	 their	 discretion	 to	 harm	 the	 interests	 of	 those	 trusting.	 Trust	
manifests	 itself	 in	 the	 form	 cooperation	 takes	 so	 that	 identifying	 trusting	 forms	 of	 cooperation	
requires	indicators	that	are	sensitive	to	its	particular	features.	
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reflexivity	and	routine	as	'key	elements	in	the	process	of	suspension	of	uncertainty';	
the	 development	 of	 shared	 symbolic	 mechanisms;	 perspective-taking	 to	 achieve	
empathy	and	discussions	of	strategic	stability	(Ibid).	Cooperation	with	disarmament,	
including	 the	 proposals	 generated	 on	 this	 topic	 noted	 above,	 is	 thus	 of	 value	 and	
importance	 for	 this	 study	 given	 its	 focus	 on	 finding	 constructive	 means	 of	
overcoming	obstacles	to	nuclear	disarmament.	At	the	same	time,	 it	 is	 important	to	
highlight	 and	 heed	possible	 criticisms	 of	 and	 concerns	with	 this	 approach,	which	 I	
shall	 now	 summarise	 over	 several	 points.	 As	 I	 note	 below,	 these	 points	 are	more	
applicable	to	some	authors	within	cooperation	with	disarmament	than	others,	both	
because	this	is	not	a	uniform	category	and	given	the	different	emphases	within	these	
author’s	work.	
	
Firstly,	the	importance	of	cooperation	with	disarmament,	as	presented	by	Wheeler	is	
based	on	questionable	assumptions	about	the	‘quintessential’	nature	of	the	security	
dilemma	 in	 international	 relations	 (Booth	 and	 Wheeler,	 2008:	 1).	 The	 security	
dilemma—as	deployed	in	this	work—thus	acts	as	a	pre-determined,	totalising	lense	
with	which	to	view	the	behaviour	of	states,	including	nuclear	possessors.	Yet,	if	one’s	
aim	 is	 to	 construct	 the	 empirical	 foundations	 of	 a	 generalisable	 theory,	 it	 is	
reasonable	 to	 suggest	 that	 a	 better	 approach	would	 be	 to	 begin	 by	 analysing	 the	
power	dynamics	and	relations	in	and	between	nations	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	One	
reason	to	do	this	is	that,	for	those	who	find	it	to	be	a	useful	analytical	tool—such	as	
Glaser	 and	 Jervis—the	 security	 dilemma	may	 operate	 at	 higher	 or	 lower	 levels	 of	
intensity,	 depending	 on	 the	 political-material	 circumstances.	 For	 example,	 these	
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authors	argued	that	the	nuclear	revolution	was	of	great	 importance	because	 it	has	
likely	helped	to	dull	the	impact	of	the	security	dilemma.		
	
The	reliance	on	a	totalising	vision	of	the	security	dilemma	is	also	puzzling	given	that	
in	their	work	of	the	same	name,	Booth	and	Wheeler	(2008:	9)	recognise	at	least	two	
other	terms	which	may	best	summarise	the	dynamics	of	international	conflict.	These	
include	the	term	‘strategic	challenge’	where	‘the	dilemma	of	interpretation	has	been	
settled’	and	‘one	government	identifies	another	state	as	a	real	threat,’	as	illustrated	
by	 Soviet	 leader’s	 response	 to	 the	 Reagan	 administration	 in	 the	 early	 1980s.	
Moreover,	 the	 Cold	 War	 in	 general	 is	 presented	 as	 being	 other	 than	 a	 security	
dilemma	 because	 ‘there	 can	 be	 no	 dilemma	 in	 a	 situation	 of	 clashing	 ideological	
fundamentalisms’	(Ibid:	67).	Notably,	the	authors	also	discuss	how	the	originator	of	
the	 term	 security	 dilemma—John	 Herz—‘departed’	 from	 his	 previous	 position,	 so	
that	he	now	considered	the	notion	that	the	dilemma	was	 ‘the	basis	of	all	past	and	
present	conflict’	to	be	‘an	exaggeration’	(Ibid:	31).	Booth	and	Wheeler	go	on	to	claim	
that	Herz	made	this	move	in	response	to	the	‘aggressive	ambition’	of	Nazi	Germany	
in	World	War	Two.		
	
Such	 strong	questioning	 of	 and	misgivings	 about	what	 aspects	 of	 both	World	War	
Two	and	the	Cold	War	were	security	dilemmas	by	the	prime	exponents	of	the	theory	
themselves,	should	justifiably	lead	us	to	wonder	what	international	conflicts	can	be	
more	clearly	shown	to	exhibit	symptoms	of	the	security	dilemma.	In	answer	to	this,	
Booth	 and	 Wheeler	 (Ibid:	 73-78)	 focus	 on	 cases	 such	 as	 the	 ‘ethnic	 violence’	 in	
	 114	
Yugoslavia	 during	 the	 1990s.	 Yet	 even	 here	 the	 security	 dilemma	 faces	 trouble	
because	 ‘just	as	a	great	deal	 remains	 in	dispute	amongst	historians,	 so	 there	 is	no	
settled	 verdict	 amongst	 security	 dilemma	 theorists’.	 Furthermore,	 as	 the	 authors	
note,	 disputes	 exist	 between	 ‘structural	 and	 unit-level	 interpretations	 (‘emerging	
anarchy’	versus	‘elite	manipulation’,	Hobbesian	fear	versus	ethnic	fundamentalism).	
Once	 again,	 we	 are	 therefore	 left	 to	 wonder	 precisely	 which	 cases	 the	 security	
dilemma	can	be	unequivocally	applied	to	so	that	it	can	explain	significant	examples	
of	state	behaviour	before	and	during	international	conflict.		
	
For	the	purposes	of	this	study,	we	also	need	to	consider	if	the	term	security	dilemma	
usefully	 describes	 the	 geopolitical	 situation	 between	 NWS	 today.	 If	 not,	 then	 we	
need	to	both	consider	what	other	terms	are	most	appropriate	and	what	our	answers	
mean	 for	 cooperation	 with	 disarmament.	 When	 answering	 these	 questions,	 to	
ensure	the	accuracy	of	the	descriptive	terminology	we	use,	and	decide	whether	the	
‘security	dilemma’	concept	is	useful	or	not,	we	can—as	Booth	and	Wheeler	(Ibid:	2)	
recognise—begin	 by	 attempting	 to	 differentiate	 between	 states	 according	 to	 their	
behaviour.	For	example,	it	may	be	useful	to	use	Glaser’s	terms	and	identify	them	as	
greedy—and	thus	revisionist	or	revolutionary	powers	or	security	seeking—and	thus	
status	quo	powers.	To	help	make	this	judgment,	we	may	retain	the	realist	focus	on	
military	power	as	a	guide	to	a	state’s	defensive	or	offensive	intentions	and	ability	to	
realise	its	strategic	goals.	Furthermore,	when	collectively	or	individually	categorising	
the	international	political	environment,	the	position	states	occupy	within	it	and	their	
resulting	behaviour,	we	may	carefully	study	examples	from	the	historical	record.	
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With	regards	to	the	first	point,	it	is	fair	to	observe,	as	Booth	and	Wheeler	(Ibid:	38)	
do,	that	we	are	faced	with	the	problem	of	how	to	define	contested	terms	associated	
with	 and	 involving	 ‘security’.	 Herz	 (1951;	 1966:	 236-237)	 argued	 that	 a	 security	
dilemma	is	a	situation	in	which	both	sides	are	‘striving	to	gain	security	from	attack,’	
yet	he	 found	 the	meaning	of	 ‘security’	 to	be	 ‘elusive’.	 For	example,	he	noted	 that	
whether	states	could	be	seeking	security	for	their	‘minimum’	territorial	needs	or	for	
wider	‘national	interests’	including	‘extreme	economic	and	political	“imperialism”’.	If	
the	 latter,	 he	 observed	 that	 this	 may	 reflect	 the	 interests	 of	 groups	 that	 are	 not	
representative	of,	or	beneficial	for,	the	nation	as	a	whole.	Based	on	Herz’s	discussion	
of	 this	question	and	 in	 relation	 to	 the	historical	 record,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 suggest	
that	when	 identifying	what	security	means	 for	a	state—and	thus	what	the	security	
dilemma	 itself	means—we	may	either	 take	 the	definition	provided	by	 the	 state	or	
states	 in	 question,	 or	 seek	 some	 other	 consensual	 and	 legitimate	 terminology,	
based,	 for	 example,	 on	 domestic	 and	 international	 public	 opinion,	 accepted	
behavioural	norms	and	legal	agreements.	
	
In	this	regard,	 it	 is	uncontroversial	to	suggest	that	the	most	obvious	and	important	
case	 to	 study	 today	 is	 the	 US,	 given	 that	 it	 is	 by	 far	 the	 world’s	 leading	 military	
power.	The	US’s	actions	 in	recent	years—including	power	projection	 in	key	regions	
of	 strategic	 importance	 to	Washington	 such	 as	 Europe,	 the	Middle	 East	 and	 East	
Asia,	with	NATO	expanding	up	to	the	borders	of	Russia	and	the	US	seeking	to	contain	
a	rising	China—underlines	the	importance	of	asking	how	we	should	characterise	the	
collective	 and	 individual	 predicament	 these	 great	 powers	 have	 created	 and	 are	
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facing.	In	response,	numerous	critics	of	US	foreign	policy	have,	over	several	decades,	
variously	described	Washington	as	 acting	 in	 a	 consistently	 aggressive,	 expansionist	
and	 imperialist	manner	 (Beard,	1934;	Bacevich,	2008;	Chomsky,	2004	 i;	Falk,	2016;	
Kiernan,	2005;	Kolko,	1969).	Moreover,	several	recent	global	public	opinion	surveys	
have	found	that	the	US	today	 is	seen	as	 ‘the	greatest’	or	a	 ‘major’	 threat	to	peace	
worldwide	 (BBC,	 2006;	 Gallup,	 2014;	 Pew	 Research	 Center,	 2017).	 Wheeler	 and	
Booth	(2008:	70,	79)	themselves	are	not	totally	unsympathetic	to	such	critiques,	but	
limit	their	description	of	the	US	as	a	state	driven	by	‘ideological	fundamentalism’	to	
the	period	of	 the	Cold	War	 and	 ‘the	 second	President	Bush,’	when	 it	 shifted	 from	
being	a	‘status	quo	power	into	a	revolutionary	one’.		
	
Whether	 one	 subscribes	 to	 the	 former	 or	 latter	 position	 regarding	 the	 US’s	
behaviour,	 the	 question	 this	 debate	 again	 raises	 is	 whether	 the	 term	 security	
dilemma,	for	the	purposes	of	this	study,	 is	the	most	appropriate	and	useful	way	of	
describing	 prevailing	 geopolitical	 interactions	 between	 the	 great	 powers.	 The	
discussion	 above	 suggests	 that	 sufficient	 evidence—including	 expert	 and	 global	
public	 opinion—exists	 to	 consider	 whether	 other	 terms,	 including	 strategic	
challenge,	 expansionism	 and	 imperialism,	 have	 a	 stronger	 explanatory	 power	 and	
legitimacy	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 geopolitical	 situation	 characterised	 by	 US	 military	
dominance.	This	being	the	case,	alongside	the	fact	that	nuclear	weapons	are	central	
aspects	 of	 the	 NWS’s	 strategic	 power,	 we	 should	 necessarily	 also	 question	 the	
explanatory	power	cooperation	with	disarmament	has	as	a	means	of	understanding	
the	causes	and	consequences	of	nuclear	disarmament	in	and	between	NWS	as	well	
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as	continuing	to	seek	additional	and	alternate	explanations.	
	
The	second	concern	that	needs	to	be	raised	about	cooperation	with	disarmament	is	
that	 it	 does	 not	 consider	 how	 nuclear	 disarmament	 could	 take	 several	 different	
shapes	 and	 forms.	 For	 example,	 it	 may	 be	 unilateral,	 bilateral	 or	multilateral	 and	
therefore	 require	 lower	 or	 higher	 levels	 of	 cooperation.	 A	 nuclear	 disarmament	
process	 may	 also	 involve	 different	 degrees	 of	 cooperation	 depending	 on	 the	
possessor	state(s)	involved	and	the	material-political	context,	for	example,	whether	
a	higher	level	of	disarmament	is	required	and	according	to	the	size	and	scale	of	the	
state’s	 nuclear	 weapons	 complex.	 The	 third	 concern	 is	 that	 cooperation	 with	
disarmament	does	not	take	into	account	domestic	sources	of	political	behaviour	and	
cooperation.	 For	 example,	 a	 state	 may	 be	 greedy—and	 thus	 less	 cooperative,	 or	
have	more	modest	goals—and	thus	be	more	cooperative,	depending	on	the	issue	in	
question,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 it	 corresponds	 to	 the	 state’s	 existing	
strategic	 aims	 and	 its	 ability	 to	 achieve	 them.	 As	 noted	 above,	 Herz	 (1966:	 237)	
himself	 identifies	 that	 state	 behaviour,	 can—at	 the	 extreme—be	 imperialist	 and	
driven	 by	 the	 interests	 of	 ‘subnational	 groups’.	 A	 theory	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	
should	 therefore	 take	 a	 state’s	 strategic	 goals	 into	 account	 when	 assessing	 how	
cooperative	it	is	or	is	not	being	regarding	an	initiative,	alongside	assessing	the	utility	
and	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 initiative	 in	 question	 and	 the	 aims	 and	 strategies	 of	 the	
identifiable	 domestic	 groups	 driving	 a	 state’s	 cooperative	 or	 non-cooperative	
behaviour.	
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Connected	 to	 this	 third	 point	 is	 the	 fourth	 concern	 that	 cooperation	 with	
disarmament—and	 similar	 studies	 that	 adopt	 a	 liberal	 viewpoint—focus	 on	 action	
pursuant	 to	 disarmament	 being	 taken	 by	 existing	 decision-making	 elites.	 For	
example,	 Wheeler	 (2009:	 2)	 argues	 that	 ‘achieving	 radical	 reductions	 in	 nuclear	
arms’	 will	 require	 NWS	 leaders	 with	 ‘imagination’	 and	 ‘empathy’	 that	 can	 be	
translated	 into	 ‘state	policies	 that	 can	build	 trust’.	 Such	 leaders	 also	need	 to	have	
‘the	 domestic	 political	 support	 to	 take	 a	 series	 of	 unilateral	 measures’.	 Yet	 such	
studies	tend	not	to	examine	whether	these	elites	are	actually	inherently	incapable	of	
co-operating	and	building	trust	on	this	topic,	nor	whether	elite	decision-makers	and	
the	 institutions	 they	 inhabit	 and	 maintain	 are	 in	 fact	 themselves	 obstacles	 to	
disarmament	so	that	more	radical	political	change	is	necessary,	or	what	the	current	
state	of	public	opinion	on	nuclear	matters	is	and	what	factors	influence	it.	This	is	an	
important	 consideration	 because	NWS	 elites	 have	 deep	 ideological	 investments	 in	
nuclear	weapons	systems	and	have	historically,	to	a	great	extent,	blocked	substantial	
progress	being	made	on	nuclear	disarmament.		
	
In	 relation	 to	 this,	 Lawrence	 Freedman	 and	 Jacob	 Nebel	 have	 made	 important	
criticisms	of	the	analysis	of	Perkovich	and	Acton.	For	example,	Freedman	(2009:	143-
144),	 reviewing	 both	 the	 approach	 of	 these	 authors	 and	 that	 of	 similar	
investigations,	 questions	 how	 far	 nuclear	 disarmament	 can	 ‘be	 taken	 as	 an	 elite	
project?’	He	goes	on	to	pointedly	characterise	the	style	of	such	works	as	‘geopolitical	
engineering	 enterprises’	 whereby	 ‘barriers	 are	 to	 be	 cleared	 by	 judicious	 treaty	
language	here,	 a	 technical	 fix	 there,	 and	a	 confidence-building	measure	 to	 follow.’	
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The	key	question	for	Freedman	here	 is	 thus	where	public	opinion	fits	 in	 to	nuclear	
disarmament	given	 that	 in	 these	works	 it	 ‘appears	 rather	distant,	as	nothing	more	
than	a	supposedly	approving	chorus.	Yet	governments	must	be	accountable	to	their	
electorates.	If	this	undertaking	is	going	to	be	treated	with	the	seriousness	it	deserves	
over	an	extended	period,	public	opinion	will	need	to	be	engaged.’		
	
Similarly,	 Nebel	 (2012:	 8)	 chides	 Perkovich	 and	 Acton	 for	 ‘leaving	 popular	 opinion	
out	 of	 the	 picture,’	 citing	 the	 author’s	 own	 framing	 of	 their	 work	 as	 part	 of	 an	
‘enormous	renovation	project’	for	‘experts	from	a	representative	range	of	states’	as	
a	source	of	what	he	terms	‘movement	pessimism’.	Nebel	(2012:	9)	claims	that	this	is	
a	serious	error	because,	with	regards	to	the	US,	‘the	historical	record	indicates	that	
the	 disarmament	 movement	 has	 immense	 political	 potential.	 The	 disarmament	
movement	has	constrained	decision-making	even	 in	the	most	pro-nuclear-weapons	
administrations.’	 The	 key	 question	 Freedman	 and	 Nebel’s	 analysis	 raises	 concerns	
what	 theory	 of	 political	 change	 is	 being	 proposed	 by	 the	 different	 approaches	 to	
nuclear	 disarmament.	 This	 study	 therefore	 aims	 to	 contribute	 to	 existing	 studies	
emphasising	 the	 need	 for	 cooperation	 to	 achieve	 nuclear	 disarmament	 by	
investigating	the	role	decision-making	elites	across	NWS	play	in	helping	or	hindering	
such	action.		
	
Notably,	Wheeler	 (2009:	 19)	 does	 discuss	 domestic	 political	 change	 in	 relation	 to	
how	Argentina	and	Brazil	 reversed	their	nuclear	 rivalry	 in	 the	1980s.	 In	addition	to	
leaders	from	both	sides	developing	empathy	for	one	another’s	‘security	concerns	by	
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taking	 a	 series	 of	 reciprocal	 confidence-building	 steps’,	Wheeler	 (Ibid)	 argues	 that	
another	 key	 ‘lesson’	 to	 be	 learned	 from	 this	 experience	 is	 the	 ‘importance	 of	
democratisation	to	trust-building’	because	leaders	came	to	power	‘who	were	aware	
of	 the	 growing	 political	 and	 economic	 costs	 and	 risks	 of	 pursuing	 a	 unilateral	
approach	to	security’.	Yet	whilst	 it	 is	argued	that	such	findings,	 including	regarding	
democratisation,	 could	 be	 applied	 ‘for	 building	 trust	 elsewhere’,	 this	 is	 not	meant	
universally	but	 for	 ‘cases	 such	as	 South	Asia,	Northeast	Asia,	 and	 the	Middle	East’	
(Ibid).	 Yet,	 as	 I	 shall	 argue	 in	 more	 depth	 in	 this	 and	 later	 chapters,	 we	 need	 to	
understand	 the	 domestic	 politics	 of	 nuclear	 possession	 for	 all	 NWS—including	
Western	liberal	democracies—and	the	ways	in	which	democratisation	may	assist	the	
path	to	national	and	international	disarmament.	
	
The	 fifth	 concern	 is	 that	 cooperation	 with	 disarmament	 as	 a	 conceptual	 tool	 is	
neutral	and	can	thus	work	against	nuclear	disarmament	as	much	as	it	can	support	it.	
For	example,	as	several	analysts	have	noted,	the	NPT	was	seen	by	the	Soviet	Union	
and	United	States	as	a	means	of	protecting	their	power	and	privilege	during	the	Cold	
War.	 Since	 then,	 the	 NWS	 have	 repeatedly	 stated	 that	 they	 are	 committed	 to	
achieving	a	NWFW	on	a	multilateral	basis,	despite	all	the	evidence	to	the	contrary.	
Maintaining	this	facade	is	important	if	NNWS	are	not	to	lose	faith	in	the	NPT	bargain,	
as	their	cooperation	is	essential	to	prevent	nuclear	proliferation	and	the	loss	of	the	
exceptional	 influence	 that	 NWS	 currently	 enjoy.	 Whilst	 the	 great	 powers	 may	
therefore	criticize	one	another’s	military	buildups	and	actions,	 including	on	nuclear	
issues,	 there	 is	 also	 a	 tacit	 understanding	 that	 they	 must	 prevent	 NNWS	 from	
	 121	
delegitimising	and	diminishing	their	position	in	the	international	hierarchy	of	states.	
This	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 recent	 concerted	 efforts	 by	 NWS	 to	 boycott	 and	 block	
negotiations	on	a	nuclear	ban	treaty,	which	received	the	support	of	122	nations	in	a	
vote	 at	 the	United	Nations	 in	 July	 2017	 (NTI,	 2017).	 In	 a	world	 consisting	 of	what	
Joseph	 Nye	 and	 Robert	 Keohane	 describe	 as	 ‘asymmetrical	 interdependence’,	
whereby	 ‘the	more	 asymmetry	 you	 have	 in	 your	 favor,	 the	 stronger	 you	 are,	 the	
more	 you	 have	 of	 some	 resource,	 the	 more	 your	 advantage	 in	 influencing	 the	
outcome	 of	 an	 event’,	 uneven	 power	 relationships	 are	 continually	 generated	
between	states	(Kreisler,	2004).	The	fact	that	the	great	powers,	to	different	degrees,	
dominate	 international	 institutions	 that	 have	 ostensibly	 been	 built	 on	 equal	
cooperation	and	participation	thus	needs	to	be	kept	in	mind	when	identifying	which	
actors	are	responsible—and	to	what	extent—for	the	present	disarmament	impasse.		
	
Overall,	 cooperation	 with	 disarmament,	 as	 an	 approach	 that	 focuses	 on	 the	
challenges	 of	 securing	 cooperation	 under	 anarchy	 in	 order	 to	 achieve	 nuclear	
disarmament,	 is	 thus	 primarily	 important	 because	 of	 its	 focus	 on	 disarmament’s	
international	security	implications.	However,	as	Keohane	suggests,	it	is	important	to	
analyse	how	‘constraints	and	 incentives’	at	 the	domestic	and	 international	political	
levels	 interact.	 In	 terms	 of	 providing	 a	 full	 explanation	 of	 the	 causes	 and	
consequences	of	nuclear	disarmament	in	and	between	NWS,	this	means	examining	
relevant	 developments	 in	 the	 domestic	 arena	 in	 tandem	 with	 those	 in	 the	
international	 arena.	 Ultimately	 therefore,	 given	 the	 normative	 sensitivity	
surrounding	discussions	of	this	topic,	the	 incomplete	and	speculative	nature	of	any	
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study	 of	 disarmament	 and	 the	 need	 to	 develop	 an	 analysis	 based	 on	 a	 close	
familiarity	with	both	the	technical	aspects	of	disarmament	and	the	political	histories	
of	nuclear	possession	in	and	between	NWS,	we	must	conclude	that	cooperation	with	
disarmament	is	a	useful	approach	to	the	topic,	but	is,	for	our	purposes,	one	that	can	
only	fill	in	some	parts	of	this	complex	puzzle.	
	
2.5	Approaches	to	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament	
Moving	beyond	realism:	Campbell	Craig	and	Daniel	Deudney	
	
Just	as	 there	 is	a	 lively	 tradition	of	discussion	within	 realism	and	several	proposals	
regarding	 how	 its	 analysis	 may	 be	 improved	 upon	 from	 liberal	 and	 institutional	
theorists,	so	there	are	a	variety	of	critiques	of	 it	from	without.	For	the	purposes	of	
this	 inquiry,	 Campbell	 Craig	 and	 Daniel	 Deudney’s	 work	 provides	 two	 the	 most	
relevant	 responses	 worth	 reviewing.	 Craig	 (2003:	 ix-xi)	 in	 Glimmer	 of	 a	 New	
Leviathan-	Total	War	 in	 the	Realism	of	Niebuhr,	Morgenthau	and	Waltz,	 is	keen	to	
present	nuclear	weapons	and	war	as	a	problem	not	 just	for	realism	but	for	 ‘formal	
American	 thinking	about	 international	politics’	 as	a	whole.	Despite	 this,	he	argues,	
such	concerns	play	a	‘strikingly	small	part’	in	this	body	of	work,	so	that	Mearsheimer,	
amongst	others,	‘consigns	the	problem	of	nuclear	war	to	the	margins’.	Craig	(Ibid:	xi)	
explains	 this	by	noting	 that	such	authors	maintain	an	obdurate	belief	 that	 ‘nuclear	
deterrence	has	largely	eliminated	the	possibility	of	thermonuclear	war’.	At	the	same	
time,	Craig—with	Sergey	Radchenko	(2017:	23)—has	recently	written	of	the	nuclear	
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revolution’s	 importance	 in	 preserving	 peace	 because	 ‘the	 aversion	 of	 leaders	 to	
nuclear	 war’	 is	 what	 ‘best	 explains	 the	 absence	 of	 major	 conflict	 among	 nuclear	
powers	over	the	past	70	years’.	
	
In	 contrast	 to	 IR	 scholars	 who	 dismiss	 the	 ‘implications	 of	 the	 thermonuclear	
revolution’,	Craig	(2003:	x)	notes	that	Jervis	and	Deudney	have	been	at	the	forefront	
of	examining	how	nuclear	weapons	‘can	be	reconciled…with	modern	Realism’.	Given	
the	unwillingness	of	mainstream	IR	to	deal	with	these	issues,	Craig	(2003:	129,	172)	
questions	whether	 realism,	which	 he	 casts	 as	 a	 ‘static	 conception	 of	 international	
relations’,	can	survive	as	a	theoretical	approach	if	 it	does	not	seek	to	advance	past	
‘the	 continuation	 of	 anarchy	 and	 of	 nuclear	 deterrence’.	 This	 is	 because	 whilst	
nuclear	deterrence	may	have	worked	to	keep	the	peace	in	the	Cold	War,	 it	will,	he	
writes,	‘sooner	or	later’	result	in	‘thermonuclear	war’	that	is	likely	to	‘kill	hundreds	of	
millions	of	people	and	possibly	exterminate	the	human	race’	 (Ibid:	172).	Craig,	 like	
Nick	 Ritchie	 and	 others,	 therefore	 accuse	 defenders	 of	 the	 nuclear	 status	 quo	 as	
being	 ‘utopian’	 in	denying	 the	 inevitability	 of	 eventual	 nuclear	 conflict.	 For	Ritchie	
(2012),	‘real’	realism	thus	logically	entails	support	for	NPS	taking	progressive	action	
on	nuclear	disarmament	in	order	to	create	a	NWFW.		
	
Craig	(2003:	171;	2015)	suggests	that	if	realism	can	be	saved	as	a	relevant	theory,	it	
will	be	because	‘the	fear	of	nuclear	war’,	threatening	human	survival,	could	provide	
the	 motivation	 to	 overcome	 anarchy.	 This	 may	 occur	 via	 ‘common	 action’	 to	
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eliminate	 nuclear	 dangers	 and	 involve	 ‘the	 establishment	 of	 an	 authoritative,	
centralised	 world	 state’.	 Thus	 for	 him,	 any	 meaningful	 answer	 to	 the	 threat	 of	
nuclear	 catastrophe	 ‘can	 only	 be	 attained	 by	 concerted	 international	 cooperation’	
yet	 he	 asserts	 that	 this	 is	 ‘something	 very	 difficult	 to	 achieve	 in	 an	 anarchical	
interstate	 system’—a	 problem	 we	 have	 previously	 discussed	 above	 (Craig,	 2015).	
The	 development	 of	 a	 world	 state,	 which	 for	 Craig	 (2009:	 27)	 would	 entail	 ‘the	
abolition	of	anarchical	great-power	politics’,	has,	as	he	points	out,	been	hinted	at	by	
leading	‘realist’	thinkers	such	as	Reinhold	Niebuhr	and	Hans	Morgenthau.	
	
However,	 in	addition	to	Craig	and	Waltz,	 these	two	thinkers	have	serious	concerns	
about	the	consequences	of	creating	such	a	state,	principally	because	it	might	create	
a	 global	 tyranny.	 Craig	 (2003:	 49,	 66)	 also	 discusses	 how,	 as	 with	 Herz	 (1966),	
Morgenthau	 and	 Niebuhr	 found	 that	 a	 shift	 away	 from	 international	 anarchy	
towards	world	government	required	the	development	of	a	world	community	so	that	
loyalties	had	to	shift	from	the	national	to	the	international	 level.	He	also	raises	the	
important	 point	 that	 Niebuhr,	 Morgenthau	 and	 Waltz	 all	 ‘gravitated	 towards	 the	
normative	goal	of	great	power	peace’,	a	shift	towards	an	internationalist	rather	than	
a	nationalist	position	of	a	kind	similar	to	Herz’s,	as	noted	above	(Craig,	2003:	164).		
	
An	 issue	 that	 once	 again	 emerges	 from	 Craig’s	 analysis	 of	 the	 three	 authors	
discussed	in	Glimmer	of	a	New	Leviathan,	is	the	lack	of	detailed	thought	given	to	the	
political	 forces	 that	 could	 drive	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 great	 power	 peace	 and	 a	
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reformed	 international	order	which	ameliorates	or	overcomes	 the	problems	posed	
by	anarchy.	Overall,	 this	work	 therefore	does	not	 thus	 seek	 to	provide	answers	 to	
the	methodological,	normative	and	political	questions	raised	by	the	thermonuclear	
revolution,	but	does	highlight	some	of	the	key	problems	and	questions	that	leading	
realists	 faced	 when	 coming	 to	 terms	 with	 it.	 For	 insights	 into	 the	 indicators	 and	
conditions	for	nuclear	disarmament	we	must	look	elsewhere	in	Craig’s	oeuvre.		
	
For	 example,	 in	 his	 article	Weberian	World	 Government	 in	 the	 Nuclear	 Age,	 Craig	
(2015)	argues	that	‘the	unique	qualities	of	the	nuclear	revolution’	makes	‘securing	a	
monopoly	 over	 violence’	 a	 task	 which	 is	 ‘even	 more	 important	 to	 a	 prospective	
world	government	 than	 it	 is	 to	a	 traditional	nation-state’.	Moreover,	drawing	 from	
the	 thinking	 of	 Alexander	 Wendt,	 Craig	 (Ibid)	 writes	 that	 finding	 a	 means	 of	
compelling	or	persuading	the	US	to	join	an	emerging	world	government	‘constitutes	
the	 single	 greatest	 obstacle’	 to	 its	 formation.	 Meanwhile,	 in	 the	 book	 Craig	 co-
authored	with	Sergey	Radchenko	(2008	i:	169),	The	Atomic	Bomb	and	the	Origins	of	
the	 Cold	 War,	 it	 is	 argued	 that	 the	 possibility	 of	 a	 state	 cheating	 and	 building	 a	
nuclear	 weapon	 secretly,	 means	 that	 ‘international	 atomic	 control	 requires	 a	
qualitatively	different	level	of	international	action	if	nations	are	to	be	persuaded	to	
place	 their	 trust	 in	 it’.	 The	 problem	 of	 cheating	 thus	 means	 that	 nuclear	
disarmament	 would	 require	 all	 nations	 to	 ‘transfer	 all	 of	 their	 technological	 and	
physical	 means	 of	 building	 atomic	 weaponry	 to	 a	 powerful	 international	 agency’	
which	would	need	 to	persuade	all	nations	 that	 it	 could	 ‘permanently…prevent	any	
nation	from	secretly	building	another	bomb’	(Ibid).		
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Craig	 also	 elsewhere	 identifies,	 in	 a	 roundabout	 way,	 some	 of	 the	 other	 political	
obstacles	to	and	opportunities	 for	nuclear	disarmament.	For	example,	 in	his	article	
with	 Jan	 Ruzicka	 (2012)	 Who’s	 in,	 who’s	 out?,	 the	 authors	 claim	 that	 the	 set	 of	
institutions	forming	the	nuclear	‘nonproliferation	complex’	are	partly	responsible	for	
holding	back	disarmament	progress	by	operating	as:		
	
a	classic	 liberal	 institution	that	pretends	to	universalism	while	being	 in	hock	
to	 the	 world’s	 most	 powerful	 states.	 Moreover,	 its	 pursuit	 of	 modest,	
‘realistic’	 goals	 has	 helped	 to	 undermine	 the	 very	 possibility	 of	 substantial	
action	on	nuclear	weapons.		
	
In	 both	 this	 article	 and	 The	 Resurgent	 Idea	 of	 World	 Government,	 Craig	 (2008)	
explores	how	weaker	 countries	 face	 strategic	 choices	 in	 relation	 to	more	powerful	
states,	drawing	again	on	Wendt’s	work	to	observe	that	‘weaker	societies’	have	in	the	
modern	 era,	 an	 ‘emerging	 choice	 between	 subjugation	 to	 powerful	 states	 and	
globalized	forces	or	participation	in	an	authentic	world	government’,	with	the	latter	
organisation	being	the	only	means	of	preserving	national	identities.		
	
The	argument	Craig	and	Radchenko	(2008:	170)	present—that	the	choice	the	major	
powers	 face	 in	 the	 nuclear	 age	 is	 between	 ‘sovereignty	 or	 international	
government’—is	 a	 formulation	 very	 similar	 to	 Waltz’s	 view.	 The	 centralisation	 of	
power	 involved	 in	 disarmament	 thus,	 for	 him,	 essentially	 means	 that	 the	 agency	
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responsible	for	managing	nuclear	knowledge	and	materials	 ‘would	have	to	become	
like	 a	 state	 itself’.	 This	was	 something	 during	 the	 Cold	War	 that	 neither	 the	 then	
Soviet	Union	or	the	United	States	was	willing	to	countenance	because	it	would,	Craig	
and	Radchenko	(Ibid)	assert,	mean	relinquishing	their	‘sovereignty	to	the	agency’.	As	
Craig	(2008)	makes	clear,	when	it	comes	to	contemporary	discussions	of	what	world	
government	might	entail,	Daniel	Deudney	has,	in	his	work	Bounding	Power	provided	
‘the	fullest	and	most	creative	vision	yet	of	formal	world	government	in	our	age’.	It	is	
therefore	appropriate	to	investigate	Deudney’s	work	further	at	this	point	to	build	on	
the	ideas	and	insights	already	discussed.		
	
To	begin	with,	Deudney	directly	tackles	problems	of	institutional	power	in	his	work,	
taking	 an	 approach	 that	 is	 both	 descriptive	 and	 prescriptive.	 His	 ideas	 are	 also	
developed	out	of	a	 critique	of	 the	 leading	mainstream	and	 realist	writers	we	have	
encountered,	 including	 Waltz,	 Mearsheimer	 and	 Keohane.	 Whilst	 great	 power	
conflict	 did	 not	 occur	 during	 the	 Cold	War,	Deudney	 (2011:	 282)	 argues	 that	 ‘it	 is	
impossible	 to	 say’	whether	 this	was	 the	 result	 of	 nuclear	weapons	 or	 some	 other	
cause.	Alongside	 Jervis,	he	 therefore	believes	 that	 the	 central	questions	about	 the	
nuclear	revolution—‘How	likely	is	deterrence	failure?	What	will	happen	after	nuclear	
use?’	 are	 ‘unanswerable	 with	 any	 assurance’	 (Ibid:	 283).	 Moreover,	 following	 the	
end	of	the	Cold	War,	we	have	moved	into	the	second	nuclear	age,	which	is	defined	
by	‘the	diffusion	of	nuclear	weapons	capability	to	small	and	often	revisionist	states,	
and	possibly	also	to	non-state	actors’	so	that	the	possibility	of	‘deterrence	failure	is	
much	 more	 likely’	 (Ibid:	 284).	 Nuclear	 weapons—which	 previously	 benefited	 US	
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hegemony—thus	 now	 threaten	 its	 interests	 so	 that	Washington	has	 had	 to	 take	 a	
series	of	steps	to	prevent	proliferation.		
	
Deudney	 (2011:	 287)	 moves	 on	 to	 pose	 the	 intriguing	 question	 of	 whether	 the	
dynamics	prevalent	 in	the	current	age	‘will	provide	the	catalytic	 impetus	to	a	fuller	
revolution	not	just	in	the	conduct	of	states	but	in	the	basic	practices	and	structures	
of	 the	 anarchic	 interstate	 system	 itself’.	 However,	 elsewhere,	 in	 an	 observation	
complementing	 Craig’s	 view,	 Deudney	 (2016)	 states	 that	 nuclear	 weapons	 have	
created	a	‘paradoxically	perverse	effect’	whereby	they	both	necessitate	‘an	exit	from	
anarchy’,	given	the	fact	that	the	system	is	prone	to	‘potentially	catastrophic	failure’,	
but	simultaneously	 ‘impede	the	traditional	path	to	exit	 from	anarchy’,	by	which	he	
means,	‘some	form	of	authoritative	world	government’.	
	
In	order	to	move	beyond	this	problem,	Deudney	(2007:	48)	develops	and	adds	the	
idea	of	‘negarchy’,	as	a	third	type	of	international	system,	to	anarchy	and	hierarchy.	
Deudney’s	 advocacy	 of	 negarchy	 is	 based	 on	 the	 need	 to	 find	 a	 way	 out	 of	 the	
contemporary	international	military-political	situation,	which	combines	anarchy	and	
the	 pronounced	 ‘violence	 interdependence’	 created	 by	 nuclear	 weaponry.	
Importantly,	 negarchy	 is	 ‘self-ordering’,	 meaning	 that	 it	 avoids	 the	 top	 down	
imposition	of	order	in	favour	of	an	‘alternative	“republican	federal”	set	of	practices’	
where	 actors	 are	 ‘authoritatively	 ordered	 by	 relations	 of	 mutual	 restraint’,	 rather	
than	 hierarchical	 subordination	 and	 anarchical	 orderlessness	 (Ibid).	 To	 bolster	 his	
position,	 Deudney	 (Ibid:	 270)	 employs	 the	 concept	 of	 Republican	 Security	 Theory,	
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which	is	based	on	the	principles	of	liberty,	sovereignty	and	limited	government	as	a	
means	 of	 refining	 and	 improving	 on	 liberal	 and	 realist	 proposals	 for	 managing	
international	order.	
	
As	with	some	of	the	other	realists	noted	above,	Deudney—in	addition	to	discussing	
the	meaning	 of	 the	 nuclear	 revolution	 for	 international	 politics—notes	 the	 impact	
that	the	possession	of	nuclear	weapons	has	had	on	domestic	 liberty,	but	goes	 into	
greater	depth	about	what	this	means	 in	practice.	For	example,	 in	Bounding	Power,	
Deudney	(2007:	255)	discusses	how	nuclear	weapons	are	‘intrinsically	despotic’	and	
have	 created	 ‘nuclear	monarchies’	 in	 all	 nuclear-armed	 states.	 Deudney	 identifies	
three	related	reasons	for	this	development:		
	
the	speed	of	nuclear	use	decisions;	the	concentration	of	nuclear	use	decision	
into	 the	 hands	 of	 one	 individual;	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 accountability	 stemming	
from	 the	 inability	 of	 affected	 groups	 to	 have	 their	 interests	 represented	 at	
the	moment	of	nuclear	use.	
	
For	 Deudney	 (2007:	 7),	 a	 state’s	 moves	 to	 ensure	 its	 security	 e.g.	 via	 nuclear	
possession	 can	 therefore	 lead	 to	 the	 centralisation	of	 decision-making	 in	 powerful	
institutions,	with	deleterious	results	for	democracy	and	liberty,	so	that	he	identifies	a	
realist	 ‘neglect	 of	 domestic	 hierarchy	 as	 a	 security	 threat’.	 Conversely,	 ‘republican	
and	Liberal	theory	and	practice’	addresses	this	problem	by	focusing	on	‘the	restraint	
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of	domestic	hierarchy	as	a	security	threat	over	progressively	larger	spaces’	(Ibid:	8).	
The	legitimacy	of	the	constitutional	republican	government	he	proposes,	created	to	
ensure	state	security,	would	thus	derive	from	‘popular	sovereignty’—the	will	of	the	
people	 (Ibid:	47).	 In	 republics,	 the	people	are	 in	 control	of	 arms	 ‘either	directly	or	
indirectly’	 so	 that	arms	control	 is	 fundamental	 to	 this	 system	of	government	 (Ibid:	
50).	
	
Such	 thinking	 informs	Deudney’s	 (Ibid:	 258)	 response	 to	what	 he	 describes	 as	 the	
‘nuclear	 political	 question’,	 whereby	 he	 identifies	 four	 groups	 that	 outline	 ‘the	
relationship	 between	 nuclear	 weapons	 and	 the	 state	 system.’	 These	 he	 labels	 as	
‘classical	 nuclear	 one	 worldism,	 nuclear	 strategism,	 automatic	 deterrence	 statism’	
and	 ‘institutional	 deterrence	 statism.’	 20 	Deudney	 (Ibid:	 246)	 then	 presents	 the	
approach	he	subscribes	 to,	namely,	 ‘federal-republican	nuclear	one	worldism’.	This	
position,	which	is	worth	presenting	in	full,	argues	that	nuclear	weapons	have:		
	
rendered	the	statist	approach	to	security	nonviable,	and	that	security	in	the	
nuclear	 era	 requires	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	 institutionalized	 division	
between	 territorial	 units	 and	 nuclear	 capability.	 Instead	 of	 either	 the	
continuation	of	an	interstate	anarchy	or	the	establishment	of	a	world	state,	a	
federal-republican	 union	 of	 strong	 mutual	 restraint	 is	 needed	 to	 provide																																									 																					
20	There	is	not	space	here	to	outline	what	each	of	these	groups	covers,	suffice	to	say	that	of	them	only	
classical	nuclear	one	worldism	could,	through	the	founding	of	world	government-	which	it	sees	as	the	
prerequisite	of	global	security-	embrace	the	idea	of	nuclear	disarmament.	
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security.	This	 view	holds	 that	a	world	hierarchical	 government	would	entail	
an	uncheckable	concentration	of	power,	and	is	unnecessary	in	the	absence	of	
an	interplanetary	threat	(Ibid:	248).	
	
Crucially,	whilst	this	approach	(and	Deudney’s	overall	analysis)	provides	us	with	the	
kind	of	two-level	and	normative	approach	required	by	nuclear	disarmament,	focused	
on	domestic	 and	 international	 security	 and	 liberty	 and	how	 they	 interact,	 he	does	
not	advocate	or	present	a	theory	of	nuclear	disarmament.	Instead,	because	Deudney	
(Ibid:	 258)	 values	 how	 nuclear	 weapons	 ‘have	 greatly	 reduced	 the	 problem	 of	
interstate	aggression,	while	creating	a	new	threat	of	general	annihilation’	he	prefers	
to	find	a	means	of	managing	the	power	of	nuclear	weapons	for	the	common	good.	
His	new	approach	 thus	proposes	 that	 the	 ‘territorial	 state	system’	not	be	 replaced	
but	 ‘complemented	 with	 a	 nuclear	 containment	 and	 restraint	 system’	 so	 that	
‘nuclear	capability	is	separated	from	state	control	and	paralyzed’	(Ibid:	259).		
	
In	outlining	‘federal-republican	nuclear	one	worldism’,	Deudney	(Ibid:	249)	also	does	
not,	 like	 the	 other	 realist	 authors	 named	 above,	 embark	 upon	 a	 detailed	
examination	of	 the	domestic	or	 international	nuclear	politics	of	 the	major	powers,	
nor	does	he	 identify	the	potential	political	sources	of	change	that	will	 facilitate	the	
transformations	he	outlines.	This	may	partly	be	because	Deudney	exhibits	a	similar	
caution	 to	 Mearsheimer,	 arguing	 that	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 definitively	 prove	 his	
proposals	 or	 explanations.	 The	 question	 of	 what	 will	 drive	 nuclear	 restraint	 or	
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disarmament	and	 the	extent	 to	which	 these	will	be	popular	or	elitist	projects	 thus	
still	hangs	in	the	air.		
	
Notwithstanding	 such	 unresolved	 issues,	 much	 in	 Deudney’s	 analysis	 can	 be	
borrowed	from,	explored	and	built	on	for	our	purposes.	For	example,	his	Republican	
Security	 Theory	 may	 be	 repurposed	 to	 imagine	 scenarios	 where	 nuclear	
disarmament	 is	 realised.	 This	 can	 be	 done	 in	 relation	 to	 Deudney’s	 concept	 of	
‘bounding	power’	a	twofold	idea	referring	to	the	massive	advances	in	the	power	of	
military	technology,	which	has	increased	beyond	previously	imaginable	bounds,	and	
the	need	to	put	boundaries	and	controls	on	it	via	agreed	restraints	(Ibid:	27-28).	The	
value	 of	 this	 approach	 for	 the	 problems	 posed	 by	 nuclear	 disarmament	 is	 that	 it	
addresses	interconnected	security	problems	at	the	domestic	and	international	levels.	
In	 this	 sense,	 it	presents	a	 fusion	of	 the	second	and	third	 images	of	Waltz,	dealing	
with	the	causes	of	 international	conflict	that	exist	at	the	unit	(national)	and	system	
(international)	 level.	 Deudney	 (Ibid:	 50)	 thus	 sees	 the	 evolution	 of	 negarchy,	 as	
involving	 ‘the	 establishment	 of	 increasingly	 cobinding	mutual	 restraints	 on	 armed	
force’,	which	in	the	case	of	nuclear	weapons	might	practically	 involve	gradual	arms	
control	and	disarmament	measures.		
	
The	 meaning	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 which	 we	 may	 now	 provisionally	 suggest	
following	our	discussion	of	Deudney’s	work,	could	therefore	entail	a	transition	from	
nuclear	 monarchies	 to	 non-nuclear	 democratic	 republics,	 concurrent	 with	 a	
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transformed	 global	 security	 order	 where	 both	 interstate	 anarchy	 and	 hierarchical	
world	government	is	eschewed	in	favour	of	a	negarchic	republican	federation.	Such	a	
scenario	 clearly	 raises	 several	 big	 questions,	 not	 least	 of	 which	 is	 how	 we	 may	
differentiate	 between	 the	 changes	 required	 for	 nuclear	 disarmament	 in	 and	
between	 each	 NWS	 given	 their	 various	 political	 and	 strategic	 positions	 and	
processes,	and	the	respective	political	 forces	that	may	be	required	to	achieve	such	
change.	 In	order	 to	begin	our	exploration	of	 these	questions,	 the	next	 section	will	
focus	on	the	concept	of	 institutional	democratisation,	which	will	help	us	both	bring	
together	 and	 build	 on	 the	 insights	 gathered	 so	 far	 and	 further	 refine	 our	
understanding	of	what	nuclear	disarmament	might	mean	in	practice	for	NWS.	
	
2.6	Approaches	to	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament	
The	domestic	politics	model	and	institutional	democratisation		
	
Having	reviewed	the	work	of	several	prominent	realist	authors	and	their	critics,	we	
may	 now	 both	 identify	 the	 main	 gaps	 in	 the	 literature	 and	 outline	 ideas	 for	
improving	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 NWS	 nuclear	
disarmament.	 In	 doing	 so,	 our	 inquiry	 will	 come	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 concept	 of	
institutional	 democratisation.	 Before	outlining	precisely	what	 this	 idea	 entails,	 it	 is	
necessary	 to	 briefly	 summarise	 our	 findings	 from	 the	 preceding	 discussion.	 Firstly,	
despite	 several	 authors—including	 from	 within	 the	 realist	 tradition—noting	 the	
domestic	political	 impacts	of	the	nuclear	revolution,	 including	on	such	crucial	areas	
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as	 liberty	and	democracy,	 their	main	 focus	when	debating	 this	 subject	 remains	on	
the	international	level	and	the	ways	in	which	anarchy	is	moderated	by	the	balance	of	
power	and	nuclear	weapons.		
	
Mainstream	 realist	 IR	 thus	 principally	 understands	 the	 nuclear	 revolution	 to	 be	 a	
historic	development	within	the	anarchic	system	with	great	significance	for	national	
and	 international	 security.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 nature	 of	 power	 and	 the	 defense-
offense	equation	were	changed	so	that	the	great	powers	moved	from	defensive	to	
deterrence-based	relationships.	According	to	all	of	the	authors	reviewed	above,	the	
period	 of	 unprecedented	 great	 power	 peace	 and	 stability	 that	 existed	 during	 the	
Cold	War	was,	albeit	to	an	extent	that	cannot	be	precisely	specified	or	proven,	can	
be	significantly	attributed	to	the	impact	of	the	nuclear	revolution.	For	many	of	these	
authors,	great	power	nuclear	disarmament	is	thus	both	clearly	undesirable,	given	the	
risks	of	instability	and	conflict	it	poses,	but	also	likely	unrealisable	given	the	political	
and	technical	obstacles	it	faces.				
	
A	related	question	which	our	reading	of	the	realist	literature	raises	is	whether	great	
power	nuclear	disarmament	can	occur	within	anarchy,	for	example,	as	a	result	of	a	
two-track	 process	 of	 domestic	 political	 reform	 and	 international	 cooperation	 to	
mitigate	 fear	 and	 uncertainty,	 or	 whether	 it	 requires	 anarchy	 to	 be	 replaced	 by	
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hierarchy	 e.g.	 a	world	 government.	21	Deudney’s	 analysis	 complicates	 this	 question	
by	 adding	 a	 third	 structure—negarchy—to	 the	 mix.	 Would	 one	 of	 these	 three	
structures	be	better	suited	to	nuclear	disarmament	than	the	other?	 In	response	to	
these	questions,	we	may	optimistically,	but	still	cautiously,	suggest	at	this	early	stage	
of	 our	 inquiry	 that	 nuclear	 disarmament	 could	 imaginably	 be	 possible	within	 each	
structure	 and	 that	 negarchy,	 whilst	 under-specified	 as	 a	 means	 of	 supporting	
disarmament	processes,	is	particularly	promising.		
	
Furthermore,	as	we	have	seen,	of	the	three	structures,	there	is	much	more	informed	
debate	 about	 the	 consequences	 of	 anarchy	 and	 the	 possibility	 of	 mitigating	 its	
effects	 in	order	 to	achieve	nuclear	disarmament.	But	as	with	 the	often	ambivalent	
response	 of	 scholars	 to	 the	 nuclear	 revolution	 itself,	 our	 conclusion	 regarding	 the	
possibility	 of	 great	 power	 nuclear	 disarmament	 under	 anarchy,	 as	 one	 of—if	 not	
the—biggest	possible	within-system	changes,	must	remain	hopeful	yet	inconclusive.	
Whilst	 this	 is	 a	 frustrating	outcome,	we	 should	 remind	ourselves	of	 the	 inherently	
speculative	 nature	 of	 our	 subject	matter	 and	 aim	 to	 provide	 clearer	 responses	 to	
these	 questions	 after	 having	 conducted	 our	 review	 of	 nuclear	 politics	 in	 and	
between	 NWS	 in	 Part	 Two.	Moreover,	 we	may	 still	 constructively	 propose	 at	 this	
point	 that	 institutional	 democratisation	 constitutes	 an	 important	 problem-solving	
tool	 within	 each	 structure,	 not	 least	 because	 of	 the	 ever-present	 need	 to	 hold	
powerful	 actors	 accountable	 for	 their	 actions	 and	 ensure	 that	 political	 processes																																									 																					
21	Great	power	nuclear	disarmament	 is	 here	 taken	 to	mean	an	unspecified	 lower	or	higher	 level	 of	
disarmament	involving	the	US,	Russia	and	China.	
	 136	
enjoy	popular	legitimacy.	
	
Leaving	aside	structural	questions	for	now,	several	of	the	authors	we	reviewed	have	
noted	that	nuclear	weapons	decision-making	is—at	least	in	part—driven	by	internal	
politics	 as	 well	 as	 external	 factors.	 Moreover,	 as	 Deudney	 makes	 clear,	 nuclear	
weapons	have	important	domestic	political	consequences	in	the	states	that	possess	
them.	If	we	are	therefore	to	imagine	how	nuclear	disarmament	might	come	about	it	
is	 incumbent	upon	us	 to	 look	at	both	the	 internal	and	 the	external	political	arenas	
when	discussing	the	meaning	and	significance	of	the	nuclear	revolution.	Additionally,	
most	of	 the	authors	 reviewed	above	do	not	either	 fully	outline	what	 they	 imagine	
the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	 to	 be,	 or	 provide	 well-
rounded	measures	and	indicators	for	disarmament.		
	
Where	authors	do	engage	meaningfully	with	the	 idea—such	as	Charles	Glaser	and,	
to	an	extent	Campbell	Craig	and	Daniel	Deudney—there	are	gaps	 in	 their	analysis,	
particularly	at	the	domestic	level.	There	are	different	reasons	why	this	is	the	case	for	
each	author.	Some	authors	(such	as	Mearsheimer	and	Waltz)	are	fully	supportive	of	
the	 nuclear	 revolution,	 for	 example,	 because	 it	 benefits	 the	 US-led	 global	 order-	
which	 they	 generally	 see	 as	 liberal	 and	 benign	 and	 because	 nuclear	 possession	
contributed	much	 to	 the	maintenance	of	 peace	 and	 stability	 during	 the	Cold	War.	
Other	authors	(such	as	Jervis,	Glaser	and	Deudney)	are	much	more	ambivalent	about	
the	 nuclear	 revolution—particularly	 given	 the	 dangers	 of	 the	 second	 nuclear	 age.	
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And	 whilst	 some	 (such	 as	 Craig,	 Schelling	 and	 Herz)	 see	 nuclear	 disarmament	 as	
potentially	beneficial,	 they	also	 feel	 that	 its	 requirements,	which	 include:	domestic	
political	 transformations;	 the	 development	 of	 effective	 conventional	 deterrence;	
robust	 monitoring	 and	 verification;	 world	 government—present	 very	 steep,	 if	 not	
insurmountable,	 hurdles.	 Given	 the	 rejection	 of	 or	 skepticism	 regarding	 nuclear	
disarmament,	 mainstream	 IR—and	 realist	 literature	 in	 particular—thus	
understandably	spends	little	or	no	time	considering	the	domestic	sources	of	political	
change	that	might	facilitate	nuclear	disarmament	nationally	and	internationally.	This	
absence	is	ultimately	a	symptom	of	structural	realism’s	pessimistic	theory	of	political	
change,	which	focuses—albeit	in	different	ways	according	to	the	author—on	anarchy	
as	the	main	factor	determining	a	state’s	international	behaviour.	
	
One	of	the	other	main	reasons	why	nuclear	politics	tend	to	be	treated	in	this	limited	
fashion	is	that	the	subject,	in	both	mainstream	and	more	critical	security	discourses,	
is	very	often	viewed	 in	terms	of	the	material	and	military	qualities	of	 the	weapons	
themselves.	However,	as	scholars	such	as	Jervis	appreciate,	of	more	importance	are	
the	 ideational	and	political	 implications	of	the	nuclear	revolution—which	are	much	
more	difficult	to	measure,	especially	given	the	secrecy	surrounding	nuclear	arsenals.	
The	 next	 step	 in	 our	 study	 must	 therefore	 be	 to	 find	 a	 means	 of	 purposefully	
investigating	 in	 more	 depth	 the	 domestic	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 nuclear	
possession	 in	 and	between	NWS	 in	order	 to	 then	understand	 the	domestic	 causes	
and	 consequences	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	 in	 and	 between	 NWS.	 First	 of	 all,	 this	
requires	 us	 to	 analyse	 the	 internal	 nuclear	 politics	 of	 each	NWS	 to	 flesh	out	what	
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Deudney’s	(2007:	250)	‘diagnosis	of	the	misfit	between	the	state	system	and	nuclear	
explosives’	means	in	practice	for	each	NWS.	By	undertaking	this	analysis	we	will	then	
be	much	better	placed	to:	 i)	appreciate	the	political	obstacles	to	and	opportunities	
for	 nuclear	disarmament	 in	 and	between	 the	NWS	 ii)	 consider	what	domestic	 and	
international	 political	 changes	 are	 required	 to	 advance	 and	 realise	 nuclear	
disarmament,	including	what	domestic	and	international	political	forces	are	needed	
to	drive	such	changes	forward.		
	
In	order	to	consider	the	requirements	of	unilateral,	bilateral	and	multilateral	nuclear	
disarmament	 action,	 in	 addition	 to	 looking	 at	 the	 circumstances	 of	 each	 NWS	
individually,	 this	 also	 means	 considering	 the	 pertinence	 of	 different	 political	
solutions.	For	example,	 if	nuclear	disarmament	 is	 to	collectively	occur	 for	 the	NWS	
will	each	NWS	ultimately	have	to	become	a	non-nuclear	democratic	republic	within	a	
global	republican	federation,	or	are	there	less	extreme	but	still	effective	options?	It	
is	reasonable	to	suggest	that	the	answer	to	this	question	will	only	become	clear	at	
some	 point	 after	 the	 disarmament	 process	 has	 begun	 and	 will	 likely	 depend	 on	
factors	such	as	the	level	of	nuclear	disarmament	required	for	each	NWS,	which	is	a	
question	 that	will	 inform	what	 the	disarmament	process	comes	 to	mean	politically	
for	each	NWS.	
	
Returning	 to	 the	question	of	how	we	can	move	beyond	our	previous	discussion	of	
the	four	mainstream	IR	traditions	and	their	approach	to	the	nuclear	revolution	and	
disarmament,	it	is	important	to	recognise	that	we	will	also	need	to	revisit	the	issue	
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of	 how	 nuclear	 disarmament	 has	 been	 justified,	 as	 previously	 outlined	 in	 Chapter	
One.	By	reviewing	the	powerful	objections	to	global	nuclear	disarmament	relating	to	
the	 stability	 of	 a	 disarmed	 world,	 and	 the	 supposed	 security	 dilemmas	 that	 this	
would	 generate,	we	 have	 gone	 part	 of	 the	way	 to	 accomplishing	 this	 task.	 This	 is	
because	we	can	both	 identify	useful	 ideas	and	 information	from	the	 literature	that	
opposes,	 is	critical	or	ambivalent	towards	the	idea	of	nuclear	disarmament	that	we	
can	adapt	and	borrow	from	and	familiarise	ourselves	with	key	arguments	we	need	to	
provide	 rebuttals	 to.	 The	 next	 step	 in	 constructing	 a	 new	 approach	 to	 nuclear	
disarmament	 thus	 involves	 drawing	 on	 existing	 ideas	 and	 analysis	 from	 the	 pro-
disarmament	 camp,	 particularly	 concerning	 the	 domestic	 and	 international	 causes	
and	 consequences	 of	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 disarmament	 and	 the	 way	 in	 which	
these	two	levels	interact.	
	
In	conducting	this	initial	survey	of	the	pro-disarmament	literature,	we	shall	focus	on	
the	 concept	 of	 institutional	 democratisation.	 This	 is	 a	 useful	 term	 to	 deploy	 here	
because	it	both	provides	a	potential	solution	to	the	absences	and	gaps	we	found	in	
our	previous	literature	review	and	because	it	captures	the	spirit	of	much	of	what	the	
disarmament	first	literature	and	movements	are	based	on	and	trying	to	accomplish.	
Before	 considering	what	 institutional	 democratisation	might	mean	 in	 practice	 as	 a	
driver	of	disarmament	and	how	it	has	been	previously	deployed	in	the	literature,	it	is	
useful	 to	 discuss	 how	 we	 may	 define	 the	 term	 given	 its	 treatment	 in	 the	 wider	
political	and	social	science	literature.		
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As	David	Held	(1992:	10),	William	E.	Hudson	(2013:	1)	and	Seva	Gunitsky	(2015)	note,	
democracy	is	a	complex	concept,	the	definition	of	which—government	or	rule	by	the	
people—raises	 many	 questions. 22 	Having	 reviewed	 several	 indexes,	 Gunitsky	
therefore	 observes	 that	 we	 should	 be	 ‘extremely	 careful’	 when	 using	 different	
measures	 of	 democracy	 given	 the	 highly	 contested	 and	 subjective	 nature	 of	 the	
topic.	 He	 recommends	 that	 we	must	 also	make	 clear	 the	 ‘inherent	 biases’	 in	 the	
measure	 chosen	 to	 identify	 ‘what	 causes	 democracy’	 and	 justify	 our	 choice	 ‘in	
relation	to	what	is	actually	being	examined’	(Ibid).	As	for	Hudson,	having	conducted	
his	 own	 review	 of	 four	 different	 models	 for	 democracy,	 his	 conclusion	 is	 that	
although	‘part	of	the	meaning	of	democracy	is	a	continued	discussion	of	the	meaning	
of	democracy’	certain	‘common	elements’	may	be	discerned,	namely,	‘popular	rule,	
equality	 and	 liberty’	 (Hudson,	 2013:	 20-21).	Held	 (1992:	 20),	meanwhile,	 proposes	
that	 if	 democracy	 is	 to	 ‘flourish’	 it	 needs	 to	 be	 reimagined	 as	 a	 ‘double-sided	
phenomenon:	concerned	on	the	one	hand,	with	the	reform	of	state	power	and,	on	
the	other	hand,	with	 the	 restructuring	of	 civil	 society’.	 This	 is	 necessary	 to	 ensure	
that	 the	 ‘active	 citizen’	 can	 once	 more	 ‘return	 to	 the	 centre	 of	 public	 life’	 and	
participate	meaningfully	in	communal	decision-making.		
																																									 																					
22	Several	other	academics	and	research	groups	have	provided	means	to	measure	democracy	(Munck	
&	Verkuilen,	2002;	Coppedge	&	Gerring	et	al,	2011).	For	example,	the	Democracy	Index	produced	by	
the	Economist	Intelligence	Unit	(EIU)	has	five	dimensions	that:		
	‘measure	the	nature	of	electoral	processes	(e.g.	 free	elections),	 functioning	of	government	
(e.g.	 checks	 and	 balances	 on	 government	 authority),	 political	 participation	 (e.g.	 voter	
turnout),	democratic	political	culture	(e.g.	popular	support	for	democracy)	and	civil	liberties	
(e.g.	a	free	press,	independent	judiciary)	in	a	country’	(McCulloch,	2014).	
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Political	 institutions,	 meanwhile,	 have	 also	 been	 defined	 in	 different	 ways.	 For	
example,	Konrad	von	Moltke	(2001:	11)	sees	them	as	‘social	conventions	or	“rules	of	
the	 game”’,	 Marie	 Gottschalk	 (2000:	 5)	 as	 ‘those	 formal	 organizations	 and	
procedures	 that	 determine	 “who	 gets	 what	 when	 and	 how”	 for	 a	 society’	 whilst	
Robert	Keohane	(1998:	383)	describes	them	as	 ‘a	general	pattern	or	categorization	
of	 activity’	 or	 a	 ‘particular	human-constructed	arrangement,	 formally	or	 informally	
organized’.	Combining	these	two	terms	together,	we	may	propose	that	institutional	
democratisation—for	the	purposes	of	this	study—refers	to	the	process	of	making	the	
institutions	 of	 each	 NWS	 that	 are	 related	 to	 nuclear	 weapons	 decision	 making	
subject	 to	 the	principles	of	popular	 rule,	equality	and	 liberty	as	part	of	an	ongoing	
discussion	regarding	the	realisation	of	the	common	good	and	sustainable	security	for	
national	 and	 international	 society.	 In	 terms	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	 more	
specifically,	 such	 processes	 of	 democracy,	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 should	
ultimately	 be	 geared	 towards	 the	 restraint	 and	 elimination	 of	 illegitimate	
concentrations	of	power	to	enable	the	dismantling	of	nuclear	weapon	systems.	
	
Robert	C.	Johansen	(1991:	210-212;	1992:	113)	has	developed	complementary	ideas	
in	his	work,	arguing	that	states	‘need	to	transform	National	Security	into	Democratic	
Security’.	 This	 is	 because	 traditional	 concepts	 of	 security	 (i.e.	 related	 to	 realism)	
discourage	 democracy	 at	 the	 international,	 domestic	 and	 individual	 level.	 By	
contrast,	democratic	 security	 ‘begins	with	 the	assumption’	 that	all	 are	 ‘entitled’	 to	
collective	and	popular	participation	 in	 ‘those	decisions	 that	profoundly	affect	 their	
lives’.	 Secondly,	 security	must	 be	 for	 ‘all	 people’	 and	not	 for	 ‘abstractions	 like	 the	
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state’	or	‘particular	governments,	governing	elites,	and	their	immediate	supporters’.		
	
Thirdly,	 democratic	 security	 entails	 the	 protection	 of	 ‘human	 dignity	 and	 widely	
agreed-upon	human	rights’.	Notably,	both	Johansen	(1991:	212)	and	Held	(1992:	11)	
propose	 a	 cosmopolitan	 approach	 to	 democracy.	 For	 example,	 the	 former	 argues	
that	global	interdependence	means	that	‘ultimately	each	of	the	world’s	governments	
must	be	held	accountable	to	all	people	affected	by	its	major	decisions,	whether	they	
live	within	 that	government’s	borders	or	not’,	whilst	 the	 latter	avers	 that	 ‘national	
democracies	 require	 international	 democracy	 if	 they	 are	 to	 be	 sustained	 and	
developed	in	the	contemporary	era’.	Overall,	Democratic	Security	as	a	concept	may	
be	seen	as	compatible	with	Deudney’s	Republican	Security	Theory,	not	least	because	
Johansen	 (1992:	 212)	 discusses	 how	 traditional	 approaches	 to	 security	 legitimise	
military	 institutions	 that	 are	 ‘hierarchical	 and	 authoritarian’	 giving	 ‘a	 tiny,	 nuclear-
armed	 set	 of	 governing	 elites	 an	 undemocratic,	 literal	 power	 over	 the	 future	 of	
civilization	and	life	itself’.		
	
Given	the	definition	and	discussion	of	institutional	democratisation	provided	above,	
the	concept	can	be	seen	as	drawing	on	and	developing	the	second	of	Scott	Sagan’s	
(1996:	 63)	 three	models	 regarding	why	 states	 build	 nuclear	weapons—namely	 the	
‘domestic	politics	model’,	which	focuses	on	the	‘domestic	actors	who	encourage	or	
discourage	governments	from	pursuing	the	bomb’.	Institutional	democratisation,	as	
we	 shall	 see,	 develops	 Sagan’s	model	 in	 important	 ways.	 This	 is	 firstly	 because	 it	
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specifically	 applies	 to	 the	 politics	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 rather	 than	why	 states	
build	the	bomb.		
	
Secondly,	 Sagan	 (Ibid:	 64)	 observes	 that	 ‘there	 is	 no	 well-developed	 domestic	
political	 theory	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 proliferation’	 that	 can	 identify	 the	 conditions	
enabling	coalitions	of	actors	 to	be	 formed	which	can	 ‘become	powerful	enough	 to	
produce	 their	 preferred	 outcomes’	 concerning	 a	 state’s	 nuclear	 choices.	 Through	
discussing	the	meaning	of	 institutional	democratisation,	this	study	seeks	to	remedy	
this	situation	by	specifying	how	domestic	nuclear	politics	works	in	each	NWS	in	order	
to	consider	what	 internal	changes	are	required	for	progress	on	disarmament	to	be	
made. 23 	In	 order	 to	 develop	 such	 approaches	 to	 fill	 the	 gap	 Sagan	 identifies	
concerning	 actor	 coalitions,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 borrow	 ideas	 from	 studies	 that	 use	 a	
domestic	politics	model	to	explore	defence	and	foreign	policy	decision-making	more	
widely.		
	
For	 example,	 Nikolas	 K.	 Gvosdev	 and	 Christopher	Marsh’s	 (2014:	 xiii,	 9),	 work	 on	
Russian	 foreign	 policy	 considers	 how	 state	 behaviour	 may	 be	 ‘disaggregated’	
according	 to	 the	 different	 ‘actors	 and	 avenues	 of	 approach’	 pushing	 and	 pulling	
policy	 in	 various,	 sometimes	 ‘contradictory’,	 directions.	 Rather	 than	 the	 state	
enacting	one	consistent	and	coherent	policy,	the	existence	of	multiple	 ‘sectors	and																																									 																					
23	The	domestic	political	sources	of	nuclear	weapons	decision-making	have	been	previously	explored	
in	the	work	of	several	authors,	including	Graham	Allison	(1971),	who	sought	to	explain	US	and	Soviet	
decision-making	during	the	Cuban	Missile	Crisis	using	a	bureaucratic	politics	model.	
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vectors’	within	the	state,	representing	different	power	centres,	can	thus	result	in	‘a	
set	of	contrasting	and	competing	foreign	policies’	(Ibid:	8).	Thirdly,	because	Sagan’s	
theory	 concerns	why	 states	 seek	 the	 bomb	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 his	 theory	 does	 not	
consider	 either	 the	 impact	 that	 nuclear	 possession	 has	 over	 time	 on	 domestic	
politics	 within	 each	 NWS—which	may	 be	 described	 as	 nuclear	 development—nor	
the	preferences	and	responses	of	the	citizens	of	NWS	to	their	state’s	nuclear	status.	
	
Robert	Dahl	 (1985)	provides	a	more	explicitly	democratic	approach	to	the	problem	
of	 nuclear	 possession	 in	 his	 Controlling	 Nuclear	 Weapons:	 Democracy	 Versus	
Guardianship.	In	this	work,	which	focuses	on	the	US	nuclear	politics,	Dahl	(Ibid:	3-7)	
pursues	a	similar	line	of	argument	to	Deudney,	stating	that	because	‘these	weapons	
have	 largely	 escaped	 the	 control	 of	 the	 democratic	 process’,	 US	 citizens	 have	
‘perhaps	 unwittingly	 adopted	 the	 Principle	 of	 Guardianship’.	 The	 idea	 of	
guardianship	 refers	 to	 the	 notion	 that	 only	 ‘a	 minority’	 of	 ‘well	 qualified’	 people	
within	 a	 state	 are	 capable	of	making	 ‘collective	decisions’.	Owing	 to	 the	 supposed	
complexity	of	nuclear	weapons,	Dahl	(Ibid:	7)	proposes	that	US	citizens	have	‘turned	
over’	decisions	 in	 this	area	 to	 ‘a	 small	group	of	people’	and	makes	 the	blunt	point	
that	‘it	is	very	far	from	clear	how,	if	at	all,	we	could	recapture	a	control	that	in	fact	
we	 have	 never	 had’.	Whilst	 Dahl	 (Ibid:	 72)	 provides	 an	 important	 investigation	 of	
how	 to	 solve	 the	 problems	 of	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 guardianship	 through	
democratic	 means,	 which	 include	 the	 development	 of	 a	 citizenry	 which	 has	
‘sufficient	 competence’	 in	 order	 to	 exercise	 ‘sufficient	 control’	 regarding	 nuclear	
decisions,	he	does	not	link	his	study	to	the	challenge	of	nuclear	disarmament.		
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However,	Dahl’s	terminology	is	useful	for	this	study	and	may	be	adapted	to	broadly	
distinguish	 between	 two	 different	 approaches	 to	 nuclear	 disarmament.	 The	 first,	
which	may	 be	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 guardianship	 model—of	 which	 cooperation	 with	
disarmament	 is	 one	 example—can	 be	 said	 to	 refer	 to	 the	 idea	 that	 existing	 NWS	
decision-making	elites	alone	are	sufficiently	capable	to	advance	the	cause	of	nuclear	
disarmament	and	that,	generally	speaking,	the	citizenry	are	not	capable	of	playing	an	
active	or	significant	role	in	this	endeavour.	As	shall	be	discussed	further	in	Part	Two	
of	this	study,	the	guardianship	model	of	nuclear	arms	control	and	disarmament	thus	
involves	a	series	of	 incremental,	step-by-step	measures	which	NWS	elites	generally	
agree	are	necessary	 and	 sufficient	 to,	 at	 the	 international	 level,	make	progress	on	
their	NPT	obligations.	The	alternative	model	 is	 institutional	democratisation,	which,	
as	we’ve	 seen,	 refers	 to	 the	 idea	 that	nuclear	weapons	decision-making	 should	be	
controlled	 by	 the	 citizens	 of	 NWS.	 Popular	 involvement	 here	 is	 vital	 given	 the	
domestic	 barriers	 to	 progress	 on	 nuclear	 arms	 control	 and	 disarmament	 involving	
existing	economic,	political	and	social	 institutions	and	the	obstructive	behaviour	of	
decision-making	 elites.	Whilst	 there	 is	 some	 overlap	 between	 the	 two	models,	 so	
that	 agreements	 and	 initiatives	 involving	 top-level	 decision-makers	 that	 contribute	
to	military	restraint	and	strategic	stability	are	of	vital	 importance,	for	example,	this	
study	ultimately	argues	that	the	guardianship	model	is,	by	its	nature	and	location	in	
the	establishment,	inherently	limited	in	terms	of	the	progress	it	can	make	on	nuclear	
disarmament.	 Institutional	democratisation	 is	 therefore	necessary	 to	drive	 forward	
and	enact	the	far-reaching	political	changes	required	by	NWS	nuclear	disarmament.	
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Despite	 Dahl	 not	 discussing	 disarmament	 in	 any	 depth,	 the	 use	 of	 institutional	
democratisation	 to	 explain	 nuclear	 disarmament	 does	 exist	 in	 the	 literature,	
although	such	works	do	not	use	this	exact	term.	Relevant	ideas	that	we	may	draw	on	
can	be	found	in	the	works	of	authors	and	scholars	such	as	Kennette	Benedict	(2016),	
Elaine	 Scarry	 (2014)	 and	 Scilla	 McClean	 (1986).24	National	 and	 international	 civil	
society	groups,	which	these	and	other	authors	have	been	involved	in,	have,	since	the	
dawn	 of	 the	 nuclear	 age,	 highlighted	 the	 role	 that	 public	 opinion—particularly	
regarding	 opposition	 to	 the	 bomb—should	 play	 in	 decisions	 of	 war	 and	 peace.	
Identifying	where	national	and	global	citizenries	stand	on	nuclear	 issues	 is	 surely	a	
vital	concern	for	any	study	of	nuclear	weapons	decision-making,	as	the	main	source	
of	 legitimacy	 for	governments	given	the	 importance	of	 the	topic,	and	shall	be	 fully	
explored	in	Part	Two.	
	
Applying	ideas	associated	with	institutional	democratisation	to	the	domestic	political	
sphere	as	a	means	of	making	progress	on	nuclear	disarmament	has	been	proposed	
by	civil	 society	groups	such	as	Oxford	Research	Group	 (ORG)	since	 the	early	1980s	
but	 has	 been	 neglected	 or	 forgotten	 as	 an	 idea	 since	 then	 by	 more	 mainstream	
discussions	of	the	topic,	despite	some	small	protest	and	research	groups	continuing	
with	related	efforts.	Such	civil	society	work	on	disarmament	is	based	on	a	belief	that	
the	 secrecy	 surrounding	 the	 development	 and	 reproduction	 of	 nuclear	 weapons																																									 																					
24	It	 is	notable	that	these	and	many	of	the	other	authors	researching	and	writing	on	the	question	of	
nuclear	disarmament	in	NWS	do	so	outside	the	mainstream	of	academia.	The	fact	they	exist	outside	
the	establishment	in	these	nations	may	in	fact	facilitate	their	ability	to	advocate	alternative	security	
policies,	including	visions	of	disarmament,	since	the	university	sector	is	part	of	state	power	and	prone	
to	reproducing	and	supporting	elite	doctrines.	
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along	with	 the	highly	 centralised	decision-making	 structures	 regarding	 their	use,	 is	
incompatible	with	and	deeply	corrosive	to	the	spirit	and	functioning	of	democracy.	
According	 to	 this	 analysis,	 for	 nuclear	 disarmament	 to	 succeed,	 each	 NWS	 must	
move	towards	a	setup	whereby	the	domestic	political	conditions	that	allow	nuclear	
weapons	to	flourish	are	no	longer	present,	or	have	been	dramatically	reduced.	Pro-
disarmament	 thinking	 has	 also	 connected	 the	question	of	 nuclear	 disarmament	 to	
the	wider	nature	of	NWS’s	defence	and	foreign	policy.	Such	authors	from	the	critical	
security,	 leftist	 and	 anti-imperialist	 tradition—particularly	 in	 the	 Western	 NWS—
place	principles	such	as	democracy,	social	justice	and	international	law	at	the	centre	
of	 their	 analysis	 and	 calls	 for	 an	 alternative	 approach	 (Gittings	&	Davis	 eds,	 1997;	
Curtis,	2003;	Monbiot,	2006;	Falk,	2014).		
	
Veteran	 US	 disarmament	 activists	 I	 interviewed	 such	 as	 Joseph	 Gerson,	 Andrew	
Lichterman	and	Jacqueline	Cabasso,	argue	that	nuclear	disarmament	is	thus	not	just	
about	nuclear	weapons	but,	especially	in	the	case	of	the	US,	requires	major	societal	
changes	given	 the	centrality	of	 the	nuclear	weapons	 complex	 to	 the	economy	and	
military	 culture.	 Nuclear	 disarmament	 therefore	will	 entail	 ‘transforming	 domestic	
power	structures’	to	‘redistribute	wealth	and	power’	as	part	of	a	democratic	process	
of	 moving	 to	 ‘environmentally	 sustainable	 economics’.	 For	 the	 US	 this	 will	 mean,	
they	argue,	 ‘popular	social	movements’	creating	a	 ‘change	 in	culture	and	ethics’	 to	
reduce	the	power	of	the	‘military-industrial	complex’.	25		
																																								 																					
25	Interviews:	AL;	JC;	JG	
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In	order	to	apply	existing	 ideas	and	approaches	from	pro-disarmament	movements	
and	make	them	relevant	to	today’s	environment,	it	is	necessary	to	conduct	a	review	
of	 the	 nuclear	 politics	 in	 and	 between	 the	 NWS	 to	 develop	 a	 theory	 of	 nuclear	
disarmament	that	is	both	rigorous	and	up-to-date.	I	shall	explain	further	in	Part	Two	
how	 this	 investigation	 shall	 proceed,	 suffice	 to	 say	 here	 that	 important	
considerations	 which	 need	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 account	 to	 illustrate	 the	 value	 of	 an	
approach	 based	 on	 institutional	 democratisation	 include:	 i)	 the	 strategic	 power	 of	
each	NWS	and	their	strategic	relations	ii)	the	regime	type	of	each	NWS	e.g.	more	or	
less	 authoritarian	 or	 democratic	 iii)	 the	 past,	 present	 and	 future	 causes	 and	
consequences	of	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament	for	each	NWS.		
	
As	we	have	 seen,	 realist	authors	are	 skeptical	of	 the	potential	 for	democratisation	
alone	to	succeed	in	creating	the	conditions	for	international	peace	and	security.	For	
example,	Niebuhr	(Craig:	2006,	52)	argues	that	anarchy	will	prevail	until	all	the	great	
powers	became	democratic.	Secondly,	Waltz	draws	on	the	historical	record	to	argue	
that	even	 if	a	state	 is	or	becomes	democratic	 it	will	still	be	prone	to	conflict	under	
anarchy.	 He	 also	 argues	 that	 it	 is	 unrealistic	 for	 peace	 and	 stability	 to	 rely	 on	 all	
democracies	 being	 of	 a	 similar	 nature.	 Several	 points	 can	 be	made	 in	 response	 to	
these	 observations,	 the	 first	 being	 that	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 make	 a	 definitive	
judgment	about	the	future	impacts	of	democratisation	on	the	international	system.	
Secondly,	there	needs	to	be	some	objective	measurement	of	how	democratic	a	state	
is	 in	order	to	make	useful	assessments,	principally	because	Waltz’s	case	studies	do	
not	 include	 modern	 democracies	 or	 those	 with	 more	 developed	 democratic	
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processes.	 Thirdly,	 Deudney’s	 Republican	 Security	 Theory	 goes	 some	 way	 to	
potentially	solving	the	problems	posed	by	both	anarchy	and	hierarchy	by	proposing	a	
third	 way	 i.e.	 negarchy.	 However,	 Deudney	 does	 not	 himself	 propose	 a	 theory	 of	
nuclear	disarmament	or	one	 sympathetic	 to	 it,	 and,	despite	emphasising	 the	need	
for	democratic	 legitimacy,	does	not	develop	a	 theory	of	political	change	to	explain	
how	his	proposals	may	be	realised.	
	
Having	 briefly	 considered	 what	 institutional	 democratisation	 pursuant	 to	 nuclear	
disarmament	might	mean	on	a	domestic	level,	based	on	past	and	present	work	from	
academic	 and	 civil	 society,	 it	 is	 appropriate	 to	 finish	 this	 section	 by	 outlining	 the	
work	 of	 international	 civil	 society	 and	 global	 governance	 with	 relevance	 to	 the	
nuclear	 revolution	and	disarmament.	This	 is	also	 important	 to	consider	 in	order	 to	
identify	 potential	 international	 sources	 of	 political	 change.	 As	 noted	 above,	 in	
addition	 to	 nationally	 based	 civil	 society	 (primarily	 in	 France,	 the	 UK	 and	 US)	
engaging	in	pro-disarmament	action—including	education,	protest	and	research—as	
reviewed	 in	 the	 unique	 historical	 work	 of	 Lawrence	 Wittner	 (2009),	 a	 vibrant	
international	peace	and	disarmament	movement	exists	whose	 ideas	and	proposals	
need	 to	be	 taken	 into	account.	Global	as	well	 as	national	public	opinion	 is	 also	an	
important	 indicator	 of	 the	 people’s	 will	 regarding	 nuclear	 issues	 and	 should	 be	
studied	 when	 crafting	 recommendations	 for	 new	 and	 reformed	 policies	 and	
institutions.	 For	 example,	 recent	 global	 public	 opinion	 polls	 appear	 to	 show	
widespread	support	for	the	goal	of	a	NWFW	and	shall	be	explored	in	full	in	Part	Two	
of	this	study.	
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Yet	realist	thought	often	sidelines	such	evidence,	instead	claiming	that	the	domestic	
nature	of	states,	regimes,	groups	or	 individuals	 is	 irrelevant	to	nuclear	decisions	or	
outcomes	 (Solingen,	 2007:	 11).	 Indeed,	 as	we’ve	 seen,	Mearsheimer	 (2001:	 77-78)	
posits	 that	 actors	 can	 be	 treated	 as	 ‘black	 boxes	 or	 billiard	 balls’	 because	 the	
international	 system	 itself	 causes	 conflict.	 Ole	 Holsti	 (1992,	 2012)	 argues	 that	
‘realists’	 of	 all	 stripes	 (including	 Morgenthau	 in	 his	 earlier	 writings)	 have	 thus	
generally	seen	public	opinion	as	 ‘largely	 irrelevant	 in	the	conduct	of	foreign	affairs’	
because	of	its	volatility	and	lack	of	coherent	structure.	Importantly,	where	the	public	
has	 preferences	 which	 are	 ‘allegedly	 driven	 by	 emotions	 and	 short-term	
considerations’,	 realist	 thought	 has	 tended	 to	 present	 officials	 and	 leaders	 as	
rational	and	cool-headed.	
	
However	research	conducted	in	several	democracies,	including	in	Europe,	Japan	and	
the	US,	has	found	that	where	anti-nuclear	weapons	public	opinion,	protest	and	civil	
society	activism	exists,	it	has	exerted	an	influence	on	the	degree	and	type	of	action	
taken	 by	 governments.	 This	 corresponds	 to	 Thomas	 Risse-Kappen’s	 (1991:	 510)	
finding	 that	 whilst	 mass	 public	 opinion	 in	 liberal	 democracies	 rarely	 has	 a	 ‘direct	
affect’	 on	 ‘policy	 decisions	 or	 the	 implementation	 of	 specific	 policies’,	 it	 does	 ‘set	
broad	and	unspecified	limits’	to	‘foreign	policy	choices’.	It	has	thus	been	argued	that	
civil	 society	 action	 has	 been	 significantly	 responsible	 for	 increased	 cooperation	 on	
arms	control	(Knopf,	1998),	the	creation	of	nuclear	weapons	free	zones	and	moves	
to	ban	nuclear	testing	(Wittner,	2009),	the	development	of	a	taboo	against	the	use	
of	nuclear	weapons	(Tannenwald,	2008)	and	the	decision	by	a	number	of	states	to	
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exercise	 restraint	 and	 not	 seek	 to	 acquire	 the	 bomb	 (Rublee,	 2009).	 Rather	 than	
being	emotional	and	unstable	therefore,	Holsti	(1992:	447)	posits	a	‘rational	public’	
thesis	suggesting	the	public	is	a	source	of	‘moderation	and	continuity	rather	than	of	
instability	and	unpredictability’.	
	
As	well	 as	examining	 civil	 society	action	on	nuclear	disarmament,	we	also	need	 to	
consider	how	scholars	have	studied	civil	society	and	global	governance	literatures	to	
identify	 relevant	 debates	 that	 we	 may	 utilise	 for	 our	 inquiry.	 From	 an	 initial	 and	
limited	 review	 of	 this	 literature,	 it	 is	 noticeable	 that	 nuclear	 weapons	 and	
disarmament	are	only	engaged	with	in	passing,	if	at	all	(Armstrong	et	al	2011;	Burnell	
&	Calvert	eds,	2004;	Wilkinson	ed.,	2005;	Kratochwil	&	Mansfield	eds,	2006;	Colas,	
2002;	 Stout	 &	 Love,	 2016,	 Weiss,	 2013;	 Keane,	 2003).	 Some	 notable	 exceptions,	
which	present	a	fuller	analysis,	do	exist—including	works	by	Richard	Falk	(2014)	and	
Mary	Kaldor	(2003:	12)—with	the	latter	tracing	the	conceptual	origins	of	global	civil	
society	to	the	dialogue	between	the	‘West	European	peace	movement	and	the	East	
European	 opposition’	 in	 the	 1980s.	 Yet	 in	 other	 prominent	 works	 the	 subject	 is	
absent—a	silence	that	is	particularly	striking	given	the	historic	weight	ascribed	to	the	
nuclear	revolution	by	scholars	such	as	Waltz.	More	widely,	academics	such	as	David	
Armstrong,	Julie	Gilson	(2011:	6-7)	and	Alejandro	Colas	(2002:	62)	highlight	the	fact	
that	civil	society	groups	may	not	always	consistently	act	in	accountable,	democratic	
and	 liberal	 ways,	 meaning	 that	 we	 should	 remain	 cautious	 when	 assessing	 their	
claims	to	political	legitimacy	and	potential	contribution	to	disarmament.	
	
	 152	
Of	the	many	challenges	involved	in	nuclear	disarmament	then,	the	fact	that	the	civil	
society	 and	 global	 governance	 literature	 appears	 not	 to	 consistently	 and	 fully	
recognise	that	it	is	desirable	or	realisable,	or	engage	substantively	with	the	extensive	
mainstream	 IR	 and	 strategic	 studies	 literature	 covering	 nuclear	 issues,	 is	
problematic.	 Yet	 whilst	 not	 all	 those	 studying	 civil	 society	 and	 global	 governance	
mention	 nuclear	 issues	 important	 issues	 of	 relevance	 to	 this	 inquiry	 are	 clearly	
raised.	For	example,	Thomas	Weiss	(2013:	25)	has	put	forward	global	governance	as	
a	 ‘halfway	 house’	 between	 anarchy	 and	 world	 government.	 For	 Weiss,	 global	
governance	 makes	 cooperation	 easier,	 a	 proposal	 complementary	 to	 Deudney’s	
explanation	 of	 negarchy	 and	 Republican	 Security	 theory	 as	 being	 a	 constitutional	
alternative	 to	 anarchy	 and	hierarchy.	Notwithstanding	 the	 challenges	noted	 above	
then,	it	will	be	important	for	this	study	to	both	understand	how	a	theory	of	nuclear	
disarmament	 relates	 to	 discourses	 concerning	 civil	 society	 and	 global	 governance	
and	 draw	 on	 the	 relevant	 knowledge	 accumulated	 in	 these	 areas	 by	 the	 scholarly	
literature.	
	
Summary		
	
This	 chapter’s	 review	of	 the	 range	of	 approaches	 from	within	and	without	 realism	
that	 engage	 with	 the	 nuclear	 revolution	 made	 several	 useful	 discoveries.	 For	
example,	 each	 of	 these	 approaches	 contained	 both	 descriptive	 and	 prescriptive	
elements,	with	authors	basing	their	response	to	the	nuclear	revolution	on	what	they	
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see	as	most	beneficial	 for	national	and	 international	 security	and	 the	avoidance	of	
nuclear	war.	However,	in	doing	so,	US	security	was	treated	as	paramount	by	many	of	
these	 authors,	 with	 some,	 such	 as	 Mearsheimer	 and	 O’Hanlon,	 advocating	 a	
particularly	nationalistic	 approach.	Meanwhile,	 nuclear	disarmament	was	generally	
either	 seen	 as	 an	 enterprise	 that	 is	 undesirable	 and	 unrealisable—or	 potentially	
beneficial,	albeit	with	several	strong	qualifications	and	reservations	attached.	These	
barriers	to	disarmament,	it	was	argued,	derive	from	the	significant	political,	technical	
and	 diplomatic	 difficulties	 faced	 at	 the	 domestic	 and	 international	 levels.	 Whilst	
none	 of	 the	 authors	 reviewed	 thus	 explicitly	 advocated	 nuclear	 disarmament,	
significantly	 engaged	 with	 the	 pro-disarmament	 literature	 and	 its	 arguments,	
differentiated	 between	 its	 unilateral,	 bilateral	 and	 multilateral	 forms	 in	 their	
discussion,	 or	 dealt	 substantively	 with	 the	 domestic	 politics	 of	 nuclear	 possession	
and	 disarmament,	 each	 still	 raises	 important	 issues	 that	 any	 theory	 of	 nuclear	
disarmament	must	engage	with	in	order	to	provide	a	well-rounded	analysis.		
	
These	issues	include	those	both	of	a	more	abstract	and	theoretical	as	well	as	a	more	
concrete	and	political	type,	such	as:	i)	whether	nuclear	disarmament	within	anarchy	
is	possible	or	whether	 it	 can	only	happen	within	negarchy	or	hierarchy	 ii)	whether	
nuclear	disarmament	would	necessarily	 lead	 to	anarchy	being	 replaced	by	another	
system	 and	 the	 type	 of	 domestic,	 regional	 and	 global	 political	 and	 security	
frameworks	it	necessitates	iii)	how	regional	and	international	peace	and	security	can	
best	be	managed	before,	during	and	after	nuclear	disarmament	iv)	the	principles	on	
which	 power	 transitions	 supportive	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	 should	 be	 based	 e.g.	
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democracy,	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 v)	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 nuclear	
disarmament	 requires	domestic	 political	 change	and	 international	 political	 change,	
including	 cooperation	 between	 NPS/NWS	 to	 mitigate	 fear	 and	 uncertainty	 vi)	 the	
domestic	 and	 international	 political	 forces	 required	 by	 progressive	 nuclear	
disarmament	 action	 vii)	 how	 national	 and	 universal	 political	 identities	 and	
institutions	can	be	reconciled.	
	
Having	 identified	 these	problems	and	questions,	our	next	natural	and	 logical	move	
would	be	to	propose	an	alternate	approach	or	theory	of	nuclear	disarmament	that	
may	 be	 tested	 against	 empirical	 evidence,	which	 in	 this	 instance	would	 centre	 on	
nuclear	 politics	 in	 and	 between	 the	NWS.	 Regarding	 the	 latter	 exercise,	which	we	
began	to	outline	above,	the	fact	remains	that	any	investigation	of	the	political	causes	
and	consequences	of	nuclear	disarmament	would	be	necessarily	speculative	since	it	
covers	something	that	has	and	is	not	happening.		
	
We	are	thus	faced	with	the	methodological	problem	of	how	to	‘test’	any	theory	we	
may	 construct.	 For	 example,	 our	 preceding	 discussion	 leads	 us	 to	 make	 two	
important	 proposals.	 Firstly,	 that	 the	 nuclear	 revolution	 occurred	 at	 both	 the	
international	and	domestic	levels,	but	the	latter	development	has	not	been	properly	
recognised	by	mainstream	IR	and	political	scholars	nor	fully	explored	historically,	or	
in	relation	to	the	political	institutions	of	the	present	day.	Secondly,	that	in	order	for	
nuclear	disarmament	to	occur,	appropriate,	concurrent	and	complementary	political	
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change	needs	to	take	place	at	both	levels.	To	this	end,	institutional	democratisation	
is	 a	 concept	which	 could	 both	 fill	 the	 gaps	 identified	 in	 our	 literature	 review	 and	
which	 provides	 a	way	 forward	 by	 suggesting	 the	 type	 of	 legitimate	 and	 necessary	
political	 forces	 and	 processes	 that	 nuclear	 disarmament	 requires	 and	 will	 benefit	
from	at	 both	 the	domestic	 and	 international	 levels.	 Testing	 this	 theory	would	 first	
mean	 investigating	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 nuclear	 possession	 in	 and	
between	 the	NWS	 to	 show	how	an	analysis	 that	 takes	 the	domestic	 impact	of	 the	
nuclear	revolution	into	account	adds	significant	explanatory	value	in	terms	of	each	of	
these	 state’s	 nuclear	 histories	 and	 present	 circumstances.	 Having	 done	 this,	 the	
second,	 more	 normative	 and	 speculative	 step	 would	 be	 to	 propose	 a	 theory	 of	
political	change	that	supports	the	goal	of	nuclear	disarmament	in	and	between	NWS.		
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PART	TWO	
Obstacles	 to	 and	 opportunities	 for	 nuclear	 disarmament	 in	 and	 between	 the	
nuclear	weapon	states	
	
In	Part	One	many	of	 the	key	problems	associated	with	nuclear	disarmament	were	
introduced	 and	 its	 meaning	 and	 significance,	 and	 the	 different	 ways	 it	 has	 been	
conceptualised,	discussed.	One	key	finding	was	that	mainstream	and	realist	works	on	
the	causes	and	consequences	of	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament	mainly	focus	
on	 the	military-security	 challenges	presented	by	 the	anarchic	 international	 system,	
with	abolition	largely	seen	as	an	undesirable	and	distant,	if	not	impossible,	prospect.	
Due	to	the	limitations	of	these	analyses,	the	concept	of	institutional	democratisation	
was	developed	as	a	means	of	rebalancing	the	study	of	nuclear	politics	towards	the	
domestic	 level	as	a	precursor	 to	exploring	how	domestic	and	 international	nuclear	
politics	interact	to	prevent	NWS	nuclear	disarmament	taking	place.	Moreover,	it	was	
also	necessary	to	develop	a	coherent	theory	of	political	change	for	nuclear	abolition	
in	order	to	build	on,	refine	and	update	existing	ideas	and	proposals.	
	
In	 order	 to	 provide	 some	means	 of	 testing	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	 institutional	
democratisation,	 we	 shall,	 in	 Chapters	 Three	 to	 Seven	 in	 the	 second	 part	 of	 this	
study,	 engage	 in	 a	 series	 of	 in-depth	 analyses	 of	 the	 nuclear	weapons	 systems	 of	
each	of	 the	 five	NWS	 in	order	of	 their	acquiring	 the	bomb:	US,	Russia,	UK,	France,	
China.	 The	 point	 of	 doing	 this	 is	 to	 further	 show	 how	 the	 various	 theories	 and	
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approaches	 outlined	 in	 Chapter	 Two	 fail	 to	 capture	 the	 political	 dynamics	 that	
frustrate	nuclear	disarmament	and	how	these	might	be	overcome	through	adopting	
an	 approach	 based	 on	 institutional	 democratisation.	 Following	 this,	 Chapter	 Eight	
will	summarise	the	relationships	and	interactions	between	NWS,	contextualising	this	
in	 terms	of	 the	wider	sphere	of	global	nuclear	order,	and	by	providing	conclusions	
and	 recommendations	 supportive	 of	 institutional	 democratisation	 on	 a	 national	
level.	
	
In	terms	of	the	flow	of	the	five	NWS	case	studies	presented	below,	each	has	broadly	
the	 same	 structure,	 beginning	 with	 a	 section	 that	 provides	 an	 overview	 of	 how	
mainstream	 and	 realist	 theory	 explains	 the	 politics	 of	 nuclear	 possession	 and	
disarmament	for	the	NWS	in	question,	followed	by	an	overview	of	how	institutional	
democratisation—and	ideas	supportive	of	this	concept—do	the	same.	Both	of	these	
sections	 examine	 these	 theories	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 historical	 record	 and	
contemporary	 scholarship	 with	 the	 goal	 of	 showing	 how	 institutional	
democratisation	brings	value	to	the	existing	literature	in	relation	to	the	question	of	
the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 NWS	 nuclear	 disarmament.	 In	 addition,	 both	
sections	have	a	historical	 focus	because	 they	explore	different	perspectives	on	 the	
origins	and	development	of	 the	bomb	 in	each	NWS,	 for	example,	 in	 the	context	of	
World	War	 Two	 and	 the	 Cold	War.	 This	 is	 done	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 current	
meanings	and	value	assigned	to	nuclear	possession	by	elites	and	the	wider	society	in	
each	NWS,	in	order	to	then	appreciate	the	politics	of	nuclear	disarmament	for	each	
NWS.	
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In	 outlining	 the	 limitations	 to	 mainstream	 and	 realist	 explanations	 of	 nuclear	
possession	and	disarmament	for	each	NWS	the	point	is	not	to	throw	out	in	entirety	
the	 claims	 and	 ideas	 contained	 therein,	 for	 example,	 regarding	 the	 flaws	 of	
cooperation	with	disarmament	and	the	guardianship	approach	to	arms	control	and	
disarmament.	Rather,	our	aim	is	to	highlight	and	increase	in	emphasis	the	important	
role	 domestic	 political	 factors	 play	 in	 nuclear	 weapons	 decision-making	 as	 the	
precursor	 to	 discussing	 and	 evaluating	 the	 validity	 of	 institutional	 democratisation	
for	 a	 nuclear	 disarmament	 process	 applicable	 to	 the	 circumstances	 of	 each	 NWS.	
Having	identified	and	compared	different	perspectives	on	the	history	of	NWS	nuclear	
possession,	 each	 chapter	 then	 includes	 a	 section	 that	 applies	 the	 theory	 of	
institutional	democratisation	to	post-Cold	War	nuclear	politics	for	each	NWS.	This	is	
done,	 for	 example,	 by	 focusing	 on	 the	 domestic	 political	 obstacles	 to	 and	
opportunities	 for	 disarmament	 and	 the	 contemporary	 strategic	 challenges	 facing,	
and	 problems	 of	 international	 cooperation	 relating	 to,	 nuclear	 disarmament	 that	
NWS	face	today.	
	
In	terms	of	the	size	of	these	case	studies,	the	chapters	for	Russia	and	the	US	are	far	
lengthier	than	the	chapters	on	the	UK,	France	and	China.	This	is	for	several	reasons,	
including	the	great	size	of	Russia	and	the	US’s	nuclear	arsenals,	 the	fact	that	these	
two	 nations	 were	 the	 key	 participants	 in	 the	 Cold	War	 nuclear	 standoff,	 and	 the	
availability	and	scale	of	the	 literature	on	nuclear	 issues	for	these	two	states.	Given	
the	importance	of	Cold	War	politics	to	the	development	of	nuclear	weapons	in	the	
US	and	the	then	Soviet	Union,	and	the	impact	this	conflict	had	on	the	other	NWS,	I	
	 159	
also	 include,	 for	 these	 two	case	studies,	a	discussion	of	 competing	explanations	of	
the	origins	of	the	Cold	War,	based	on	what	Andrew	H.	Kydd	(2005:	80)	describes	as	
the	 ‘motivations	and	beliefs	of	 the	two	sides’.	For	example,	 I	argue	that	whilst	 the	
mainstream	and	realist	approaches	reviewed	in	Chapter	Two	have	diverse	outlooks,	
generally	 speaking,	 they	best	correspond	to	what	Kydd	 (Ibid:	3)	describes	as	 ‘post-
revisionist’	 or	 ‘traditionalist’	 perspectives	 on	 the	meaning	 of	 the	 Cold	War	 and	 its	
aftermath.	The	former	position	traces	the	origins	of	this	conflict	‘to	mistrust’,	so	that	
the	 two	 superpowers	 were	 both	 security	 seekers,	 but	 their	 ‘desire	 for	 security	
propelled	 them	 into	 conflict’	 and	 a	 highly	 tense	 nuclear	 standoff	 (Ibid:	 4).	 As	 for	
traditionalism,	this	is	more	commonly	found	in	the	non-scholarly	literature,	including	
from	more	hawkish	US	military	and	government	 sources.	As	Kydd	 (Ibid:	82)	notes,	
this	 position	 presents	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 as	 an	 ‘inherently	 expansionist	 power,	
interested	 in	 exploiting	 cooperation,	 not	 reciprocating	 it,	 that	 is,	 untrustworthy’	
whilst	 the	US	 is	 ‘coded	as	a	 security	 seeker;	 trusting	at	 first,	 and	 then	 increasingly	
fearful	as	time	went	by’.	
	
The	 specific	 claims	 and	 ideas	 of	 institutional	 democratisation,	 meanwhile,	
correspond	better	to	revisionist	and	other	critical	perspectives	on	the	Cold	War	and	
US	global	strategy.	For	example,	revisionist	accounts	of	the	Cold	War,	as	Kydd	(Ibid:	
4,	 83)	 explains,	 argue	 that	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 was	 ‘primarily	 defensively	 motivated	
while	the	capitalist	West	was	the	imperialistic	and	aggressive	party’.	‘Orwellianism’,	
meanwhile,	contends	that	both	superpowers	were	expansionist	so	that	the	Cold	War	
was	‘nontragic’.	Notably,	it	is	often	the	case	that	the	critical	nuclear	literature,	which	
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is	supportive	of	or	compatible	with	institutional	democratisation,	adopts	a	revisionist	
or	 Orwellian	 approach	 to	 the	 Cold	 War.	 Overall,	 introducing	 a	 discussion	 of	
competing	historical	perspectives	in	these	sections,	I	argue,	helps	to	both	clarify	the	
differences	between	various	perspectives	on	nuclear	politics	and	provide	a	coherent	
and	clear	framework	within	which	we	can	develop	more	specific	claims	about	US	and	
Russian	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament.	
	
In	addition,	 for	the	US	chapter,	a	section	 is	 included	that	highlights	the	 idea	of	the	
NWS—and	 the	US	 in	 particular—having	 dual	 nuclear	 disarmament	 responsibilities,	
both	 to	 eliminate	 their	 nuclear	 arsenals	 (and	 thus	 transition	 to	 FNWS	 status)	 and	
contribute	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 NWFW.	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 former,	 the	 NWS	 made		
commitments	 at	 the	 2010	NPT	 Review	 Conference	 to:	 i)	 reduce	 the	 salience—the	
role	and	significance—of	nuclear	weapons	in	their	national	security	policy26	ii)	‘apply	
the	 principles	 of	 irreversibility,	 verifiability	 and	 transparency	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
implementation	 of	 their	 treaty	 obligations’,	 for	 example,	 on	 nuclear	 disarmament	
(United	 Nations,	 2010).	 Regarding	 China,	 France,	 the	 UK	 and	 Russia’s	 relative	
strategic	power,	these	nations	have	limited	power	projection	capabilities	so	they	do	
not	 play	 a	 comparable	 role	 to	 the	 US	 in	 terms	 of	 other	 state’s	 strategic	 thinking,	
including	 regarding	nuclear	weapons.	 Thus,	whilst	 all	NWS	have	dual	disarmament	
																																								 																					
26	As	noted	in	Chapter	1,	aspects	of	NWS’s	current	nuclear	policies	which	could	be	changed	to	reduce	
the	salience	of	nuclear	weapons	in	national	security	policy	(also	potentially	as	moves	towards	a	VNA	
as	 part	 of	 the	 transition	 to	 disarmament)	 concern:	 i)	 acquisition:	what	 kit	 is	 bought	 and	 owned	 ii)	
declaratory:	 public	 statements	 about	 the	 role	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 iii)	 deployment:	 how	 nuclear	
weapons	 are	 arranged	 and	 positioned	 iv)	 employment:	 the	 circumstances	 and	 ways	 in	 which	 the	
government	plans	to	use	nuclear	weapons	to	achieve	strategic	aims.	
	 161	
responsibilities,	these	are,	albeit	to	varying	degrees,	much	less	significant	than	that	
of	the	US.	For	this	reason,	and	given	the	limited	space	available	to	this	study,	I	have	
not	 included	 a	 separate	 section	 on	 this	 issue	 in	 the	 chapters	 on	 Russia,	 the	 UK,	
France	and	China.		
	
On	an	official	level,	it	is	worth	noting	here	that	the	NWS	collectively	argue	that	they	
will	be	able	to	completely	fulfill	their	nuclear	disarmament	obligations	only	as	part	of	
a	 multilateral	 and	 ‘incremental,	 step-by-step	 approach’,	 involving	 themselves	 and	
the	 other	NPS,	 as	 noted	 in	 the	 ‘P5’s’	 joint	 statements	 (P5	 Statement,	 2015:	 2).	 In	
general	 therefore,	 at	 an	 inter-governmental	 level	 involving	 the	 NWS,	 emphasis	 is	
placed	 on	 the	 need	 for	 top-level	 decision	 makers	 to	 create	 the	 conditions	 for	
international	cooperation,	which	 is	 typical	of	 the	guardianship	approach	to	nuclear	
arms	 control	 and	 disarmament.	 As	 we	 saw	 in	 Chapter	 Two,	 many	 international	
relations	 scholars	 also	 promote	 this	 approach,	 although	 some,	 such	 as	 Glaser,	 do	
recognise	 the	 role	 domestic	 politics	 and	 sub-national	 groups	 play	 in	 driving	 arms	
races	and	conflict.	
	
The	next	 issue	 to	 consider	 is	what	method	 should	 be	 adopted	 in	 order	 to	 analyse	
NWS	 bearing	 all	 the	 above	 in	mind.	 Clearly,	 we	 need	 to	 consider	 state	 behaviour	
from	both	a	domestic	and	foreign	perspective,	so	we	can	appreciate	the	national	and	
international	 character	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 decision-making.	 But	 we	 also	 need	 to	
recognise	the	different	political	forces	at	play	within	each	NWS	and	neither	treat	the	
state	as	a	monolithic	entity	nor	mystify	the	process	by	which	the	ideas	and	materials	
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necessary	 for	 the	 perpetuation	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 systems	 are	 actively	 being	
reproduced.27		
	
Recognising	 the	 provisional	 nature	 of	 the	 state	 and	 state	 practices	 allows	 us	 to	
approach	NWS	behavior,	past	and	present,	with	a	fresh	and	critical	eye	as	required	
by	this	study	given	its	intention	to	examine	the	potential	for	transformative	nuclear	
disarmament	action.	The	approach	I	take	to	NWS	nuclear	weapons	decision-making	
may	thus	be	described	as	institutional-historical.	In	addition,	given	the	centralisation	
of	 such	 decision-making	 power	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 very	 small	 military	 and	 political	
groups	across	NWS,	it	is	important	to	be	clear	that	when	referring	to	one	or	more	of	
these	 ‘states’,	 we	 mean	 political	 executives	 whose	 actions	 principally	 reflect	 the	
interests	and	will	of	private	concentrations	of	economic,	social	and	political	power,	
rather	than	the	citizenry	at	large.	
	
As	 a	 point	 of	 departure,	we	may	 identify	 a	 few	 of	 the	 similarities	 and	 differences	
between	 NWS	 that	 raise	 interesting	 questions.	 For	 example,	 whilst	 some	 of	 the	
NWS’s	 governmental	 structures	 or	 ‘regime	 types’	 have	 more	 similarities	 than	
others—such	as	France,	the	UK	and	the	US—as	formally	 ‘liberal	democracies’,	 they	
																																								 																					
27	Nick	Ritchie	(2012:	190)	summarises	this	eloquently	when	he	argues	that	‘the	social,	political,	and	
technological	systems,	meanings,	conceptual	apparatus,	and	institutions	that	facilitate	the	production	
and	deployment	of	 nuclear	weapons	 are	not	 inevitable	 or	 enduring	but	must	 be	 actively	 sustained	
and	reproduced	over	time.	In	fact,	it	is	the	contingent	nature	of	this	nuclear	weapons	system	or	actor-
network	that	allows	for	the	possibility	of	its	collapse’.			
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are,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 all	 unique	 in	 terms	of	 history	 and	 culture.	How	have	 these	
different	 regime	 types,	 cultures	 and	 histories	 impacted	 on	 nuclear	 weapons	
decision-making	 and	 arguments	 concerning	 nuclear	 disarmament?	 Or,	 is	 it	 more	
pertinent	to	consider,	as	scholars	such	as	McLean	(1986)	and	Miall	(1987)	have	done,	
the	similarities	between	processes	of	nuclear	weapons	decision-making	across	NWS?	
For	 example,	 is	 it	 reasonable	 to	 conceptualise	 nuclear	 weapon	 'systems'	 as	 a	
singularly	 elite,	 military-technical	 culture	 shared	 across	 NWS?	 Again,	 if	 this	 is	 the	
case,	what	does	this	mean	for	the	project	of	nuclear	disarmament	today?	As	well	as	
considering	the	factors	reinforcing	the	continuation	of	nuclear	weapons	possession	
and	modernisation,	 there	 is	 also	 the	 important	question	of	what	 countervailing	or	
opposing	forces	to	the	status	quo	exist,	both	nationally	and	internationally.	Based	on	
this	understanding,	and	the	requirements	of	institutional	democratisation,	questions	
we	 should	 consider	 in	more	 detail	 include:	what	 do	 recent	 public	 opinion	 polls	 in	
NWS	 and	 globally	 regarding	 nuclear	 weapons	 issues	 mean	 for	 the	 prospects	 of	
nuclear	disarmament	and,	more	broadly,	what	shape	are	national	and	global	nuclear	
disarmament	movements	in	today?		
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Chapter	Three:	United	States	of	America		
Introduction	
	
As	 outlined	 above,	 this	 chapter	 provides	 an	 in-depth	 investigation	 of	 US	 nuclear	
politics	 in	 order	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	US	 nuclear	
possession	 and	 disarmament	 and	 reveal	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	 institutional	
democratisation.	The	sizable	space	and	detail	given	to	the	discussion	of	the	US	in	this	
chapter	is,	as	noted	above,	justified	by	both	the	scale	and	global	importance	of	the	
US	military	and	nuclear	establishments—which	create	the	high	level	of	responsibility	
the	US	has	if	nuclear	disarmament	is	to	be	realised	in	and	between	NWS—and	by	the	
absence	of	an	adequate	analysis	of	domestic	nuclear	politics	in	the	mainstream	and	
realist	works	reviewed	in	Chapter	Two.	
	
The	chapter	begins	with	a	summary	of	how	the	mainstream	and	realist	approaches	
explored	in	Chapter	Two	relate	to	the	US’s	particular	experience	as	a	NWS	and	how	
the	US’s	nuclear	status	has	been	justified	by	government	and	military	officials	as	well	
as	 scholars	 over	 time.	 This	 is	 principally	 done	 by	 placing	 the	US’s	 development	 of	
nuclear	weapons	within	the	context	of	relevant	historical	events	from	the	mid	to	late	
20th	and	early	21st	century—focusing,	in	particular,	on	the	Cold	War.	The	next	section	
begins	 the	 process	 of	 showing	 how	 the	 US’s	 experience	 as	 a	 NWS	 illustrates	 the	
limitations	 of	 the	 previously	 reviewed	mainstream	 claims	 and	 approaches	 and	 the	
ways	 in	which	 institutional	 democratisation	 helps	us	better	 understand	 the	 causes	
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and	consequences	of	US	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament.		
	
It	is	important	to	distinguish	here	between	the	discourse	concerning	the	causes	and	
consequences	 of	 US	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 disarmament	 in	 the	 academic	
international	relations	literature	explored	in	Chapter	Two	and	that	in	other	spheres	
where	 nuclear	matters	 are	most	 prominently	 discussed,	 for	 example,	 state	 bodies	
(whether	military	or	civilian)	thinktanks	and	NGOs.	Perhaps	the	main	difference	with	
nuclear	 thought	 outside	 of	 academia	 is	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 theoretical	 approach	 to	
international	 politics,	 whereby	 abstract	 concepts	 such	 as	 anarchy	 rarely	 explicitly	
feature	in	debates	concerning	US	nuclear	weapons	and	national	security.28	As	we	will	
see,	 one	may,	 for	 this	 reason,	 label	 the	 ideas	 discussed	 below	 as	 generally	 fitting	
within	 the	 realist	 camp,	 given	 their	 assumptions	 about	 society,	 politics	 and	 the	
causes	of	conflict,	whilst	they	are	not	structurally	realist.	In	addition,	and	as	noted	in	
the	 introduction	 to	 this	 chapter,	 the	 scholarly	 work	 we	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Two	
generally	fits	within	a	post-revisionist	approach	to	the	Cold	War	whilst	mainstream	
non-academic	 justifications	 often	 tend	 to	 adopt	 a	 traditionalist	 perspective—with	
the	 Soviet	 Union	 presented	 as	 having	 posed	 an	 expansionist	 threat	 to	 a	 security-
seeking	 and	 trusting	 US	 (Kydd,	 2005:	 82).	 Notably,	 whilst	 these	 historical	
perspectives	 differ	 as	 a	 whole	 from	 those	 that	 I	 argue	 are	more	 compatible	 with	
institutional	democratisation,	there	are	also	several	areas	of	factual	agreement	and	
																																								 																					
28	Whilst	this	is	an	important	difference	one	can	only	provide	informed	speculation	on	the	reasons	for	
it	being	so.	For	example,	it	may	be	because	scholarship’s	legitimacy	in	this	area	is	based	on	claims	of	
independence	 and	 objectivity	 whilst	 government’s	 legitimacy	 in	 this	 area	 is	 based	 on	 claims	 of	
popular	representation	and	ensuring	national	security	from	prevalent	external	threats.	
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overlap.	
	
It	 is	 therefore	 useful	 to	 review	 prominent	military	 analysts,	 historians	 and	 official	
state	narratives	to	see	how	explanations	for	US	nuclear	possession	have	developed	
over	 time.	 In	 such	 accounts,	 the	 justification	 for	 the	 US’s	 development	 and	 then	
continued	possession	of	a	nuclear	arsenal	 focuses	on	 the	 threat	posed	by	external	
enemies—beginning	with	Nazi	Germany	during	WW2,	 the	 Soviet	Union	during	 the	
Cold	War	and	more	nebulous	adversaries	and	opponents,	including	from	developing	
nations,	in	the	late	20th	and	early	21st	centuries.		
	
In	contrast,	the	claims	presented	by	 institutional	democratisation	centre	initially	on	
the	domestic	political	drivers	and	impact	of	US	nuclear	possession,	starting	with	the	
idea	 that	 the	Manhattan	Project	marked	 the	beginning	of	 the	US	national	 security	
state—and	 the	 role	 this	 played	 in	 the	 US’s	 global	 strategy	 following	 WW2.	 I	
therefore	draw	on	the	work	of	authors	such	as	Robert	Dahl	to	begin	specifying	the	
wider	impact	nuclear	possession	has	had	on	the	US’s	political	system	and	to	highlight	
pre-existing	scholarly	arguments	compatible	with	the	main	contentions	of	this	thesis.	
More	specifically,	 I	discuss	how	domestic	elite	actors	and	groups	shape	US	defence	
and	foreign	policy,	including	on	nuclear	issues.	
	
Having	 provided	 this	 comparative	 historical	 overview,	 I	 go	 into	 more	 detail	
concerning	 what	 institutional	 democratisation	 would	 mean	 in	 terms	 of	 political	
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change	 for	 the	US	when	 reviewing	modern	 day	US	 nuclear	 politics,	 updating	Dahl	
and	 other’s	 work	 in	 the	 process.	 This	 includes	 a	 consideration	 of	 the	 short	 to	
medium	 term	 nuclear	 arms	 control,	 non-proliferation	 and	 disarmament	 measures	
the	 US	 could	 take	 and	 the	 reasons	 for	 Washington’s	 continued	 inaction	 and	
obstruction.	 This	 series	 of	 measures	 conforms	 to	 a	 more	 mainstream,	 liberal,	
guardianship	 analysis	 of	 the	 topic	 that	 focuses	 on	 the	 international	 level	 and	
interactions	between	NWS	elite	decision-makers	as	the	basis	for	cooperation.	I	argue	
that	 whilst	 it	 is	 important	 to	 consider	 these	 steps	 and	 actions,	 this	 approach	 has	
several	limitations.	For	example,	a	range	of	evidence	is	presented	to	show	both	how	
wide	the	democratic	deficit	is	in	the	US	and	how	this	is	reflected	in	the	gap	between	
US	 public	 opinion	 on	 arms	 control,	 non-proliferation	 and	 disarmament	 and	 the	
actions	of	elite	actors	and	the	US	government.		
	
The	 following	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 seeks	 to	 provide	 a	major	 discussion	 of	 these	
issues	in	order	to	both	challenge	official	justifications	for	the	US’s	nuclear	status	and	
fill	gaps	in	the	mainstream	and	realist	literature	on	nuclear	politics.	This	is	primarily	
done	through	an	examination	of	the	domestic	economic,	political	and	social	drivers	
of	US	nuclear	possession	and	its	consequences.	For	example,	the	US	government	has	
historically	presented	nuclear	possession	as	a	necessity	 to	ensure	national	 security	
via	deterrence	given	the	external	threats	posed	to	US	freedom	and	democracy	and	
the	 nation’s	 other	 vital	 interests.	 Yet	 critical	 security	 analysts,	 such	 as	 Dahl	 and	
Deudney,	 argue	 that	 the	 US’s	 maintenance	 of	 such	 a	 huge	 nuclear	 and	 military	
establishment	 has	 serious	 repercussions	 for	 freedom	 and	 democracy	 at	 home.	
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Despite	 this,	 mainstream	 indexes	 of	 global	 democracy	 tend	 to	 present	 the	 US	 as	
beacon	 of	 democracy	 for	 the	 world	 and	 do	 not	 take	 into	 account	 such	 critical	
perspectives.		
	
I	 then	provide	an	overview	of	 the	US’s	post-Cold	War	global	 strategy	and	 the	 role	
played	 in	 it	 by	 nuclear	 weapons,	 discussing	 how	 the	 US’s	 conventional	 military	
power	has	a	singular	impact	on	other	NWS’s	nuclear	thinking	and	the	implications	of	
this	 for	 nuclear	 disarmament.	 From	 here,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 US	 has	 a	 unique	 dual	
responsibility	 to	 advance	 nuclear	 disarmament	 by	 taking	 progressive	 steps	 on	 a	
national	 level	and	by	acting	 in	ways	 that	 support	progressive	 steps	being	 taken	by	
other	NWS.	Another,	more	recent	development	in	the	US’s	nuclear	arsenal,	concerns	
how	it	is	now	managed	and	reproduced	by	private	corporations—which	I	discuss	in	
terms	 of	 what	 this	 means	 for	 democratic	 accountability	 and	 transparency.	
Subsequently,	 the	 present	 state	 of	 the	 US	 peace	 and	 disarmament	 movement	 is	
considered	to	explore	its	potential	contribution	to	disarmament	initiatives	and	how	
it	may	develop	and	be	strengthened	as	part	of	a	wider	democratisation	process.	The	
chapter	 ends	with	 a	 summary	 explaining	 its	 significance	 for	 the	 overall	 arguments	
put	forward	by	this	thesis.		
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3.1	Mainstream	 and	 realist	 perspectives	 on	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 US	
nuclear	possession	and	disarmament	
	
Despite	 a	 variety	 of	 disagreements	 within	 mainstream	 and	 realist	 thought,	 such	
works	generally	 see	US	nuclear	possession	 since	1945	as	 justifiable	and	necessary.	
Several	reasons	are	provided	to	justify	this	stance,	including:	the	anarchic	nature	of	
the	 international	 state	 system;	 the	 peace	 and	 stability	 provided	 by	 deterrence	 in	
bipolar	and	multipolar	worlds;	 the	 liberal,	benign	nature	of	 the	US’s	global	power;	
the	need	to	protect	US	allies,	values	and	 interests;	and	the	difficulties	and	dangers	
posed	by	disarmament.	
	
For	example,	historian	Richard	Rhodes	(1986:	379)	argues	that	US	physicist’s	original	
motive	 for	 developing	 the	 bomb	was	 fear	 of	 Germany	 triumphing	 in	 the	war	 and	
establishing	 ‘a	 thousand-year	 Reich	 made	 invulnerable	 with	 atomic	 bombs’.	 The	
atomic	bombings	of	Hiroshima	and	Nagasaki	were	then	widely	celebrated	for	leading	
to	 Japan’s	 early	 surrender	 in	 the	war.	 Until	 the	 Soviet	 acquisition	 of	 the	 bomb	 in	
1949	 the	US	held	an	atomic	monopoly,	yet	 initiatives	 to	manage	atomic	weaponry	
via	an	international	agency—including	the	Acheson-Lillenthal	report	and	the	Baruch	
plan,	proposed	by	the	US,	and	the	Soviet	Gromyko	plan—failed,	it	is	argued,	due	to	
mutual	mistrust	between	the	superpowers	(US	DoE,	2017).	
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Such	mistrust	meant	that	the	Cold	War	quickly	became	a	nuclear	standoff	between	
East	and	West.	Yet	 there	was	no	consensus	 in	 the	US	concerning	what	 the	 role	of	
nuclear	weapons	should	be.	Tom	Nichols	and	Dana	Struckman	(2017)	of	the	US	Naval	
War	College	therefore	observe	how,		
there	were	strong	divisions	among	American	strategists	about	the	purpose	of	
nuclear	weapons.	For	some,	they	existed	only	to	deter	nuclear	attacks	on	the	
United	 States;	 for	 others,	 they	 were	 the	 military	 equalizer	 between	 an	
outgunned	West	and	a	gigantic	Communist	alliance.		
	
The	 latter	 position	 informs	 the	 analysis	 presented	 by	US	 Brigadier	 General	 Robert	
Spalding	(2013),	who	argues	that	the	US	defeated	the	Soviet	Union	to	win	the	Cold	
War	 ‘by	 maintaining	 a	 credible	 nuclear	 force’.	 According	 to	 this	 position,	 the	 US	
deployed	nuclear	weapons	 in	Europe	 to	defend	 it	 against	 the	Soviet’s	 ‘numerically	
superior	conventional	force’.	Moreover,	the	US’s	formidable	nuclear	triad	‘deterred	
the	Soviets	from	attacking’	and	were	at	the	‘forefront’	of	the	US’s	‘defense	strategy’	
receiving	‘priority	in	both	rhetoric	and	funding.’		
	
Spalding’s	 (Ibid)	 justification	 for	US	nuclear	 possession	here	 rests	 on	 the	 idea	 that	
nuclear	weapons	 are	 the	 ‘US’s	 instruments	 of	 peace’	 and	 that	 ‘peace	 can	 only	 be	
secured	through	strength’.	Moreover,	nuclear	weapons	are	the	‘only	aspect’	of	the	
US’s	 ‘national	 defense’	 that	 are	 capable	 of	 delivering	 such	 ‘peace’—and	 do	 so	
affordably.	Spalding’s	narrative	here	 implicitly	draws	on	a	 traditionalist	perspective	
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which,	 Joyce	 P.	 Kaufman	 (2013:	 78)	 explains,	 sees	 the	 Cold	 War	 as,	 ‘a	 war	 of	
ideology,	 which	 assumed	 that	 the	 two	 divergent	 approaches	 (democracy	 and	
communism)	could	not	coexist	peacefully.	Therefore	one	side	would	have	to	emerge	
as	dominant’.	Nuclear	possession,	according	to	this	ideological	interpretation	of	the	
Cold	War,	was	thus	essential	for	the	US,	if	 it	was	to	defend	its	democracy	from	the	
threat	posed	by	communism.	Indeed,	Mearsheimer	(Moore,	1996:	22)	has	described	
the	 US’s	 nuclear	 arsenal	 as	 ‘an	 ideal	 middle-class	 weapon	 and	 a	 strong	 force	 for	
democracy’.	This	 is	partly	because,	he	claims,	without	a	nuclear	arsenal	 in	the	Cold	
War	 the	US	may	have	had	 to	become	a	 ‘garrison	 state’	 leading	 to	 ‘crazy	domestic	
politics’	as	defense	spending	sky-rocketed	with	a	bulging	military	(Ibid).	
	
Framing	nuclear	deterrence	as	both	essential	for	the	defence	of	US	democracy	and	
legitimate	 because	 ‘approved,	 through	 the	 political	 processes	 of	 the	 democratic	
nations	 it	 protects,	 since	 at	 least	 1950’,	 as	 Reagan’s	 Defence	 Secretary	 Caspar	
Weinberger	 argued,	 is—on	 the	 face	 of	 it—a	 particularly	 authoritative	 means	 of	
justifying	nuclear	possession	(Pringle	&	Arkin,	1984:	245).	It	is	also	one	with	several	
implications	for	this	study,	given	our	central	contention	that	nuclear	disarmament—
particularly	 in	 France,	 the	 UK	 and	 US—requires	 institutional	 democratisation.	
Proponents	of	US	nuclear	possession	today,	may	thus	point	to	polling	data	showing	
public	support	for	the	US’s	status	as	a	NWS	and	Kerry	Herron’s	argument	that,	‘the	
importance	 the	 general	 public	 attaches	 to	 US	 nuclear	 weapons	 capabilities	 is	
growing’	 (Hey,	2000).	Benjamin	Valentino	and	Scott	Sagan	 (2017:	5,	39)	also	argue	
that	 current	 attitudes	 amongst	Americans	 to	 ‘the	use	of	nuclear	weapons	and	 the	
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killing	of	 noncombatants’	 shows	 that	US	public	 opinion	 ‘is	 unlikely	 to	 be	 a	 serious	
constraint	 on	 any	 president	 contemplating	 the	 use	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 in	 the	
crucible	 of	war’.	 Despite	 such	 findings,	 however,	 realist	 thought	 and	guardianship	
arguments	 generally	 tend	 not	 to	 ascribe	 great	 importance	 to	 public	 opinion,	 for	
reasons	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Two.	Where	 prominent	 establishment	 figures	 do	 so,	
the	 public	 is	 presented	 as	 a	 body	 requiring	 expert	 guidance.	 For	 example,	 former	
Defense	Secretary	William	Perry	(2015:	xvi,	195),	emphasises	the	role	of	the	public,	
so	 that	 that	 the	 US	 won’t	 lead	 the	 world	 in	 ‘reducing	 nuclear	 dangers…unless	
Americans	understand	the	importance	of	doing	so’,	but	his	argument	fits	within	the	
guardianship	 approach	because	he	believes	elites	must	educate	and	guide	 citizens	
towards	prudent	policy.	
	
Moving	on	to	 the	narrower	question	of	how	the	US	deterrent	operated	during	the	
Cold	War,	 Halit	 Tagma	 (2010:	 173),	 draws	 on	 the	work	 of	 Lawrence	 Freedman	 to	
explain	 that	 the	defining	 characteristic	of	 the	US’s	nuclear	 strategy,	 ever	 since	 the	
‘first	 Soviet	 test’,	 was	 to	 strive	 to	 ‘maintain	 a	 second-strike	 capability	 against	 the	
Soviet	 Union’.	 The	 US,	 according	 to	 this	 analysis,	 has	 therefore	 focused	 on	
maintaining	a	reliable	deterrent	against	a	Soviet	attack,	because	both	sides	needed	
invulnerable	retaliatory	forces	in	order	to	create	a	‘nuclear	stalemate’.	As	we	saw	in	
Chapter	 Two,	 proponents	 of	 US	 nuclear	 possession	 further	 argue	 that	 nuclear	
deterrence	then	successfully	 ‘kept	the	peace’	between	the	superpowers	during	the	
Cold	War	by	 inducing	 ‘great	 caution	 in	 international	politics’	 and	discouraging	 ‘the	
use	of	nuclear	threats	to	resolve	disputes’	(Lieber	&	Press,	2006:	42).	In	recent	years	
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the	 US	 government	 has	 presented	 several	 arguments	 in	 favour	 of	 its	 continued	
possession	 of	 nuclear	weapons.	 Former	 Defense	 Secretary	 Robert	 Gates	 (US	 DoD,	
2010:	ii)	provided	a	succinct	justification	for	the	US’s	nuclear	arsenal	in	his	foreword	
to	the	2010	Nuclear	Posture	Review,	stating	that:	
		
as	 long	 as	 nuclear	 weapons	 exist,	 the	 United	 States	must	maintain	 a	 safe,	
secure	and	effective	nuclear	arsenal	to	maintain	strategic	stability	with	other	
major	nuclear	powers,	deter	potential	adversaries	and	reassure	our	allies	and	
our	partners	of	our	security	commitments	to	them.		
	
Elsewhere,	 nuclear	 deterrence	 has	 been	 presented	 by	 the	 US	 government	 as	 ‘the	
ultimate	 protection	 against	 a	 nuclear	 attack	 on	 the	 United	 States’,	 preventing	
adversaries	 from	 pursuing	 undesirable	 courses	 of	 action,	 such	 as	 aggression	 with	
weapons	 of	 mass	 destruction	 (WMD),	 or	 nuclear	 weapons	 (US	 Department	 of	
Defense,	2014:	11;	Kristensen	et	al,	2009:	8-9;	US	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	2015:	11).		
	
The	 US	 government	 also	 claims	 that	 its	 extended	 deterrence	 relationships	 with	
regional	 allies	 (such	 as	 Japan	 and	 South	 Korea	 in	 East	 Asia)	 both	 provides	
reassurance	and	protects	 these—and	other	nations—from	conventional	 or	nuclear	
attack	 whilst	 also	 preventing	 them	 from	 developing	 their	 own	 nuclear	 arsenals	
(Obama,	 2009;	 Roberts,	 2013:	 9).	 In	 addition	 to	 these	 central	 and	 extended	
deterrence	roles,	 the	2014	Quadrennial	Defense	Review	(2014:	11)	states	that,	 the	
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US’s	nuclear	arsenal	‘also	supports	our	ability	to	project	power	by	communicating	to	
potential	nuclear-armed	adversaries	that	they	cannot	escalate	their	way	out	of	failed	
conventional	aggression’.	
	
With	regards	to	disarmament,	as	we	have	seen,	mainstream	and	realist	approaches	
from	 the	 US	 academy	 are	 particularly	 sceptical	 regarding	 its	 possibility,	 need	 and	
benefits.	Still,	some	scholars	discussed	above—including	Glaser	and	O’Hanlon—have	
given	 the	 subject	 sustained	attention.	As	with	 these	authors,	 the	main	obstacle	 to	
disarmament	action	in	academic	and	officials	analyses	is	generally	taken	to	be	at	the	
international	 level.	 For	 example,	 representatives	 of	 the	 US	 government	 have	
previously	 claimed	 that	 the	 US	 has	 ‘an	 outstanding	 and	 unequalled	 record	 of	
compliance’	with	 its	NPT	Article	VI	obligations,	and	 that	 it	 continues	 to	 reduce	 the	
role	and	size	of	its	nuclear	arsenal	(Ford,	2007:	6).	Yet	Washington	has	also	made	it	
clear	 that	 ‘as	 long	 as	 these	weapons	 exist,	 the	United	 States	will	maintain	 a	 safe,	
secure	and	effective	arsenal’,	whilst	also	taking	part	 in	the	step-by-step	P5	process	
(US	DoD,	2010:	v).	
	
In	 more	 hawkish	 variants	 of	 the	 US	 mainstream	 and	 establishment	 discourse,	
exemplified	by	former	senior	US	officials	such	as	Harold	Brown	and	John	Deutch	as	
well	 as	 Keith	 B.	 Payne,	 nuclear	 disarmament	 is	 explicitly	 rejected.	 For	 example,	
Brown	and	Deutch	(2007:	1)	describe	even	the	‘aspirational	goal’	of	 ‘eliminating	all	
nuclear	 weapons’	 as	 ‘counterproductive’	 and	 a	 ‘fantasy’	 since	 it	 ‘risks	
compromising…U.S.	security	and	international	stability’	whilst	Payne	(2007:	1)	argues	
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that	disarmament	‘works	at	cross	purposes	with	many	other	legitimate	U.S.	foreign	
policy	objectives,	such	as	deterring	the	use	of	WMD’	and	threatens	to	‘increase	the	
prospects	for	catastrophe’.		
	
Opponents	 of	 US	 nuclear	 disarmament	 often	 present	 Russia	 as	 a	 key	 barrier	 to	
meaningful	 nuclear	 negotiations.	 The	 Iranian,	 North	 Korean	 and	 Pakistani	 nuclear	
programmes	also	often	 feature	 in	official	publications	as	obstacles	 to	 international	
progress	on	NPT	action	plans	(Wood,	2017).	The	official	US	narrative	of	Soviet	and,	
thereafter,	 Russian	 intransigence	 and	 obstructionism	 has	 its	 origin	 in	 accounts	 of	
why	 Cold	 War	 initiatives	 to	 exert	 international	 control	 over	 the	 bomb	 failed,	
including	 the	 Acheson-Lillenthal	 and	 Baruch	 Plans	 and	 Reykjavik	 Summit	 (Payne,	
2007:	3;	Hoffman,	2014;	US	Office	of	the	Historian,	2017;	The	Reagan	Vision,	2017).	
Today,	 US	 government	 officials	 frequently	 argue	 that	 Russia’s	 nuclear	 and	
conventional	 military	 modernisation,	 as	 well	 as	 recent	 actions	 in	 the	 Ukraine,	
threaten	 to	 derail	 arms	 control	 processes	 and	 strategic	 stability	 more	 widely.	 In	
particular,	the	development	of	new	missile	technologies	have	led	to	claims	by	the	US	
that	Russian	actions	threaten	to	undermine	‘numerous	agreements’,	such	as	the	INF	
treaty	(US	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff,	2015:	2).		
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3.2	Critical	perspectives	on	the	causes	and	consequences	of	US	nuclear	possession	
and	disarmament	
	
In	order	to	usefully	apply	the	 institutional	democratisation	approach	to	the	US,	it	 is	
important	to	provide	an	alternative	explanation	of	the	origins	of	nuclear	possession	
in	the	context	of	20th	century	history,	focusing	on	the	meaning	of	the	Cold	War,	to	
support	our	subsequent	argumentation.	Of	the	alternative	explanations	of	the	Cold	
War,	a	revisionist	perspective	that	highlights	the	importance	of	domestic	factors	best	
suits	 our	 needs	 and	 shall	 be	 outlined	 below.	 The	 main	 point	 in	 presenting	 this	
summary	 is	 to	 illustrate	 the	main	divergences	with	 traditional,	post-revisionist	 and	
mainstream	 analyses	 rather	 than	 provide	 a	 full	 historical	 reconstruction,	 both	 for	
reasons	of	space	and	to	avoid	repetition,	given	that	there	are	several	areas	of	factual	
overlap	and	agreement	between	this	different	perspectives.	
	
Revisionist	perspectives	on	the	meaning	of	the	Cold	War	take	different	 forms.	One	
striking	 explanation	 provided	 by	 several	 analysts	 (Chomsky,	 1992;	Melman,	 1976;	
Kolko	&	Kolko,	1972;	Kaldor,	1990)	 focuses	on	how	 the	US	and	Soviet	Union	were	
both	 expansionist	 and	 used	 the	 Cold	 War	 as	 a	 means	 of	 inculcating	 fear	 and	
obedience	 to	manage	 their	 domestic	 populations.	Analysts	 such	 as	C.	Wright	Mills	
(1956)	also	emphasise	the	importance	of	domestic	economic	factors	driving	foreign	
expansion,	stating	that	the	US	has	‘at	once	a	permanent-war	economy	and	a	private-
corporation	 economy’.	 Similarly,	 Chomsky	 (2004	 ii)	 describes	 how	 Charles	Wilson,	
CEO	of	General	Electric,	 ‘warned	at	 the	end	of	World	War	 II	 that	 the	US	must	not	
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return	to	a	civilian	economy,	but	must	keep	to	a	"permanent	war	economy"	of	the	
kind	that	was	so	successful	during	the	war:	a	semi-command	economy,	run	mostly	
by	 corporate	 executives,	 geared	 to	 military	 production.’	 In	 order	 for	 successive	
governments	 to	 justify	 to	 the	 US	 public	 the	 maintenance	 of	 the	 huge,	 centrally	
controlled,	 military	 infrastructure	 constructed	 during	 World	 War	 II,	 it	 was	 thus	
necessary	 to	 repeatedly	 invoke	 the	 threat	of	an	aggressive	Soviet	Union	as	part	of	
what	 Chomsky	 (1992:	 21)	 argues,	was	 a	 ‘national	 security	 ideology	 for	 population	
control’.	This	was	because,	George	Kennan	(1987:	118)	observed	towards	the	end	of	
the	Cold	War,		
	
were	the	Soviet	Union	to	sink	tomorrow	under	the	waters	of	the	ocean,	the	
American	military-industrial	establishment	would	have	to	go	on,	substantially	
unchanged,	 until	 some	 other	 adversary	 could	 be	 invented.	 Anything	 else	
would	be	an	unacceptable	shock	to	the	American	economy.	
	
Looking	more	widely,	as	David	Jablonsky	(2002:	5)	explains,	an	‘expansive	concept	of	
US	 national	 security’	 was	 developed	 during	 and	 after	 WW2,	 whereby	 national	
security	 was	 linked	 ‘to	 so	 many	 interdependent	 factors,	 whether	 political	 and	
economic	or	psychological	and	military’	so	that	‘the	subjective	boundaries	of	security	
pushed	out	further	into	the	world,	encompassing	more	geography	and	thereby	more	
issues	 and	 problems.’	 Given	 such	 a	 broad	 conceptualization	 of	 security,	
‘developments	anywhere’	could	be	seen	by	Washington	as	having	‘an	automatic	and	
direct	impact	on	US	core	interests’.	The	result	was	the	growing	influence	of	military	
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and	 security	 concerns	 and	 an	 all-encompassing	 military	 establishment.	 This	 was	
reinforced	by	the	Soviet	military	buildup,	including	the	explosion	in	1949	Soviet	of	a	
nuclear	device,	which	 implanted	 ‘the	 image	of	an	external	 threat’	 in	 the	American	
mind	(Ibid).		
Kaufman	 (2013:	 78)	 makes	 the	 compelling	 point	 that	 the	 Cold	 War	 was	 thus,	 in	
addition	 to	 being	 a	 war	 of	 ideology,	 ‘a	 political	 war’	 whereby	 democracy	 and	
communism	were	 seen	 as	 inherently	 ‘antithetical’,	 creating	 inevitable	 conflict.	 For	
Kaufman,	 the	 widespread	 belief	 amongst	 the	 US	 populace	 that	 communism	 was	
inherently	expansionist	and	threatening	‘had	not	only	foreign	policy	implications	for	
the	United	States	but	important	domestic	ones	as	well.	The	growth	of	McCarthyism	
and	the	Red	Scare	created	a	domestic	atmosphere	that	supported	U.S.	foreign	policy	
priorities’.	 In	 such	a	 febrile	 atmosphere	 the	possession	of	 nuclear	weaponry	 could	
thus	be	 justified	as	necessary	 to	ensure	national	 security,	whilst	 calls	 for	unilateral	
disarmament	 could	be	presented	by	 leading	US	political	 figures,	 such	as	Democrat	
Senator	Stuart	Symington,	as	‘surrendering	to	communism’	(McFarland,	2001:	113).		
	
Following	the	fall	of	the	Berlin	Wall,	Kennan’s	prediction	regarding	the	continuity	of	
the	 US’s	 ‘military-industrial	 establishment’	 proved	 to	 be	 accurate,	 as	 the	 same	
establishment	espoused	new	threats	to	the	nation	in	order	to	justify	the	retention	of	
thousands	 of	 immensely	 powerful	 nuclear	 warheads.	 The	 peace	 dividend	 many	
expected	 to	 follow	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	War	 thus	 did	 not	materialise	 because	 the	
people	and	groups	occupying	key	positions	in	US	economic	and	political	institutions	
during	 the	Cold	War	retained	substantial	 influence	and	control	after	 the	 fall	of	 the	
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Soviet	Union.	Furthermore,	it	 is	argued	that	since	the	end	of	World	War	Two,	from	
which	 the	 US	 emerged	 as	 the	 ‘preponderant’	 world	 power,	 ‘the	 US	 pursued	 an	
“imperial	grand	strategy”	which	sought	to	ensure	“the	 limitation	of	any	exercise	of	
sovereignty”	 by	 states	 that	 might	 interfere	 with	 its	 global	 designs’	 (Leffler,	 1993;	
Chomsky,	2003:	69).	By	this	reckoning,	the	demise	of	the	Soviet	Union	removed	the	
principle	 brake	 on	 the	US’s	 pursuit	 of	 global	 hegemony,	 allowing	 it	 to	move	 from	
‘containment’	 to	 ‘enlargement’,	 as	 President	 Clinton’s	 National	 Security	 Advisor—
Anthony	Lake—put	it	(1993).	
	
This	 brief	 summary	 of	 revisionist	 perspectives	 is	 useful	 to	 both	 understand	 the	
historical	context	in	which	the	US	nuclear	arsenal	emerged	and	developed	as	well	as	
the	impact	of	the	bomb	on	US	society	and	politics.	For	example,	the	consequence	of	
President	Roosevelt’s	decision	to	acquire	nuclear	weapons	was,	for	Richard	Rhodes	
(1986:	 379),	 that	 a	 ‘separate,	 secret	 state	with	 separate	 sovereignty’	was	 created,	
beginning	with	the	Manhattan	Project	in	1939,	which	employed	130,000	people	and	
was	of	 a	 similar	 size	 to	 the	entire	US	automobile	 industry	 (Gosling,	2010:	97).	 The	
immense	 size	 and	 secrecy	of	 the	US’s	 nuclear	weapons	 system,	whereby	 top-level	
bureaucratic,	military	and	political	actors	accumulated	and	centralised	huge	power	
away	 from	 the	public	 gaze	 in	 the	 name	of	 national	 security—justified	 as	 vital	 at	 a	
time	of	war—led	the	Atomic	Heritage	Foundation	(2013:	11)	to	describe	the	legacy	
of	the	Manhattan	Project	as	the	creation	of	the	‘national	security	state’.	Gary	Wills	
(2010:	1)	explores	this	idea	in	his	work,	arguing	that	the	US’s	acquisition	of	the	bomb	
changed	US	history	 ‘down	to	 its	deepest	constitutional	roots’	because	 it	 ‘redefined	
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the	 presidency,	 as	 in	 all	 respects	 America’s	 “Commander	 in	 Chief”,	 whilst	 also	
helping	 to	 foster	 ‘an	 anxiety	 of	 continuing	 crisis,	 so	 that	 society	 was	 pervasively	
militarized’.	 Crucially	 therefore,	 a	wartime	mentality	 continued	 into	 peacetime,	 so	
that	 the	 US’s	 nuclear	 arsenal	 was	 purposefully	 insulated	 from	 accountability	 and	
transparency	 measures,	 making	 it	 much	 more	 difficult	 to	 introduce	 democratic	
controls	 over	 these	 weapons,	 an	 essential	 condition	 for	 non-proliferation	 and	
disarmament	efforts.		
	
For	Robert	Dahl	(1985:	3),	in	Controlling	Nuclear	Weapons,	this	new	technology	thus	
presented	 a	 ‘tragic	 paradox’.	 This	 was	 because	 whilst	 ‘no	 decisions	 can	 be	 more	
fateful	for	Americans,	and	for	the	world	than	decisions	about	nuclear	weapons’	such	
decisions	 ‘have	 largely	 escaped	 the	 control	 of	 the	 democratic	 process’.	 Dahl	 (Ibid)	
therefore	 argued	 that	 nuclear	 possession	 had	 contributed	 to	 the	 ‘alienation’	 of	
political	 control.	 Rather	 than	 delegating	 authority	 to	 responsible	 experts	 in	 a	
representative	 democracy	 of	 the	 kind	 envisaged	 by	 the	 founding	 fathers,	 the	 US	
democratic	process	after	the	nuclear	revolution	was	thus	both	becoming	more	and	
more	‘hollow’	and	increasingly	clothing	‘a	de	facto	regime	of	guardianship’.	
	
Similarly,	David	Meyer	 (1990:	 27)	 persuasively	 argues	 that	 ‘despite	 conflict	 among	
policy	 makers	 about	 the	 political	 utility	 of	 nuclear	 weapons,	 US	 national	 security	
policy	and	the	role	of	nuclear	weapons	within	it,	has	been	remarkably	consistent.	It	
has	 also	been	generally	 isolated	 from	wider	domestic	political	 debate.’	Meyer	 and	
Daniel	 Ellsberg	 have	 outlined	 the	 strategic	 rationale	 that	 explains	 why	 US	 policy	
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makers	 have	 consistently	 valued	nuclear	weapons.	 For	 example,	Meyer	 (1990:	 27)	
states	that:	
	
Since	Harry	Truman	ordered	the	Little	Boy	detonated	over	Hiroshima,	nuclear	
weapons	have	consistently	been	used	primarily	not	to	protect	the	territorial	
security	of	the	United	States	but	to	support	conventional	forces	and	foreign	
policy	 goals.	 Increasingly	 diverse	 and	multifaceted	nuclear	 capabilities	 have	
been	 the	 ultimate	 guarantor	 of	US	military	 superiority	 in	 pursuit	 of	 a	wide	
range	of	political	and	military	goals.	Given	these	broad	objectives,	Pentagon	
planners	 and	 elected	 officials	 involved	 in	 making	 policy	 have	 necessarily	
conceived	 of	 the	 use	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 considerably	 more	 flexibly	 and	
broadly	then	has	the	general	public.		
	
Meanwhile,	 Ellsberg	 (Krieger,	 2011:	 54)	 observes	 that	 the	 US	 made	 twenty-five	
‘threats	or	consideration	of	nuclear	first	use	in	crises’	between	1948	and	2008,	going	
on	to	state	that,		
	
I	 suspect	antinuclear	activists	 in	general	have	 too	 little	appreciated	 the	 link	
between	our	ambitious	imperial	policy-	our	belief	that	we	had	the	right	to	a	
sphere	 of	 influence	 that	 extended	 right	 to	 the	 borders	 of	 the	 Soviet	Union	
and	China	(now,	the	whole	world)	as	in	Iran,	Korea,	the	Persian	Gulf,	Taiwan,	
Vietnam-	and	our	reliance	on	first-use	nuclear	threats	to	make	that	feasible,	
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to	give	us	a	trump–card	ability	to	protect	our	expeditionary	forces	thousands	
of	 miles	 from	 home	 from	 larger	 ground	 forces	 operating	 in	 their	 own	
neighbourhoods.	
	
Meyer’s	 work	 in	 particular	 complements	 Dahl’s	 emphasis	 on	 the	 importance	 of	
democratic	control,	an	idea	that	is	explored	in	different	ways	by	a	range	of	authors.	
According	 to	 these	 analyses,	 domestic	 politics—including	 competing	 bureaucratic	
and	 institutional	 interests—rather	 than	 the	 machinations	 of	 foreign	 powers,	 are	
significantly	 responsible	 for	 driving	 nuclear	 weapons	 programmes.	 Moreover,	 the	
power	of	committed	citizens	and	an	engaged	Congress	to	halt	military	programmes	
and	achieve	arms	 control	 agreements,	 such	as	 the	Anti-Ballistic	Missile	 Treaty	 and	
the	INF	Treaty,	is	highlighted.		
	
Other	 authors	 in	 this	 category	 include	 April	 Carter	 (1989:	 25),	 who	 wrote	 on	 the	
domestic	obstacles	to	nuclear	arms	control,	including	Presidential	and	Congressional	
electoral	 cycles	 and	 politics,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 ‘difficulty	 of	 keeping	 secrets	 in	
Washington’	 and	 Janne	 E.	 Nolan	 (1989:	 69;	 1999),	 who	 discussed	 the	 domestic	
politics	 of	 nuclear	 strategy,	 including	 the	 associated	 ‘entrenched	 bureaucracy’	 of	
military	planners.	Elsewhere,	Peter	Pringle	and	William	Arkin	(1983)	focused	on	the	
secrecy	 surrounding	 the	 development	 of	 US	 nuclear	 war	 plans,	 whilst	 James	 M.	
Lindsay	(1991),	considered	the	role	of	Congress	in	nuclear	weapons	decision-making.	
More	recently,	Tom	Sauer’s	(2005),	work	reviews	the	bureaucratic	politics	driving	US	
nuclear	weapons	policy.	Other	historical	works	by	former	senior	government	officials	
	 183	
such	 as	 Strobe	 Talbott	 (1984:	 229)	 highlight	 the	 ‘permanent,	 institutionalized	
acrimony’	 behind	 US	 policy	 on	 ‘strategic	 arms	 control’.	 Whilst	 not	 all	 of	 these	
authors	 explicitly	 advocate	 or	 even	 focus	 on	 US	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 their	 work	
helps	 us	 to	 identify	 the	 main	 domestic	 obstacles	 to	 nuclear	 arms	 control	 and	
disarmament,	 including	 the	powerful	 elites	 and	 related	 institutions	 responsible	 for	
reproducing	the	bomb.		
	
For	 example,	 Sauer	 (2005:	 25)	 argues	 that	 in	 the	 mid	 to	 late-1990s,	 there	 was	 a	
‘growing	 consensus’	 amongst	 non-governmental	 experts	 in	 support	 of	 minimum	
deterrence.	As	advocates	of	this	policy,	such	as	Hans	Kristensen,	and	his	co-authors,	
(2009:	 1)	 explain,	 this	would	 involve	nuclear	weapons	having	 just	 one	mission,	 ‘to	
deter	the	use	of	nuclear	weapons’,	which	would,	he	and	his	co-authors	claim,	‘lessen	
the	 legitimacy	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 and	 allow	 for	 significant	 reductions	 in	 global	
stockpiles’.	 However,	 the	 political	 power	 of	 the	 arms	 control	 community	 and	 the	
peace	movement	at	 this	 time—which	are	 important	contributors	to	any	process	of	
institutional	democratisation—was	too	weak	to	overcome	the	might	of	the	‘nuclear	
weapons	 establishment’.	 With	 regard	 to	 the	 peace	 and	 disarmament	 movement,	
Jacqueline	 Cabasso	 (2008:	 33)	 also	 notes	 that	 during	 the	 1990s	 several	 NGOs	
working	 on	 these	 issues	 moved	 to	 Washington	 DC	 and	 shifted	 their	 approach	 to	
‘securing	Russian	“loose	nukes”	and	keeping	them	out	of	the	hands	of	“rogue”	states	
and	terrorists’.	
	
As	 for	 the	 nuclear	 weapons	 establishment,	 Sauer	 argues	 that	 his	 consists	 of	 a	
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network	 of	 ‘gigantic	 bureaucratic	 organisations’,	 such	 as	 the	 Pentagon,	which	 had	
been	created	during	the	1940s	and	50s.	These	institutions	had	four	key	interests	in	
protecting	 the	 US	 nuclear	 weapons	 system	 from	 fundamental	 change—‘budget,	
personnel,	 autonomy	 and	 prestige’—which	 the	 proposed	 shift	 to	 minimum	
deterrence	directly	 threatened.	Moreover,	whilst	many	 in	 the	military	 saw	nuclear	
weapons	as	 irrelevant	and	felt	they	should	be	discarded	in	order	to	procure	usable	
weapons,	any	move	towards	disarmament	was	vetoed	by	a	small	group	within	 the	
military—centred	around	the	nuclear	‘targeting	community’	(Sauer,	2005:	94).29		
	
Given	 the	 relative	 strength	 of	 the	 nuclear	 establishment	 and	 the	weakness	 of	 the	
proponents	 of	 minimum	 deterrence—or	 nuclear	 disarmament	 for	 that	 matter—
Sauer	therefore	proposes	that	there	needs	to	be	a	‘major	societal	debate’	in	the	US	
if	 the	 bureaucratic	 resistance	 to	 change	 is	 to	 be	 broken.	 For	 him,	 this	 would	
necessitate	Presidential	leadership,	which	harnessed	the	weight	of	public	opinion	in	
order	to	form	a	‘bipartisan	consensus’	in	Congress	(Ibid).	In	concluding	her	review	of	
the	failures	of	some	members	of	the	Clinton	administration	in	attempting	to	reform	
nuclear	 weapons	 policy,	 Nolan	 (1999)	 puts	 forward	 a	 similar	 view,	 but	 focuses	
principally	on	the	failure	of	the	White	House	to	show	leadership	and	expend	political	
capital	in	order	to	take	on	established	bureaucracies—principally	the	Pentagon.		
																																									 																					
29	This	 was	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 roll	 call	 of	 new	 nuclear	 abolitionists	 included	 senior	 military	
figures	such	as	General	George	Lee	Butler	(former	head	of	Strategic	Air	Command),	General	Andrew	
Goodpaster	(former	Supreme	Allied	Commander,	Europe	of	NATO),	Rear	Admiral	Eugene	Carroll	and	
General	Charles	A.	Horner	(who	made	his	position	known	whilst	still	head	of	US	Space	Command).	
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Other	 critical	 and	 revisionist	 analysis	 focuses	 on	 the	 significant	 popular	 support	 in	
the	US	 for	 action	pursuant	 to	nuclear	 disarmament.	According	 to	 this	 perspective,	
presented	by	authors	such	as	David	Cortright	(2008:	149-150,	323)	key	events—such	
as	 the	 Reykjavik	 summit	 involving	 Reagan	 and	 Gorbachev—therefore	 need	 to	 be	
seen	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 popular	 pressure	 in	 East	 and	 West	 to	 avoid	 a	 nuclear	
conflagration	 and	make	 progress	 on	 arms	 control	 and	 disarmament.	 Jeffrey	 Knopf	
(1998:	 247)	 also	 uses	 a	 ‘domestic	 structure	 approach’	 to	 show	 how	 US	 ‘citizen	
activism	on	behalf	of	arms	control	and	disarmament’	did	have	a	significant	impact	on	
Washington’s	‘preferences	for	cooperation’	and	entry	into	‘strategic	arms	talks’.		
	
The	other	 side	of	 this	 coin,	 for	 authors	 such	 as	Meyer	 (1990),	 is	 that	US	decision-
making	elites	have	historically	co-opted,	sidelined	or	ignored	underlying	support	for	
nuclear	 arms	 control,	 non-proliferation	 and	 disarmament	 amongst	 the	 populace.	
Such	trends	continue	to	this	day,	so	that	a	2004	poll	by	the	Program	on	International	
Policy	Attitudes	(Kull	et	al,	2004:	9)	found	that	a	majority	of	the	US	public	was	‘not	
aware’	 that	 the	 US	 had	 ‘made	 a	 commitment	 to	 seek	 the	 ultimate	 elimination	 of	
nuclear	weapons	as	part	of	the	Non-Proliferation	Treaty’.	When	made	aware	of	this	
fact,	however,	‘a	very	large	majority’	thought	that	‘doing	so	was	a	good	idea	and	that	
the	 US	 should	 make	 greater	 efforts	 toward	 that	 goal’.	 This	 finding	 is	 again	
representative	of	the	broader	absence	of	public	debate	concerning	nuclear	weapons	
in	the	US,	which	is	both	a	result	of	and	perpetuates	citizens	not	treating	such	issues	
as	a	priority.	Despite	this,	a	report	on	how	to	communicate	nuclear	weapons	issues	
to	the	public	by	the	US	 in	the	World	 initiative	(2009:	14)	argued	that	 ‘the	fact	that	
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the	 public	 does	 not	 think	 about	 nuclear	 weapons	 issues-	 yet	 still	 supports	 deep	
reductions	 in	 the	number	of	weapons,	 and	 in	 some	cases,	 concludes	on	 their	own	
that	we	need	to	eliminate	all	nuclear	weapons	is	a	real	opportunity	for	advocates’.		
	
Thus,	contrary	 to	 those,	 such	as	Christopher	A.	Ford	 (2007:	1),	who	argue	that	 the	
US’s	 adherence	 to	 Article	 VI	 of	 the	 NPT	 is	 ‘exemplary’,	 critics	 point	 to	 a	 series	 of	
actions	 the	 US	 should	 immediately	 take	 to	 begin	 reducing	 the	 salience	 of	 nuclear	
weapons	in	its	national	security	policy	and	realise	its	dual	international	disarmament	
obligations.	 Such	 measures	 and	 proposals	 include:	 ratification	 of	 the	 CTBT;	
negotiation	 of	 a	 FMCT;	 support	 for	 all	 five	 existing	 and	 other	 proposed	 nuclear	
weapon	free	zones,	including	the	Middle	East	WMD	Free	Zone;	and	the	removal	and	
destruction	of	 the	 so-called	 ‘tactical’	weapons	 it	 deploys	 in	 five	 European	nations,	
under	 ‘nuclear	 sharing	 arrangements’	 (van	 der	 Zeijden	 et	 al,	 2012:	 8).	Other	 early	
proposed	 actions,	 specifically	 directed	 at	 changing	 the	 policies	 governing	 the	 US’s	
nuclear	weapons,	include:	taking	nuclear	weapons	off	alert;	adopting	a	policy	of	No	
First	 Use;	 and	 the	 retirement	 and	 verified	 elimination	 of	 non-deployed	 reserve	
stockpile	weapons	(Kristensen	et	al,	2009:	2).	There	are	also	a	number	of	actions	the	
US	could	take	in	relation	to	diplomacy,	arms	control	and	trade,	covering	areas	such	
as	 the	US’s	 support	 for	 the	nuclear	weapons	programmes	of	NPS—particularly	 the	
UK—and	NAS.		
	
Moreover,	 critics	 of	US	nuclear	policy	 argue	 that	 recent	 changes	wrought	by	 arms	
control	 agreements	 such	 as	New	 START	do	not	match	 the	majority	 of	 the	 public’s	
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expressed	 desires	 or	 expectations.	 Indeed,	 commenting	 on	 their	 research	 into	 US	
and	Russia	public	opinion	on	nuclear	weapons	arms	control	and	disarmament,	John	
Steinbrunner	 and	 Nancy	 Gallagher	 (2008)	 observe	 that	 ‘responses	 to	 detailed	
questions	reveal	a	striking	disparity	between	what	U.S.	and	Russian	leaders	are	doing	
and	what	their	publics	desire’.30		
	
Steinbrunner	and	Gallagher	(2008)	therefore	suggest	that	US	political	leaders	should	
be	much	bolder	in	using	their	‘bully	pulpits	to	solidify	and	mobilize	public	support’	in	
order	to	articulate	‘a	compelling	alternative	that	is	more	in	line	with	the	public’s	core	
values’.	One	of	the	broad	alternatives	these	authors	outline	based	on	their	research	
is	that	the	US	(and	Russian)	people	would	support	 leaders	 ‘who	directed	their	own	
bureaucracies	 to	 alter	 fundamentally	 both	 the	 guiding	 objective	 and	 the	 action	
program	used	to	address	the	challenges	of	the	new	nuclear	era’	(Ibid).	
	
3.3	US	nuclear	politics	in	the	post-Cold	War	world	
	
The	previous	section	explored	both	the	gaps	 in	mainstream	and	realist	accounts	of	
the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 US	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 disarmament	 and																																									 																					
30 	For	 example,	 their	 polling	 found	 that,	 ‘At	 the	 most	 fundamental	 level,	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	
Americans	 and	 Russians	 think	 that	 nuclear	 weapons	 have	 a	 very	 limited	 role	 in	 current	 security	
circumstances	 and	 believe	 that	 their	 only	 legitimate	 purpose	 is	 to	 deter	 nuclear	 attack.	 It	 is	 highly	
consistent,	then,	that	the	publics	in	both	countries	would	favor	eliminating	all	nuclear	weapons	if	this	
action	could	be	taken	under	effective	international	verification’	(Ibid).		
	 188	
summarised	the	explanatory	value	of	 institutional	democratisation	for	this	thesis	 in	
relation	 to	 the	 historical	 record.	 For	 example,	 the	 secretive	 and	 unaccountable	
development	of	the	US’s	nuclear	weapons	was	explained	in	relation	to	the	political	
conditions	of	World	War	Two	and	the	Cold	War.	 In	addition,	 the	need	to	take	 into	
account	public	opinion	on	nuclear	arms	control,	non-proliferation	and	disarmament	
given	the	striking	democratic	deficit	exhibited	in	these	areas	and	the	importance	of	
the	 popular	 will	 as	 a	 source	 of	 international	 cooperation	 was	 highlighted.	 This	
section	builds	on	these	insights	concerning	the	value	of	institutional	democratisation	
by	 first	examining	 the	 role	nuclear	weapons	play	within	 the	US’s	global	 strategy	 in	
the	 post-Cold	War	 era.	 Understanding	 the	 goals	 of	 US	 global	 strategy—and	 what	
domestic	 actors	 and	 groups	 drive	 and	 shape	 these	 goals,	 both	 historically	 and	 in	
recent	times—is	vital	if	we	are	to	properly	examine	the	political	barriers	for	moving	
to	 low	 numbers	 on	 the	 path	 to	 zero.	 Furthermore,	 comprehending	 the	 benefits	
decision-making	 elites	 believe	 nuclear	 possession	 brings—domestically	 and	
internationally—is	 an	 important	 part	 of	 understanding	 their	 resistance	 to	
disarmament.	
	
The	discussion	 then	moves	on	 to	explore	 in	more	depth	 the	domestic	politics	 that	
shape	Washington’s	 strategic	 behaviour.	 For	 example,	 we	 shall	 examine	 how	 the	
nuclear	 weapons	 establishment	 is	 embedded	 within	 the	 US	 economy,	 state	 and	
society,	and	the	obstacles	to	and	opportunities	for	progressive	change	supportive	of	
disarmament,	such	as	institutional	democratisation,	presented	by	the	status	quo.	In	
terms	of	obstacles,	this	means	outlining	which	powerful	domestic	actors	and	groups,	
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with	economic	and	political	 influence	over	nuclear	weapons	decision-making,	drive	
the	 US’s	 continued	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 prevent	 disarmament	 action.	 As	 for	
opportunities,	this	 includes	identifying	the	current	state	of	those	actors	and	groups	
in	government	and	civil	society	that	endorse	progressive	action	supportive	of	nuclear	
disarmament.	 In	 addition,	 given	 the	 US’s	 immense	 conventional	 military	 power—
which	has	a	singular	impact	on	the	strategic	thought	of	all	other	states—the	ideas	of	
institutional	democratisation	can	and	should	also	be	generally	applied	to	US	defence	
and	 foreign	 policy	 to	 imagine	 a	 process	 by	 which	Washington	 reorients	 its	 global	
strategy	 so	 that	 it	 meaningfully	 contributes	 to	 and	 supports	 other	 NWS	 realising	
their	nuclear	disarmament	obligations.	
	
3.3.1	US	nuclear	weapons	after	the	Cold	War:	retaining	the	bomb	indefinitely	
	
In	Empire	and	 the	Bomb,	 Joseph	Gerson	highlights	 the	 fact	 that	 ‘as	 the	end	of	 the	
Cold	 War	 began	 to	 be	 anticipated’,	 the	 Reagan	 administration	 brought	 together	
senior	military	and	 strategic	planners	 to	 formulate	proposals	 for	 the	new	era.	This	
resulted	in	the	Discriminate	Deterrence	report	of	1988,	which	highlighted	that	‘Japan	
and	Europe	were	beginning	to	challenge	US	global	hegemony’	so	that	the	US	needed	
to	 focus	 on	 three	 regions:	 the	 Persian	 Gulf,	 Mediterranean	 and	 Pacific	 Ocean	 in	
order	to	remain	the	world’s	dominant	power.	Moreover,	 this	necessitated	that	the	
Pentagon	 prioritise	 the	modernisation	 of	 its	 nuclear	 arsenal	 and	 invest	 in	military	
capabilities	 for	 rapid	 military	 intervention,	 including	 high-tech	 weaponry	 (Gerson,	
2007:	20).	Gerson	(Ibid:	215-216)	points	out	that	the	1991	Gulf	War	saw	this	report’s	
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‘rationales	and	strategy’	being	put	 into	practice,	a	war	which	also	saw	London	and	
Washington	issuing	nuclear	threats	to	Baghdad.		
	
Behind	closed	doors,	military	planners	continued	to	develop	ambitious	plans	for	how	
nuclear	weapons	could	be	used.	According	to	William	Burr	(2008),	the	 leaked	1992	
Defense	 Planning	 Guidance	 showed	 how,	 during	 the	 George	 H.	 W.	 Bush	
administration,	 Pentagon	 officials	 ‘tried	 to	 develop	 a	 strategy	 for	maintaining	U.S.	
preponderance	 in	 the	 new	 post-Cold	 War,	 post-Soviet	 era’,	 key	 to	 which	 was	
‘preventing	 the	 reemergence	 of	 a	 new	 rival’.	 One	 of	 the	 authors	 of	 the	 report,	
Andrew	R.	Hoehn,	argued	that	 the	US	 ‘must	continue	 to	maintain	a	diverse	mix	of	
survivable	and	highly	capable	nuclear	forces,	including	non-strategic	nuclear	forces’,	
which,	 as	 Burr	 explains,	 would	 support	 the	 US’s	 ‘global	 role’,	 ‘validate	 security	
guarantees’	to	regional	allies	and	‘deter	Russian	nuclear	forces’.31		
	
Thus,	as	William	Arkin	(1993:	24)	described	in	a	1993	article,	even	before	the	end	of	
the	 Cold	War,	 as	 the	 nuclear	 complex	 grew	 ‘idle’	 and	 a	 test	 ban	 loomed,	 ‘nuclear	
advocates	 in	 the	 military	 and	 the	 laboratories	 began	 highly	 creative	 efforts	 to	
identify	new	“requirements”	for	nuclear	weapons’.	These	were	partly	a	response	to	
fears	that	new	facilities	would	be	cancelled	and	existing	sites	closed	causing	the	loss																																									 																					
31	At	 the	 same	 time	 as	 taking	 advantage	 of	 the	 historic	 strategic	 opportunity	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 Soviet	
Union	presented,	Burr	(2008)	points	out	that	then	Secretary	of	Defense	Dick	Cheney	and	his	advisers	
‘wanted	 to	 develop	 lower-cost	 strategies	 and	 plans	 to	prevent	 future	 global	 threats	 to	 American	
power	and	interests’	because	they	believed	that	‘military	spending	at	Cold	War	levels	was	no	longer	
possible’.	
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of	 key	 production	 capabilities	 and	 lead	 to	 ‘structural	 disarmament’	 (Ritchie,	 2008:	
32).	 Proposals	 thus	 emerged	 for	 a	 new	 generation	 of	 weapons	 including	 ‘mini-
nukes’—low-yield	warheads	capable	of	penetrating	the	ground	for	‘hard	target	and	
surface	 attacks’.	 Arkin	 warned	 that	 ‘just	 conducting	 research’	 on	 these	 weapons	
would	 have	 several	 damaging	 consequences	 for	 international	 co-operation	 on	
security.	 For	 example,	 US-Russia	 relations	 would	 be	 harmed,	 ‘anti-democratic	
military	and	nuclear	mafias	in	Russia’	would	be	strengthened	whilst	non-proliferation	
efforts	and	the	chances	of	agreeing	a	test	ban	would	be	seriously	undermined.	
	
Hans	 Kristensen	 (1998:	 33)	 makes	 similar	 points,	 emphasising	 that	 Clinton,	 whilst	
pledging	 that	 the	US	would	not	use	nuclear	weapons	 against	NNWS,	 expanded	 its	
nuclear	 war	 plans	 to	 ‘take	 on	 a	 broader	 role	 including	 rogue	 states	 armed	 with	
weapons	of	mass	destruction’.	As	‘rogue	states’	increasingly	acquired	WMD	(defined	
as	 nuclear,	 chemical,	 biological	 and	 radiological	 weapons),	 the	 Department	 of	
Defense	was	able	to	characterise	the	 international	environment	as	evolving	from	a	
‘weapon	 rich	 environment’	 to	 a	 ‘target	 rich	 environment’	 (Ibid:	 22).	 Several	
observers	 of	 Clinton’s	 policies	 from	 quite	 different	 backgrounds,	 including	 former	
military	chief	General	Lee	Butler	(Schell,	1998),	nuclear	weapons	policy	expert	Janne	
E.	Nolan	(1999)	and	disarmament	activist	Jacqueline	Cabasso	(Falk	&	Krieger,	2008:	
34),	therefore	criticised	his	administration	for	squandering	the	opportunity	after	the	
Cold	 War	 to	 enact	 reforms	 that	 would	 delegitimise	 nuclear	 weapons.	 Instead,	 as	
Arkin	 (1993),	 and	 Sauer	 (2005:	 64)	 argue,	 Clinton	made	 a	 series	 of	 decisions	 that	
	 192	
strengthened	 and	 ‘re-legitimised’	 the	 US	 nuclear	 weapons	 system. 32 	Whilst	
Republicans	were	 primarily	 responsible	 for	 the	US	 not	 ratifying	 the	 CTBT	 in	 1999,	
several	scholars	also	note	that	Clinton’s	campaign	to	ensure	it	passed	in	the	Senate	
was	 a	 failure,	 showing	 a	 lack	 of	 leadership	 on	 this	 vital	 issue	 (Sauer:	 2005,	 152).	
Overall,	 these	developments	have	 led	Kristensen	 (2003:	4)	 to	observe	 that	military	
planners—rather	 than	 democratically	 mandated	 political	 leaders—had	 achieved	
significant	‘leverage’	in	shaping	the	US’s	nuclear	policies	after	the	Cold	War.	
	
This	 last	 point	 is	 central	 if	we	 are	 to	 understand	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 policies	 of	 the	
Bush	administration,	which	several	critics	have	cast	as	a	radically	aggressive	shift	 in	
US	defense	and	foreign	policy.33	Whilst	this	viewpoint	is	valid,	it	is	incorrect	to	claim	
that	 the	 shift	 came	 suddenly	 and	 out	 of	 the	 blue.	 Rather,	 as	William	 Burr	 (2008)	
points	 out,	 the	 1992	Defense	 Planning	Guidance	 calling	 on	 the	US	 to	 ‘prevent	 the	
reemergence	 of	 a	 new	 rival’	 informed	 the	 Clinton	 administration’s	 strategy	 and	
forshadowed	the	‘preemptive	doctrine	that	George	W.	Bush	has	tried	to	turn	into	an	
axiom	of	U.S.	policy’.	Indeed,	as	James	Mann	(2004)	identified,	the	invasion	of	Iraq	in																																									 																					
32	For	 example,	 the	 first	 new	 guidance	 for	 nuclear	 weapons	 since	 Reagan	 in	 1981	 was	 issued—	
Presidential	 Decision	 Directive	 60—which	 reaffirmed	 nuclear	 weapons	 as	 the	 ‘cornerstone’	 of	 US	
national	 security	 ‘for	 the	 indefinite	 future’	 and	 gave	 the	 President	 more	 options	 when	 ordering	
nuclear	attacks	(Smith,	1997).	
	
33	For	 example,	 President	 Jimmy	 Carter	 (2005)	 reviewing	 the	 policies	 of	 the	 Bush	 administration,	
rebuked	the	US	as	 ‘the	major	culprit	 in	this	erosion	of	the	NPT.	While	claiming	to	be	protecting	the	
world	from	proliferation	threats	in	Iraq,	Libya,	Iran	and	North	Korea,	American	leaders	not	only	have	
abandoned	existing	treaty	restraints	but	also	have	asserted	plans	to	test	and	develop	new	weapons,	
including	anti-ballistic	missiles,	 the	earth-penetrating	 'bunker	buster'	and	perhaps	some	new	 'small'	
bombs.	 They	 also	 have	 abandoned	 past	 pledges	 and	 now	 threaten	 first	 use	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	
against	non-nuclear	states’.	
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2003	‘was	carried	out	 in	pursuit	of	a	 larger	vision	of	using	America's	overwhelming	
military	 power	 to	 shape	 the	 future’.	 Furthermore,	 military	 planners	 during	 the	
Clinton	administration	 signaled	 their	determination	 to	establish	programs	ensuring	
‘full	spectrum	dominance’,	as	outlined	in	the	Joint	Chiefs	of	Staff’s	2000	‘conceptual	
template’	 for	 the	 US’s	 armed	 forces,	 entitled	 Joint	 Vision	 2020.	 This	 document	
described	 how	 the	 US	 would	 dominate	 ‘in	 all	 domains-	 space,	 sea,	 land,	 air	 and	
information’,	 by	 ‘operating	 unilaterally	 or	 in	 combination	 with	 multinational	 and	
interagency	partners,	 to	defeat	 any	adversary	and	 control	 any	 situation	across	 the	
full	range	of	military	operations’	(JCS,	2000:	6).		
	
With	expansionist	plans	such	as	these	high	on	the	military	establishment’s	agenda,	
the	stage	was	therefore	well	set	for	the	incoming	administration	of	George	W.	Bush.	
As	 is	well	known,	the	Bush	team	included	several	 figures,	such	as	Dick	Cheney	and	
Paul	 Wolfowitz,	 with	 ‘nationalist’	 or	 ‘neo-conservative’	 outlooks.34	This	 group	 had	
been	closely	involved	in	formulating	policy	under	George	H.W.	Bush’s	administration	
and	 subsequently	 the	 Project	 for	 a	 New	 American	 Century,	 which	 stood	 for	 huge	
build-ups	 of	 high-tech	 weaponry	 and	 an	 increased	 role	 for	 nuclear	 weapons	 and	
military	power	at	the	expense	of	diplomacy	(Burr,	2008;	Gerson,	2007:	242).	In	2001-
2003	 the	 influence	 of	 these	 officials	 on	US	 strategic	 thinking,	 including	 on	 nuclear	
weapons,	was	made	manifest	in	a	series	of	documents,	principally	the	2001	Nuclear	
Posture	Review	(NPR),	the	2002	National	Security	Strategy	(NSS),	the	2002	National																																									 																					
34	Cheney	 was	 Secretary	 of	 Defense	 under	 George	 H.W.	 Bush	 and	 now	 became	 Vice-President.	
Wolfowitz	 was	 Under	 Secretary	 of	 Defense	 under	 George	 H.W.	 Bush	 and	 now	 became	 Deputy	
Secretary	of	Defense.	
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Strategy	to	Combat	Weapons	of	Mass	Destruction	and	the	2003	National	Policy	on	
Ballistic	 Missile	 Defense	 (BMD).	 Overall,	 the	 approach	 taken	 by	 the	 Bush	
administration	was	 described	 by	G.	 John	 Ikenberry	 (2002)	 as	 a	 ‘neoimperial	 grand	
strategy’,	which,	he	lamented,	would	‘rend	the	fabric	of	the	international	community	
and	 political	 partnerships	 precisely	 at	 a	 time	 when	 that	 community	 and	 those	
partnerships	are	urgently	needed.’	
	
The	NPR	played	its	part	by	elevating	nuclear	weapons	in	US	strategy	to	a	level	akin	to	
that	 of	 Reagan’s	 first	 term,	 specifically	 naming	 seven	 nations	 as	 primary	 nuclear	
targets:	China,	Iran,	Iraq,	Libya,	North	Korea,	Syria	and	Russia.	The	Review	also	called	
for	 investment	 in	 a	 new	 generation	 of	more	 usable	 nuclear	 weapons,	 including	 a	
‘bunker-buster’	 to	 destroy	 enemy	 command	 bunkers	 and	 WMD	 sites	 deep	
underground	(Gerson,	2007:	244).35		
	
James	Goodby	(2006:	188)	argues	that	the	NSS	is	‘essential’	to	an	understanding	of	
the	 Bush	 administration’s	 approach	 to	 nuclear	 weapons	 policy	 and	 also	 ‘codified	
Bush’s	preventive	war	thinking’.	For	example,	the	NSS	states	that	‘We	must	build	and	
																																								 																					
35	Analysts	such	as	Sauer	 (2005:	66)	have	noted	that	much	of	 the	 thinking	 in	 the	NPR	and	the	Bush	
administration’s	 nuclear	 weapons	 policy	 more	 generally,	 can	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 a	 2001	 report	
produced	 by	 the	 National	 Institute	 for	 Public	 Policy,	 a	 study	 directed	 by	 Keith	 B.	 Payne,	 who	was	
thereafter	 given	 a	 senior	 position	 in	 the	 Pentagon.	 This	 document	 argued	 that	 the	 US	 needed	 a	
smaller,	more	efficient,	arsenal’	of	specialised	weapons.	Some	deeply	buried	targets,	it	argued,	could	
only	be	destroyed	by	‘one	or	more	nuclear	weapons’	(NIPP,	2001:	6).	
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maintain	 our	 defenses	 beyond	 challenge…our	 forces	 will	 be	 strong	 enough	 to	
dissuade	 potential	 adversaries	 from	 pursuing	 a	 military	 buildup	 in	 hopes	 of	
surpassing	 or	 equaling	 the	 power	 of	 the	 United	 States’.	 As	 Goodby	 points	 out,	
‘simply	put’	this	meant	that,	‘unchallenged	military	supremacy	over	any	other	nation	
in	 the	 world,	 and	 anticipatory	military	 action	 against	 perceived	 gathering	 threats’	
was	‘at	the	heart	of	the	Bush	strategic	doctrine’.		
	
In	practice,	this	new	strategic	framework	included	the	construction	and	deployment	
of	 BMD,	 as	 a	 result	 of	which,	 the	US	unilaterally	withdrew	 in	 2002	 from	 the	Anti-
Ballistic	Missile	Treaty	 (ABMT)—considered	by	most	countries	 to	be	a	 ‘cornerstone	
of	 strategic	 stability’	 (Boese,	 2002).	 In	 terms	 of	 the	 nuclear	 arsenal	 itself,	
restructuring	took	the	 form	of	 further	deep	cuts	 to	 the	nuclear	stockpile,	plans	 for	
new	warheads—‘mini-nukes’	such	as	the	B61-11	and	a	new	approach	to	maintaining	
aging	warheads—the	Reliable	Replacement	Warhead	(RRW).36		
	
The	 question	 of	 spending	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 survival	 and	 growth	 of	 the	 nuclear	
weapons	production	complex	thus	remains	central	 to	today’s	debate,	as	 illustrated																																									 																					
36	Whilst	the	RRW	project	was	eventually	cancelled	in	2009	by	the	Obama	administration,	the	NNSA	
soon	came	up	with	an	ambitious	new	plan,	termed	‘3+2’,	with	a	projected	cost	of	at	least	$60	billion.	
This	was	 described	 by	 analyst	 Eryn	MacDonald	 (2013)	 as	 a:	 ‘25-year	 plan	 to	 consolidate	 the	 seven	
existing	 types	 of	 U.S.	 nuclear	 weapons	 down	 to	 five-three	 interoperable	 ballistic	missile	 warheads	
that	could	be	used	on	either	 ICBMs	or	SLBMs;	and	two	air-delivered	weapons,	a	bomb	and	a	cruise	
missile’.	The	key	question	she	poses	 is	 ‘Who	Wants	3+2?’,	 implying	that	 it	must	be	the	NNSA,	given	
that	Obama	had	previously	ruled	out	new	nukes,	Congress	has	expressed	skepticism	about	the	plans	
and	‘there	is	also	little	enthusiasm’	for	it	amongst	the	services	who	would	use	the	weapons	(Ibid).		
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by	 a	 2012	Washington	 Post	 report	 (Priest,	 2012),	which	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	US’s	
nuclear	 arsenal	 ‘is	 set	 to	 undergo	 the	 costliest	 overhaul	 in	 its	 history,	 even	 as	 the	
military	 faces	 spending	 cuts	 to	 its	 conventional	 arms	 programs	 at	 a	 time	 of	 fiscal	
crisis.’	 For	 example,	 the	 DoD	 and	 the	 National	 Nuclear	 Security	 Administration	
(NNSA)	 plan	 to	 spend	 hundreds	 of	 billions	 of	 dollars	 on	 nuclear	weapons	 projects	
over	the	next	decade	and	beyond.	This	includes	$68	billion	to	develop	and	purchase	
a	new	generation	of	nuclear	bombers,	$347	billion	to	purchase	and	operate	12	new	
ballistic	 missile	 submarines	 and	 billions	 more	 on	 new	 nuclear	 weapons	 facilities	
(Hartung	&	Anderson,	2012:	1).			
	
It	is	by	these	huge	proposed	outlays	that	we	should	assess	President	Obama’s	record	
on	nuclear	weapons.	The	 sweeping	and	much-vaunted	 rhetoric	of	his	2009	Prague	
speech,	whereby	he	stated	‘America's	commitment	to	seek	the	peace	and	security	of	
a	 world	without	 nuclear	weapons’	 evaporated	 against	 the	 formidable	 cliffs	 of	 the	
nuclear	weapons	 establishment	which	was	 determined	 to	 retain	 nuclear	weapons	
‘indefinitely’.	 Michael	 Izbicki	 (2010:	 138)	 of	 the	 US	 Naval	 Submarine	 School	 thus	
provided	an	apposite	 summary	of	how	current	US	policy	will	damage	nuclear	non-
proliferation,	 when	 stating	 that	 ‘it	 will	 be	 difficult	 for	 foreign	 powers	 to	 conclude	
that	 the	 United	 States	 is	 serious	 about	 a	 long-term	 reduction	 in	 nuclear	weapons	
while	we	are	modernizing	our	infrastructure	so	dramatically’.	
	
The	 Obama	 administration’s	 approach	 to	 nuclear	 weapons	 and	 broader	 national	
security	 concerns	 was	 outlined	 in	 four	 key	 documents,	 the	 BMD	 Review	 (2010	 i),	
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Nuclear	Posture	Review	(2010	 ii),	Quadrennial	Defense	Review	(2010	 iii	and	2014),	
and	 Space	 Posture	 Review	 (2010	 iv).	Marco	 J.	 Lyons	 (2014),	 a	 US	 Army	 strategist,	
argues	 that	 the	 Nuclear	 Posture	 Review	 was	 produced	 as	 part	 of	 ‘significant	
continuity	 in	 policy	 and	 posture	 since	 the	 last	 NPR’	 so	 that	 it	 ‘reaffirmed	 a	
fundamental	 role	 for	 nuclear	 weapons	 in	 national	 security’.	 Thus	 whilst	 Obama’s	
high-profile	Prague	speech	was	widely	lauded	as	representative	of	a	break	from	the	
Bush	years—with	his	promotion	of	a	nuclear	weapons	free	world	cited	by	the	Nobel	
Committee	as	a	 reason	for	awarding	him	the	2009	Nobel	Peace	Prize—the	policies	
he	 pursued	 in	 this	 area	 were	 not	 only	 in	 total	 harmony	 with	 preceding	
administrations,	 but,	 as	 Joe	 Cirincione	 (2013:	 34)	 avers,	 shared	 by	 US	 national	
security	experts	‘across	the	political	spectrum’.37		
	
Brad	 Roberts	 (2013:	 9),	 who	 helped	 lead	 the	 Nuclear	 Posture	 and	 BMD	 Reviews,	
states	 that	 an	 important	 influence	 on	 them,	 was	 the	 ‘emerging	 challenges	 to	
extended	 deterrence	 and	 strategic	 stability’,	 particularly	 in	 Northeast	 Asia,	 the	
Middle	East	and	 the	Euro-Atlantic	areas.	With	 regard	 to	 the	 former,	North	Korea’s	
long-range	missile	and	nuclear	programmes	and	China’s	military	modernisation	are	
highlighted	as	key	challenges.	This	is	because,	it	is	argued,	the	US’s	key	allies	in	the	
region—Japan	 and	 South	 Korea—may	 seek	 their	 own	 nuclear	 weapons	 if	 the	
strength	 of	 the	 US	 commitment	 to	 protect	 them	 come	 what	 may	 is	 called	 into	
question.	The	curious	argument	presented	here	is	thus	that	maintaining	a	strong	and	
																																								 																					
37	Joe	Cirincione	notes	that	Obama’s	Republican	rival	for	the	Presidency—Senator	John	McCain—had	
stated	in	2008	that	‘The	United	States	should	lead	a	global	effort	at	nuclear	disarmament’.	
	 198	
credible	US	nuclear	 ‘umbrella’	 actually	works	 to	prevent	proliferation	and	advance	
the	 cause	 of	 disarmament.	 In	 reality	 Washington	 does	 not	 want	 South	 Korea	 or	
Japan	to	develop	their	own	nuclear	weapons	because	it	may	then	become	dragged	
into	a	conflict.38	Moreover,	 if	US	allies	 in	one	region	seek	the	bomb	this	may	cause	
allies	 in	 other	 regions	 to	 pursue	 their	 own	 deterrents—an	 act	 of	 independence	
which	would	make	these	‘vassal	states’	harder	to	control	(McCormack,	2007).		
	
This	situation	illustrates	why,	if	a	President	wishes	to	go	beyond	rhetoric	and	enact	
meaningful,	progressive	reform	to	nuclear	policy,	they	will	need	to	have	prepared	an	
alternative	 strategic	 framework	 in	 order	 to	 change	 how	 the	 US	 relates	 to	 current	
allies	 if	 a	 more	 rational	 peace	 and	 security	 system	 is	 to	 be	 created.	 Any	 such	
initiative	will,	of	course,	also	require	significant	political	will—for	example,	as	part	of	
a	 process	 of	 institutional	 democratisation—if	 the	 nuclear	 establishment	 is	 to	 be	
successfully	challenged	(McLean	1986;	Nolan,	1999).	
	
3.3.2	The	US’s	dual	nuclear	disarmament	responsibility	
	
Before	 examining	 in	 more	 detail	 the	 question	 of	 institutional	 democratisation	 in	
relation	to	the	US’s	national	nuclear	disarmament	obligations	we	need	to	first	deal	
																																								 																					
38	As	 Roberts	 (2013,	 23)	 states,	 ‘a	 proliferation	 of	 strike	 capabilities	 among	U.S.	 allies	 and	 partners	
would	heighten	the	perceived	U.S.	risk	of	unwanted	entanglement	in	crisis	and	escalation	under	the	
nuclear	shadow’.	
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with	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 US	 has	 a	 particularly	 significant	 dual	 nuclear	 disarmament	
responsibility.	The	scale	of	this	responsibility	is	important	to	outline	so	that	our	claim	
that	 institutional	 democratisation	 is	 a	 legitimate	 endeavour	 may	 be	 strongly	
established.	This	responsibility	first	relates	to	the	US’s	nuclear	arsenal	and	secondly,	
to	 the	US’s	 immensely	powerful	 conventional	military	which	has,	as	Waltz	avers,	a	
singular	influence	on	all	state’s	strategic	thought,	including	as	the	main	global	driver	
of	nuclear	proliferation.	Similarly,	Brown	and	Deutch	(2007:	1)	note	that,	‘even	in	the	
absence	of	overwhelming	superiority	in	nuclear	weapons,	the	great	predominance	of	
U.S.	 conventional	 forces	would	 remain	 a	 strong	motive	 for	 aspiring	 states	 to	 seek	
nuclear	weapons’.	For	the	purposes	of	this	study	we	therefore	need	to	consider	how	
the	US	can	move	from	its	current	strategic	posture	to	one	supportive	of	NWS	nuclear	
disarmament	and	the	value	of	institutional	democratisation	to	this	process.		
	
With	regard	to	the	US’s	first	nuclear	disarmament	responsibility,	one	of	the	ways	in	
which	we	may	identify	NWS	and	other	NPS’s	responsibility	to	disarm,	and	contribute	
to	the	creation	of	a	NWFW,	is	by	considering	which	state’s	behavior	has	been	more	
or	 less	responsible	for	putting	the	global	public’s	human	rights	 in	 jeopardy	through	
actions	 that	 increase	 the	 likelihood	of	nuclear	detonation.	Reviewing	 the	historical	
record	shows	that,	of	the	nine	NPS,	the	US	is	primarily	responsible	for	 jeopardising	
these	rights,	given	that	since	1945	it	 is:	 i)	the	only	state	to	have	detonated	nuclear	
weapons	against	another	state—Japan	ii)	according	to	the	Comprehensive	Test	Ban	
Treaty	Organisation	(2012),	 the	state	which	has	carried	out	the	most	nuclear	tests,	
over	1000,	damaging	countless	people’s	health	in	and	outside	the	US	iii)	according	to	
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a	 2010	 Stimson	 Centre	 study	 (Black,	 2010),	 the	 state	 which	 has	 made	 the	 most	
threats	 to	 use	 nuclear	weapons—to	 achieve	 political	 goals	 iv)	 the	 state	which	 has	
engaged	 most	 widely	 in	 vertical	 and	 horizontal	 nuclear	 proliferation,	 both	
qualitatively	and	quantitatively—including	to	the	UK,	France,	India	and	Pakistan—	so	
that	 as	 Joe	 Cirincione	 (2013:	 134)	 has	 argued	 ‘past	 Democratic	 and	 Republican	
administrations	 have	 constantly	 placed	 proliferation	 and	 democracy	 concerns	
second	to	other	geopolitical	aims’	v)	with	Russia	the	only	state	to	maintain	nuclear	
weapons	on	high	levels	of	alert	vi)	plans	to,	as	described	by	Hans	Kristensen	and	his	
co-authors	 ‘aggressively’	 use	 nuclear	 weapons	 for	 war-fighting	 in	 a	 range	 of	
scenarios	(Kristensen	et	al,	2009:	21),	developing,	as	Lynn	Eden	(2011)	and	Zachary	
Keck	(2015)	have	outlined,	more	and	more	accurate	and	thus	lethal	nuclear	weapons	
vii)	 the	 only	 possessor	 state	 that	 stations	 nuclear	 weapons	 overseas	 and	 that	
provides	extended	deterrence	guarantees	 to	allied	nations	viii)	 is	developing	BMD,	
space-based	 weapons	 and	 advanced	 conventional	 capabilities.	 These	 are	 part	 of	
what	David	McDonough	(2006:	11)	describes	as	the	‘long-standing	goal	of	American	
nuclear	 war-planners’	 to	 achieve	 the	 capability	 to	 launch	 a	 disarming	 first-strike	
against	an	opponent,	otherwise	known	as	nuclear	superiority,	which	is	magnified	as	
the	US	seeks	to	‘prevent’	or	‘rollback’	the	ability	of	weaker	states—both	nuclear	and	
non-nuclear	powers—to	establish	or	maintain	a	deterrence	relationship.	
	
In	 proceeding	 with	 our	 discussion	 of	 the	 US’s	 second	 responsibility—to	 support	
other	NPS	in	moving	towards	nuclear	disarmament—it	is	firstly	necessary	to	consider	
which	 US	 military	 capabilities	 (for	 power	 projection,	 for	 example)	 and	 what	
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behaviour	 is	 perceived	 as	 threatening	 by	 certain	 states,	 thus	 driving	 nuclear	
proliferation.	 Secondly,	 we	 will	 consider	 the	 options	 the	 US	 has	 to	 reduce	 such	
threats,	 including	 by	 Washington	 exercising	 strategic	 restraint,	 building	 more	
cooperative	 relationships	 with	 other	 states	 and	 supporting	 efforts	 to	 create	 a	
NWFW.	 Following	 this,	 the	 next	 and	 final	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	will	 consider	 the	
possible	means	by	which	changes	to	the	US’s	strategic	posture	might	take	place	to	
support	 the	 US	 realising	 its	 dual	 nuclear	 disarmament	 responsibilities,	 including,	
crucially,	 institutional	 democratisation	 with	 a	 view	 to	 increasing	 and	 making	
permanent	popular	control	over	defence	and	foreign	policy.	
	
According	 to	 Ben	 Zala	 and	 Andrew	 Futter	 (2013:	 2-3)	 the	 US	 has,	 under	 Barack	
Obama’s	 administration,	 sought	 to	 ‘increase	 the	 role	 of	 advanced	 conventional	
weaponry’	 in	order	to	‘reduce	its	own	nuclear	stockpile’.	The	danger	they	correctly	
highlight	 is	 that	 magnifying	 US	 conventional	 superiority	 ‘essentially	 works	 to	
decrease	 US	 vulnerability	 in	 a	 nuclear	 disarmed	 world,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	
increasing	 the	 vulnerability	 of	 its	 current	 or	 future	 rivals	 and	 adversaries.’	 For	
example,	China	and	Russia	 see	 their	nuclear	weapons	as	 a	means	of	deterring	 the	
threat	posed	by	the	US’s	far	superior	conventional	forces	(Hansell	&	Potter,	2009:	2).		
	
The	 scale	 of	 these	 forces	 is	 immense—the	 US	 military	 operates	 10	 Unified	
Combatant	 Commands	 whose	 areas	 of	 operation	 span	 the	 globe,	 including	 more	
than	2,500,000	personnel	and	an	estimated	1,000	military	bases	spread	across	each	
continent	 (Johnson,	 2007).	 On	 top	 of	 this,	 Beijing	 and	 Moscow	 include	 in	 their	
	 202	
strategic	calculations	the	US’s	advanced	military	capabilities,	such	as	BMD,	precision-
guided	munitions,	 long	 range	 conventionally	 armed	weapons	 that	 can	be	 assigned	
strategic	goals,	and	the	weaponisation	of	outer	space	(Zagorksi,	2011;	Acton,	2013).	
Furthermore,	 as	 seen	 in	 the	 recent	 Ukraine	 crisis,	 Russia	 strongly	 objects	 to	 the	
expansion	of	US	power	close	to	its	borders,	which	has	occurred	under	the	auspices	
of	NATO.	As	Perkovich	and	Acton	(2009:	30-31)	therefore	conclude,	a	NWFW	would	
require	the	US	to	give	assurances	that	the	global	elimination	of	nuclear	arsenals	will	
not	lead	to	an	increase	in	its	relative	military	power	and	that	any	use	of	military	force	
will	be	constrained	by	international	law.	
	
Of	 particular	 importance	 for	 our	 discussion	 is	 the	 Bush	 administration’s	 2002	
withdrawal	 from	 the	 Anti-Ballistic	Missile	 Treaty	 (ABMT).	 As	 previously	 noted,	 the	
ABMT	 was	 seen	 internationally	 as	 a	 ‘cornerstone	 of	 strategic	 stability’	 because	 it	
facilitated	later	agreements	limiting	and	reducing	US	and	Russian	deployed	strategic	
nuclear	 arsenals	 (Boese,	 2002).39	BMD	 is	 widely	 seen	 as	 an	 offensive	 first	 strike	
weapon	because	a	 functioning	 system	would	protect	 the	attacking	nation	 from	an	
opponent’s	 second	 strike	 (Hildreth	&	Woolf,	 2010:	 2).	 BMD	 therefore	 undermines	
strategic	 stability	 between	 the	 US	 and	 Russia,	 whilst	 posing	 a	 particular	 threat	 to	
China	because	it	only	has	an	estimated	45	Intercontinental	Ballistic	Missiles	(ICBMs)	
capable	of	reaching	the	continental	US	(Kristensen	&	Norris,	2015:	78).	The	result,	as	
																																								 																					
39	Today,	 the	average	annual	US	spend	on	missile	defense	(based	on	figures	 for	2013	to	2017)	 is	an	
estimated	$9.5	billion	(Loehrke,	2012),	over	four	times	more	than	the	budget	for	the	NNSA’s	defense	
nuclear	 non-proliferation	 programmes,	whose	work	 includes	 safeguarding	 dangerous	weapons	 and	
materials	in	the	former	Soviet	Union	(NNSA,	2014).	
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the	 bipartisan	 Congressional	 Commission	 (2009:	 32)	 on	 the	 US’s	 strategic	 posture	
points	 out,	 is	 that	 China	 ‘may	 already	 be	 increasing	 the	 size	 of	 its	 ICBM	 force	 in	
response	 to	 its	 assessment	of	 the	U.S.	missile	 defense	program’.	 Similarly	Michael	
Byers	 (2000)	 has	 argued	 that,	 for	 Russia,	 ‘the	 only	 rational	 response’	 to	 US	 BMD	
would	be	‘to	maintain,	and	strengthen’	its	existing	nuclear	forces.40		
	
Chomsky	 (2003:	225)	argues	 that	US	missile	defense	 is	only	 ‘a	small	 component	of	
much	 more	 ambitious	 programs	 for	 militarisation	 of	 space,	 with	 the	 intent	 to	
achieve	 a	monopoly	 on	 the	 use	 of	 space	 for	 offensive	military	 purposes’.	 The	 US	
(alongside	Israel)	thus	abstains	from	the	annual	UN	General	Assembly	resolution	on	
the	prevention	of	an	arms	race	in	outer	space	(PAROS),	which	every	other	country	in	
the	world	 supports	 (RCW,	 2014	 ii).	 Both	 James	 Acton	 (2013)	 and	 Dennis	 Gormley	
(2010)	 have	 thus	 highlighted	 how	 Chinese	 and	 Russian	 military	 planners	 have	
concerns	about	all	of	the	US’s	high-precision	conventional	weapons.41	Moreover,	the	
US	has	begun	 research	and	development	 into	even	more	 technologically	advanced	
systems,	 leading	 Gormley	 (Ibid:	 88)	 to	 underline	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 US	 being																																									 																					
40	Elsewhere,	 Yousaf	 Butt	 (2010)	 states	 that	 BMD	 is	 an	 unproven	 technology	 so	 that	 the	 current	
system	 ‘cannot	 even	 reliably	 intercept	 a	 single	 missile	 that's	 launched	 at	 a	 known	 time	 and	 on	 a	
known	trajectory’.	He	therefore	argues	 that	 the	real	problem	 is	 that	US	policymakers	might	believe	
exaggerated	claims	about	the	system’s	effectiveness,	thus	emboldening	them	to	‘stake	out	riskier	and	
more	aggressive	regional	policies’.	Moreover,	China	and	India	have	already	begun	‘following	the	US’s	
lead’	by	developing	missile	defense	test	programs,	with	Pakistan	 likely	 to	be	next,	a	dynamic	which	
could	 draw	 these	 nations	 into	 a	 cycle	 of	 proliferation,	 putting	 pressure	 on	 US	 and	 Russian	
policymakers	to	respond	in	kind.			
41	For	 example,	 Gormley	 (2010:	 87)	 states	 that	 Moscow	 fears	 that	 ‘future	 advanced	 conventional	
weapons—together	with	improved	missile	defenses—could	place	Russia	in	a	position	of	unacceptable	
vulnerability’	as	its	nuclear	forces	may	be	targeted.	
	 204	
transparent	 over	 where	 these	 programmes	 stand	 today	 and	 ‘what	 restrictions	 or	
operational	constraints’	it	might	be	‘willing	to	accept,	if	any,	on	their	development	or	
operation	to	accelerate	the	path	toward	nuclear	abolition’.42		
	
Following	the	logic	of	President	Obama’s	(Broad	&	Sanger,	2009)	statement	that	the	
US	 will	 ‘retain	 our	 deterrent	 capacity	 as	 long	 as	 there	 is	 a	 country	 with	 nuclear	
weapons’,	if	the	US	pursues	improvements	in	its	conventional	military	capabilities	in	
order	to	enforce	its	global	hegemonic	designs,	then	it	will	not	be	able	to	relinquish	
its	 nuclear	 weapons.	 Ultimately	 then,	 if	 the	 US	 is	 to	 help	 create	 the	 political	
conditions	 for	 a	 NWFW	 it	 will	 need	 to	 accept	 that	 this	 involves	 a	 process	 of	
delegitimising	 the	 threat	 or	 use	of	 force	 as	 instruments	 of	 state	 policy.	Moreover,	
the	 US	 should	 show	 strategic	 restraint	 by	 abandoning	 plans	 to	 militarise	 space,	
expand	its	BMD	network	and	develop	more	advanced	conventional	weapons	such	as	
precision	guided	munitions	in	order	to	provide	certainty	over	its	intentions	and	meet	
its	NPT	obligations.	
	
An	important	part	of	this	retreat	from	power	projection	will	be	a	recognition	that	the	
US’s	pursuit	of	global	supremacy	undermines	not	only	other	nation’s	but	also	its	own	
security.	 For	 example,	 the	US	 now	 faces	 a	 real	 threat	 of	 nuclear	 terrorism	 from	 a	
range	 of	 potential	 sources.	 Former	US	Defense	 Secretaries	 Robert	McNamara	 and	
William	Perry	(2009)	believe	that	‘there	is	a	greater	than	50	percent	probability	of	a																																									 																					
42	These	include	the	Conventional	Strike	Missile	and	experimental	hypersonic	technology.	
	 205	
nuclear	strike	on	US	targets	within	a	decade’.	This	threat	also	stems	from	the	failure	
to	 properly	 retrieve	 and	 secure	 fissile	 materials	 globally.	 Yet,	 despite	 Obama’s	
promise	 to	 ‘keep	 wayward	 nuclear	 weapons	 and	 radioactive	 material	 out	 of	 the	
hands	of	terrorists’,	David	Culp	(2014)	reports	that	the	administration	has	proposed	
to	 reduce	 the	 money	 available	 for	 nuclear	 nonproliferation	 programs—by	 $400	
million	for	2015.43	
	
There	is	some	awareness	of	the	international	impact	of	US	military	power	in	the	top	
echelons	of	the	US	establishment.	For	example,	in	2001,	then	Secretary	of	State	for	
Defense,	William	Cohen	(2001)	outlined	how:	
	
At	the	dawn	of	the	21st	Century,	the	United	States	now	faces	what	could	be	
called	a	Superpower	Paradox.	Our	unrivaled	 supremacy	 in	 the	conventional	
military	arena	 is	prompting	adversaries	 to	seek	unconventional,	asymmetric	
means	to	strike	what	they	perceive	as	our	Achilles	heel.		
	
The	 meaning	 of	 the	 ‘Superpower	 Paradox’	 is	 that	 the	 more	 powerful	 the	 US	 is	
militarily	and	the	more	it	projects	this	power	globally,	the	more	state	and	non-state	
actors	 will	 ‘seek	 to	 acquire	 capabilities	 to	 inflict	 mass	 casualties	 and	 destruction:	
																																								 																					
43	Culp	 (2014)	 also	 speculates	 that	 the	 Department	 of	 Energy	 has	 taken	 these	 funds	 to	 pay	 for	
increased	 spending	 (of	 $534	 million	 for	 2015)	 on	 nuclear	 weapons	 following	 pressure	 from	 the	
Pentagon	(NNSA,	2014:	7).	
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nuclear,	biological	and	chemical	 (NBC)	weapons	or	the	means	to	deliver	them’.	Yet	
the	DoD’s	solution	to	this	was	not	for	the	US	to	reduce	its	military	presence	overseas	
or	 cut	 back	military	 spending.	 Instead,	 the	DoD	 argued	 that	 the	US	must	 increase	
counter-proliferation	 efforts	 (including	 the	 threat	 of	 conventional	 and	 nuclear	
weaponry)	 to	prevent	weaker	 (third-world)	nations	and	non-state	actors	acquiring,	
threatening	or	using	WMD	against	the	US	(Cohen,	2001).	Hans	Kristensen	(2010:	9)	
highlights	 how	 this	 counter-proliferation	 mission	 led	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 Global	
Strike	 under	 George	 W.	 Bush,	 a	 ‘new	 phenomenon’	 consisting	 of	 ‘a	 preemptive	
strategy	 focused	on	destroying	WMD	targets	before	 they	can	be	used’.	One	of	 the	
key	 dangers	 here	 is	 that	 the	 distinction	 between	 ‘retaliation	 (deterrence)	 and	
preemption	 (Global	 Strike)’	 has	 been	 blurred.44	As	 Kristensen	 (2010:	 10)	 explains,	
this	 ambiguity	 did	 not	 evolve	 accidentally	 but	 was	 done	 on	 purpose	 ‘to	 create	
uncertainty	in	an	adversary’s	mind	about	a	U.S.	response’.	The	problem	here	is	that	
whilst	sometimes	this	might	work	and	‘strengthen	deterrence’	in	other	situations	‘it	
might	undermine	it	and	trigger	military	counter-planning	or	even	the	very	escalation	
it	was	intended	to	prevent’	(Ibid).		
	
																																								 																					
44	Both	Chomsky	 (2003)	and	Gormley	 (2009)	agree	with	 this	analysis,	except	 they	argue	 that	Bush’s	
policy	was	one	of	prevention	rather	than	pre-emption.	Chomsky	(2002)	describes	preventive	war	as	
‘the	use	of	military	 force	 to	 eliminate	 an	 invented	or	 imagined	 threat’	 and	 therefore	 ‘the	 supreme	
crime	that	was	condemned	at	Nuremberg’.	
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In	 terms	 of	 the	 potential	 for	 the	 US	 to	 move	 away	 from	 the	 status	 quo,	 recent	
surveys	of	 public	 opinion	have	 found	 that	 there	 is	 substantial	 support	 for	 defence	
spending	to	be	cut,	so	that,	according	to	Peter	Cary	(2017)	of	the	Center	for	Public	
Integrity,	 ‘public	 opinion	 is	 again	 at	 odds	 with	 Washington’	 on	 this	 topic.	 Other	
recent	polls	from	the	Pew	Research	Center	(2016)	and	Survey	Sampling	International	
(Dyer,	2016)	found	that	the	majority	of	Americans	want	the	US	to	‘focus	on	its	own	
problems	 rather	 than	 expanding	 the	 military’s	 role	 abroad’	 (O’Toole	 &	 De	 Luce,	
2016).	 Similarly,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 nuclear	 weapons,	 a	 Stimson	 Center	 (Kull	 et	 al,	
2012)	study	found	that	two	thirds	of	those	polled	‘decreased	the	budget	for	nuclear	
weapons,	 including	eight	 in	ten	Democrats	and	two	thirds	of	Republicans,	with	the	
sample	as	a	whole	 cutting	 it	 an	average	of	27%—the	 largest	area	percentage	cut’.	
This	 data	 reinforces	 the	 points	 made	 in	 the	 above	 discussion	 of	 institutional	
democratisation,	 highlighting	 the	 gap	 between	 US	 public	 opinion	 on	 military	 and	
nuclear	 matters	 and	 government	 policy.	 The	 question	 of	 how	 this	 gap	 might	 be	
closed	will	be	examined	further	below,	suffice	to	note	for	now	that	one	of	the	major	
difficulties	 in	 shifting	 to	 a	 new	 approach	 will	 be	 how	 to	 reconcile	 the	 sometimes	
contradictory	positions	taken	by	the	public	on	these	issues.	For	example,	according	
to	Andrew	Kohut	(2014)	of	Pew	Research,	‘the	typical	American	continues	to	look	at	
world	 leadership	 with	 a	 fair	 degree	 of	 skepticism	 and	 is	 extremely	 wary	 of	
engagement	 in	 areas	 of	 conflict.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 most	 continue	 to	 take	
considerable	comfort	in	American	military	power.’		
	
	
	 208	
3.3.3	Actors	and	interests	driving	US	nuclear	weapons	decision-making	today	
	
The	previous	 two	sections	 reviewed	the	approach	policy-makers	have	 taken	to	 the	
bomb	since	the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	with	a	particular	focus	on	the	early	1990s,	and	
placed	 this	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 US’s	 global	 strategy	 and	 the	 US’s	 dual	 nuclear	
disarmament	responsibility,	including	the	ways	in	which	US	conventional	superiority	
drives	other	state’s	nuclear	choices.	This	section	will	examine	the	domestic	drivers	of	
these	 policies,	 with	 the	 principle	 goal	 of	 understanding	 who	 is	 in	 charge	 of	 US	
nuclear	 weapons	 and	 how	 nuclear	 weapons	 decisions	 are	 made.	 The	 following	
section	 then	 proposes	 how	 institutional	 democratisation,	 as	 a	 theory	 of	 change	
focused	 on	 realising	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 may	 be	 applied	 to	 existing	 US	 nuclear	
politics.		
	
It	is	useful	to	begin	this	effort	by	looking	at	the	key	governmental	actors	involved	in	
US	nuclear	weapons	decision-making,	 including	their	role	and	position	in	the	policy	
hierarchy.	Ritchie	(2008:	10)	provides	a	detailed	overview	of	this	 in	his	study	of	US	
nuclear	 weapons	 policy	 after	 the	 Cold	 War,	 stating	 that	 ‘the	 White	 House,	 in	
particular	 the	office	of	 the	president,	and	 the	National	Security	Council’	 sits	at	 the	
centre	 of	 decision-making,	 with	 the	 ‘next	 policy	 ring	 encompassing	 executive	
departments	and	agencies’.	The	two	primary	government	organisations	 involved	 in	
nuclear	weapons	 policy	 here	 are	 the	DoD	 and	Department	 of	 Environment	 (DOE),	
within	which	sits	 the	NNSA.	Outside	 the	executive	and	 in	 the	next	 ‘policy	 ring’	 lies	
Congress,	 consisting	of	 the	 Senate,	House	of	 Representatives	 and	 the	 judiciary.	As	
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James	M.	 Lindsay	 (1991:	 163)	 notes	 in	 his	 study	 Congress	 and	 Nuclear	Weapons,	
‘members	of	Congress,	no	matter	how	well-intentioned,	almost	always	lack	in-depth	
understanding	of	nuclear	 issues’.	Lindsay	therefore	argues	that	Congress	fits	within	
Dahl’s	 guardianship	 model,	 given	 the	 ‘tremendous	 disparity’	 between	 it	 and	 the	
executive’s	nuclear	knowledge.	
	
Given	 the	 apparent	 primacy	of	 the	Presidency	 in	 nuclear	matters,	when	 reviewing	
post-Cold	War	history	US	nuclear	weapons	policy,	it	is	tempting	to	follow	the	work	of	
Ritchie	 and	 others,	 such	 as	 former	 US	 ambassador	 James	 Goodby	 (2006),	 and	
organize	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 period	 after	 1989	 according	 to	 Presidential	
administrations,	 including	 George	 H.W.	 Bush	 (1989-1993),	 Bill	 Clinton	 (1993-2001)	
and	George	W.	Bush	(2001-2009).	The	problem	with	following	this	approach	is	that	
whilst,	formally	speaking,	the	principal	responsibility	for	nuclear	weapons	policy	lies	
with	 the	 President,	 as	 the	 Oxford	 Research	 Group	 (ORG)	 study	 How	 Nuclear	
Weapons	Decisions	Are	Made	argues,	 in	practice	 it	 is	 the	power	of	the	 ‘permanent	
bureaucracies’	 which	 both	 sets	 the	 agenda	 and	 strongly	 mitigates	 against	 change	
(McLean,	 1986:	 256).45	Bureaucrats	 control	 the	 development	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	
systems	which	now	last	for	‘fifteen	or	twenty	years’,	much	longer	than	the	period	in	
which	 government	 ministers—even	 Presidents—are	 in	 office.	 There	 is	 thus	 great	
pressure	 on	 elected	 officials	 to	 maintain	 consistency	 with	 their	 predecessor’s	
decisions,	 reducing	 opportunities	 and	 space	 for	 democratic	 deliberation	 and	
participation.																																									 																					
45	As	described	above,	this	arrangement	is	common	across	all	NWS.	
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	Thus,	 as	 the	 ORG	 study	 explains,	 whilst	 the	 President	 is	 the	 ‘ultimate	 decision-
maker’	on	nuclear	weapons	issues,	with	the	responsibility	for	implementing	them,	he	
or	 she	 will	 be	 faced	 by	 significant	 limitations.	 For	 example,	 ‘like	 other	 decision-
makers,	the	President	will	rarely	see	options	unless	he	insists	on	them;	by	the	time	
he	 is	 presented	with	 a	weapons	 issue	 for	 approval,	 almost	 all	 of	 the	decisions	 are	
made’.	Faced	with	an	immensely	powerful	bureaucracy	with	deep-rooted	interests	in	
the	 status	 quo,	 ‘unless	 he	 has	 a	 comprehensive,	 alternative	 policy	 formulation	 for	
national	 security	 a	 single	 system	 disapproval	 or	 variation	 would	 have	 no	 logic’	
(McClean,	1986:	62).			
	
Money,	power	and	the	nuclear	weapons	establishment	
	
In	addition	to	a	critical	view	of	nuclear	weapons	policy	at	a	governmental	level	and	in	
relation	 to	 US	 grand	 strategy	 we	 need	 to	 examine	 what	 other	 non-governmental	
actors	and	groups	are	driving	nuclear	weapons	policy.	This	 section	 shall	do	 this	by	
first	 considering	 the	 different	ways	 pro-disarmament	 analysts	 have	 conceptualised	
and	critiqued	the	US’s	nuclear	weapons	establishment,	as	well	as	what	action	they	
propose	 in	 order	 for	 the	US	 to	make	progress	 on	 the	 short	 to	medium-term	arms	
control	 and	 disarmament	 measures	 outlined	 above	 and	 move	 towards	 zero.	 This	
includes	 a	 consideration	 of	 the	 economic,	 social	 and	 political	 drivers	 of	 nuclear	
possession.	 I	 then	move	on	to	discuss	the	current	health	of	US	democracy	and	the	
state	 of	 prominent	 pro-disarmament	 actors	 and	 groups,	 both	 as	 a	 means	 of	
developing	the	concept	of	institutional	democratisation	in	relation	to	the	range	of	US	
	 211	
institutions	 involved	 in	the	management	and	reproduction	of	nuclear	weapons	and	
imagining	how	the	current	political	obstacles	to	disarmament	may	be	overcome.	
	
Beginning	with	pro-disarmament	critiques	of	the	US	nuclear	weapons	establishment,	
one	prominent	 approach	argues	 that	 the	power	 and	privilege	of	 the	US’s	military-
industrial	complex	(MIC)	needs	to	be	confronted	and	diminished	if	the	US	is	to	make	
progress	on	disarmament.	For	example,	the	Women’s	International	League	for	Peace	
and	Freedom	(2014)	define	the	MIC	as	the:		
	
policy	 and	 monetary	 relationships	 between	 legislators,	 national	 armed	
forces,	 and	 the	 so-called	 “defence”	 industry	 (aka	 war	 profiteers).	 These	
relationships	include	political	contributions,	political	approval	for	expenditure	
on	weapons	and	war,	lobbying	to	support	bureaucracies,	and	oversight	of	the	
industry.	
	
It	is	therefore	worth	briefly	investigating	the	notion	of	the	MIC,	considering	its	utility	
as	 a	 concept,	 for	 example,	 in	 relation	 to	 how	 different	 actors	 and	 institutions	
reproduce	 the	 US	 nuclear	 weapon	 system	 and	 block	 action	 supportive	 of	 nuclear	
disarmament.	
	
Analysts	 such	 as	 Andrew	 Lichterman	 argue	 that	 the	 various	 actors	 and	 groups	
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forming	the	MIC	in	the	US	have	strong	economic,	political	and	ideological	interests	in	
maintaining	 the	 nation’s	 nuclear	 weapons	 system.	 He	 thus	 notes	 that	 the	 ‘still-
considerable	 economic	 and	 political	 power	 of	 the	 immense	 nuclear	 weapons	
complex	 and	 associated	 elements	 of	 the	 aerospace-military-industrial	 complex’	
forms	‘a	national	web	of	institutions	that	continues	to	deploy	an	array	of	ideological	
and	 institutional	 techniques	 to	 sustain	 their	 flow	of	 tax	dollars’	 (Lichterman,	2012:	
91).	
	
The	 financial	 rewards	 associated	 with	 the	 production	 of	 nuclear	 arms	 today	 and	
historically	are	indeed	enormous.	Stephen	Schwarz	(2012)	has	estimated	that	the	US	
spent	 $8.7	 trillion	on	 its	 nuclear	 forces	between	1940	 and	2010.	 Estimates	on	 the	
cost	 of	 US	 nuclear	 weapons	 today	 vary,	 mainly	 due	 to	 the	 difficulty	 in	 collating	
reliable	 information.	 For	 example,	 in	 2005,	 the	 Government	 Accountability	 Office	
(2005)	reported	that	even	the	DoD	itself	did	not	know	the	exact	cost	of	the	nuclear	
arsenal.		
	
Despite	this,	a	2012	report	by	the	Ploughshares	Fund	(2012)	estimated	that	the	US	
would	spend	$640	billion	on	‘nuclear	weapons	and	related	programs’	over	the	next	
decade,	 whilst	 a	 2013	 study	 by	 the	 Congressional	 Budget	 Office	 (2013)	 estimated	
that	 the	US	 plans	 to	 spend	 $355	 billion	 over	 the	 next	 decade	 on	maintaining	 and	
modernising	 its	nuclear	 arsenal.	According	 to	a	 recent	 report	by	 the	 James	Martin	
Center	(Wolfstahl	et	al:	2014),	the	DoD	and	the	NNSA	plan	to	spend	approximately	
$1	trillion	on	nuclear	weapons	projects	over	the	next	30	years,	though	more	recent	
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estimates	claim	that	this	could	rise	by	50%	owing	to	inflation	(Reif,	2017).	
	
Scholars	 such	 as	Noam	Chomsky	 have	 outlined	 the	wider	 significance	 of	 the	 huge	
costs	 of	 nuclear	 weapons.	 For	 Chomsky	 (1989:	 185)	 and	 other	 critics,	 such	 as	
Chalmers	 Johnson	 (2008),	 the	production	of	 these	weapons	 is	 a	prime	example	of	
‘military	Keynesianism’,	which	involves	the	state	heavily	subsidising	private	industry	
with	public	money	 for	 the	production	of,	 in	 this	 case,	military	 hardware—which	 it	
then	 buys—as	 the	 sole	 consumer	 in	 the	 case	 of	 nuclear	 weapons.	 Indeed,	
Lichterman	 (2012:	 102)	 describes	 how	military	 spending	has	 been	 ‘one	of	 the	 few	
forms	of	government	 industrial	policy	capable	of	gaining	any	consistent	consensus’	
across	the	US	political	system.	The	US	nuclear	weapon	system,	as	part	of	the	MIC,	or	
what	Chomsky	(1993)	prefers	to	call	the	‘Pentagon	system’,	is	thus	criticised	on	the	
grounds	 that	 it	 not	 only	 socialises	 the	 cost	 and	 risk	 of	 developing	 hi-tech	military	
equipment	whilst	privatising	profits,	but	also	 robs	 the	US	people	of	vital	 resources	
that	 could	 be	 invested	 in	 goods,	 services	 and	 infrastructure	 fulfilling	 basic	 human	
needs.		
	
Elsewhere,	 scholars	 such	 as	 Greg	 Mello	 of	 Los	 Alamos	 Study	 Group	 and	 William	
Hartung	 of	 the	 Center	 for	 International	 Policy	 have	 produced	 analyses	 to	 explain	
nuclear	weapons	 decision-making	within	 the	 nuclear	 establishment	 and	 the	 forces	
behind	the	rocketing	budgets.	In	doing	so,	their	work	helps	us	address	some	of	the	
political	 questions	 left	 unanswered	by	proposals	 (as	outlined	 in	 section	3.2	 above)	
that	the	US	move	to	minimum	deterrence.	As	Hartung	(2012:	4)	states,	for	example,	
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making	‘sensible	cuts’	to	the	US’s	nuclear	arsenal	will	require	policy	makers	to	‘take	
on	the	money,	power	and	influence	of	the	nuclear	weapons	lobby’.46		
	
His	2012	study,	Bombs	Versus	Budgets:	 Inside	the	Nuclear	Weapons	Lobby	explains	
how	the	main	nuclear	weapons	contractors	 in	 the	US	give	 large	sums	of	money	to	
members	of	Congress	who	sit	on	‘the	four	key	subcommittees	with	jurisdiction	over	
nuclear	weapons	spending’.	The	purpose	of	these	donations,	Hartung	suggests,	is	in	
order	 for	 the	 nuclear	 weapons	 lobby	 to	 ‘either	 collaborate	 to	 promote	 higher	
nuclear	weapons	spending	or	compete	for	their	share	of	a	shrinking	pie’	(Ibid).	The	
US’s	 continued	 possession	 of	 and	 investment	 in	 a	 sizable	 nuclear	 arsenal	 is	 of	
particular	importance	to	these	companies	as	they	have	become,	to	varying	degrees,	
‘dependent’	on	such	government	contracts	for	income.	Several	contractors,	such	as	
Babcock	and	Wilcox,	Bechtel,	Honeywell,	Northrup	Grumman	and	Lockheed	Martin	
are	 also	 involved	 in	 ‘more	 than	 one	major	 nuclear	weapons-related	 project’	 (Ibid:	
8).47		
Hartung’s	 study	 is	 very	 valuable	 in	 explaining	 how	 corporate	 interests	 influence																																									 																					
46	For	Hartung	 (2012:	4),	 this	 lobby	comprises	 the	 ‘individuals	and	 institutions	 that	benefit	 from	the	
nuclear	status	quo,	including	corporations	involved	in	designing	and	building	nuclear	delivery	vehicles;	
companies	 that	 operate	 nuclear	warhead-related	 facilities;	 and	members	 of	 Congress	with	 nuclear	
weapons-related	facilities	or	deployments	in	their	states	or	districts.’	
	
47	As	 well	 as	 lobbying	 and	 political	 donations,	 Hartung	 (2012:	 13)	 documents	 the	 ‘revolving	 door’	
between	 the	 defence	 industry	 and	 government,	whereby	 the	 ‘top	 14	 nuclear	weapons	 contractors	
employ	137	 lobbyists	who	formerly	worked	for	key	nuclear	weapons	decision	makers’.	This	 is	done,	
he	 suggests,	 both	because	 former	government	employees	may	 receive	 ‘special	 treatment’	 for	 their	
current	firms	from	their	erstwhile	colleagues	and	because	current	government	officials	may	not	wish	
to	upset	potential	future	employers	by	striking	hard	bargains	over	procurement	decisions.	
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Congress	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 lucrative	 nuclear	weapons-related	 contracts.	 In	 terms	of	
the	 hierarchy	 of	 power	 on	 these	 issues,	 however,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	
Congress,	 whilst	 an	 important	 player,	 has	 a	 limited	 reach.	 For	 example,	 Ritchie	
(2008:	10)	argues	that,	despite	having	the	‘power	of	the	purse’	so	that	it	can	remove	
or	 increase	 funding	 for	 a	 programme,	 Congress	 should	 be	 considered	 a	 ‘junior	
partner	in	nuclear	weapons	policy-making’.	He	goes	on	to	argue	that	this	is	because	
‘the	administration	dominates	nuclear	weapons	policy	by	setting	the	agenda	through	
its	control	over	 information	and	expertise	and	relatively	 few	members	of	Congress	
have	considerable	knowledge	of	and	interest	 in	nuclear	weapons	issues’	(Ibid).	Yet,	
as	we	have	seen,	whilst	administrations	come	and	go,	‘imperial	grand	strategy’	and	
the	‘permanent	bureaucracies’	that	refine	and	implement	the	nuclear	weapons	plans	
associated	with	 ‘full	 spectrum	dominance’	 remain	 firmly	entrenched	 in	 the	halls	of	
US	state	power.	
	
With	 regards	 to	 the	DoE	 and	NNSA,	Mello	 (2014)	 reports	 that	 in	March	2014,	 the	
White	 House	 asked	 for	 ‘a	 7%	 increase	 over	 current-year	 spending’,	 amounting	
to	$8.6billion	for	nuclear	warhead	research	and	production,	which	was	‘significantly	
more	 than	 Ronald	 Reagan	 did	 in	 1985,	 the	 Cold	 War’s	 highest	 peak	 for	 design,	
testing,	and	production,	 in	constant	dollars.’	Mello	and	Hill	 (2006:	4)	describe	how	
the	DoE	is	now	the	‘most	privatized	federal	department’,	with	94%	of	its	expenditure	
going	 to	 a	 ‘handful’	 of	 contractors	 in	 2004.	 This	 situation	 leads	 these	 authors	 to	
conclude	 that	 ‘it	 is	 now	 hard	 to	 tell	 where	 government	 ends	 and	 where	 the	
corporations	which	 comprise	 and	 profit	 from	 its	 activities	 begin’,	 describing	 these	
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corporations	 as	 ‘parastatal’	 but,	 crucially,	 not	 subject	 to	 any	 sort	 of	 democratic	
accountability.	 Indeed,	 the	 general	 lack	 of	 accountability	 and	 transparency	
surrounding	the	US’s	nuclear	weapons	system	makes	it	very	difficult	to	ascertain	its	
true	 cost.	 The	 opaque	 nature	 of	 the	 system	 is	 thus	 clearly	 a	 significant	 barrier	 to	
democratic	 deliberation	 and	 participation	 in	 decision-making	 concerning	 nuclear	
matters	and	something	that	needs	to	be	rectified	if	there	is	to	be	democratic	control	
of	nuclear	weapons	pursuant	to	their	elimination.	
	
3.3.4	Nuclear	disarmament	in	an	era	of	democratic	decline	
	
In	addition	to	looking	at	the	specifics	of	US	nuclear	weapon	decision-making,	as	part	
of	the	US’s	global	posture,	and	the	top-down,	secretive	nature	of	decision-making	in	
these	 areas,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 contextualise	 such	 processes	 within	 the	 general	 US	
political	system	to,	for	example,	compare	how	the	conduct	of	nuclear	politics	relates	
to	 wider	 political	 cultures	 and	 trends—including	 the	 present	 health	 of	 US	
democracy.	 In	 doing	 so,	 we	 may	 shed	 some	 light	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	
nuclear	 weapons	 decision-making	 and	 institutional	 democratisation	 and	 the	
obstacles	to	and	opportunities	for	the	latter	in	the	US	today.		
	
Indeed,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 suggest	 initially	 that	 the	nature	of	US	nuclear	weapons	
policy	making	 outlined	 above	 is	 just	 one	 example	 of	 the	 far-reaching	 influence	 of	
small	 groups	of	extremely	powerful	 and	wealthy	 individuals	 and	 corporations	over	
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the	US	political	system.	Such	concerns	have	led	some	scholars	to	question	whether	
the	US	today	can	accurately	be	described	as	a	functioning	democracy.	For	example,	
Brenner	(2013)	claims	the	US	is	a	‘plutocracy’	whilst	the	results	of	Gilens	and	Page’s	
(2014)	 investigation	 into	 which	 actors	 exert	 most	 influence	 over	 US	 public	 policy	
found	 ‘substantial	 support	 for	 theories	 of	 Economic	 Elite	 Domination’.	 Elsewhere	
Sheldon	 Wolin	 (2010)	 describes	 the	 emerging	 political	 system	 as	 ‘inverted	
totalitarianism’	given	the	 increasing	power	of	an	authoritarian	state	run	by	and	for	
the	rich	and	the	decline	of	institutions	capable	of	checking	that	power.	It	is	therefore	
imperative	 to	 understand	 how	 the	 US’s	 democratic	 decline	 and	 the	 rise	 of	 the	
plutocrats	relates	to	and	 impacts	on	nuclear	weapons	decision-making	 if	we	are	to	
properly	 appreciate	 the	 politics	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	 today	 and	 the	 potential	
contribution	 institutional	democratisation	 could	make	 in	 this—and	other—areas	of	
US	political	 life.	This	 is	also	necessary	given	 that,	as	we	have	seen,	 the	majority	of	
mainstream	 political	 analyses	 discussing	 US	 nuclear	 weapons	 tend	 to	 ignore	 or	
marginalise	such	concerns.	
	
Moreover,	 when	 reviewing	 the	 publications	 of	 mainstream	 research	 groups,	 it	 is	
notable	that	they	have	quite	a	different	view	of	the	state	of	US	democracy	than	the	
one	 presented	 above.	 For	 example,	 the	 Economist	 Intelligence	 Unit	 (2016),	 from	
2006-2015,	 classified	 the	 US	 as	 a	 ‘full	 democracy’,	 before	 it	 was	 judged	 to	 have	
slipped	 to	 the	 rank	 of	 ‘flawed	 democracy’	 in	 2016.	 Elsewhere,	 a	 2017	 Freedom	
House	(2017)	report	gave	the	US	a	score	of	89/100	and	classified	it	as	in	the	first	out	
of	 seven	 ranks	 for	 political	 rights	 and	 civil	 liberties.	 Such	 discrepancies	 between	
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critical	 and	mainstream	approaches	 should	 lead	us	 to	 question	 the	methodologies	
used	by	both	sides	to	reach	their	results.	For	example,	from	an	initial	review	of	this	
literature	 it	 is	 not	 apparent	 that	 the	 gap	 between	 public	 opinion	 and	 government	
policy	 on	 nuclear	 matters	 outlined	 in	 section	 3.2	 is	 taken	 into	 account	 when	
formulating	assessments	of	the	health	of	US	democracy.	Chapter	Eight	will	provide	a	
fuller	 consideration	of	 how	 such	methodological	 discrepancies	might	 be	overcome	
by	assessing	the	ways	in	which	nuclear	possession’s	impact	on	democratic	processes	
might	be	measured.	
	
Leaving	aside	such	methodological	questions	for	now,	critics	such	as	Chomsky	(1992:	
32)	 emphasise	 that	 the	 essential	 task	 of	 tackling	 the	 Pentagon	 System	 involves	
recognising	 that	 the	 problem	 is	 one	 of	 ‘power	 and	 privilege’	 and	 ‘specific	
institutional	 structures’.	 The	 scale	 of	 this	 challenge	 requires	 the	 construction	 of	
‘stable	popular	institutions’	so	that	citizens	can	act	to	undermine	the	power	of	elites	
and	 participate	 fully	 in	 decision-making	 (Chomsky,	 2002:	 185).	 Without	 the	
emergence	 of	 strong	 popular	 forces,	 able	 to	 exert	 democratic	 control	 over	 key	
institutions,	 US	 global	 dominance	 will	 continue,	 threatening	 the	 survival	 of	 the	
species—Hegemony	or	Survival—as	the	title	of	Chomsky’s	2003	study	has	it.		
	
Elaine	Scarry	reaches	similar	conclusions	in	her	2014	work	Thermonuclear	Monarchy:	
Choosing	between	Democracy	and	Doom,	where	she	argues	that	the	US	people	must	
use	the	US	Constitution	as	a	tool	to	dismantle	the	US	nuclear	weapons	system.	For	
Scarry	(2014:	13),	in	a	similar	fashion	to	Dahl	and	Deudney,	the	possession	of	nuclear	
	 219	
weapons	 has	 converted	 the	 US	 government	 into	 ‘a	 monarchic	 form	 of	 rule	 that	
places	 all	 defense	 in	 the	 executive	 branch	 of	 government’	 leaving	 the	 population	
‘incapacitated’.	 She	 goes	 on	 to	 argue	 that	 this	 dire	 situation	 is	 ‘radically	
incompatible’	 with	 the	 US	 Constitution,	 firstly	 because	 that	 document	 requires	 a	
Congressional	 declaration	 of	 war	 and	 secondly,	 because	 of	 the	 ‘constitutional	
requirement	that	distributes	to	the	entire	adult	population	shared	responsibility	for	
use	of	 the	country’s	arsenal’	 (Ibid:	31).	 In	response	to	this	problem,	Lindsay	 (1991:	
170)	 argues	 for	 ‘decentralizing	 authority’	 because	 Congress	 ‘should	 play	 an	 active	
role	 on	 nuclear	 weapons	 matters	 regardless	 of	 who	 occupies	 the	 White	 House’.	
Similarly,	a	recent	report	by	the	Ploughshares	Fund	(2016)	outlines	how	the	US	can	
reduce	its	nuclear	spending,	reform	its	nuclear	posture	and	restrain	its	nuclear	war	
plans	so	that	the	nuclear	button	is	controlled	by	Congress.48		
	
In	terms	of	domestic	forces	that	might	attenuate	the	US’s	march	to	nuclear	weapons	
modernisation	and	help	implement	such	reforms,	Lichterman	(2014:	24)	argues	that,	
at	present,	the	‘main	obstacle’	is	likely	to	be	US	military	industries’	seeming	inability	
to	complete	‘ever-more	complex	manufacturing	and	industrial	projects’.	As	we	have	
seen,	this	is	because	of	the	‘cost	overruns	and	schedule	delays’	which	have	blighted	
																																								 																					
48	In	this	report,	short-term	reforms	towards	the	democratic	control	and	ultimate	dismantlement	of	
the	US’s	nuclear	arsenal	are	outlined	by	Kennette	Benedict	 (Ibid:	25),	who	writes	that	the	 incoming	
Trump	administration	should:	‘place	our	nuclear	weapons	on	a	much	lower	level	of	launch	readiness,	
release	 to	 the	 public	 more	 information	 about	 the	 nuclear	 weapons	 in	 our	 own	 arsenals,	 include	
legislators	 and	 outside	 experts	 in	 its	 nuclear	 posture	 review	 and	 recognize	 Congress’	 authority	 to	
declare	war	as	a	prerequisite	to	any	use	of	nuclear	weapons’.		
	 220	
programmes	run	by	the	NNSA,	thus	‘eroding	congressional	and	military	support’	and	
causing	 this	 organisation	 ‘to	 downscale	 or	 indefinitely	 defer’	 several	 projects.	 By	
contrast,	Lichterman	and	his	co-authors	present	domestic	opposition	to	US	nuclear	
weapons	policies	as	very	weak,	with	‘little	debate’	amongst	the	public	on	this	issue	
and	no	real	‘disarmament	movement’	to	speak	of	(Ibid:	25).		
	
Similarly,	US-based	activists	Richard	Falk	and	David	Krieger	(2012:	8)	have	spoken	of	
the	‘general	complacency	amongst	the	public’,	which,	Falk	states	‘may	be	hiding	an	
underlying	 despair,	 a	 turning	 away	 because	 it	 seems	 impossible	 to	 get	 rid	 of	 the	
weaponry’.	 Instead,	 Lichterman	 (2014:	 25)	 argues	 that	public	 discourse	on	nuclear	
weapons	 is	 ‘dominated	by	specialists’	who	focus	on	proliferation	to	NNWS	or	non-
state	 actors	 rather	 than	 on	 the	 risks	 posed	 by	 ‘nuclear	 weapons	 held	 as	 central	
elements	 of	 national	 security	 policies	 in	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 world’s	 most	 powerful	
states’.		
	
The	 pessimism	 displayed	 by	 several	 prominent	 supporters	 of	 US	 nuclear	
disarmament	regarding	the	potential	role	of	the	public	and	the	relative	strength	of	
their	movement	is	of	no	small	significance.	Firstly,	as	previously	discussed	in	Chapter	
Two,	 such	 ‘movement	 pessimism’	 may	 be	 expected	 from	 elites	 who	 generally	
malign,	 ignore	 or	 underestimate	 the	 potential	 of	 popular	 movements,	 but	 not	
necessarily	 from	 within	 the	 movements	 themselves	 (Nebel,	 2012:	 232).	 Secondly,	
polling	data	 shows	 that,	despite	 the	 impediments	 to	understanding	 the	 issues	at	a	
substantive	level,	the	US	public	supports	a	range	of	progressive	action.	This	includes	
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adopting	a	more	 restrained	and	multilateralist	 approach	 to	 global	 affairs,	 reducing	
spending	 on	 the	 military—and	 nuclear	 weapons	 in	 particular—as	 well	 as	 nuclear	
arms	control,	non-proliferation	and	disarmament.	We	might	therefore	draw	an	initial	
conclusion	 that	 supporters	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	 should	 better	 study	 and	 learn	
from	polling	data,	to,	as	the	US	in	the	World	(2009)	report	suggests,	take	advantage	
of	the	constituencies	of	support	that	do	exist	and	build	upon	them.	
	
It	 is	 worth	 considering	 at	 this	 point	 the	 difference	 between	 the	 US	 disarmament	
movement	of	today	and	that	of	its	peak	in	the	1980s,	which	saw	in	New	York	in	1982	
the	largest	protest,	at	that	time,	in	US	history	on	the	theme	‘Freeze	the	Arms	Race-	
Fund	Human	Needs’	(Wittner,	2010).	For	Lichterman,	the	Freeze	campaign	was	part	
of	 a	 ‘broader	 and	 deeper’	 social	 movement	 than	 exists	 today,	 proposing	
disarmament	but	also	critical	of	nuclear	power	and	with	strong	analyses	of	political	
institutions.49	The	 Freeze	 movement	 has	 been	 criticized	 by	 several	 disarmament	
activists	 such	 as	 Joseph	 Gerson	 for	 not	 being	 an	 abolition	 movement,	 but	 based	
around	 ‘removing	 the	 sense	 of	 fear’	 regarding	 the	US-Soviet	 arms	 race.50	David	 S.	
Meyer’s	 A	 Winter	 of	 Discontent	 (1990:	 221),	which	 tells	 the	 story	 of	 the	 Freeze	
movement	 and	 analyses	 the	 politics	 of	 peace	 movements,	 also	 notes	 the	 way	 in	
which	mainstream	 politicians	 co-opted	 and	 ‘demobilized’	 the	 campaign,	 turning	 it	
into	 something	 ‘more	moderate	and	 less	 threatening	 to	 the	bipartisan	 tradition	of	
																																								 																					
49	Interview:	AL	
50	Interview:	JG	
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arms	control’.51		
	
In	 the	medium	 to	 long-term,	 the	 key	 challenge	 for	 opponents	 of	 the	US’s	 nuclear	
weapon	system	is	thus	how	to	engage	with	and	mobilise	the	public	in	order	to	lever	
out	undemocratic	and	militarist	forces	from	systems	of	governance	and	gain	popular	
control	over	key	institutions.	There	is	not	space	to	fully	consider	this	question	here,	
suffice	 to	 say	 that,	 in	 order	 for	 such	movements	 to	 be	 built	 there	 needs	 to	 be	 a	
common	understanding	amongst	politically	active	groups	that	nuclear	disarmament	
requires	the	MIC	or	Pentagon	System	to	be	progressively	dismantled	as	part	of	wider	
social,	 economic	 and	 political	 change.	 Moreover,	 whilst	 some	 degree	 of	 elite	
bargaining	 and	 coalition	 building	 may	 be	 necessary	 to	 develop	 legislation	 and	
highlight	key	issues,	history	suggests	that	disarmament	activists	need	to	be	wary	of	
politician’s	own	agendas	if	truly	progressive	policies	are	to	be	developed.	
	
Conclusion	
	
In	terms	of	NWS	nuclear	disarmament,	the	preceding	discussion	has	shown	that	we	
must	recognise	that	the	US	sits	in	a	category	by	itself	given	both	the	size	and	scale	of	
its	 nuclear	 arsenal	 and	 its	 overall	 military	 power,	 which	 together	 exert	 a	 singular																																									 																					
51	As	Meyer	 (1993:	 467)	 explains,	 co-option	 by	 the	 government	 of	 the	 anti-nuclear	movement	 had	
previously	 occurred	 when	 President	 Kennedy	 agreed	 the	 limited	 test	 ban	 treaty	 in	 1963,	 which	
legitimated	the	establishment’s	arms	control	measures	and	‘effectively	protected	US	nuclear	policies	
from	strong	domestic	criticism’.	
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influence	 on	 all	 other	 nation’s	 strategic	 thought	 and	 thus	 their	 nuclear	 choices.	
Moreover,	 whilst	 less	 prevalent	 as	 a	 legitimating	 discourse	 today,	 US	 nuclear	
possession	was,	 for	most	of	the	Cold	War,	 justified	 in	terms	of	the	need	to	defend	
democracy	 in	 the	 ideological	 struggle	 against	 communism.	 For	 these	 reasons,	 it	 is	
clear	 that	 the	main	 contention	of	 this	 thesis—that	 institutional	 democratisation:	 i)	
has	 significant	 analytical	 value	 given	 the	 limitations	 of	 existing	 approaches	 to	 the	
politics	of	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament	ii)	is	necessary,	on	a	practical	level	as	
a	 transformative	 political	 process,	 for	 NWS	 nuclear	 disarmament—will,	 to	 a	 great	
extent,	stand	or	fall	depending	upon	its	applicability	to	the	US	case.		
	
With	 regard	 to	 the	 former	 claim,	 this	 chapter	 found	 that	 the	US	 nuclear	weapons	
establishment	is	today	embedded,	at	the	domestic	level,	in	a	range	of	governmental	
and	 non-governmental	 economic,	 political	 and	 social	 institutions	 that	 have	 an	
interest	 in	 the	 bomb’s	 continual	 reproduction.	 This	 interest	 has	 grown	 to	 be	 far	
deeper	 and	 more	 widespread	 than	 when	 it	 was	 originally	 formed,	 during	 the	
turbulent	economic,	social	and	political	conditions	of	World	War	Two.	The	security	
model	has	most	validity	at	this	historical	point,	as	the	drive	for	the	bomb	emerged	at	
a	time	when	all	of	US	society	was	geared	towards	defeating	Nazi	Germany.		
	
The	 secretive	 and	 hierarchical	 nature	 of	 the	 bomb	 thus	 reflected	 the	 totalitarian	
nature	of	 the	US	polity	during	 this	period,	 so	 that	 the	US	government	was	able	 to	
justify	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 its	 use	 against	 Japan	with	 reference	 to	 the	onerous	
demands	 of	war	 and	 the	 imperative	 need	 for	 victory.	 Yet,	 as	 the	 critical	 literature	
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explains,	rather	than	the	US	military	establishment	being	downgraded	after	the	war	
and	 nuclear	 possession	 being	 a	 temporary	 phenomenon—so	 that	 both	 became	
subject	 to	 democratic	 control	 and	 restraint—the	 Pentagon	 system	 and	 national	
security	state	grew	in	power	whilst	efforts	at	international	management	of	the	bomb	
failed.	With	such	missed	opportunities	the	nuclear	revolution	thus	took	on	ominous	
new	domestic	and	international	meanings	with	the	emergence	of	the	Cold	War.	
	
For	 example,	 institutional	 democratisation	 explains	 how	 the	 entrenchment	 of	 the	
US’s	 nuclear	 status	 had	 significant	 consequences	 for	 all	 aspects	 of	 US	 domestic	
political	 life.	 As	 Robert	Dahl	 noted,	 the	 bomb	was,	 from	 the	 beginning,	 a	 paradox	
even	by	the	standards	of	official	rhetoric	since	it	was	built	to	defend	democracy	but	
this	 project	 necessitated	 the	 suspension	 of	 democracy	 in	 important	 areas	 of	
government	and	 the	creation	of	a	 ‘guardianship’,	or,	 for	Deudney	 ‘monarchy’.	This	
paradoxical	security	paradigm	continued	and	was	indeed	expanded	over	the	course	
of	 the	 20th	 century	 because	 the	 Cold	 War	 was	 framed	 at	 an	 official	 level	 as	 an	
ideological	 conflict	 involving	 the	 US	 defending	 its	 liberal	 and	 benign	 democracy	
against	Soviet	communism’s	evil	empire.	Governments	on	both	sides	thus	used	the	
Cold	 War	 as	 a	 means	 of	 managing	 their	 populations	 and	 legitimising	 the	
maintenance	 and	 growth	 of	 enormous	 military	 power,	 including	 nuclear	 arsenals.	
Moreover,	 as	 the	 US’s	 military	 and	 nuclear	 might	 grew	 in	 line	 with	 its	 global	
ambitions,	so	did	its	influence	and	importance	to	the	US	economy	and	society.	This	
made	it	particularly	difficult	for	critics	to	challenge	possession	of	the	bomb,	not	least	
because	defenders	of	the	status	quo	could	accuse	their	opponents	of	siding	with	the	
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ideological	 enemy—a	 particularly	 potent	 means	 of	 protecting	 their	 own	 domestic	
interests.	
	
However,	 nuclear	 technology,	 whilst	 ensuring	 significant	 levels	 of	 unaccountable	
power	for	small	groups	of	domestic	elites,	soon	came	to	threaten	the	very	survival	of	
the	US	as	it	spread	to	the	Soviet	Union,	and	beyond.	Moreover,	nuclear	possession	
was	and	is—as	both	critical	authors	such	as	Meyer,	Ellsberg	as	well	as	several	of	the	
other	 mainstream	 analysts	 reviewed	 above	 note—important	 for	 US	 power	
projection	as	part	of	 its	 global	 strategic	posture,	 including	 its	extended	deterrence	
relationships	 in	 Europe	 and	 East	 Asia,	 to	 ensure	world	 order	 is	 run	 in	 accordance	
with	US	interests.	Yet	neither	of	these	points	are	considered	by	the	security	model,	
which	principally	frames	nuclear	acquisition	as	a	necessary	and	rational	response	to	
external	 threats.	 Critical	 approaches	 such	 as	 institutional	 democratisation	 thus	
better	 explain	 why	 the	 US’s	 nuclear	 weapons	 complex	 not	 only	 survived	 but	 was	
modernised	 following	 the	 end	of	 the	Cold	War	 and	 the	disappearance	of	 the	US’s	
main	strategic	opponent.	
	
Other	 limitations	 of	 the	 mainstream	 and	 realist	 literature	 were	 shown,	 as	 the	
potential,	but	unfulfilled,	domestic	sources	of	 international	cooperation	on	nuclear	
arms	 control	 and	 disarmament	 action	 to	 be	 found	 amongst	 the	 US	 public	 were	
identified.	 To	 develop	 this	 point,	 the	 utility	 of	 institutional	 democratisation	 as	 a	
theory	of	change	in	relation	to	the	US	case	needs	to	be	more	clearly	outlined	so	we	
may	 usefully	 speculate	 on	 how	 the	 US	 may	 make	 progress	 on	 its	 nuclear	
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disarmament	responsibilities.		
	
Before	doing	this	we	must	specify	what	these	responsibilities	entail.	The	US—like	all	
other	 NWS	 parties	 to	 the	 NPT—has	 two	 clear	 international	 obligations	 regarding	
nuclear	disarmament,	namely,	 it	must	eliminate	 its	nuclear	arsenal	and	act	 in	ways	
that	support	other	state’s	ability	to	eliminate	theirs.	Unlike	other	NWS,	the	US	 is	a	
superpower,	 the	 sole	 superpower	 in	 fact,	with	 an	 array	 of	 economic,	military	 and	
political	 capabilities	 that	 together	 comprise	 a	 level	 of	 power	without	 precedent	 in	
world	history.	Despite	not	being	able	to	present	here	a	full	comparative	analysis	of	
NWS	 strategic	 power,	 we	 may	 reasonably	 propose	 that	 the	 US	 has	 a	 particularly	
great	 responsibility	 to	 act	 in	 ways	 supportive	 of	 its	 dual	 disarmament	
responsibilities,	given	both	the	size	and	lethality	of	the	US’s	arsenal	and	the	crucial	
role	US	foreign	policy	often	plays	in	shaping	other	state’s	nuclear	weapons	decision-
making.	
	
This	 proposal	 itself	 suggests	 that	 it	 is	 not	only	useful	 but	 essential	 to	differentiate	
between	NWS	in	terms	of	their	responsibility	for	nuclear	disarmament—an	idea	that	
does	 not	 exist	 in	 mainstream	 approaches	 such	 as	 cooperation	 with	 disarmament.	
Moreover,	 this	 chapter	 outlined	 the	 many	 unilateral	 disarmament	 actions	 the	 US	
could	 take	 outside	 of	 arrangements	 involving	 significant	 cooperation	 with	 other	
nations,	 which	 mainly	 means	 Russia	 and	 China.	 When	 it	 comes	 to	 bilateral	 and	
multilateral	 disarmament	 processes	 the	US	 has	 a	 particular	 responsibility	 to	 boost	
cooperation	in	relation	to	nuclear	disarmament	action	in	numerous	ways,	beginning	
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with	strategic	restraint	involving	military	technology	and	the	threat	and	use	of	force.		
	
However,	 in	 the	 post-Cold	 War	 era	 successive	 US	 administrations,	 despite	 much	
rhetoric	 about	 the	 desirability	 of	 a	 NWFW,	 have	 failed	 to	 live	 up	 to	 these	
responsibilities.	 Instead,	 democratic	 processes	 have	 been	 disregarded,	 with	
decisions	regarding	nuclear	weapons	use	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	the	President,	
significant	support	given	to	allies’	nuclear	weapons	programmes,	and	the	will	of	the	
US	public	on	nuclear	weapons	 issues	 largely	 ignored.	 International	 law	and	the	UN	
Charter,	meanwhile,	have	 repeatedly	been	 sidelined	 in	 favour	of	military	build-ups	
and	overseas	aggression.	Importantly,	the	US	public	have	been	persuaded	that	huge	
state	 intervention	 in	 the	 economy	 through	 massive	 military	 spending—much	 of	
which	goes	into	private	hands—is	necessary	to	protect	their	nation	from	dangerous	
overseas	threats.	The	US	government’s	behaviour,	at	home	and	abroad,	consciously	
increases	 threats	 to	 national	 security,	 yet	whilst	 decision-makers	 are	 aware	of	 the	
consequences	 of	 their	 policies	 they	 prefer	 to	 discuss	 how	 to	 counter	 the	 threats	
they’ve	 helped	 create	 rather	 than	 considering	 alternatives	 to	 militarism.	 Such	
alternatives	 and	 the	 causes	 of	 insecurity	 are	 therefore	 largely	 absent	 from	 the	
mainstream	discourse,	which	instead	tends	to	repeat	the	narratives	of	the	powerful.	
The	 result	 is	 a	 self-fulfilling	 prophecy	 as	 defenders	 of	 the	 status	 quo	 and	 an	 even	
more	 powerful	 military,	 use	 the	 spread	 of	 WMD	 and	 the	 threat	 of	 terrorism	 to	
generate	 an	 atmosphere	 of	 fear	 and	 uncertainty	 in	 order	 to	 justify	 expansionist	
policies.		
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Taken	 as	 a	 whole,	 the	 US’s	 government’s	 policies	 have	 thus	 severely	 impeded	
progress	on	nuclear	non-proliferation	and	disarmament,	both	because	 its	quest	 for	
hegemony	 and	 full	 spectrum	 dominance	 provokes	 other	 nations	 into	 seeking	 or	
retaining	the	bomb	and	because	the	US	has	greatly	accelerated	the	spread	of	nuclear	
weapons	internationally	by	supporting	the	nuclear	programmes	of	its	allies.	In	doing	
so,	the	US	has	substantially	increased	the	possibility	that	someday	someone	will	use	
nuclear	 weapons,	 whether	 by	 accident,	 miscalculation,	 madness	 or	 design.	 This	
finding	also	 leads	us	 to	conclude	 that	 there	 is	no	 ‘security	dilemma’	here	 for	NWS	
such	as	China	and	Russia	as	they	have	understood	the	US’s	strategic	 intent—based	
on	 the	 significant	 degree	of	 continuity	 exhibited	by	 the	US’s	 behaviour	 post-1945.	
These	 and	 other	 nations	 therefore	 prioritise	 self-defence	 against	 a	 potential	 US	
attack,	within	which	nuclear	deterrence	plays	a	central	role.	
	
Consequently,	 there	 is	a	particularly	 long	 list	of	measures	 the	US	could	unilaterally	
take	 to	begin	 fulfilling	 its	obligations	under	 the	NPT,	 in	order	 to	both	eliminate	 its	
own	nuclear	arsenal	and	create	the	conditions	whereby	other	NWS	are	able	to	do	so.	
These	 unilateral	 actions	 should	 be	 implemented	 first	 as	 progress	 on	 them	 would	
make	it	much	easier	to	take	forward	other	co-operative	bilateral	and/or	multilateral	
measures	between	NWS.	In	the	medium	to	long	term,	efforts	both	to	eliminate	the	
US’s	 nuclear	 weapons	 and	 transform	 US	 foreign	 policy	 in	 line	 with	 domestic	 and	
international	 law	 require	 challenging	 the	 deep-rooted	 institutions	 and	 interests	 of	
the	 MIC/Pentagon	 System.	 However,	 supporters	 of	 the	 permanent	 war	 economy	
have	 not	 only	 resisted	 efforts	 to	 reduce	 its	 role	 in	 society	 but	 have	 promoted	 its	
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growth	 in	 recent	 years	 so	 that	 military	 spending	 now	 dwarfs	 that	 of	 the	 Reagan	
administration	 at	 the	 height	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 whilst	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 US’s	 nuclear	
weapons	system	is	expected	to	grow	substantially	over	the	next	twenty	years	as	the	
triad	is	modernised.		
	
These	developments	are	partly	due	to	the	relative	weakness	of	current	oppositional	
forces,	 in	 particular	 the	nuclear	 disarmament	movement	 in	 the	US	 and	 globally.	 A	
key	 obstacle	 to	 building	 such	 movements	 is	 the	 secrecy	 and	 misinformation	 that	
surrounds	nuclear	weapons.	For	example,	despite	the	strength	and	openness	of	the	
US’s	formally	democratic	institutions	the	vast	majority	of	the	US	public	is	not	aware	
of	 how	 their	 leaders	 use	 nuclear	 weapons	 so	 that	 whilst	 there	 is	 significant	
opposition	to	current	policies—such	as	first	use—this	does	not	translate	into	political	
pressure	 for	 change.	 Moreover,	 research	 shows	 that	 the	 US	 public	 also	 generally	
supports	 progressive	 action	 towards	 nuclear	 disarmament	 and	 has	 historically	
succeeded	 in	 pressuring	 Washington	 into	 arms	 control	 agreements.	 In	 addition,	
there	 has	 been	 a	 lively	 debate	 within	 elite	 circles	 regarding	 the	 value	 of	 nuclear	
possession,	with	 prominent	 figures	 such	 as	William	Perry	 and	General	George	 Lee	
Butler	 advocating	 nuclear	 abolition.	 Despite	 these	 positive	 factors,	 there	 exists	 a	
sense	 of	 ‘movement	 pessimism’	 or	 scepticism	 in	 the	 US	 nuclear	 disarmament	
movement	about	the	potential	role	the	public	could	play	in	these	areas,	which	may	
prevent	popular	forces	being	used	effectively	to	realise	the	movement’s	goals.		
	
In	 terms	 of	 opportunities	 for	 nuclear	 disarmament	 action	 then,	 harnessing	 public	
	 230	
opinion	 is	 key	 if	 decision-makers	 are	 to	 be	 held	 accountable	 to	 domestic	 and	
international	 law	 and	 Congress	 and	 the	 President	 are	 to	 be	 empowered	 to	 take	
progressive	action	on	 these	 issues.	Whilst	 the	guardianship	model	of	 arms	 control	
and	 disarmament	 has	 been	 shown	 to	 have	 a	 limited	 impact,	 collaborating	 with	
nuclear	sceptics	from	the	US	establishment	could	provide	political	benefits	amongst	
certain	 constituencies.	 Moreover,	 if	 a	 democratic	 peace	 is	 indeed	 to	 be	 realised,	
means	must	be	found	to	democratise,	ideally	in	a	permanent	form,	the	US	state	if	it	
is	 to	 persuade	 other	 nations	 of	 its	 peaceful	 intentions	 and	mitigate	 their	 fear	 and	
uncertainty,	 particularly	 given	 its	 singular	 military	 might	 and	 record	 of	 power	
projection.		
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Chapter	Four:	Russia		
	
Introduction	
	
This	chapter	provides	an	 in-depth	 investigation	of	 the	causes	and	consequences	of	
Russian	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 disarmament,	 in	 order	 to	 further	 assess	 the	
explanatory	 power	 of	 institutional	 democratisation	 alongside	 other	 approaches.	
Chapter	 Eight	 then	 contextualises	 Russia’s	 responsibility	 for	 disarmament	 action	
alongside	the	other	NWS	and	makes	appropriate	conclusions	and	recommendations.	
This	case	study	proceeds	in	several	sections,	beginning	with	a	summary	of	how	the	
mainstream	 and	 realist	 approaches	 explored	 in	 Chapter	 Two	 relate	 to	 Russia’s	
particular	 experience	 as	 a	 NWS	 and	 how	 Russia	 has	 officially	 justified	 its	 nuclear	
status	over	time.	This	is	principally	done	by	placing	Russia’s	development	of	nuclear	
weapons	within	 the	 context	of	 relevant	historical	 events	 from	 the	mid	 to	 late	20th	
and	early	21st	century—focusing,	in	particular,	on	the	Cold	War.		
	
The	 next	 section	 begins	 the	 process	 of	 showing	 how	 Russia’s	 nuclear	 experience	
illustrates	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 previously	 reviewed	 mainstream	 and	 realist	
approaches	 and	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 institutional	 democratisation	 helps	 us	 better	
understand	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 Russian	 nuclear	 possession	 and	
disarmament.	 Reviewing	 alternate	 perspectives	 on	 post-World	War	 Two	 history	 in	
these	 sections	 is	 useful	 in	 explaining	 how	 international	 developments	 interacted	
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with	the	Soviet	Union	/	Russia’s	domestic	politics	and	how	this	interaction	led	to	the	
rapid	expansion	of	its	nuclear	weapons	establishment.	In	addition,	it	is	important	to	
consider	what	 opportunities	 have	 existed	 for	 Russia	 to	 adopt	 an	 alternative,	 non-
nuclear	approach	to	security	(such	as	during	the	Gorbachev	era	and	the	end	of	the	
Cold	 War),	 assess	 what	 opportunities	 exist	 today	 and	 imagine	 how	 democratic	
movements	might	take	advantage	of	such	openings	in	the	future.	
	
Whilst	 the	 security	 model	 is	 right	 to	 emphasise	 how	 Russia’s	 external	 threat	
perceptions	drove	its	original	decision	to	acquire	the	bomb,	we	also	need	to	consider	
the	 contribution	 of	 domestic	 factors,	 such	 as	 how	 the	militarised	 and	 totalitarian	
nature	of	the	post-WW2	Soviet	polity	facilitated	the	rapid	development	of	the	bomb	
and	worked	to	prevent	disarmament.	Moreover,	as	the	Russian	nuclear	arsenal	grew	
over	the	course	of	the	Cold	War,	the	bomb	took	on	 important	domestic	economic,	
social	and	political	meanings,	 including	as	a	way	by	which	successive	regimes	could	
legitimate	their	rule.		
	
Today,	although	Russia’s	nuclear	deterrent	strategy	is	driven	by	its	relations	with	the	
US—and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 China—it	 is	 similarly	 necessary	 to	 look	 at	 how	 the	
international	and	the	domestic	levels	interact	to	shape	Russia’s	nuclear	politics	and	
the	extent	to	which	the	adoption	of	alternative	security	postures	and	arrangements	
by	 the	 other	 NWS	 might	 enable	 Russia	 to	 move	 towards	 a	 more	 liberal	 and	
democratic	 polity	 and	 achieve	 nuclear	 disarmament.	 In	 order	 to	 do	 this,	 the	main	
body	of	this	chapter	investigates	the	various	economic,	political	and	social	drivers	of	
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Russian	nuclear	possession	in	the	post-Cold	War	era,	and	outlines	the	changing	role	
and	 importance	of	nuclear	weapons	 in	Russia’s	domestic	and	 international	politics.	
In	 addition,	 I	 discuss	 the	 obstacles	 to	 and	 opportunities	 for	 institutional	
democratisation	 pursuant	 to	 nuclear	 disarmament	 today,	 considering	 the	 current	
state	 of	 Russian	 public	 opinion	 and	 civil	 society	 engagement	 in	 nuclear	matters	 in	
relation	to	Russia’s	authoritarian	political	model.	
	
Given	the	history	and	scale	of	the	Russian	nuclear	arsenal,	this	chapter	is	of	a	similar	
length	to	that	of	the	US	chapter.	In	addition,	I	have	endeavoured	where	possible	to	
avoid	repeating	points	concerning	the	two	nation’s	Cold	War	rivalry	and	continuing	
adversarial	relations.	Important	differences	between	the	two	case	studies	to	note	at	
the	 outset,	 which	 affect	 the	 size	 and	 character	 of	 the	 chapter,	 concern	 Russia’s	
regime	 type	 and	 overall	 strategic	 power.	 Regarding	 the	 former	 point,	 many	
assessments	of	Russia’s	political	system	consider	it	to	be	lacking	in	essential	qualities	
necessary	for	a	democracy	and	therefore	cast	it	as	authoritarian	and	illiberal.	Several	
scholarly	and	other	expert	studies	have	also	portrayed	Russia	as	moving	further	and	
further	away	from	democracy	towards	authoritarianism	over	the	course	of	the	2000s	
as	a	result	of	President	Vladimir	Putin’s	rule.		
	
It	would	appear	that	the	opportunities	for	 institutional	democratisation	 in	this	case	
are	 far	more	 limited	 than	 in	 the	 US	 because	 Russia	 begins	 from	 a	 less	 conducive	
starting	point.	 Yet	 there	 is	 also	evidence	 showing	 that	 the	Russian	people	 support	
progressive	 action	 being	 taken	 on	 arms	 control	 and	 disarmament.	 These	 findings	
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raise	 the	 question,	 which	 I	 shall	 examine	 below,	 of	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	
guardianship	 model	 of	 nuclear	 arms	 control	 and	 disarmament	 may	 be	 more	
appropriate	and	practical	for	Russia’s	political	circumstances,	at	least	in	the	short	to	
medium	 term.	 In	 addition,	 there	 is	 the	 issue	 of	 Russian	 resistance	 to	 perceived	
Western	meddling	in	its	domestic	affairs	and	those	of	states	in	it	near	abroad.	Thus,	
any	sense	that	external	forces	are	acting	to	impose	Western-style	democracy	will	be	
strongly	 opposed,	 as	 was	 seen	 when	 Moscow	 accused	 the	 US	 of	 interfering	 in	
Eastern	European	nations	by	 supporting	opposition	movements	during	 the	 ‘Colour	
Revolutions’	 in	 the	 2000s.	 This	 raises	 another	 question,	 which	 I	 explore	 below:	 if	
nuclear	 disarmament	 requires	 institutional	 democratisation,	 how	 might	 the	
conditions	arise	internally,	in	the	medium	to	long	term,	whereby	Russia	moves	away	
from	authoritarianism	and	towards	democracy?		
	
4.1	 Mainstream	 and	 realist	 perspectives	 on	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	
Russian	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament	
	
To	begin	with,	 it	 is	necessary	 to	again	note	 that	 the	mainstream	and	 realist	works	
reviewed	 in	Chapter	Two	mainly	 focus	on	US	nuclear	politics	and	strategy—and	do	
so	most	of	the	time	in	terms	of	how	an	attack	by	the	Soviet	Union	/	Russia	against	
the	US	or	its	allies	could	be	credibly	deterred.	Far	less	space	is	therefore	given	over	
in	 these	 works	 to	 the	 Russian	 nuclear	 experience	 or	 the	 world	 as	 viewed	 from	
Moscow.	Despite	this,	it	 is	possible	to	apply	the	principles	and	ideas	underlying	the	
approaches	 reviewed	 in	 Chapter	 Two	 to	 Russia,	 for	 example,	 by	 studying	 how	
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Russian	strategic	analysts	have	applied	realist	and	other	approaches	in	their	work.	In	
doing	 so	 we	 may	 observe	 what	 may	 be	 termed	 Russian	 perspectives	 on	 realist	
approaches	 to	 international	 relations,	 some	 of	 which	 mirror	 the	 descriptions	 and	
prescriptions	of	arguments	promoting	US	interests.	As	previously	noted,	whilst	these	
historical	perspectives	differ	as	a	whole	 from	those	that	are	more	compatible	with	
institutional	 democratisation,	 there	 are	 also	 several	 apparent	 areas	 of	 factual	
agreement	 and	 overlap,	 for	 example,	 concerning	 the	 importance	 of	 strategic	
stability.	
	
Realist	 explanations	 of	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 Soviet	 nuclear	 programme	 focus	 on	 the	
threat	posed	by	the	US.	Thus,	as	David	Holloway	(2012:	377)	argues,	Stalin’s	decision	
to	 acquire	 the	 bomb	was	 taken	 two	weeks	 after	 the	US	 bombing	 of	 Hiroshima	 in	
1945,	 because	 he	 saw	 the	 ‘use	 of	 the	 bomb	 as	 an	 anti-Soviet	 move	 designed	 to	
deprive	the	Soviet	Union	of	strategic	gains	in	the	Far	East	and	more	generally	to	give	
the	 United	 States	 the	 upper	 hand	 in	 defining	 the	 postwar	 settlement’.	 Moscow	
thereafter	devoted	 immense	resources	to	a	crash	program	that	allowed	a	bomb	to	
be	tested	in	1949—several	years	earlier	than	predicted	by	US	intelligence	(Ibid:	378).	
This	was	done,	as	Craig	and	Radchenko	(2008:	97)	explain,	in	order	to	strengthen	the	
USSR’s	 bargaining	 position	 and	 great-power	 claims	 by	 ending	 the	 US	 nuclear	
monopoly.	 Yet	 in	 reports	 such	 as	 the	 US	 State	 Department’s	 NSC-68	 (1950),	 the	
Soviet	acquisition	of	the	bomb	was	framed	as	an	essential	part	of	the	USSR’s	‘hostile	
designs’	 to	 spread	 Communism	 around	 the	 world.	 Moscow’s	 ‘formidable	 power’	
thus	presented	 ‘the	gravest	threat	to	the	security	of	the	United	States’	 (Ibid).	Such	
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assessments	of	 Soviet	 aims	 inform	 traditionalist	Western	perspectives	on	 the	Cold	
War,	which	 emphasise	 the	USSR’s	 expansionist	 ambitions	 and	military	 strength.	 In	
such	accounts,	generally	speaking,	domestic	political	factors	are	not	ignored	so	much	
as	they	tend	to	play	a	lesser	role.	
	
After	 Stalin’s	 death,	 Soviet	 strategy	 followed	 US	 policy	 in	 key	 areas,	 with	
conventional	forces	cut	back	and,	Holloway	(2012:	386)	argues,	‘increasing	emphasis	
on	 nuclear	 weapons	 and	 on	 ballistic	 missiles	 as	 the	 means	 to	 deliver	 them’.	
Thereafter,	as	retired	Russian	General	Vladimir	Belous	explains,		
	
there	 emerged	 an	 approximate	 balance	 between	 both	 sides	 in	 strategic	
offensive	 weapons	 that	 contributed	 naturally	 to	 strategic	 stability	 and	 the	
concept	of	nuclear	deterrence	based	on	the	central	model	of	mutual	assured	
destruction	(MAD)	that	has	never	lost	its	topicality	(Blank	ed.,	2011:	138).	
	
Such	 ‘topicality’	was	again	shown	 in	2015	when	US	General	 Joseph	Dunford	stated	
that	 ‘Russia	presents	the	greatest	threat	to	our	national	security’	(CNN,	2015).	This	
statement,	 representing	 apparent	 continuity	 with	 the	 US’s	 Cold	 War	 strategic	
assessments,	 is	 redolent	 of	 a	 significant	 section	 of	 contemporary	 mainstream	
Western	thinking	regarding	Russia	and	its	position	in	the	international	state	system.	
According	to	this	viewpoint,	proposed	by	analysts	such	as	Fiona	Hill	and	Steven	Pifer	
(2016)	of	the	Brookings	Institution	and	Julianne	Smith	and	Adam	Twardowski	(2017)	
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of	the	Center	for	a	New	American	Century,	the	aggressive	and	obstructive	nature	of	
the	current	Kremlin	regime	 is	 the	major	obstacle	to	reducing	tensions	and	building	
stability	across	the	Euro-Atlantic	area.	Moreover,	senior	figures	such	as	former	NATO	
head	 Anders	 Fogh	 Rasmussen	 argue	 that	 Russia	 military	 power	 and	 provocative	
actions	 abroad	 must	 be	 contained	 and	 that	 the	 West	 must	 communicate	 its	
determination	to	act	forcefully	should	Moscow	cross	its	red	lines	(Khan,	2016).	
	
US	and	NATO	forces,	meanwhile,	are	officially	presented	as	democratic,	peaceful	and	
benign	 so	 that	 expansion	 to	 the	 borders	 of	 Russia	 by	 the	military	 alliance	 is	 non-
threatening	 (NATO,	 2017).	 According	 to	 NATO,	 therefore,	 there	 is	 no	 security	
dilemma	 for	 Moscow,	 and	 the	 alliance’s	 expansion	 is	 legitimate	 because	 former	
Warsaw	Pact	and	other	Eastern	European	nations	actively	want	to	join	it.	Moreover,	
advanced	 military	 capabilities	 such	 as	 BMD	 deployed	 in	 Europe—the	 Alliance	
argues—should	not	trouble	Moscow	as	they	are	aimed	at	dealing	with	threats	from	
elsewhere	 (Ibid).	 Whilst	 accounts	 emphasising	 the	 West’s	 peaceful,	 liberal	 and	
benign	character	are	common,	it	must	be	recognised	that	there	is	a	debate	amongst	
Western	policy	experts	regarding	the	West’s	relations	with	Russia	and	how	best	to	
respond	to	the	Putin	regime.52	Either	way,	 the	explanation	 for	adversarial	 relations	
																																								 																					
52	For	example,	Mearsheimer	(2014)	places	the	blame	for	the	Ukraine	crisis	at	the	West’s	door	owing	
to	NATO’s	unwarranted	expansion,	so	that	Russian	nuclear	deterrence	is	an	inevitable	result.	Others,	
particularly	 those	 more	 closely	 entwined	 with	 NATO,	 such	 as	 Lord	 Peter	 Ricketts	 (2016),	 advised	
against	 Washington	 making	 ‘a	 deal	 with	 Putin	 which	 involves,	 for	 instance,	 pulling	 back	 on	 the	
forward	basing	of	US	forces	in	eastern	Europe,	or	no	further	Nato	enlargement’.	Similarly,	General	Sir	
Richard	Shirreff	formerly	NATO’s	deputy	supreme	commander	in	Europe,	urged	that	the	alliance	must	
increase	 even	 further	 its	 military	 presence	 in	 the	 Baltic	 states	 if	 conflict—and	 nuclear	 war—with	
Moscow	is	to	be	avoided	(Cooper,	2016).	
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remains	 focused	 on	 the	 strategic	 balance	 between	 Russia	 and	 the	 West	 at	 the	
international	level.		
	
Russian	experts	have	additionally	argued	that	changes	to	the	international	scene	are	
essential	for	progress	on	nuclear	disarmament	between	Moscow	and	Washington.	In	
the	 background	 of	 Russia’s	 strategic	 calculus	 also	 lies	 nuclear-armed	 China,	 with	
which	Russia	shares	an	extensive	border.	Thus,	notably,	a	2010	article	entitled	‘Start	
a	new	disarmament	plan’	by	 the	Russian	 ‘gang	of	 four’	 Yevgeny	Primakov,	Mikhail	
Moiseyev,	 Igor	 Ivanov	and	Evgeny	Velikhov	 (2010),	argued	 that	 in	 the	 long-term,	a	
‘world	without	nuclear	weapons	 is	 not	our	 existing	world	minus	nuclear	weapons’	
but	that	this	endeavor	necessitated	‘a	thorough	overhaul	of	the	entire	international	
system’	 that	 included	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 ‘reliable	 mechanism	 for	 peaceful	
settlement	of	major	and	local	international	and	border	conflicts’.53	
	
Russia’s	 determination	 to	 retain	 its	 great	 power	 status—seen	 by	 the	 Kremlin	 as	
having	 been	 shamefully	 lost	 in	 the	 1990s—is	 thus	 a	 significant	 problem	 for	
disarmament	efforts	today.	Evidence	of	these	ambitions	can	be	found	in	the	recent	
Foreign	 Policy	 Concept	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 (2013),	 which	 outlines	 how	 the	
nation	has	‘a	special	responsibility	for	maintaining	security	in	the	world	both	on	the	
global	and	regional	levels’.	Russia	pursues	its	goals	via	a	‘multi-vector	policy’,	which																																									 																					
53	Yevgeny	 Primakov	 is	 a	 former	 Russian	 Prime	Minister,	Mikhail	Moiseyev	 a	 retired	Army	General,	
Igor	Ivanov	a	former	Russian	Foreign	Minister	and	Evgeny	Velikhov—a	prominent	Russian	physicist.	
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includes	 giving	 a	 central	 role	 to	 the	 United	 Nations	 and	 the	 development	 of	 a	
multipolar	world	order	based	on	‘international	law	and	principles	of	equality,	mutual	
respect	and	non-interference	in	internal	affairs	of	states’	(Ibid).		
	
Whilst	a	level	playing	field	is	called	for	at	the	international	level,	so	that	Russia	sits	as	
an	 equal	 at	 the	 top	 table	 of	 diplomacy,	 democratic	 principles	 are	 not	 applied	 at	
home.	Given	 the	 authoritarian	 nature	 of	 the	 ruling	 elite,	 the	 domestic	 causes	 and	
consequences	of	nuclear	disarmament	are	 thus	not	considered	 in	official	or	expert	
analysis,	so	that	 the	only	scenario	entertained	 is	one	where	Moscow	ascends	once	
again	 to	 international	 parity	 with	 the	 US.	 This	 realist	 approach	 is	 informed	 by	 a	
rejection	of	the	‘new	thinking’	developed	by	former	premier	Mikhail	Gorbachev	and	
his	circle	at	the	end	of	the	Cold	War.	Mikhail	Tyspkin	(2009:	787)	links	the	rejection	
of	Gorbachev	by	contemporary	Russian	elites	to	their	‘pursuit	of	great	power	status’.	
This	urge,	he	claims,	did	not	start	with	Putin,	but	materialised	soon	after	the	USSR’s	
fall	 in	1991,	when	‘a	consensus	emerged	across	the	range	of	Russian	elites	that	(1)	
Gorbachev’s	‘new	thinking’,	which	discounted	the	use	of	different	types	of	power	in	
international	 relations,	had	 failed,	and	 (2)	Russia’s	natural	 role	 in	 the	 international	
system	is	that	of	a	major	power.’	The	memory	of	both	the	failure	and	betrayal	of	the	
Gorbachev	 years,	 where	 significant	 strategic	 concessions	 were	 made	 to	 the	West	
without	 adequate	 reciprocation,	 and	 the	 Yeltsin	 presidency,	 where	 Russia	 is	
remembered	 as	 being	 disgracefully	 weak,	 are	 of	 particular	 importance	 in	
understanding	the	nationalism	alive	in	Russia	today.	
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As	 things	 currently	 stand,	 the	 Kremlin	 is	 therefore	 strongly	 resistant	 to	 nuclear	
disarmament,	 so	 that	 whilst	 it	 publicly	 endorses	 the	 goal	 of	 nuclear	 zero,	 this	 is	
regarded	as	such	a	long-term	aspiration	as	to	be	impractical.	As	Nikolai	Sokov	(2011:	
188)	explains,	when	President	Putin	signed	a	 law	 in	2010	on	funding	for	upgrading	
the	nuclear	weapons	complex	he	mentioned	that	the	country	would	need	its	arsenal	
for	 the	next	 ‘30-40-50	 years’.	Moreover,	 democratisation—those	 from	 the	Russian	
establishment	 might	 well	 argue—whether	 in	 pursuit	 of	 disarmament	 or	 other	
initiatives,	 is	 misguided	 given	 the	 evidence	 suggesting	 that	 the	 Russian	 public	
strongly	 supports	 the	 nation’s	 nuclear	 status	 and	 foreign	 policy	 under	 Putin	more	
widely.	 For	 example,	 a	 2006	 poll	 indicated	 that	 76%	 of	 respondents	 believed	 that	
Russia	 ‘needs	nuclear	weapons’,	with	over	50%	considering	nuclear	weapons	to	be	
the	 main	 guarantee	 of	 security	 (Akhtamzyan,	 2006).	 Sceptics	 may	 therefore,	
reasonably,	use	such	data	to	support	their	claim	that	the	domestic	political	barriers	
to	nuclear	disarmament	in	Russia	are	too	high	for	this	project	to	succeed	in	the	near	
future.	Given	 that	nuclear	weapons	are	one	of	 the	main	 currencies	 through	which	
Moscow	seeks	to	maintain	its	international	standing,	the	process	of	devaluing	these	
weapons	is	thus	particularly	challenging.	This	is	also	because	proposals	put	forward	
by	Russian	experts	almost	exclusively	place	arms	control	and	disarmament	measures	
within	 a	 bilateral	 or	 multilateral	 framework	 involving	 an	 incremental	 step-by-step	
approach	(the	‘P5’	process),	managed	by	the	NWS.		
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4.2	 Critical	 perspectives	 on	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 Russian	 nuclear	
possession	and	disarmament	
	
In	terms	of	the	applicability	of	critical	approaches	and	the	domestic	politics	model	to	
this	case	study,	it	is	useful	to	begin	with	the	question	of	regime	type.	Following	the	
1917	revolution	Russia	transitioned	from	an	absolutist	and	autocratic	monarchy	to	a	
self-proclaimed	 socialist	 republic.	 However,	 soon	 after	 any	 democratic	 element	 of	
the	 revolution	 was	 purged	 as	 Lenin	 and	 then	 Stalin	 implemented	 a	 brutal	
dictatorship	(Fitzpatrick,	2008:	41).	Dahl	(1989:	53)	argues	that	Lenin’s	leadership	of	
the	Bolshevik	party	created	a	type	of	guardianship	that	had	a	‘unique…claim	to	rule’,	
namely,	 in	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 proletariat.	 As	WW2	progressed	 the	 importance	of	
atomic	 power	 became	 clear,	 stimulated	 by	 Stalin’s	 desire	 for	 military	 strength	 to	
influence	events	on	the	world	stage.	Connected	to	this,	Craig	and	Radchenko	(2008:	
165)	 argue,	 was	 Stalin’s	mistrust	 of	 the	West,	 which	 was	 part	 of	 ‘a	 long-standing	
tradition’.	 There	 was	 thus	 no	 security	 dilemma	 for	 the	 Kremlin	 or	 taste	 for	
cooperation	because	it	only	saw	continuity	 in	Western	policy,	so	that	after	WW2	it	
was	‘beseiged	by	a	capitalist	world	bent	on	destroying	it’	(Ibid).		
	
The	man	put	in	charge	of	the	Soviet	nuclear	programme	was	Lavrenti	Beria—a	close	
associate	of	Stalin.	Despite	the	devastation	of	wartime,	Beria	created,	according	to	
Alexander	 Vershinin	 (2017),	 ‘a	 super-ministry	 with	 enormous	 resources	 and	
emergency	powers’	which	eventually	became	‘a	new	industrial	sector…in	the	space	
of	a	few	years	-	the	atomic	industry’.	Holloway	(2012:	396)	notes	that	as	time	passed	
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the	 atomic	 and	 defense	 industries	 and	 military	 in	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 ‘became	
increasingly	 influential	 in	the	formulation	of	policy,’	 in	a	way	similar	to	the	process	
that	took	place	in	the	US.		
For	 Sergey	 Koulik	 (1991:	 125),	 policies	 ‘formulated	 under	 conditions	 of	 wartime	
emergency’	 gradually	 turned	 into	 ‘a	 routine	 process	 of	 catching-up’	 i.e.	 with	 US	
military	 strength.	The	USSR’s	 ‘military-industrial	machine’	was	 thus	 imbued	with	 ‘a	
strong	momentum	which	was	geared	towards	the	pursuit	of	military	competition	for	
years	to	come’	(Ibid:	139).	Whilst	there	was	some	truth	in	Soviet	propaganda	efforts	
that	the	bomb	was	a	defensive	measure	to	ward	off	imperialist	aggression	from	the	
West,	this	narrative	also	hid	the	domestic	reality	of	Soviet	society,	which	was	stuck	in	
the	‘inertia	of	the	military	machine’	(Ibid:	140).	Moscow	and	Washington’s	Cold	War	
rhetoric	 therefore	presented	a	mirror	 image	of	 the	other	 side—with	both	claiming	
that	 their	 bomb	 was	 peaceful	 whilst	 the	 opponent’s	 symbolised	 only	 nefarious	
intent.	Such	propagandising	was	routinely	deployed	at	home	and	internationally.	For	
the	Kremlin,	 the	bomb	was	 a	 scientific	 and	 technological	 triumph	 that	 boosted	 its	
prestige,	yet	the	Soviet	leadership	also	felt	the	need	to	present	its	new	weapon	on	
the	 international	 stage	 as	 a	 symbol	 of	 peace	 and	 emphasise	 their	 preference	 for	
disarmament	(Barghoorn,	1964:	111).		
	
Whilst	the	USSR	tried	to	cultivate	a	positive	image	in	the	eyes	of	world	public	opinion	
and	 respond	 to	 criticisms	of	 its	 foreign	policy,	 domestically	 there	was	no	need	 for	
such	 efforts.	 Thus,	 as	 April	 Carter	 (1989:	 26)	 explains,	 the	 absence	 of	 ‘any	 direct	
popular	or	legislative	pressure’	on	the	Kremlin	during	the	Cold	War	on	arms	control	
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policies	meant	 the	Soviet	 leadership	was	never	held	accountable	on	 this	 issue	and	
also	 did	 not	 feel	 pressure	 to	 rein	 in	 its	 military	 programmes.	 Yet	 this	 situation	
changed	following	Mikhail	Gorbachev’s	rise	to	power	in	1985.	Bruce	Russett	(2011:	
99)	 makes	 the	 point	 that	 the	 ‘internal	 character	 of	 the	 Soviet	 system	 moved	
importantly	 towards	democracy	during	 the	1986-1989	period.’	According	 to	Alexei	
Arbatov	(2010:	54-55),	this	development	ushered	in	a	‘golden	age’	of	‘civilian	control	
and	democratic	accountability	 in	 their	peculiar	Soviet	 reforms’	whereby	academics	
and	 experts	 were	 involved	 in	 policymaking,	 including	 ‘the	 major	 disarmament	
endeavours	 of	 the	 time’.	 Arbatov	 credits	 this	 movement—with	 Gorbachev’s	
support—for	taming	the	military	establishment,	enabling	the	agreement	of	the	1987	
INF	 Treaty,	 the	1990	Treaty	on	Conventional	Armed	 Forces	 in	 Europe	 (CFE)	 Treaty	
and	START	I.54	Moreover,	David	Cortright	(2008:	150)	claims	that	Gorbachev	and	the	
European	 peace	 movements	 should	 be	 credited	 for	 ‘demanding	 political	 change’,	
which	 led	 to	 the	 Soviets	 offering	 ‘sweeping	 nuclear	 reductions’	 including	 the	
elimination	of	all	nuclear	weapons	at	the	1986	Reykjavik	Summit.		
	
Matthew	Evangelista	(1999:	306)	embellishes	on	these	points	in	highlighting	how	the	
real	 significance	 of	 Gorbachev’s	 administration	 was	 the	 realisation	 that	 Soviet	
actions,	 which	 were	 intended	 as	 defensive,	 at	 times	 appeared	 threatening	 to	 the	
West—even	 to	 those	 who	 ‘were	 sensitive	 to	 Soviet	 security	 interests’	 such	 as	
																																								 																					
54	Today	 the	 INF	 is	 under	 threat	 as	 the	 US	 and	 Russia	 trade	 allegations	 that	 each	 has	 violated	 the	
treaty	by	developing	new	missile	systems,	with	Russia	threatening	to	withdraw	(Ghoshal,	2014).	
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‘members	of	European	peace	movements’.	This	influenced	the	shift	in	Soviet	foreign	
policy	 towards	 ‘common	 security’	 as	 outlined	 in	 the	 Palme	 Commission	 report	
(1982),	which	advocated	international	cooperation	to	achieve	complete	and	general	
disarmament	and	the	peaceful	resolution	of	conflicts.		
	
Andrei	Grachev	(2008:	38)	meanwhile,	emphasises	how	Gorbachev	was	also	one	of	a	
new	generation	of	political	leaders	who	‘were	not	prepared	to	accept	uncritically	the	
unlimited	demands	 of	 the	military-industrial	 complex,	 especially	 at	 a	 time	when	 it	
had	begun	to	devour	vital	parts	of	the	body	of	Soviet	society’.55	The	MIC	had,	by	the	
late	1970s,	‘gained	a	position	of	almost	unrestrained	domination	of	the	political	and	
economic	life	of	the	country’,	making	it	immune	from	political	control.	Importantly,	
particularly	 given	 our	 previous	 discussion	 of	 the	 influence	 of	 the	 MIC/Pentagon	
System	 in	 US	 nuclear	 weapons	 decision-making,	 Grachev	 also	 concludes	 that	 ‘the	
two	superpowers’	engaged	in	the	arms	race	as	they	were	‘obviously	motivated	more	
by	a	common	interest	 in	preserving	the	status	quo	(including	the	positions	of	their	
respective	military	lobbies	and	industrial	complexes)	than	by	real	defence	concerns’.	
The	preceding	analysis	suggests	that	the	principal	significance	of	Gorbachev	for	this	
study	 was	 his	 attempt	 to	 exert	 political	 control	 over	 nuclear	 weapons	 decision-
making,	hitherto	dominated	by	military-industrial	 interests.	Moreover,	his	brand	of	
‘new	thinking’	prioritised	disarmament	as	a	means	 to	 reorient	 the	Soviet	economy	
away	from	military	spending	in	order	to	provide	more	and	better	goods	and	services	
																																								 																					
55	Grachev	 was	 former	 Deputy	 Head	 of	 the	 International	 Department	 of	 the	 Communist	 Party's	
Central	Committee	and	a	confidant	of	Gorbachev.	
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for	 its	 citizens	 and	 to	 reduce	 tensions	with	 the	West	 on	 the	 path	 to	 international	
cooperation	between	nations	(Grachev,	2008).		
	
David	 Cortright	 (2008:	 323)	 argues	 that	 Gorbachev’s	 strategic	 concessions	 and	
sweeping	economic	and	political	reforms	in	tandem	with	the	popular	movements	in	
Eastern	 and	 Western	 Europe	 presented	 a	 golden	 opportunity	 to	 realise	 nuclear	
disarmament	 and	 build	 ‘more	 reliable	 structures	 of	 peace	 and	 international	
cooperation’.	 Instead,	 Cortright	 (Ibid:	 149)	 contends	 that	 the	 theory	 of	 ‘cold	 war	
triumphalism’,	whereby	military	power	broke	the	Soviet	economy,	embedded	itself	
in	US	strategic	thinking.	This	led	to	a	series	of	actions	by	the	US	that,	Russian	analysts	
argue,	pushed	 their	country	 into	a	corner	and	 increasingly	 led	 to	a	 reliance	on	 the	
military	and	nuclear	weapons	 for	 security	as	 the	1990s	wore	on.	 For	example,	 the	
authors	 of	 the	 Russian	 Institute	 of	 World	 Economy	 and	 International	 Relations	
(IMEMO)	 study	 Russia	 and	 the	 Dilemmas	 of	 Nuclear	 Disarmament	 (Arbatov	 et	 al,	
2012:	 97-102)	 state	 that	 the	 continued	 existence	 of	 NATO	 as	 a	 military	 alliance	
following	 the	 dissolution	 of	 the	 Warsaw	 Pact,	 the	 incorporation	 of	 former	 pact	
members	 into	 NATO	 and	 the	 latter’s	 subsequent	 expansion—breaking	
‘commitments	 previously	 undertaken	 at	 the	 highest	 level’—treated	 Russia	 like	 a	
‘loser’	in	the	Cold	War	and	took	advantage	of	its	weakness	for	Western	gain.		
	
Thus,	whilst	there	was	an	opening	for	strategic	cooperation	and	the	development	of	
a	 security	 community	between	 the	West	and	Russia	 following	 the	end	of	 the	Cold	
War,	 symbolised	 by	Gorbachev’s	 (1989)	 proposal	 for	 a	 ‘common	European	home’,	
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this	withered	away	as	 the	US	preferred	enlargement	 to	 restraint.	Western	policies	
during	 the	1990s	and	2000s	presented	a	series	of	crises	and	serious	challenges	 for	
US-Russian	 relations.	As	 I	 shall	 explore	 in	more	detail	 in	 section	4.3,	 this	 led	 to	an	
increasing	Russian	reliance	on	nuclear	weapons	in	their	defence	and	foreign	policy.	
Several	 Russian	 analysts	 note	 that	 this	 situation	was	 not	 inevitable	 but	 a	 result	 of	
changes	 in	 Russia’s	 domestic	 affairs	 and	 international	 position.	 Understanding	 the	
process	by	which	Russian	international	policy	 is	made	helps	us	appreciate	how	and	
why	 such	 a	 shift	 occurred.	 For	 example,	 as	 Gvosdev	 and	Marsh	 (2014:	 xiii)	 note,	
there	 are	 different	 ‘sectors	 and	 vectors’	 within	 Russia	 that	 create	 various	 foreign	
policies.	External	developments	 therefore	may	weaken	or	 strengthen	 the	ability	of	
different	 sub-national	 actors	 and	 groups	 to	 realise	 their	 policy	 preferences.	 For	
example,	 in	 the	years	 following	 the	end	of	 the	Cold	War	more	conservative	actors	
have	been	strengthened,	leading	to	a	revived	Russian	nationalism.	This	is	significant	
for	the	claim	that	institutional	democratisation	is	necessary	for	nuclear	disarmament	
because	states	with	influence	over	Russian	actions,	such	as	the	US,	need	to	consider	
how	 their	 actions	 impact	 on	 Russian	 domestic	 politics—either	 supporting	 or	
undermining	the	prospects	for	military	restraint	and	liberal	democratic	reforms.	
	
To	argue	that	the	West	should	be	more	sensitive	in	its	dealings	with	Russia	if	it	wants	
a	more	liberal	and	cooperative	regime	in	Moscow	is	not	to	absolve	the	latter	for	its	
part	 in	 obstructing	 democratisation	 and	 disarmament	 nor	 to	 place	 all	 the	
responsibility	 for	 the	 status	 quo	 at	 the	West’s	 door.	 As	 Lilia	 Shevtsova	 (Blank	 ed.,	
2012)	argues,	the	main	aim	of	the	Russian	political	system	at	home	is	for	ruling	elites	
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to	 maintain	 their	 monopoly	 of	 power.	 Nuclear	 weapons	 are	 thus	 a	 part	 of	 the	
regime’s	survival	strategy,	so	that,	as	Dmitri	Trenin	(2005:	7)	argues,	since	the	end	of	
the	 Cold	 War,	 in	 Russian	 domestic	 politics,	 ‘control	 over	 nuclear	 weapons	 has	
become	the	ultimate	symbol	of	presidential	authority,	an	equivalent	of	the	old-time	
scepter	and	the	orb’.	
	
Despite	 these	 observations,	 Western	 studies	 of	 Russian	 nuclear	 politics	 rarely	
investigate	domestic	political	dynamics	in	that	nation.	This	may	partly	be	due	to	the	
relative	 difficulty	 in	 finding	 appropriate	 and	 useful	 source	 material,	 compared	 to	
Western	 societies.	 It	 may	 also	 be	 partly	 down	 to	 the—not	 unreasonable—
assumption	that	political	forces	outside	the	Kremlin	are	of	minimal	importance	given	
the	 degree	 of	 centralised	 control	 over	 security	 matters	 and	 the	 nuclear	 issue	 in	
particular.	 There	 may	 also	 be	 an	 assumption	 that	 the	 Russian	 public	 aren’t	 fully	
conscious	politically	and	blindly	accept	Kremlin	policy.	 For	example,	 the	Economist	
Intelligence	Unit	(2016),	from	2006-2015,	classified	Russia	as	an	‘authoritarian’	state,	
whilst	 a	 2017	 Freedom	 House	 (2017)	 report	 gave	 Russia	 a	 score	 of	 20/100	 and	
classified	it	as	in	the	bottom	of	seven	ranks	for	political	rights	and	in	the	second	to	
last	 rank	 for	 civil	 liberties.	 Yet	 examining	 the	 preferences	 of	 the	 Russian	 public	
concerning	security	issues	is	vital	if	we	are	to	familiarise	ourselves	with	the	potential	
for	progressive	change.	
	
As	noted	in	the	previous	section,	in	addition	to	the	consensus	on	foreign	and	security	
policy	 amongst	 decision-makers,	 some	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 the	 Russian	 public	
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strongly	supports	the	nation’s	nuclear	status.	Furthermore,	according	to	one	Russian	
military	 expert	 I	 interviewed,	 ‘alternative	 voices	 are	 present	 but	 negligible,	 nearly	
anonymous’.56		 Despite	 the	 difficult	 political	 environment,	 there	 are	 some	 Russian	
NGOs—with	 connections	 to	 Western	 partners—that	 continue	 to	 work	 on	 these	
issues.57	However,	Pavel	Podvig	(2012)	argues	that	the	Russian	public	support	for	its	
government’s	nuclear	weapons	policies	is	largely:		
	
a	 result	of	 the	 lack	of	an	open	and	 informed	discussion	of	national	 security	
priorities	and	policies	that	would	involve	independent	voices.	While	there	are	
non-governmental	research	organizations	that	are	involved	in	the	discussion	
of	defence	policies,	there	are	no	independent	public	organizations	that	would	
have	nuclear	weapons	related	issues	on	the	agenda.	
	
Whilst	there	is	therefore	significant	evidence	to	suggest	that	there	is	strong	support	
across	Russian	society	for	nuclear	possession,	as	suggested	above,	it	is	also	clear	that	
this	state	of	affairs	was	not	inevitable	but	resulted	from	a	particular	set	of	conditions	
following	the	end	of	the	Cold	War.	Moreover,	apparently	contradictory	polling	data	
suggests	 that	 there	 is	 strong	 support	 amongst	 the	 Russian	 public	 for	 arms	 control	
and	disarmament.	For	example,	a	2005	poll	by	VTsIOM	showed	that	39%	of	Russians	
supported	nuclear	 reductions,	 but	 not	 to	 zero	 (Podvig,	 2005).	 Similarly,	 a	 poll	 two																																									 																					
56	Interview:	IS	
57	These	NGOs	 have	 some	 access	 to	 and	 influence	with	 the	 foreign	ministry,	which	 is	 amenable	 to	
discussions	on	this	topic	(Tsypkin	&	Loukianova,	2009:	113-117).	
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years	later	reported	strong	support	amongst	the	Russian	public	for	deep	cuts	to	the	
nation’s	 arsenal—with	53%	even	 favouring	 reductions	below	400	nuclear	weapons	
(World	Public	Opinion,	 2007).	However,	 a	 survey	 in	 2010	by	VTsIOM	 (RIA	Novosti,	
2010)	 struck	 a	 different	 note,	 as	 its	 polling	 showed	 that	 60%	of	 Russians	 opposed	
further	reductions,	with	many	believing	New	START	had	benefited	the	US	more	than	
Russia.	Clearly	these	findings	present	a	mixed	picture	of	Russian	attitudes	to	nuclear	
issues,	 suggesting	 a	 preference	 for	 reductions	 alongside	 a	 continuing	 interest	 in	
Russia	 remaining	 a	 nuclear	 possessor—a	 position	 influenced	 by	 a	 wariness	 of	
Western	 intentions	and	a	preference	 for	 the	nation	 to	 retain	a	semblance	of	great	
power	status.	
	
In	terms	of	 the	medium	to	 long-term	changes	required	for	Russia	democratisation,	
Andreas	Umland	(2012)	thus	makes	the	point	that:	
	
Russia	will	become	a	 law-ruled	democracy	when	 it	stops	seeing	herself	as	a	
civilizational	 center	 engaged	 in	 a	 geopolitical	 struggle	 beyond	 her	 borders.	
Once	 the	 Russians	 discard	 the	 mirages	 of	 “The	 Third	 Rome”	 and	 imperial	
greatness,	they	will	finally	become	free.	
	
The	argument	that	Russia’s	overblown	ambitions	need	to	be	discarded	if	progressive	
and	liberal	reforms	are	to	be	realised	raises	several	questions,	which	I	discuss	further	
below.	These	include	whether	the	Russian	people	or	Russian	elites—or	both—need	
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to	embrace	this	shift	 in	mindset,	what	a	new	Russian	 identity	might	 look	 like,	how	
such	a	shift	may	occur	(for	example,	through	civil	society	movements),	and	how	such	
a	transition	connects	to	disarmament.		
	
4.3	Russian	nuclear	politics	in	the	post-Cold	War	world	
	
In	order	 to	provide	an	overview	of	 the	different	 factors	pushing	and	pulling	Russia	
towards	and	away	from	reliance	on	nuclear	weapons	following	the	end	of	the	Cold	
War,	 I	 will	 begin	 by	 outlining	 the	 former	 before	 turning	 to	 those	 developments	
potentially	 conducive	 to	 Russia	 reducing	 the	 salience	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 in	 its	
security	 policy.	 The	 purpose	 of	 this	 investigation	 is	 to	 assess	 the	 theory	 that	 the	
underlying	political	 relationship	between	Russia	and	 the	US	has	been	 the	principal	
determinant	of	Russian	dependence	on	nuclear	weapons	over	the	last	two	decades.	
In	the	following	section	I	then	consider	the	 importance	of	other	domestic,	regional	
and	 international	 factors,	 and	 how	 they	 interact,	 as	 a	 means	 of	 assessing	 the	
explanatory	 value	 of	 institutional	 democratisation	 regarding	 Russian	 nuclear	
possession	and	disarmament.	
	
As	 Dale	 Herspring	 (2011:	 3)	 notes,	 Boris	 Yeltsin’s	 term	 in	 office	 (1991-1999)	 was	
described	as	a	 time	of	 ‘confusion	and	chaos’	 for	 those	 in	charge	of	Russia’s	armed	
forces.	With	the	economy	in	freefall	the	resources	available	for	conventional	forces	
and	nuclear	weapons	rapidly	diminished,	leading	to	Moscow’s	nuclear	arsenal	falling	
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to	 a	 level	 4-4.5	 times	 below	 its	 Cold	War	 peak	 during	 this	 decade.	 Yet,	 as	 Nikolai	
Sokov	(2002:	101)	points	out,	whilst	numbers	were	falling	sharply,	debate	over	the	
growing	Russian	reliance	on	nuclear	weapons	‘dominated	the	1990s’.	For	Sokov,	this	
reliance	was	not	fixed	but	fluctuated	according	to	regional	and	international	political	
events,	‘peaking’	in	response	to	a	combination	of	four	variables:	i)	acute	perception	
of	external	 threat	 ii)	perceived	absence	of	alternative	means	 to	ensure	 security	 iii)	
perception	 of	 high	 utility	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 iv)	 cost-effective	 optimisation	 of	
military	capability	(Ibid.	105-106).	On	the	other	hand,	Russian	scholars	such	as	Alexei	
Arbatov	 and	 Vladimir	 Dworkin	 (2005:	 8)	 note	 that	 ‘despite	 serious	 differences	 on	
some	issues’	during	the	1990s	and	early	2000s	there	were	also	several	constructive	
cooperative	initiatives	undertaken	between	Russia	and	the	US.		
	
According	 to	 several	 sources,	 Yeltsin	 had	 made	 overtures	 to	 NATO	 regarding	
potential	Russian	membership	 ‘as	a	 long-term	political	aim’	 in	December	1991,	but	
received	no	 response	 (Friedman,	1991;	Straus,	1997;	Trenin,	2007:	71).	 Instead,	as	
Eugene	 B.	 Rumer	 (2007:	 18)	 posits,	 a	 weak	 Russia,	 transitioning	 from	 Soviet	
authoritarianism	 to	democracy,	was	 ‘bypassed’	 by	 the	West.	At	 this	 time,	western	
planners	saw	an	opportunity	to	maximise	their	power,	assuming	that	Russia	would	
eventually	 acquiesce	 in	 the	 post-Cold	War	 international	 order	 they	were	 creating.	
Moreover,	moves	to	expand	NATO	and	‘secure	Russia’s	periphery’	would	also	ensure	
that	 if	Russia	re-emerged	‘as	a	threat	to	Europe,	as	either	a	totalitarian	or	a	failing	
state’	 that	 it	 could	 be	 contained	 (Ibid:	 19).	 Recently,	 Russian	 aggression	 against	
Ukraine	was	used	by	US	and	British	statespeople	to	 justify	the	UK	and	other	NATO	
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members	maintaining	 their	 nuclear	 weapons	 to	 deter	 such	 ‘adventurism’	 and	 the	
possibility	 of	 future	 ‘nuclear	 blackmail’	 (BASIC,	 2014;	 Scowcroft	 et	 al,	 2014).	 This	
path	 was	 chosen	 despite	 warnings	 from	 a	 range	 of	 eminent	 US	 statespeople	 and	
political	 commentators,	 including	 George	 Kennan	 (Friedman,	 1998)	 and	 Robert	
McNamara	(Arms	Control	Association,	1997)	that	NATO	expansion	would	lead	to	an	
adverse	 reaction	 in	 Russia	 and	 would	 constitute	 a	 ‘policy	 error	 of	 historic	
proportions’.58	Indeed,	 as	 Alexander	 Konovalov	 (Schell,	 1998:	 158)	 argued	 at	 the	
time,	the	result	of	these	policies	was	that	many	Russians	began	to	think	that	the	US	
‘needs	 a	 weak,	 humbled	 Russia,	 perhaps	 as	 a	 source	 of	 cheap	 labor	 and	 raw	
materials’.		
	
For	 their	 part,	 Russian	 military	 strategists	 responded	 to	 the	 far	 superior	 NATO	
conventional	military	 forces	 they	 saw	as	 threatening	Russian	borders	 in	 1996-7	by	
emphasising	 the	 uses	 of	 tactical	 nuclear	 weapons	 (TNW),	 a	 development	 which	
‘propelled	nuclear	weapons	into	the	center	of	attention	and	created	a	perception	of	
their	high	utility’	according	to	Sokov	(2002:	103-4).59	The	next	crisis	between	Russia	
and	the	West	took	place	in	1999	with	NATO’s	bombing	of	Serbia.	Sokov	(2011:	205)	
describes	 how	 a	 meeting	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 Security	 Council	 during	 the	
Kosovo	war,	headed	by	Putin,	decided	to	‘enhance	reliance	on	nuclear	weapons	in	a																																									 																					
58	In	 June	 1997	 a	 group	 of	 fifty	 leading	 foreign	 policy	 experts,	 including	 former	 senators,	 retired	
military	officers,	diplomats	and	academicians	sent	an	open	letter	to	President	Clinton	expressing	their	
opposition	to	NATO	expansion	(Arms	Control	Association,	1997).		
59	Elsewhere,	Roger	N.	McDermott	 (2011:	71)	has	argued	 that	 the	Russian	Navy	has	been	 the	main	
proponent	 in	 the	 armed	 forces	 of	 maintaining	 TNW,	 not	 least	 because	 they	 are	 viewed	 as	 ‘as	 a	
necessary	part	of	confronting	the	U.S.	Navy	in	any	conflict’.	
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departure	from	all	documents	adopted	in	the	1990s’.		
	
The	primary	 innovation	at	this	 time	was	the	new	mission	given	to	nuclear	 forces—
deterrence	of	limited	conventional	wars	(Sokov,	2004).	The	significance	for	Russia	of	
the	Kosovo	war	and	the	subsequent	invasion	of	Iraq	in	2003	was	that	it	showed	how	
the	 US	 could	 use	 force	 without	 the	 authorisation	 of	 the	 United	 Nation’s	 Security	
Council.	Moreover,	Bill	Clinton’s	decision	in	1999	to	go	ahead	with	a	national	missile	
defence	system	and	amend	the	ABM	Treaty	accordingly	was	viewed	by	Moscow	as	
evidence	 that	Washington	was	 seeking	 the	ability	 to	 launch	a	 large-scale	attack	or	
even	gain	a	first-strike	capability	(Sokov,	2002:	104).	
	
With	 Putin	 now	 the	 Russian	 President,	 the	 National	 Security	 Concept	 and	 the	
Military	 Doctrine	 of	 2000	 enshrined	 the	 new	 role	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 outlined	
above.	 The	 reliance	 on	 nuclear	 weapons	 would	 be	 a	 temporary	 measure	 until	
conventional	 forces—particularly	precision-guided	munitions	and	missile	defence—
were	 developed	 (Sokov,	 2011:	 249).	 In	 this	 sense	 nuclear	 weapons	 were	 a	 cost-
effective	means	of	deterring	NATO’s	quantitatively	and	qualitatively	stronger	forces	
(Sokov,	 2002:	 105).	 Yet	 the	 many	 problems	 with	 conventional	 modernisation—
frequent	 delays,	 corruption	 by	 officials,	 inadequate	 production	 equipment	 and	
skilled	personnel—were	at	 least	 as	 great	 as	 those	with	nuclear	weapons,	meaning	
that	progress	was	far	more	sluggish	than	planned	despite	the	significant	increase	in	
spending	(Westerlund,	2012:	76;	Herspring,	2011:	26).	The	Kremlin	is	now	also	faced	
with	 the	 problem	 of	 a	 struggling	 economy	 (a	 situation	 made	 worse	 by	 Western	
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sanctions	 following	 the	 annexation	 of	 Crimea)	 at	 a	 time	 when	 it	 plans	 further	
increases	 in	military	expenditure,	 leading	 to	a	greater	 reliance	on	defence	supplies	
from	abroad	(Myers	et	al,	2014).		
	
Thus	 despite	 the	 attempts	 at	 military	 reform	 and	 the	 2020	 State	 Armament	
Programme,	which	aimed	to	equip	the	military	with	30%	of	new	arms	by	2015	and	
70%	by	2020,	Russia	is	unlikely	to	ever	close	the	gap	with	China,	the	US	and	NATO,	
ensuring	 that	 its	 reliance	 on	 nuclear	 weapons	 will	 continue	 ‘indefinitely’	
(Oxenstierna	&	Berstrand,	2012:	58;	Sokov,	2011:	249).	Several	scholars	agree	that	
the	 outlook	 for	 Russia’s	 conventional	 military	 is	 bleak—it	 now	 stands	 on	 the	
‘precipice	 of	 irrelevance’	 so	 that	 the	 nation	 may	 be	 classified	 as	 a	 ‘strategic	
backwater’—according	 to	 one	Washington-based	 analyst	 I	 spoke	 to	 (Goure,	 2011:	
265).	60		
	
Returning	to	the	1990s	and	early	2000s,	there	continued	at	this	time	to	be	a	debate	
over	 the	 proper	 role	 for	 nuclear	weapons	 in	 Russian	 security	 policy.	 For	 example,	
within	 the	 military	 General	 Anatoly	 Kvashnin	 and	 then	 defence	 minister	 Igor	
Sergeyev	were	engaged	 in	 ‘constant	 conflict’,	with	 the	 former	 favouring	expanded	
conventional	 forces	 whilst	 the	 latter	 promoted	 a	 more	 robust	 nuclear	 arsenal,	 a	
																																								 																					
60	Interview:	JA	
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situation	 leading	 to	 ‘bureaucratic	 chaos’	 (Herspring,	 2011:	 6-7).61	Thereafter	 Putin	
stated	 that	 he	 was	 not	 ‘surprised’	 by	 the	 US	 abrogating	 the	 Anti-Ballistic	 Missile	
Treaty	(ABMT)	in	2002	but	considered	it	a	‘mistake’.	He	also	said	he	did	not	believe	it	
would	‘pose	a	threat	to	the	national	security	of	the	Russian	Federation’,	whereas	the	
previous	Russian	line	was	that	such	an	action	would	lead	to	a	new	nuclear	arms	race	
(BBC,	2001).	 Indeed,	 as	Andrei	 Shoumikhin	 (2011:	104)	notes,	Russia	 formerly	 saw	
the	 ABMT	 as	 ‘the	 cornerstone	 of	 strategic	 stability	 in	 bilateral	 relations	 and	 the	
foundation	of	geopolitical	“parity”	between	the	superpowers’.62	
	
By	 2003	Russia’s	 nuclear	weapons	 policy	 had	 begun	 to	 ‘stabilise’	 as	 shown	by	 the	
publication	of	the	Ministry	of	Defence’s	new	White	Paper	(Sokov,	2003).	The	second	
wave	of	NATO	enlargement	took	place	 in	2004,	 including	two	former	Warsaw	Pact	
members—Bulgaria	and	Romania	and	three	former	members	of	the	USSR—Estonia,	
Latvia	and	Lithuania.	At	the	2008	NATO	summit	George	W.	Bush	administration	had	
also	 wanted	 to	 extend	 membership	 to	 Georgia	 and	 Ukraine,	 a	 move	 strongly	
opposed	 by	 Moscow,	 as	 it	 did	 not	 want	 NATO	 or	 the	 EU	 encroaching	 on	 former																																									 																					
61 	According	 to	 Arbatov	 and	 Dworkin	 (2005:	 42),	 Kvashnin	 persuaded	 the	 Kremlin	 in	 2000	 to	
redistribute	 funds	 from	 the	 land-based	 ICBM	 force	 to	 ‘general	 purpose	 forces’,	 something	 they	
consider	a	 ‘grave	strategic	blunder’	 for	 financial	and	strategic	 reasons,	not	 least	because	 it	enabled	
the	US	to	‘abandon’	the	ABM	Treaty	and	START	negotiations.	
62	Phillip	Marguiles	(2008:	59)	has	speculated	that	this	change	in	tack	was	due	to	the	fact	that	the	day	
after	 the	 US	 left	 the	 AMBT	 Russia	 withdrew	 from	 the	 START	 II	 agreement	 which	 banned	multiple	
independently	 targetable	 re-entry	 vehicles	 (MIRVs)	 being	 used	 on	 ICBMs.	 This	 was	 convenient	 for	
Russia	 as	 its	 limited	 capacity	 to	 produce	missiles	meant	 that	MIRV-ing	 had	 again	 become	 Russia’s	
principal	 means	 of	 maintaining	 nuclear	 parity	 with	 the	 US	 (Westerlund	 &	 Roffey,	 2012:	 138).	
However,	one	London-based	analyst	I	spoke	to	suggested	that	the	US’s	abrogation	of	the	ABMT	was	a	
‘serious	 blow	 to	 trust’	 between	 the	 two	 nations,	 at	 a	 time	when	 Russia	 was	 trying	 to	 improve	 its	
relations	with	the	West	(Interview:	IS).	
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Soviet	 states	 (Dempsey,	 2014).	 Karaganov	 (2010)	 thus	 explicitly	 blamed	 NATO	
expansion	 for	 the	 conflict	 in	 Georgia.	 Furthermore,	 Mikhail	 Tsypkin	 (2009:	 783)	
points	out	that	during	this	time	32%	of	the	Russian	public	saw	Putin’s	foreign	policy	
‘as	 the	 main	 success	 of	 his	 tenure’,	 the	 same	 percentage	 seeing	 his	 main	
achievement	as	being	economic	growth.		
	
As	noted	above,	whilst	Russia	 reacted	negatively	 to	NATO	expansion	and	overseas	
aggression,	Arbatov	and	Dworkin	(2005:	8)	identify	several	cooperative	ventures	that	
have	been	proposed	or	 launched,	 to	varying	degrees	of	success,	over	 the	past	 two	
decades.	They	describe	how	this	cooperation	has	encompassed,		
	
various	economic	and	political	spheres,	peace-keeping	operations,	resolution	
of	 regional	 conflicts,	 non-proliferation	 of	 weapons	 of	 mass	 destruction	
(WMD),	 the	 struggle	 against	 terrorism,	 joint	 ground	 and	 naval	 force	
exercises,	 programs	 of	 securing	 and	 eliminating	 stockpiles	 of	 nuclear	 and	
chemical	 weapons,	 safe	 disposal	 of	 nuclear	 materials	 and	 old	 nuclear	
submarines,	salvage	operations	at	sea,	and	joint	space	manned	systems.		
Moreover,	 two	 initiatives	 from	1997	 indicated	that	a	warmer	relationship	between	
Russia	and	the	West	was	possible.	The	NATO-Russia	Founding	Act	promised	to	ease	
concerns	 over	NATO	 expansion	 and	 the	US-Russia	Helsinki	 Summit	 suggested	 that	
Russia’s	concerns	over	long-range	conventional	air-launched	cruise	missiles	and	sea-
launched	 cruise	 missiles	 would	 be	 addressed	 in	 future	 arms	 control	 negotiations	
(Sokov,	 2008:	 77).	 Whilst	 Washington’s	 post-Cold	 War	 triumphalism	 and	 NATO’s	
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expansion	 were	 key	 factors	 behind	 the	 inability	 to	 reshape	 US-Russian	 relations,	
Sokov	 (2002:	107)	also	suggests	 that	Moscow	could	have	been	more	 ‘constructive’	
and	less	‘passive’	in	its	dealings	with	the	West.	Today,	as	several	commentators	have	
argued,	 one	 area	 where	 all	 of	 the	 major	 powers	 could	 make	 a	 contribution	 is	 in	
making	 clear	 their	 intentions	 over	 future	 plans	 for	 military	 modernisation	 (NRDC,	
2013).	
	
With	regards	to	Russia’s	relationship	with	Europe,	one	of	the	key	strategic	concerns	
is	the	1990	CFE	Treaty,	which	created	the	framework	for	conventional	arms	control	
and	stability	across	the	continent.	Yet	today	this	system	is	broken,	with	Russia	having	
suspended	 its	 participation	 in	 2007,	 out	 of	 a	 concern	 that	 CFE	 ‘flank	 limitations’	
could	increase	Russian	vulnerability	following	Georgia	and/or	Ukraine	joining	NATO,	
a	fear	which	intensified	following	the	2008	Georgia	conflict	(Hansell	et	al,	2009:	13).		
	
Two	months	prior	to	the	start	of	this	conflict,	President	Dmitri	Medvedev	had,	during	
a	visit	to	Germany—Russia’s	most	important	trading	partner—urged	the	agreement	
of	 a	 new	 European	 security	 architecture.	 This	 included	 a	 proposal	 to	 develop	 and	
sign	 a	 European	 Security	 Treaty.	 Moreover,	 in	 2010	 Putin,	 now	 Prime	 Minister,	
proposed	 a	 Russia-EU	 free	 trade	 zone	 ‘from	 Lisbon	 to	 Vladivostok’	 and	 closer	
cooperation	 on	 energy	 and	 industrial	 policy,	 also	 whilst	 visiting	 Germany	 (Spiegel	
Online,	 2010).	 Arbatov	 and	 Dworkin	 (2012:	 103)	 argue	 that	 Medvedev’s	 initiative	
was	 intended	 to	 ‘provide	 Russia	 with	 a	 veto	 power	 regarding	 NATO's	 actions…in	
particular,	 its	 expansion’	 and	 was	 therefore	 ‘deemed	 unacceptable	 by	 the	West’.	
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Elsewhere,	Vladimir	Socor	(2008)	suggested	Russia’s	aim	was	also	to	strengthen	the	
Organisation	 for	 Security	 and	 Cooperation	 in	 Europe	 (OSCE)	 as	 a	 security	 actor	
‘where	 Russia	 wields	 veto	 power,	 and	 promote	 such	 initiatives	 bilaterally	 with	
selected	European	governments’.	Receiving	little	encouragement	to	these	proposals	
from	 the	 EU,	 Hedenskog	 (2012:	 28)	 argues	 that	 Russia	 dropped	 them	 in	 2011	 to	
instead	focus	its	energies	on	developing	a	joint	European	missile	defence,	although	
the	 senior	 Russian	 diplomat	 I	 spoke	 to	 said	Medvedev’s	 initiative	was	 ‘still	 on	 the	
agenda’.63	
	
Summarising	where	Russia	stands	today,	Dmitri	Trenin	(2013)	argues	that:		
	
Russia	 may	 be	 European,	 historically	 and	 culturally,	 but	 it	 is	 apart	 from	
Europe,	 represented	 today	 by	 the	 European	 Union.	 For	 Russia,	 the	 EU	 has	
long	ceased	to	be	a	mentor	and	has	recently	ceased	to	be	a	model.	Instead,	
Russia	 is	 busy	 building	 a	 geopolitical	 unit	 to	 include	 much	 of	 post-Soviet	
Eurasia.	
	
Whilst	this	may	be	true,	several	NATO	nations,	including	Germany,	the	Netherlands,	
the	US	and	Turkey	are	amongst	Russia’s	largest	trading	partners.	The	EU	and	Russia	
are	 thus,	 economically	 at	 least,	 ‘mutually	 dependent’,	 with	 the	 former	 especially	
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reliant	 on	 Russia’s	 coal,	 oil	 and	 gas	 reserves	 (Paine,	 2013:	 26),	 although	 Rumer	
(2007:	62)	argues	that	Europe	is	building	pipelines	from	Central	Asia	 in	an	effort	to	
‘wean	itself	off	its	dependence	on	Russian	energy	sources’.64		
Turning	 to	 China,	 in	 recent	 years	 it	 has	 become	 one	 of	 Russia’s	 leading	 trade	
partners	and	 the	 two	nations	 share	 similar	views	across	a	 range	of	political	 issues,	
including	 in	their	resistance	to	US	hegemony	(Downs,	2010:	164).	There	were	even	
meetings	between	 the	 two	nations	 in	2000	 to	discuss	a	 joint	BMD	system,	 though	
this	 did	 not	 go	 anywhere	 and	 Moscow	 is	 generally	 wary	 of	 expanding	 military	
cooperation	with	Beijing	 (Hansell	&	Perfilyev,	 2009:	 133).	 In	 1996	 the	 two	nations	
established	 the	 Shanghai	 Co-operation	 Organisation	 (SCO),	 which	 has	 become	 a	
forum	where	they	‘can	balance	and	coordinate	their	interests	in	Central	Asia	and	in	
their	immediate	vicinity	while	at	the	same	time	keeping	the	US	and	other	actors	out	
of	the	region’	(Hedenskog,	2012:	32).		
	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 some	 Russian	 analysts,	 whilst	 relatively	 unconcerned	 about	
China’s	 military	 aspirations	 today,	 worry	 about	 possible	 future	 hostile	 Chinese	
maneouvres,	 for	 example,	 the	 annexation	 of	 Russia’s	 sparsely	 populated	 Far	 East	
(Hansell	&	Perfilyev,	2009:	135).	Whilst	Beijing’s	small	nuclear	arsenal	does	not	strike	
fear	 into	 Russian	 hearts,	 according	 to	 one	 Moscow-based	 expert	 I	 spoke	 to,	 the	
																																								 																					
64	For	 its	 part,	 Russia	 has	 attempted	 to	 forge	 better	 relations	 with	 the	 US	 and	 the	 EU	 to	 attract	
investment	 and	 new	 technology	 for	 economic	 and	 industrial	 modernisation	 as	 part	 of	 its	 wider	
attempt	 to	 regain	 great	 power	 status.64	Meanwhile,	 Frank	 Westerlund	 (2012:	 93)	 suggests	 that	
Russian	 state	 expenditure	 could	 be	 ‘concentrated	 in	 areas	 where	 foreign	 materiel	 is	 not	 an	
alternative,	e.g.	nuclear	weapons	systems’.	
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superiority	of	its	large	and	well-armed	military	cannot	be	ignored	and	remains	in	the	
background	of	 Russia’s	 nuclear	 planning.65	Indeed	McDermott	 (2011:	 71)	 identifies	
Moscow’s	 conventional	 inferiority	 as	 a	 key	 driver	 of	 its	 continued	 possession	 of	
tactical	 nuclear	 weapons.	 Similarly,	 Nikolai	 Sokov	 (2011:	 198)	 has	 described	 how	
Russia’s	 partly	 retains	 nuclear	 arsenal	 ‘just-in-case’	 China	 ‘becomes	 a	 foe…or	
attempts	to	transform	Russia	into	a	subordinate	power’.66		
	
4.4	 Domestic	 actors	 and	 interests	 driving	 Russian	 nuclear	 weapons	 decision-
making	
	
Having	 reviewed	 the	 significant	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 post-Cold	 War	 international	
security	environment	has	shaped	Russian	nuclear	weapons	decision-making,	we	may	
now	consider	the	domestic	obstacles	to	and	opportunities	for	nuclear	disarmament,	
including	how	the	domestic	and	international	levels	interact,	and	further	assess	the	
explanatory	power	of	 institutional	democratisation	for	this	case	study.	According	to	
an	 experienced	 Russian	 analyst	 I	 interviewed,	 top	 Russian	 decision-makers	 value	
nuclear	 weapons	 most	 highly	 out	 of	 the	 five	 NWS	 because	 they	 have	 specific	
domestic	political	uses.	 In	his	opinion,	nuclear	weapons	are	a	means	by	which	 the	
elite	 can	 ‘manage	 the	 domestic	 population’	 as	 they	 are	 a	 potent	 symbol	 of	 the																																									 																					
65	Interview:	AB	
66	Sokov	(2011:	214)	goes	on	to	describe	how	‘confidential	interviews	with	high-level	Russian	military	
indicate	 that	 nuclear	 weapons	 assigned	 to	 deterrence	 of	 China	 are	 strategic	 and	 air-launched	
intermediate-range,	 i.e.	weapons	 capable	of	 reaching	political,	military,	 and	economic	 targets	deep	
inside	China’.	
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nation	and	the	military’s	greatness,	thus	‘preserving	the	population’s	self-esteem’.67	
Similiarly,	 Tsypkin	 (2009:	 784)	 has	 noted	 how	both	 Yeltsin	 and	 Putin	 used	 nuclear	
missiles	 as	 ‘political	 theatre’	 to	maintain	 an	 image	of	 strength	 amongst	 the	Russia	
public.	These	weapons	thus	provide	‘stability’,	give	the	impression	that	the	nation	is	
still	a	leader	in	scientific	and	technological	achievement	and	act	as	a	distraction	from	
the	years	of	economic	turmoil	following	the	demise	of	the	Soviet	Union.		
	
According	to	the	Russian	analyst	just	mentioned,	there	is	thus	‘no	point’	considering	
the	question	of	nuclear	disarmament	under	 the	current	Russian	 leadership,	as	any	
serious	moves	 in	 this	 direction	would	 ‘undermine	 its	 power	 base’	 and	 amount	 to	
‘political	 suicide’.68	Karaganov	 (2011)	 has	made	 similar	 arguments,	 stating	 that	 the	
idea	of	‘nuclear	zero’	is	‘not	only	unrealistic,	but	outright	dangerous’	so	that	the	only	
point	of	arms	control	for	Russia	is	as	a	bargaining	tool	to	build	trust	and	transparency	
between	the	great	powers	(McDermott,	2011:	79).	
	
If	 this	 formulation	 is	correct	and	 the	current	 ruling	 regime	 in	Moscow	has	become	
inextricably	linked	with	the	possession	of	nuclear	weapons,	it	is	necessary	to	explore	
how	this	regime’s	power	might	be	weakened	so	that	alternative	political	groupings	
that	 are	 supportive	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	 might	 emerge.	 One	 of	 the	 main	
problems	 we	 face	 here	 is	 that	 the	 political	 atmosphere	 in	 Russia	 is	 such	 that	
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discussions	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 by	 Russian	 analysts	 working	 in	 that	 country	 only	
rarely	criticise	domestic	political	decisions,	presumably	because	to	do	so	and	actively	
promote	 nuclear	 disarmament	 would	 challenge	 the	 Kremlin’s	 authority	 and	 thus	
carry	personal	and	professional	 risks.	 It	 is	worth	emphasising	however,	 that	Russia	
retains	 substantial	 expert	 knowledge,	 both	 governmental	 and	 non-governmental,	
concerning	 nuclear	 arms	 control	 and	 disarmament,	 stemming	 from	 the	 continual	
negotiations	in	this	area	since	the	1960s	(Hansell	et	al,	2009:	8).	
	
There	 are	 thus	 two	 alternatives	 available	 to	 decrease	 Russian	 reliance	 on	 nuclear	
weapons	 according	 to	 Nikloai	 Sokov	 (2009:	 76).	 The	 first,	 which	 has	 already	 been	
discussed,	 is	 for	Russia	 to	 successfully	build	up	 its	 conventional	 forces	 so	 they	 can	
substitute	 for	 nuclear	 deterrence.	 The	 second	 is	 that	 Russia’s	 security	 situation	 is	
‘improved	just	enough	to	facilitate	a	change	in	the	domestic	political	lineup	so	that	
“pro-nuclear”	groups	do	not	hold	the	veto	over	decision	making	on	this	issue.	Then,	
if	the	political	leadership	decides	to	minimize	reliance	on	nuclear	weapons,	it	will	be	
able	to	do	so.’	This	 latter	argument	has	much	merit	but	does	not	address	whether	
Russian	 elites	 should	 rein	 in	 their	 regional	 and	 international	 political	 ambitions	 or	
whether	 and	 how	 domestic	 political	 change	 could	 occur,	 leading	 to	 a	 more	
progressive	 government.	 As	 already	 asserted,	 it	 is	 therefore	 necessary	 to	 also	
consider	 the	 possibility	 of	 domestic	 political	 change	 occurring,	 with	 or	 without	
external	developments	conducive	to	disarmament.	
	
Whilst	during	the	Cold	War,	it	was	true	to	say	that	the	Soviet	Union	‘did	not	have	a	
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military-industrial-complex;	 rather	 it	 was	 one’	 (Westerlund,	 2012:	 65-87),	 things	
have	 now	 changed.	 According	 to	 Fredrik	 Westerlund,	 the	 ‘deeply	 dysfunctional’	
relationship	between	 the	defence	ministry	and	 industry	has	 led	 to	 this	 sector	now	
being	 a	 ‘dependent’	 of	 the	 state,	 rather	 than	 its	 principal	 focus.	 Yet	 the	 defence	
industry	 still	 retains	 a	 ‘crucial’	 role	 in	 the	economy,	not	 least	 as	 a	 large	employer,	
receiving	a	boost	 in	 recent	years	owing	to	 increased	orders	 from	the	Russian	state	
and	the	nation	being	one	of	the	world’s	largest	arms	exporters,	with	China	and	India	
two	 of	 its	 biggest	 customers	 (Ibid;	 SIPRI,	 2014	 i)	 More	 broadly,	 contemporary	
observers	of	Russia	describe	it	as	a	‘managed’	or	‘vertical’	democracy,	with	immense	
power	concentrated	in	the	President’s	office	(Laruelle,	2009).	Putin	has	occupied	this	
office	for	three	non-consecutive	terms	since	2000,	handling	the	powerful	‘financial-
industrial	 clans’	 upon	 which	 the	 Russian	 political	 system	 ‘uneasily’	 rests	 (Tsypkin,	
2009:	782).	
	
As	analysts	at	IMEMO	(Arbatov	et	al,	2012:	102)	argue,	after	2000,	Moscow	chose	to	
‘insure	 its	 sovereignty	 and	 centralized	 rule	 by	 building	 an	 authoritarian	 political	
regime	on	the	basis	of	carbon-export	economy’,	a	course	‘which	required	a	notion	of	
immanent	 external	 threat	 as	 one	 of	 the	 instruments	 of	 consolidation’.	 Mikhail	
Tsypkin	 (2009:	 782)	paints	 a	 vivid	picture	of	 just	 how	 the	Russian	political	 process	
works	 today,	describing	 it	 as	a	 ‘special	operation’—a	 term	 from	Soviet	 intelligence	
referring	to	‘covert	activities	pursued	in	order	to	achieve	political	results’.		
	
This	 centralised	 rule	 is	 particularly	 tight	 when	 it	 came	 to	 national	 security	 policy,	
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including	 nuclear	 weapons,	 which	 several	 analysts	 (Arbatov,	 2012;	 Hansell	 et	 al,	
2009:	7)	note	became	far	more	restricted	under	Putin’s	rule	decision-making	than	his	
predecessor	as	he	 ‘built	 a	decision-making	pyramid	 that	 consolidated	power	 in	his	
hands’.	For	Arbatov	(2012:	74),	nuclear	weapons	are	thus	the	section	of	the	Russian	
state	least	influenced	by	‘civilian	control	and	democratic	accountability’.	This	has	led	
to	 a	 lack	 of	 understanding	 of	 the	 basics	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 and	 arms	 control	
amongst	 much	 of	 the	 Russian	 political	 class	 (Tsypkin,	 2009:	 785).	 Moreover,	 if	
military	spending	and	procurement	are	not	subject	to	more	transparency,	with	some	
oversight	by	the	Duma,	media	and	general	public,	 it	 is	doubtful	whether	Russia	will	
be	able	 to	achieve	effective	modernisation	and	 reform	 in	 this	area	 (Oxenstierna	&	
Berstrand,	2012:	51).	Yet	at	present,	for	Boris	Kagarlitsky	(2002:	6,	160),	the	Russian	
state	 is	only	 ‘pseudo-parliamentary’	because	 the	Duma,	when	established,	 ‘had	no	
power’	and	a	true	multi-party	system	has	not	developed.	
	
Certain	 public	 opinion	 polls	 from	 recent	 years	 appear	 to	 show	 that	 Russians	 are	
generally	 supportive	 of	 their	 government’s	 nuclear	 weapons	 policy.	 For	 example,	
one	of	the	few	in-depth	polls	on	this	subject	from	2000	found	that	40%	of	Russians	
believed	 that	nuclear	weapons	gave	 their	 country	 ‘political	might’	 (Sumner,	 2000),	
though	another	poll	 from	2005	suggested	that	Russians	believed	that	several	other	
factors,	 such	 as	 human	 rights	 and	 culture,	 were	 of	 greater	 consequence	 (Podvig,	
2005).	More	generally,	a	2007	poll	showed	that	63%	of	Russians	support	the	aim	of	
eliminating	all	nuclear	weapons,	with	66%	wanting	their	government	to	‘do	more	to	
pursue	this	objective’	(World	Public	Opinion,	2007).	
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Importantly,	there	is	a	wider	domestic	function	of	nuclear	weapons	for	the	political	
elite	 that	 controls	 them	 so	 tightly,	 something	 often	 unmentioned	 and	which	 does	
not	appear	 in	official	documents—namely	 regime	 survival.	As	one	Russian	political	
analyst	I	interviewed	suggests,	nuclear	weapons	can	deter	Western	attempts	to	‘get	
too	 involved	 in	 Russia’s	 affairs’.	 Nuclear	 weapons	 therefore	 act	 as	 an	 ‘ideological	
defence’	for	the	Kremlin,	which	has	recently	seen	regimes	without	nuclear	weapons	
being	toppled	either	by	the	West	or	with	the	latter’s	support	in	the	Middle	East	and	
during	the	Arab	Spring.	69	Moreover,	during	the	‘colour	revolutions’	of	2003-2005	in	
Georgia	 and	 Ukraine,	 Moscow	 believed	 the	 West	 was	 trying	 to	 interfere	 in	 and	
destabilise	Russia’s	traditional	sphere	of	influence	(Laruelle,	2009:	145).		
	
Similarly,	 Eugene	 B.	 Rumer	 (2007:	 25)	 has	 written	 about	 how	 ‘Russian	 security	
interests	call	for	Moscow	to	maintain	a	security	belt	around	its	periphery,	made	up	
of	 satellites	 compliant	 with	 Russian	 policy	 preferences’.	 Again,	 we	 may	 decode	
‘Russian’	here	 to	mean	 the	 security	 interests	of	 the	 ruling	 regime,	which	does	not	
want	popular	unrest	and	democratic	political	demands	from	neighbouring	countries	
spreading	to	its	territory.	To	this	degree,	nuclear	weapons	act	as	a	tool	to	bind	the	
elite	 to	 the	 people	 through	 a	 nationalist	 discourse	 whereby	 the	 ‘managers	 of	
democracy’	 in	 the	 ruling	 United	 Russia	 party	 protect	 the	 Russian	 nation	 against	
external	threats,	which	it	has	itself	sometimes	over-hyped	for	domestic	political	gain.	
This	may	in	the	short-term	provide	benefits	to	the	current	occupants	of	the	Kremlin	
but	cuts	against	Russia’s	real	long-term	security	interests	and	needs.																																										 																					
69	Interview:	IS	
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Firstly,	as	Alexander	Konovalov	(Schell,	1998:	159)	points	out,	‘the	real	challenges	of	
Russia’s	 future	are	 in	 the	south	and	the	Far	East…but	because	of	NATO	expansion,	
the	 West	 forces	 Russia	 to	 think	 about	 the	 European	 theater’.	 This	 has	 meant	
European	security	has	been	subject	 to	 ‘nuclearization’	as	military	planners	react	 to	
perceived	 threats	 posed	 by	 NATO’s	 conventional	 superiority.	 Tsypkin	 (2009:	 788-
791)	 suggests	 that	 this	 shows	 the	 US’s	 insensitivity	 to	 the	 concern	 with	 ‘strategic	
depth’	 in	 Russian	 strategic	 culture	 which	 must	 cater	 for	 the	 world’s	 greatest	
landmass,	 extensive	 border	 including	 Europe,	 China	 and	 the	 Arctic	 and	 a	 sizable	
population.	Thus,	based	on	the	response	by	the	Kremlin	to	the	US’s	plans	for	BMD	in	
Central	 Europe,	military	 intelligence,	which	 during	 Soviet	 times	 sometimes	 ‘wildly’	
exaggerated	the	Western	threat,	has	grown	in	influence,	whilst	that	of	the	Ministry	
of	 Foreign	 Affairs—known	 to	 provide	 more	 realistic	 analysis	 and	 be	 amenable	 to	
proposals	on	arms	control	and	disarmament—has	diminished.	Secondly,	as	Jonathan	
Schell	(1998:	156)	contends,	despite	its	huge	nuclear	arsenal,	these	weapons	proved	
‘entirely	powerless’	to	prevent	the	fall	of	the	Soviet	Union.70		
	
Thus,	as	Nikolai	 Zlobin	 (2012)	avers,	 the	Kremlin	has	 cynically	 created	 ‘a	besieged-
fortress	mentality	 in	 the	minds	of	 the	people’	by	 rallying	 them	against	 ‘an	outside	
enemy’.	As	a	result,	global	public	opinion	polls	consistently	show	the	Russian	public	
																																								 																					
70	Retired	 General	 Makhmut	 Gareev	 (McDermott,	 2011:	 68)	 has	 made	 a	 complementary	 point,	
arguing	 that,	 ‘Having	 a	 mindset	 that	 Russia’s	 security	 is	 guaranteed	 as	 long	 as	 there	 are	 nuclear	
weapons	do	not	conform	fully	to	the	new	realities.	We	know	the	Soviet	Union	had	nuclear	weapons,	
but	 nuclear	 weapons	 remain	 and	 there	 is	 no	 union	 state.’	 He	 went	 on	 to	 point	 out	 that	 nuclear	
weapons	are	useless	in	local	conflicts	such	as	Chechnya,	against	economic	or	cyber	threats	and	other	
subversive	acts	against	Russia.	
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to	be	among	those	with	the	most	negative	views	of	the	US	(Tsypkin,	2009:	793;	Pew	
Research,	 2014).	 The	 result	 has	 been	 that	 Cold	War	 stereotypes,	which	had	never	
been	 wholly	 discarded,	 were	 revived	 as	 conflict	 outpaced	 cooperation	 and	
reactionary	forces	in	the	US	and	Russia	found	new	soil	in	which	to	grow.	It	must	be	
said,	 however,	 that	 this	 relationship	 is	 and	 was	 more	 beneficial	 to	 Russian	 than	
American	hawks	given	that,	as	we	have	seen,	the	latter	principally	turned	to	threats	
from	terrorism,	the	Middle	East	and	China	to	justify	maintaining	a	huge	military	after	
the	fall	of	the	Soviet	Union.		
	
Yet	 it	 remains	the	case	that	 (albeit	now	to	a	different	degree	than	during	the	Cold	
War)	 at	 times	 of	 tension	 the	 pro-militarist	 and	 pro-nuclear	 camps	 in	 both	 capitals	
feed	off	another	in	a	kind	of	symbiotic	relationship.	This	is	because	certain	sections	
of	 the	elite	 in	both	Russia	and	the	US	have	a	mutual	bureaucratic	and	 institutional	
interest	in	maintaining	control	and	influence	over	national	policy.	Thus,	according	to	
Mikhail	 Tsypkin	 and	 Anya	 Loukianova	 (2009:	 119),	 the	 Russian	 defence	 industry	
supports	 ‘continued,	even	enhanced	 reliance	on	nuclear	weapons’	and	also	 largely	
opposes	 US-Russian	 cooperation	 because	 of	 ‘both	 the	 traditional	 perceptions	
inherited	from	the	Soviet	period	and	the	acute	competition	in	global	arms	markets’.	
The	 Russian	 military-industrial	 base	 therefore	 needs	 sections	 of	 the	 US’s	 political	
establishment	 to	 engage	 in	 the	 game	 of	 demonisation,	 threats	 and	 sabre-rattling.	
This	cycle	of	enmity	benefits	militarists	and	nationalists	 in	both	nations,	so	that	US	
proponents	of	European	NATO	nations	retaining	non-strategic	nuclear	weapons	can	
justify	this	by	pointing	to	an	aggressive,	rearming	Russia	as	a	dangerous	belligerent	
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whilst	 US	 proposals	 for	 BMD	 in	 Eastern	 Europe	 provoke	 ‘outrage’	 in	 Moscow,	
fostering	an	‘atmosphere	of	grievance’	which	strengthens	the	ruling	elite	(Scowcroft	
et	al,	2014;	Tsypkin,	2009:	794).71		
	
The	 image	of	 an	all	 conquering	and	belligerent	Russia	has	 therefore	 recently	been	
conveyed	 to	 the	world	despite	 the	 fact	 that	 its	 economy	 is	 stagnating,	 its	 political	
model	is	unstable	and	its	military	is	relatively	weak	(IISS,	2015).	With	regards	to	the	
latter,	Russia	possesses	only	 limited	power	projection	 capabilities—with	a	 regional	
rather	than	global	reach—and	is	surrounded	by	nations	with	more	sophisticated,	hi-
tech	 weaponry	 (Carlsson	 &	 Norberg,	 2012:	 114;	 Rumer,	 2009:	 74).	 Moreover,	
according	 to	 a	 report	 by	 the	 Natural	 Resources	 Defense	 Council	 (2013:	 7),	 ‘the	
conventional	military	 balance	 now	 favors	 NATO	 over	 Russia	 by	 a	 factor	 of	 3	 to	 1’	
whilst	‘in	military	expenditures,	the	ratio	of	NATO	to	Russia	is	20	to	1’.	
	
On	a	more	optimistic	note,	two	 interviewees	 I	spoke	to	(one	working	for	a	Russian	
NGO	and	one	for	the	Russian	government)	voiced	the	opinion	that	the	Ukraine	crisis	
may	 present	 an	 opportunity	 to	 give	 the	US-Russia	 relationship	 a	 ‘deep	 shake’	 and	
start	 things	 afresh	 ‘with	 a	 clear	 piece	 of	 paper.72	Indeed,	 Fyodor	 Lukyanov	 (2012)																																									 																					
71	One	Moscow-based	analyst	I	spoke	to	argued	that	conservative	forces	used	the	Crimean	conflict	as	
an	 opportunity	 to	 push	 their	 arguments	 with	 journalists	 and	 the	 media	 (Interview:	 AB).	 Kremlin-
backed	journalist	Dmitry	Kiselyov’s	claim	in	March	2014	that	Russia	could	turn	the	US	‘to	radioactive	
ash’	was	thus	symbolic	of	a	developing	rhetorical	style,	whereby	it	is	‘becoming	mainstream	to	blame	
the	 US’.	 For	 this	 analyst,	 such	 an	 atmosphere	 makes	 diplomacy	 and	 the	 work	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Foreign	Affairs	more	arduous,	whilst	the	rhetoric	becomes	a	‘self-fulfilling	prophecy’.			
72	Interviews:	AB;	MU	
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describes	 how	 Russia’s	 current	 ‘battle’	 against	 the	 West	 gives	 the	 Kremlin	 ‘an	
opportunity	 to	 build	 a	 new	 foundation	 for	 national	 development’.	However,	 as	 he	
points	 out,	 ‘the	 thing	 that	 everyone	 can	 agree	 on,	 from	the	 ultra-left	 to	the	 ultra-
right,	 is	 that	 Russia	 needs	 self-sufficient	 modernization	 more	 than	 it	 needs	
Gorbachev	 style	 accommodation	 with	 the	West.’	 The	message	 here	 is	 that	 Russia	
may	 now	 go	 further	 in	 ‘de-coupling’	 from	 the	 ‘previous	 Western	 model	 of	
development’	and	close	off	its	economy.		
	
One	method	not	mentioned	here,	but	by	which	Russia	would	be	able	to	divert	funds	
to	much-needed	 ‘modernisation’	 and	 invest	 in	 social	 goods	 and	 services,	 is	 to	 cut	
spending	 on	 its	 nuclear	weapons	 programmes	 and	military	 forces	more	 generally.	
Importantly,	 the	 burden	 of	 total	military	 spending	 on	 Russia’s	 economy	 is	 roughly	
twice	that	of	other	countries—excluding	the	US	(Oxenstierna	&	Berstrand,	2012:	45).	
Reorienting	the	economy	away	from	wasteful	military	expenditure	should	therefore	
be	 a	 priority,	 given	 that,	 according	 to	 the	Organization	 for	 Economic	Co-operation	
and	Development	 (OECD),	 Russia	 has	 ‘poverty	 and	 income	 inequalities	well	 above	
the	OECD	 average’	 (OECD,	 2011).	 Such	 a	 shift	 could	 be	 brought	 about	 by	 a	 public	
discussion	 of	 Russia’s	 defence	 and	 security	 policies,	 yet	 the	 prospects	 for	 this	 are	
clearly	 inauspicious	 whilst	 the	 Kremlin	 is	 ‘harnessing	 patriotic	 sentiment	 to	
consolidate	 its	 support	 amongst	 society’,	 in	 the	 words	 of	 Gudkov,	 and	 divert	
attention	 from	 the	 deep	 structural	 problems	 facing	 Russia’s	 economy	
(Nechepurenko,	2014).		
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Separately,	 Tsypkin	 and	 Loukianova	 (2009:	 118)	 suggest	 that	 if	 Russia’s	 strong	
position	 as	 a	 ‘leader’	 in	 nuclear	 energy	 and	 proponent	 of	 peaceful	 nuclear	 energy	
were	 ‘gradually	emphasized’	 above	 its	 status	as	a	NWS,	 then	 this	 ‘trade-off’	might	
support	initiatives	to	‘engage	Russia	on	disarmament’.	Any	shift	to	a	new	economic	
and	 political	 regime	 that	 is	 supportive	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	 will	 significantly	
depend	on	Russia’s	external	security	environment	and	how	acceptable	such	changes	
are	 to	Russian	society	at	 large.	One	key	question	here,	as	Eugene	B.	Rumer	 (2007:	
51)	 highlights,	 is	 how	 amenable	 Russians	 might	 be	 to	 further	 social	 and	 political	
‘upheavals’.	 Given	 their	 recent	 history,	 Rumer	 argues,	 Russians	 currently	 prefer	
stability	to	the	‘uncertainties’	of	liberal	democracy,	despite	the	significant	grievances	
held	against	their	own	government.	
	
Elsewhere,	 several	prominent	Russian	authors	have	emphasised	 the	 importance	of	
the	country	engaging	in	liberal	and	democratic	reforms,	but	have	also	urged	caution	
regarding	 the	prospects	 for	 such	a	 transformation.	 For	example,	Kagarlitsky	 (2002:	
135,	280)	has	argued	that	the	Russian	people	‘are	not	ready	for	democracy’	but	‘do	
not	want	dictatorship’,	a	situation	which	arose	with	the	‘decay	of	society’	after	the	
fall	 of	 the	 USSR	 and	 which	 is	 ‘aggravated	 in	 turn	 by	 the	 bankruptcy	 of	 politics’.	
Similarly,	Anna	Politkovskaya	(2004:	273,	284)	argued	that	whilst	Putin’s	supporters	
have	 exaggerated	 his	 popular	 appeal,	 the	 public’s	 ‘limitless	 apathy’	 and	 ‘fearful’	
reaction	to	Putin’s	behaviour	enabled	his	‘cynical	manipulation’	of	Russia.	Kagarlitsky	
(2002:	 280)	 therefore	 proposes	 that	 the	 ‘historic	 task’	 for	 Russia,	 if	 the	 nation’s	
economic	 and	 political	 life	 is	 to	 survive,	will	 be	 to	 ‘search	 for	 new	 forms	 of	 social	
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being’,	which	will	emerge	from	and	support	a	self-organising	and	politically	engaged	
citizenry.	 Signs	 of	 such	 a	 democratic	movement	 could	 be	 seen	 the	 anti-corruption	
protests	 of	 2011,	 so	 that,	 as	 Perry	 Anderson	 (2015:	 15)	 observes,	 ‘widespread	
opposition’	to	Putin	exists	‘in	the	centre	of	the	country’.	Yet,	for	former	Presidential	
aide	Gleb	Pavlovsky	(2014:	65),	a	credible	rival	to	Putin,	who	will	be	able	to	maintain	
existing	living	standards,	has	yet	to	emerge.	
	
Looking	forward,	Rumer	(2007:	84)	therefore	argues	that	Americans	and	Europeans	
need	to	realise	that	the	emergence	and	development	of	democratic	and	progressive	
forces	 in	 Russia	 requires	 them	 to	 ‘engage,	 explain,	 listen	 and	watch	 carefully,	 and	
help	 wherever	 help	 is	 sought	 and	 possible	 to	 give’.	 To	 this	 extent,	 the	 path	 to	
cooperation	on	nuclear	disarmament	will	depend	on	wider	forms	of	cooperation	and	
confidence-building	 requiring	 patient	 engagement	 between	 nations	 over	 the	 long-
term.	 Furthermore,	 this	 type	of	 initiative	will	 likely	only	be	possible	 if	 the	 costs	of	
inaction	 and	 the	 benefits	 of	 success	 are	 clearly	 explained	 to	 the	 American	 and	
Russian	publics	by	political	 leaders,	 the	media	and	civil	 society	 in	order	 to	harness	
the	energy	required	to	break	through	the	current	 impasse	and	sustain	such	efforts	
over	time.	
	
Conclusion	
	
This	 chapter	 has	 explored	 a	 range	 of	 views	 on	Russian	 nuclear	 politics	 in	 order	 to	
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ascertain	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	mainstream,	 realist	 and	 critical	 approaches	 to	
the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 disarmament.	 For	 the	
Russian	 case	 study,	 the	 security	model	 is	most	persuasive	when	outlining	 the	high	
barriers	to	nuclear	disarmament	driven	by	Russia’s	perception	of	the	US	and	NATO	
as	an	existential	threat.	Nuclear	weapons	thus	continue	to	be	highly	valued	because	
the	Kremlin	and,	to	an	extent,	the	general	populace,	still	see	their	nation	as	a	great	
power	 and	 regional	 hegemon	 seeking	 independence	 from	 Western	 containment.	
Moscow’s	nuclear	deterrence	strategy	is	therefore	a	response	to	a	national	sense	of	
Western	encirclement	as	well	as	the	need	to	ensure	regime	survival.	Yet,	as	several	
authors	 noted	 above	 have	 explained,	 Russian	 nuclear	 possession	 also	 plays	 an	
integral	 role	 in	 its	 domestic	 political	 system	 as	 a	 symbol	 of	 the	 ruling	 elite’s	
domination	over	society	and	its	continuity	with	the	Soviet	era	when	the	nation	was	a	
world	 superpower—which	 is	 in	 line	 with	 the	 expectations	 of	 institutional	
democratisation.		
	
Given	 that	 Russia	 is	 an	 authoritarian	 one-party	 state—a	 guardianship	 in	 and	 of	
itself—	it	is	clear	that	there	are	thus	greater	barriers	to	institutional	democratisation	
than	 for	 the	 nuclear	 possessors	 that	 are	 liberal	 democracies.	 As	 such,	 despite	 the	
current	 regime	 showing	 signs	 of	 vulnerability	 given	 recent	 crises	 and	 troubles	 at	
home	 and	 abroad,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 Russian	 democracy	 and	 moves	 towards	
disarmament	will	 take	some	time	to	emerge.	 In	 the	short	 term	 it	will	 therefore	be	
vital	 for	 Russia’s	 current	 guardians	 of	 the	 arsenal	 to	 do	 their	 part	 in	 ensuring	
strategic	stability	with	the	US,	to	prevent	conflict	and	thus	avert	a	potential	nuclear	
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war.	
	
Despite	the	 fractured	nature	of	 relations	between	Moscow	and	Washington	today,	
the	period	from	the	fall	of	the	Soviet	Union	to	the	present	can	be	seen	as	one	of	a	
series	of	 lost	opportunities	for	the	causes	of	both	 institutional	democratisation	and	
nuclear	 disarmament.	 Despite	 Reagan	 and	Gorbachev	 coming	 close	 but	 ultimately	
failing	 to	 agree	 to	 the	 abolition	 of	 nuclear	weapons	 at	 Reykjavik,	 the	 latter’s	 new	
thinking,	driven	by	a	spirit	of	cooperation	and	nonviolence	on	the	international	front	
and	liberalising	moves	at	home,	opened	up	the	potential	to	permanently	demilitarise	
relations	 between	 East	 and	 West.	 Some	 progress	 was	 made	 with	 important	
agreements,	including	the	INF	and	CFE	treaties,	offering	hope	that	a	new	and	lasting	
political	and	security	settlement	could	be	reached.	Yet	the	ABMT	has	been	jettisoned	
and	 the	 INF	 and	 CFE	 agreements	 are	 under	 threat	 of	 collapse—just	 when	 such	
initiatives	are	most	needed.		
	
The	current	malaise	can	be	explained	by	the	 fact	 that,	 following	the	demise	of	 the	
Soviet	Union,	a	triumphalist	US	and	NATO—throughout	the	1990s	and	into	the	21st	
century—chose	to	largely	exclude	Russia	whilst	building	the	new	international	order,	
instead	 acting	 in	 ways	 which	 Russians	 found	 particularly	 threatening.	 This	 led	 a	
weakened	 and	humiliated	Russia,	 now	 led	by	 the	 authoritarian	 regime	of	Vladimir	
Putin,	to	cling	to	nuclear	weapons	as	one	of	the	few	remaining	sources	of	strength	in	
a	unipolar	world	ruled	by	force.	Gorbachev’s	 idealism	was	thus	well	and	truly	dead	
having	been	replaced	by	a	realism	of	short-term	tactics	aimed	at	protecting	Russian	
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sovereignty	 from	 external	meddling.	 The	 power	 of	 the	 President	 and	 his	 circle	 of	
oligarchs	was	thus	consolidated	whilst	the	prospects	for	social	democracy	withered	
away.	
	
This	situation	clearly	benefited	nationalist	and	militarist	forces	in	Moscow	(and	to	a	
lesser	 extent	 in	 Washington,	 though	 this	 has	 been	 more	 the	 case	 following	 the	
Georgia	and	Ukraine	conflicts)	who	were	able	to	rally	popular	support	for	increased	
spending	on	conventional	and	nuclear	weapons	as	part	of	a	 renewed	emphasis	on	
finding	 military	 solutions	 to	 political	 problems,	 all	 of	 which	 boosted	 their	 own	
institutional	 power	 bases.	 Thus	whilst	 rhetorically	 US	 and	 Russian	 political	 leaders	
professed	 to	 be	 developing	 a	 new	 political	 partnership,	 in	 reality	 Moscow	
increasingly	 saw	NATO’s	 actions	 as	 a	 direct	 danger	 and	 acted	 accordingly.	 US	 and	
Russian	officials	 thus	 continued	meeting	 to	 discuss	 issues	 of	 strategic	 stability	 and	
manage	 their	 nuclear	 standoff,	 with	 bureaucrats	 exchanging	 detailed	 information	
about	 several	 aspects	 of	 their	 arsenals	 during	 arms	 control	 negotiations.	 Yet	 the	
responsibility	 each	 nation	 has	 to	 achieve	 nuclear	 disarmament	 required	 them	 to	
commit	to	a	long-term	political	partnership	to	deal	with	the	mutual	threat	of	nuclear	
war,	 something	 that	 neither	 of	 these	 nation’s	 leaderships—with	 their	 particular	
brands	 of	 elite	 economic	 domination	 and	 prominent	 nationalist	 and	 militarist	
cultures—are	or	were	capable	of.	
	
Thus,	 at	 present,	 Russian	 leaders	 prefer	 to	 sit	 alongside	 their	 US	 counterparts	 as	
equals	 through	 retaining	 a	 sizable	 nuclear	 arsenal.	 These	 leaders	 face	 virtually	 no	
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domestic	 pressure	within	Russia	 that	may	 cause	 them	 to	 reconsider	 the	 costs	 and	
benefits	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 and	 the	 policies	 that	 govern	 them.	 Whilst	 there	 is	
evidence	 that	 significant	 sections	 of	 the	 Russian	 public	 would	 support	 moves	 to	
further	reduce	their	nuclear	arsenal,	there	is	no	domestic	movement	or	institutional	
focus	for	their	preferences,	either	in	the	media	or	parliament.	The	current	dire	state	
of	 relations	 with	 the	 US	 also	 means	 that	 disarmament	 talk	 struggles	 to	 find	
prominent	supporters	in	Russia	with	unilateral	measures	completely	off	the	table.	In	
any	 case,	 information	on	 the	Russian	nuclear	weapons	 system	 is	 scarce	and	 rarely	
discussed	publicly—except	to	drum	up	patriotic	fervour.		
	
Yet	were	debate	concerning	the	social,	environmental	and	financial	costs	and	risks	of	
these	weapons	to	enter	public	discourse	it	is	possible	that	opposition	to	them	could,	
as	seen	in	Western	democracies,	rise	accordingly,	opening	up	a	new	political	space	
for	 dissent	 and	 alternative	 security	 policies	 to	 be	 proposed.	 Given	 the	 structural	
disarmament	 taking	 place	 in	 Russia	 there	 is	 an	 opportunity	 at	 this	 time	 to	 raise	
fundamental	questions	about	the	necessity	of	retaining	nuclear	weapons	so	that	the	
momentum	 is	 towards	 zero	 rather	 than	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 more	 resilient	
deterrent—militarily	 and	 politically—at	 low	 numbers.	 Moreover,	 the	 weighty	
technical	 and	 diplomatic	 knowledge	 concerning	 arms	 control	 and	 disarmament	
resident	in	Russian	governmental	and	non-governmental	bodies	could	be	harnessed	
to	 support	 such	 efforts	 as	 part	 of	 moves	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 institutional	
democratisation.	
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As	it	is,	and	given	the	desire	of	Russian	elites	to	protect	and	maximise	their	power,	it	
is	 likely	that	nuclear	disarmament	for	Russia	will	 thus	only	take	place	when	a	new,	
democratic	and	liberal-minded	regime	is	in	place.	How	this	might	happen	is	clearly	a	
complex	question	 for	 the	medium	 to	 long-term,	 yet	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 identify	 some	
measures	that	can	be	taken	in	the	short-term	to	cultivate	the	development	of	such	
progressive	 forces.	 For	 example,	 given	 the	 internal	 contradictions	 and	 many	
weaknesses	 within	 its	 economic	 and	 political	 model,	 Russia—meaning	 the	 nation	
and	 its	 citizens	 rather	 than	 the	elite	 alone—needs	 to	 find	a	new	basis	 for	 security	
and	 an	 alternative	 purpose	 beyond	 achieving	 ‘great	 power	 status’,	 a	 goal	 that	
primarily	benefits	those	in	the	Kremlin.	In	order	to	do	so,	Russia	requires	that	good	
relationships	 with	 democratic	 European	 nations	 are	 maintained	 given	 the	 latter’s	
demand	 for	 Russian	 energy	 and	 its	 hi-tech	 industrial	 exports,	 including	 defence	
equipment.		
	
Yet	 the	 current	 sanctions	 following	 Crimea,	 have	 damaged	 an	 already	 failing	
economy	leading	to	calls	for	Russia	to	distance	itself	further	from	the	West.	This	may	
appear	attractive	to	the	purveyors	of	‘vertical	democracy’	as	a	short-term	means	to	
harness	 nationalist	 sentiment,	 but	will,	 in	 the	 long	 run,	 only	 further	 undercut	 the	
possibilities	 for	 the	 modernisation	 of	 Russia’s	 infrastructure	 and	 the	 health	 and	
wellbeing	of	 its	populace.	Moreover,	 if	Russians	perceive	 their	 lot	 to	be	worsening	
over	the	next	decade,	it	will	be	harder	for	the	ruling	elite	to	maintain	their	hold	on	
power	 if	discontent	 returns	 to	 the	streets	of	Russian	cities,	which	could	 result	 in	a	
more	unpalatable	regime—with	an	even	greater	commitment	to	military	might	and	
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nuclear	weapons—attaining	power.	
	
Looking	forward	then,	if	Russia	is	to	move	away	from	reliance	on	nuclear	weapons	it	
will	need	 to	be	 included	 in	 cooperative	proposals	 coming	 from	the	US	and	Europe	
that	 recognise	 Russia’s	 legitimate	 security	 fears	 and	 concerns.	 As	 discussed	 in	 the	
previous	 chapter,	 the	 recent	 political	 situation	 in	 the	US	has	 not,	 to	 say	 the	 least,	
inspired	 optimism	 for	 such	 a	 shift	 of	 priorities.	 Yet	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 other	
middle	 powers,	 such	 as	 Germany,	 might	 play	 a	 constructive	 role	 in	 mending	 the	
relationship	 between	 Russia	 and	 the	 West.	 For	 example,	 Germany	 and	 other	
influential	states	on	good	terms	with	Russia	could	put	political	capital	into	revisiting	
some	of	the	economic	and	security	proposals	for	Russo-European	cooperation	made	
in	recent	times.	Looking	more	widely,	the	promise	of	a	truly	multipolar	world	order	
where	Russia	feels	itself	to	be	an	equal	and	is	integrated	economically	and	politically	
with	both	the	rising	powers	of	Brazil,	India,	China	and	South	Africa—widely	known	as	
the	 BRICS—but	 also	 the	 other	 major	 Western	 nations,	 could	 open	 up	 new	
possibilities	 for	 international	 cooperation	 and	 the	 construction	 of	 security	
communities	 that	 delegitimise	 the	 threat	 and	 use	 of	 force	 as	 instruments	 of	 state	
policy.	
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Chapter	Five:	United	Kingdom		
	
Introduction	
	
This	 chapter	 assesses	 the	 extent	 to	which	 institutional	 democratisation,	 and	 other	
mainstream	 and	 realist	 approaches,	 provide	 insight	 and	 understanding	 into	 the	
causes	and	consequences	of	UK	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament.	 The	chapter	
proceeds	 in	 several	 sections,	 beginning	 by	 comparing	 and	 contrasting	 different	
historical	views	on	the	UK’s	nuclear	experience	since	World	War	Two	before	moving	
on	to	discuss	modern	day	British	nuclear	politics.	Chapter	Eight	then	contextualises	
the	UK’s	responsibility	for	disarmament	action	alongside	the	other	NWS	and	makes	
appropriate	conclusions	and	recommendations.	
	
The	first	section	of	this	chapter	summarises	the	mainstream	and	realist	approaches	
explored	in	Chapter	Two	in	relation	to	the	UK’s	particular	experience	as	a	NWS.	This	
is	principally	done	by	placing	the	UK’s	development	of	nuclear	weapons	within	the	
context	 of	 relevant	 historical	 events	 from	 the	 mid	 to	 late	 20th	 and	 early	 21st	
century—focusing,	 in	particular,	on	the	Cold	War,	where	the	UK	became	a	NWS	as	
part	 of	 a	 close	military	 alliance	with	 the	United	 States	 in	 opposition	 to	 the	 Soviet	
Union.	 I	 also	 explore	 justifications	 for	 Britain	 retaining	 the	 bomb	 and	 arguments	
against	 disarmament	 from	advocates	 of	 nuclear	 possession	 as	well	 as	 how	 the	UK	
has	officially	justified	its	nuclear	status	over	time.	For	example,	the	UK	government	
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has	 historically	 presented	 nuclear	 possession	 as	 a	 necessity	 to	 ensure	 national	
security	 via	 deterrence	 given	 the	 external	 threats	 posed	 to	 UK	 freedom	 and	
democracy	and	the	nation’s	other	vital	interests.	Yet	there	are	also	strong	domestic	
political	factors	driving	the	UK’s	nuclear	weapons	decision-making	and	international	
policy	 more	 generally,	 including	 those	 relating	 to	 the	 dynamics	 in	 and	 between	
political	parties,	 inter-service	 rivalries,	 the	maintenance	of	elite	group’s	position	 in	
the	social	order	and	other	bureaucratic	concerns.	
	
The	second	section	of	this	chapter	explores	these	domestic	factors	and	considers	the	
explanatory	 power	 of	 institutional	 democratisation	 regarding	 the	 causes	 and	
consequences	of	UK	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament.	Official	 justifications	 for	
the	UK’s	 nuclear	 status	 are	 also	 challenged	 and	 the	 limitations	 in	 the	mainstream	
and	 realist	 literature’s	 explanation	 of	 UK	 nuclear	 politics	 identified.	 This	 is	 done	
initially	through	an	exploration	of	critical	perspectives	on	the	Cold	War	and	UK	global	
strategy	to	 identify	historical	approaches	that	support	the	specific	claims	and	ideas	
of	 institutional	 democratisation.	 Previous	 work	 focusing	 on	 the	 UK’s	 domestic	
nuclear	politics	 is	 also	discussed	here	 in	order	 to	 specify	 the	wider	 impact	nuclear	
possession	has	had	on	the	UK’s	polity,	relate	this	to	criticisms	of	the	UK’s	record	as	a	
liberal	democracy	and	its	maintenance	of	a	sizable	and	costly	military	establishment,	
and	highlight	existing	scholarly	arguments	compatible	with	the	main	contentions	of	
this	thesis.		
	
Having	provided	 this	historical	overview	of	 the	different	approaches	 to	UK	nuclear	
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possession	and	disarmament,	the	third	section	of	this	chapter	goes	into	more	detail	
concerning	current	obstacles	 to	and	opportunities	 for	 institutional	democratisation	
in	the	UK	by	reviewing	modern	day	UK	politics	in	relation	to	the	nuclear	question.	A	
range	of	evidence	 is	presented	to	show	both	how	wide	the	democratic	deficit	 is	 in	
the	UK	and	how	this	is	reflected	in	and	relates	to	the	gap	between	UK	public	opinion	
on	nuclear	arms	control	and	disarmament	and	the	actions	of	elite	actors	and	the	UK	
government.		
	
For	 example,	 the	 present	 state	 of	 the	UK	 peace	 and	 disarmament	movement	 and	
public	 opinion	 concerning	 the	UK’s	 role	 in	 the	world	 is	 considered	 to	 explore	 civil	
society’s	 potential	 contribution	 to	 disarmament	 initiatives	 and	 how	 these	 may	
develop	and	be	strengthened	as	part	of	a	wider	democratisation	process.	Given	the	
UK’s	 role	 as	 a	 key	 lieutenant	 of	 the	 US	 in	 managing	 global	 order,	 British	 nuclear	
disarmament—as	part	of	a	new	approach	to	international	policy	prioritising	human	
rights	 and	 international	 law—would	 likely	 have	 an	 important	 impact	 on	 both	
Western	 and	 global	 nuclear	 politics.	 It	 is	 therefore	 argued	 that	 institutional	
democratisation	 in	 the	UK	would	 play	 a	 key	 role	 here	 as	 a	 process	which	 has	 the	
potential	 to	 influence	 the	US’s	global	 strategy	 in	 transitioning	 from	one	of	military	
dominance	 and	 offensive	 unilateralism	 to	 a	 more	 restrained,	 consensual	 and	
multilateralist	profile,	including	through	progressive	demilitarisation.		
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5.1	Mainstream	 and	 realist	 perspectives	 on	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 UK	
nuclear	possession	and	disarmament	
	
Whilst	 the	UK	was,	 following	 the	US	and	USSR,	 the	 third	nation	 to	acquire	nuclear	
weapons	in	1952,	 it	was	also,	as	Andrew	Brown	(2008:	37)	notes,	 ‘the	first	state	to	
take	 the	 decision	 to	 acquire	 an	 atom	 bomb’.	 As	 Scott	 Sagan	 (1996:	 58)	 explains,	
realist	 explanations	 of	 the	 British	 decision	 to	 develop	 nuclear	weapons—based	on	
the	security	model—emphasise	the	‘growing	Soviet	military	threat’	and	the	reduced	
‘credibility’	 of	 US	 extended	 deterrence	 guarantees	 following	 the	 USSR	 developing	
the	 ability	 to	 ‘threaten	 retaliation	 against	 the	 United	 States’.	 UK	 planners	 thus	
wanted	to	be	able	to	deter	the	Soviet	Union,	for	example,	should	the	US	‘go	it	alone’	
and	 start	 a	 war	 when	 they	 saw	 an	 advantage	 (Coleman	 &	 Siracusa:	 2006:	 25).	 It	
was—and	 is—also	believed	 that	being	 a	nuclear	possessor	 allows	 the	UK	 to	 retain	
influence	 in	Washington	 in	order,	as	Roger	Ruston	 (1989)	vividly	puts	 it,	 to	have	a	
‘say	in	the	end	of	the	world’.		
	
Margaret	 Gowing	 (1974:	 184-5),	 meanwhile,	 identifies	 several	 factors	 driving	 the	
early	British	pursuit	of	nuclear	weapons	in	addition	to	its	desire	to	be	able	to	deter	
an	 ‘atomically	 armed	 enemy’,	 whether	 Nazi	 Germany	 or	 the	 Soviet	 Union.	 For	
example,	 as	 a	 great	military	 power	 Britain	must	 possess	 ‘all	major	 new	weapons’,	
with	 the	 bomb	 symbolising	 British	 strategic	 independence.	 According	 to	 Andrew	
Dorman	 (2017:	 15-16),	 ‘successive	British	 governments’	 have	 valued	possessing	an	
‘independent	 nuclear	 deterrent’	 because	 the	 experience	 of	 WW2	 led	 to	 a	
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recognition	 that	 ‘ultimately	 one	 state	 might	 not	 be	 prepared	 to	 sustain	 massive	
losses	 for	 another’.	 Furthermore,	 Winston	 Churchill	 justified	 the	 British	 bomb	 as	
being	 necessary	 to	 ensure	 that	 Soviet	 military	 targets	 ‘would	 be	 given	 what	 we	
consider	 the	 necessary	 priority’	 based	 on	 what	 planners	 saw	 as	 the	 UK’s	 unique	
vulnerability	 to	 nuclear	 attack	 owing	 to	 its	 size	 and	 proximity	 to	 Europe	 (Clark	 &	
Wheeler,	 1989:	10-12,	71).	 Thus,	 as	 Foreign	Secretary	Ernest	Bevin	asserted	about	
the	new	nuclear	technology—and	despite	the	cost	at	a	time	of	austerity—‘We	could	
not	 afford	 to	 acquiesce	 in	 an	 American	monopoly	 of	 this	 new	 development,’	 and	
‘We’ve	got	to	have	the	bloody	Union	Jack	on	top	of	it’	(Brown,	2008:	39).	
	
As	Malcolm	Chalmers	 (1984:	11)	notes,	 another	official	UK	 justification	 for	nuclear	
possession	 was	 that	 the	 UK	 would	 act	 as	 a	 second	 centre	 of	 decision-making	 in	
Europe,	 meaning	 that	 the	 Soviet	 Union	 would	 more	 likely	 be	 ‘deterred	 from	
aggression’.	In	addition	to	deterring	attacks	on	the	British	mainland,	in	the	late	1950s	
the	UK’s	airborne	nuclear	force	was	also	tasked	with	a	global	role	as	part	of	the	UK’s	
commitments	to	NATO.73	Kristan	Stoddart	(2012:	80,	232)	explains	that	this	role	‘was	
fulfilled	 through	 ‘independence	 in	 concert’	 with	 the	 United	 States’	 and	 that	 V-
bombers	were	deployed	for	this	mission	because	they	were	 ‘far	more	flexible	than	
Polaris’	and	‘could	be	used	as	a	visible	politico-military	signal	to	reassure	friends	and	
dissuade	potential	adversaries	from	hostile	action.’	
																																								 																					
73	As	 Stoddart	 (2012:	 80)	 points	 out	 the	 UK’s	 nuclear	 force	was	 also	 ‘tasked	 at	 a	 strategic	 level	 to	
support	the	Central	Treaty	Organisation	(CENTO),	covering	the	Middle	East,	and	the	South	East	Asia	
Treaty	Organisation	(SEATO)’	albeit	‘to	a	much	lesser	extent’.	
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Today,	 supporters	 of	 Britain	 remaining	 a	 nuclear	 possessor,	 such	 as	 former	 US	
Defense	 Secretary	 Ash	 Carter	 (Reuters,	 2016),	 argue	 that	 the	 UK	 can	 and	 should	
'punch	above	its	weight'	in	order	to	continue	playing	an	‘outsized	role’	in	the	world.	
According	 to	 this	 logic—found	 in	 the	 arguments	 of	 prominent	 pro-Trident	 figures	
such	as	Commodore	Tim	Hare	 (2011)—by	disarming,	 the	UK	would	 shirk	 its	 global	
responsibilities	 and	 would	 have	 to	 downgrade	 its	 ambitions,	 leading	 to	 a	 loss	 of	
influence	and	international	status,	as	well	as	pressure	to	let	go	of	its	permanent	seat	
on	the	UN	Security	Council.	Disarmament	would,	moreover,	cause	the	UK	to	lose	the	
security	 and	 stability	 nuclear	deterrence	provides	 and	 could	 create	 the	perception	
that	the	UK	 is	a	 ‘soft	target	 for	nuclear	blackmail	and	 intimidation’	 in	the	words	of	
Peter	Cannon	(2012)	of	the	Henry	Jackson	Society.		
	
Such	concerns,	 it	 is	argued,	are	of	crucial	 importance	 in	a	volatile	world	where	the	
only	certainty	 is	uncertainty.	For	example,	Booth	and	Wheeler	(2008:	266)	point	to	
Tony	 Blair’s	 remarks	 in	 2006,	 prior	 to	 the	 government’s	 decision	 on	 whether	 to	
replace	the	UK’s	Trident	nuclear	weapons	system,	that	‘the	United	Kingdom	should	
continue	as	a	nuclear	weapons	state,	for	at	least	the	next	50	years,	because	‘the	one	
certain	thing	about	our	world	today	is	its	uncertainty’.	For	adherents	of	this	mindset,	
such	 as	 Lord	 George	 Robertson	 (2011),	 recent	 events,	 including	 the	 Arab	 Spring,	
suggest	 that	 the	 future	will	 be	beset	by	 continual	 surprises	 and	 shocks,	 some	of	 a	
nuclear	nature,	heightening	risk	and	the	need	for	security	guarantees.	For	example,	
the	DPRK	has	tested	a	nuclear	weapon	and	Iran	is	seeking	to	acquire	one,	whilst	both	
China	 and	 Russia	 are	 modernising	 their	 nuclear	 arsenals.	 For	 Conservative	 Way	
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Forward	 (2012),	 the	 UK	 should	 treat	 China	 as	 a	 competitive	 rising	 power	 whilst	
Russia's	behaviour	is	of	concern	and	must	be	carefully	watched	in	case	an	aggressive	
and	extremist	leadership	takes	power.	
	
Proponents	of	the	UK	remaining	a	NWS,	such	as	Sir	David	Omand	(2011)	also	tend	to	
aver	 that	 NATO's	 collective	 security	 system—including	 a	 framework	 of	 deterrence	
extended	 from	 the	US	 to	 its	 European	 allies—is	 fundamental	 to	 the	UK's	 national	
security.	 Ending	 the	 UK's	 nuclear	 contribution	 would,	 Cannon	 (2012)	 therefore	
argues,	weaken	this	system	by	making	 it	dependent	on	France	(as	the	only	NWS	in	
Europe)	and	the	US.	Such	a	development	would	also,	for	Hare	(2011)	likely	open	up	
new	 fault	 lines	 and	 stresses	 in	 the	 Euro-Atlantic	 relationship,	 jeopardising	 US	
commitments	 to	 Europe.	 In	 addition,	 Omand	 (2011)	 argues	 that	 any	 action	which	
jeopardised	the	US	commitment	to	providing	a	nuclear	‘umbrella’	over	Europe	would	
not	only	affect	British	and	European	security	but	could	also	put	at	risk	Washington’s	
extended	deterrence	in	the	Far	East	and	Pacific	regions.	
	
In	general,	opponents	of	disarmament	argue	that	 the	UK	would	therefore	not	gain	
anything	 from	 giving	 up	 its	 nuclear	weapons.	 For	 example,	 Lord	 Robertson	 (2011)	
argues	 that	 such	 a	 move	 would	 not	 have	 any	 positive	 impact	 on	 global	 nuclear	
proliferation.	This	is,	he	argues,	shown	by	the	fact	that	the	significant	disarmament	
that	 the	 UK	 has	 already	 carried	 out	 has	 done	 nothing	 to	 discourage	 proliferation	
among	 those	 states	 that	 desire	 nuclear	 weapons	 capability.	 On	 the	 contrary,	
Conservative	 Way	 Forward	 (2012)	 propose	 that	 unilateral	 disarmament	 would	
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ensure	 that	 the	 UK	 has	 no	 influence	 or	 leverage	 over	 multilateral	 disarmament	
negotiations.	 Instead	of	moving	to	zero,	the	UK—according	to	Hare	(2011)—should	
promote	 its	 ‘disarmament	 and	 security	 record’,	 continue	 its	 work	 on	 developing	
verification	technology	and—for	Lord	Michael	Boyce	(2011)—encourage	the	US	and	
Russia	 to	 take	 the	 lead	on	disarmament,	 following	on	 from	the	New	START	 treaty.	
Opponents	of	disarmament,	 such	as	 former	Defense	 Secretary	 Sir	Malcolm	Rifkind	
(2014:	7),	also	point	to	the	significant	public	support	for	the	UK	remaining	a	NWS.		
	
In	terms	of	a	multilateral	path	to	zero	of	the	kind	sketched	out	by	groups	such	as	the	
Deep	Cuts	Commission	and	the	Canberra	Commission,	the	UK	government’s	position	
is	 that	 it	 would	 join	 in	 such	 a	 process	 after	 the	 US	 and	 Russia	 have	 reached	 low	
numbers	of	nuclear	weapons.	For	example,	during	Gordon	Brown’s	tenure	as	Prime	
Minister	 the	 Foreign	 and	 Commonwealth	 Office	 (2009)	 produced	 an	 information	
paper	 entitled	 Lifting	 the	 Nuclear	 Shadow:	 Creating	 the	 Conditions	 for	 Abolishing	
Nuclear	 Weapons,	 wherein	 the	 government	 outlined	 how	 it	 would	 fulfill	 its	
commitments	under	the	NPT.	The	document	stated	that	the	UK	would	‘continue	to	
work	towards	the	total	elimination	of	our	own	nuclear	arsenal	and	all	others	through	
multilateral,	 mutual	 and	 verifiable	 agreements’.	 Furthermore,	 when	 ‘useful’,	 the	
government	would	willingly	include	in	any	negotiations	‘the	small	proportion	of	the	
world’s	nuclear	weapons	that	belong	to	the	UK’	(Ibid:	12).	
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5.2	Critical	perspectives	on	the	causes	and	consequences	of	UK	nuclear	possession	
and	disarmament	
Alternative,	 critical	 perspectives	 on	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 UK	 nuclear	
possession	and	disarmament,	such	as	institutional	democratisation,	focus	on	the	role	
played	by	domestic	politics.	Defenders	of	 the	UK’s	nuclear	 status,	 such	as	Michael	
Quinlan	 (2009:	 121),	 thus	 hint	 at	 but	 do	 not	 explain	 the	 domestic	 ‘political,	
institutional	and	other	motivations,	as	distinct	from	security	rationales’	for,	what	he	
describes	 as,	 Britain’s	 ‘independent’	 possession	 of	 the	 bomb.	 It	 is	 therefore	
necessary	 to	 look	 elsewhere	 for	 evidence	 and	 ideas	 supporting	 institutional	
democratisation.	For	example,	according	to	John	Simpson	and	Jenny	Nielsen	(2010:	
86),	 rather	 than	 being	 subject	 to	 democratic	 influence	 and	 control,	 the	 original	
British	 decision	 to	 acquire	 nuclear	 weapons	 was,	 taken	 by	 ‘a	 small	 group	 of	 key	
cabinet	 members	 in	 private’	 and	 subsequent	 British	 governments	 ‘continued	 to	
favour	taking	decisions	through	this	process’.	For	Lawrence	Freedman	(1980:	54)	the	
established	 tradition	 was	 one	 of	 ‘secret	 and	 bipartisan	 policy-making’	 with	 an	
‘emphasis	 on	 continuity’.	 Beatrice	 Heuser	 (1998:	 16-21)	 similarly	 observes	 that	
British	political	culture	 is	 less	democratic	than	the	US’s,	so	that	the	normal	secrecy	
on	defence	and	nuclear	 issues	 is	 only	heightened	 in	 the	UK	and	 the	public	 is	 ‘told	
very	 little’.	 Heuser	 (Ibid)	 links	 this	 situation	 to	 the	 historic	 ‘mutual	 fear’	
characterising	 the	 ‘class	 divide’	 in	 the	 UK,	 which	 consists	 of	 the	 British	
establishment’s	‘fear	of	the	masses’,	who	elites	see	as	an	‘internal	threat’,	whilst	the	
people	themselves	are	suspicious	of	‘the	ruling	classes’.		
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The	continuity	which	Freedman	and	Heuser	refer	 to	 is	explained,	 in	relation	to	the	
bomb,	by	analysts	such	as	Nick	Ritchie	(2006)	and	Malcolm	Chalmers	(2010:	2),	who	
highlight	 the	 defence	 establishment’s	 inherent	 conservatism,	 resistance	 to	 radical	
change	 and	 the	 bureaucratic	 and	 technological	 momentum	 that	 pushes	 British	
nuclear	possession	along.	For	a	nation	of	its	size	the	British	military	establishment	is	
particularly	 large	 meaning	 that	 it	 carries	 significant	 weight	 in	 decision-making.	 As	
David	Edgerton	 (2006:	 1-3)	notes,	 this	 situation	 came	about	 as	between	1939	and	
1955	 a	 ‘military-industrial-scientific	 complex’	 was	 created	 that	 amounted	 to	 a	
‘warfare	state’,	giving	the	UK	a	‘sharply	differentiated	third	place	in	a	bipolar	world’.	
Notably,	 Edgerton	 (Ibid:	 12)	 also	 states	 that	 following	 World	 War	 Two	 the	 UK	
underwent	 a	 ‘radical	 change’	 so	 that	 it	 was	 ‘no	 longer	 as	 liberal-	 economically,	
politically,	intellectually’.	
	
Even	today,	when	the	UK	 is	 seen	as	a	declining	power,	 the	still	 significant	size	and	
scale	of	 the	British	 ‘warfare	 state’	makes	 the	question	of	 loss	aversion	particularly	
pertinent	when	 discussing	 disarmament.	 Tony	 Blair	 (2010:	 636)	 thus	 argued	 in	 his	
memoirs	 that	 scrapping	 Trident	would	be	 too	much	of	 a	 downgrading	of	 the	UK’s	
status	as	a	nation	for	which	no	Prime	Minister	wanted	to	take	the	blame.	In	addition	
to	 international	 ‘uncertainty’	 therefore,	 on	 the	 domestic	 front	 Blair,	 as	 Labour	
leader,	wanted	to	carefully	manage	the	nuclear	issue	both	within	the	country	and	his	
party.	 This	was	 necessary	 so	 that	 the	 subject	would	 not	 damage	 Labour’s	 internal	
cohesion,	 as	 it	 had	 done	 in	 the	 past,	 nor	 challenge	 the	 bipartisan	 consensus	 on	
defence	and	security	matters.	When	it	comes	to	nuclear	weapons	the	phenomenon	
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of	 political	 fear	 thus	 still	 looms	 large	 in	 the	 UK—for	 some	 in	 Labour	 this	 means	
avoiding	looking	weak	on	security	and	for	Conservatives,	of	letting	their	side	down.	
Turning	to	the	question	of	the	special	relationship,	the	secrecy	pervading	the	British	
nuclear	weapon	system	during	the	Cold	War	became	inextricably	linked	to	Britain’s	
near	total	dependence	on	the	US	over	a	range	of	areas.	As	Kristan	Stoddart	 (2012:	
14)	explains,	Britain	can	only	claim	to	have	any	semblance	of	an	independent	nuclear	
weapons	 capability	 between	 1952	 and	 the	 mid-1960s.	 In	 1962	 President	 John	 F.	
Kennedy	had	agreed	 to	provide	Prime	Minister	Harold	Macmillian	with	 the	Polaris	
nuclear	 weapons	 system	 on	 terms	 that	 were	 seen	 as	 ‘remarkably	 favourable’	 to	
Britain	 (Freedman,	 1980:	 25).	 In	 exchange	 the	UK	 committed	 to	 assign	 its	 nuclear	
force	 to	NATO	nuclear	 force	and	 target	 it	 in	accordance	with	alliance	plans	 (Davis,	
2015:	 20).	As	 Freedman	explains,	without	Polaris	 the	UK	would	not	have	had	 ‘any	
sort	 of	 credible	 nuclear	 capability’,	 given	 the	 speed	 of	 the	 superpower’s	
technological	development	at	that	time	(Ibid:	8).	The	resulting	‘co-operative	nuclear	
alliance’	led	Sir	Frank	Cooper,	the	Permanent	Under	Secretary	of	Defence,	to	state	in	
the	mid-1980s	that	‘if	you	ask	me	whether	the	Americans	have	an	undue	degree	of	
influence	over	British	defence	policy	 I	would	have	 to	 say	 yes’	 (Stoddart,	 2012:	 14;	
Miall,	 1987:	 77).	 As	 Hugh	Miall	 (Ibid)	 noted,	 in	 return	 for	 nuclear	 and	 intelligence	
material,	 Britain	 became	 a	 client	 state	 of	 the	 US,	 providing	 bases	 for	 its	 nuclear	
forces	 as	well	 as	 diplomatic	 and	military	 support	when	 required—an	 arrangement	
that	raised	serious	questions	about	the	UK’s	claims	to	be	a	sovereign	democracy.	
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Indeed,	as	Bruce	Kent	 (2003:	64)	observes,	 it	was	Britain’s	subordination	to	the	US	
that,	 in	 the	 early	 1980s,	 ignited	 huge	 public	 opposition	 to	 nuclear	 weapons,	
following	 the	 government’s	 decision	 to	 host	US	 cruise	missiles	 and	 replace	 Polaris	
with	the	far	more	powerful	Trident	nuclear	weapons	system.	The	UK’s	vigorous	anti-
nuclear	movement	has	existed	since	the	early	days	of	the	bomb,	with	the	Campaign	
for	Nuclear	Disarmament	(CND)	being	founded	 in	1958.	CND,	and	the	wider	British	
anti-war	 and	 peace	 movement’s	 strength	 has	 ebbed	 and	 flowed	 over	 the	 years,	
largely	in	response	to	the	degree	of	public	awareness	and	sense	of	threat	regarding	
nuclear	 dangers.	 Today	whilst	 some	 surveys	 show	 that	 a	majority	 of	 voters	 (54%)	
would	prefer	Britain	 to	 abandon	 its	 nuclear	weapons	 and	not	 replace	 them,	other	
surveys	 show	 that	 a	 larger	majority	 (81%)	 favour	 an	 international	 plan	 ‘for	 totally	
eliminating	nuclear	weapons	according	 to	a	 timeline’	 (World	Public	Opinion,	2008;	
Glover,	2009).	Thus,	as	a	2007	study	by	the	Simons	Foundation	(2007)	found,	the	UK	
‘boasts	a	high	level	of	support	for	elimination	of	nuclear	arms	and	nuclear	testing	all	
over	the	world’.	
	
Despite	the	relatively	low	salience	of	nuclear	issues	for	the	British	public	today,	there	
remains	 a	 backbone	 of	 researchers,	 parliamentarians,	 civil	 society	 and	 religious	
groups	working	to	raise	social	consciousness	regarding	the	costs	and	risks	of	nuclear	
weapons	and	contribute	to	the	goal	of	disarmament.	Rather	than	nuclear	weapons	
securing	British	democracy,	freedom	and	human	rights,	Heuser	(1998:	26)	points	out	
that	 ‘disarmers,	 by	 contrast’	 argue	 that	military	 spending	may	undermine	national	
‘prosperity	 and	 welfare’,	 making	 it	 ‘impossible’	 to	 protect	 vital	 public	 goods	 and	
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services.	
	
Currently,	as	Ritchie	 (2012:	153)	 states,	 ‘the	British	public	appears	quite	 firm	 in	 its	
support	 of	 global	 nuclear	 disarmament’	 whilst	 its	 support	 for	 the	 planned	
replacement	 of	 Trident	 is	 ‘increasingly	 limited’.	 Indeed,	 at	 a	 time	 of	 austerity	 the	
significant	sums	dedicated	to	Trident	drives	opposition	from	several	fronts,	including	
civil	 society	 groups,	 the	 public,	 several	 senior	 political	 figures,	 such	 as	 former	
defence	 minister	 Michael	 Portillo	 and	 Lord	 David	 Owen	 as	 well	 as	 high-ranking	
retired	 military	 officials	 (Norton-Taylor,	 2009;	 BBC,	 2012;	 Street,	 2015).	 The	 UK’s	
nuclear	force	is	also	subject	to	international	 legal	restrictions	regarding	use—which	
some,	such	as	ICAN-UK	(2012),	interpret	as	meaning	that	any	threat	or	use	of	nuclear	
weapons	is	 illegal—whilst	the	UK’s	NPT	disarmament	obligations	require	it	to	scrap	
Trident.	Furthermore,	the	UK’s	2010	National	Security	Strategy	(2010)	asserted	that	
the	UK	does	not	currently	face	a	‘major	state	military	threat’,	opening	the	question	
of	who	and	what	Trident	is	meant	to	deter.		
	
Despite	 these	 challenges	 to	 Trident’s	 legitimacy,	 following	 parliamentary	 approval,	
the	British	government	is	proceeding	with	plans	to	spend	tens	of	billions	of	pounds	
on	replacing	its	nuclear	weapons	system	over	the	next	decade.	Yet	some,	such	as	Ian	
Davis	(2011:	3),	have	questioned	whether	the	institutional	continuity	that	pushes	the	
nuclear	weapons	 establishment	 along	meant	 that	modernisation	 began	 prior	 to	 it	
being	 debated	 by	MPs.	Moreover,	 the	 discourse	 surrounding	 replacement	 has,	 so	
far,	mainly	focused	on	the	question	of	whether	there	are	more	affordable	systems	to	
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Trident	 rather	 than	whether	 its	 replacement	 should	be	 cancelled,	which	 raises	 the	
issue	of	how	much	political	influence	the	movement	for	nuclear	disarmament	has	in	
the	 UK.	 Another	 concern	 with	 relevance	 to	 democracy,	 transparency	 and	
accountability	concerns	 the	UK’s	nuclear	 relationship	with	 the	US	as	part	of	NATO.	
For	 example,	 the	 independent	 think-tank	 NATO	Watch	 (2015)	 has	 highlighted	 the	
military	 alliance’s	 closed	 and	 secretive	 nature,	 whereby	 it	 denies	 civil	 society	 ‘the	
right	to	participate	in	the	formulation	of	policies	that	have	a	profound	effect	on	their	
liberties	and	security’.	
	
Such	 concerns	 complement	 arguments	made	by	 critics	 of	 the	UK’s	 overall	 political	
system.	 For	 example,	David	 Beetham	 (2011:	 2)	 argues	 that	 Britain	 has	 become	 an	
‘unelected	 oligarchy’.	 This	 state	 of	 affairs	 is	 the	 result	 of	 the	 ‘dominance’	 of	
‘corporate	 and	 financial	 elites’	 over	 the	 government	 ‘through	 the	 financing	 of	
political	 parties,	 think	 tanks	 and	 lobbying	 organisations,	 membership	 of	 advisory	
bodies,	 ‘revolving	 doors’	 and	 joint	 partnerships	 with	 government’.	 Such	 an	
assessment	 stands	 in	 stark	 contrast	 to	 evaluations	 provided	 by	 the	 Economist	
Intelligence	Unit	 (2016)	and	Freedom	House	 (2017),	which	 find	 that	 the	UK	 scores	
highly	across	a	range	of	indicators	concerning	democratic	standards	and	civic	rights.	
It	is	notable,	as	previously	mentioned,	that	none	of	these	studies	directly	incorporate	
nuclear	 matters	 or	 military-related	 institutions	 into	 their	 methodology,	 possibly	
given	that	such	authors	presume	to	be	these	issues	to	be	recondite	by	nature,	with	
relatively	 low	political	 salience.	 Beetham	 (2011:	 19-20),	 however,	 does	 provide	 an	
overview	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 private	 interests	 influence	 government	 in	 the	 UK,	
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highlighting	‘the	links	between	the	Ministry	of	Defence	and	the	arms	manufacturing	
companies,	and	the	strong	support	given	by	government	to	their	international	trade	
along	with	other	exporters.’	
	
5.3	UK	nuclear	politics	today		
	
Having	 provided	 an	 initial	 overview	 of	 how	 institutional	 democratisation	 adds	
explanatory	 value	 to	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 UK	
nuclear	possession	and	disarmament,	 this	 section	 shall	 now	 look	 in	more	detail	 at	
contemporary	 nuclear	 politics	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 a	 fuller	 analysis	 to	 support	 the	
main	contentions	of	this	thesis.	Public	discussion	of	whether	the	UK	should	remain	a	
NWS	grew	as	2016	approached—which	was	when	the	final	decision	on	whether	to	
replace	Trident	with	a	successor	nuclear	weapons	system	was	supposed	to	be	taken.	
Yet,	as	I	explore	below,	several	analysts	have	argued	that	replacement	was	inevitable	
given	 that	 key	 political	 decisions	 had	 been	made,	 contracts	 for	 essential	materials	
agreed	 and	 work	 on	 upgrading	 infrastructure	 begun.	 Moreover,	 the	 impetus	 for	
these	 decisions	 can	 be	 largely	 explained	 by	 domestic	 factors,	 stemming	 from	 the	
overlapping	 needs	 and	 interests	 of	 several	 key	 economic,	 industrial	 and	 political	
actors	 and	groups.	 In	order	 to	understand	how	 the	UK	might	 eventually	decide	 to	
relinquish	 its	 nuclear	 weapons	 I	 therefore	 explore	 in	 this	 section	 the	 politics	 of	
Trident	 replacement	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 strengths	 and	 weaknesses	 of	 the	 forces	
supportive	 of	 and	 opposing	 Britain	 remaining	 a	 nuclear	 power.	 I	 also	 touch	 upon	
how	the	British	state’s	defence	and	foreign	policies	impact	on	the	broader	goal	of	a	
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NWFW.	
	
Of	the	scholars	working	on	this	issue	Nick	Ritchie	provides	one	of	the	most	in-depth	
investigations	of	the	forces	working	for	the	‘reproduction’	of	Trident	in	his	A	Nuclear	
Weapons-Free	World?	Britain,	Trident	and	 the	Challenges	Ahead	 (2012:	51).	 In	 this	
work,	Ritchie	identifies	four	key	‘enablers’	of	a	like-for-like	replacement	for	Trident.	
These	include	nuclear	deterrence,	national	identity,	the	nuclear	relationship	with	the	
United	 States,	 and	 the	 submarine-building	 industry.	 He	 then	 outlines	 the	 main	
‘resistances’,	 namely,	 the	 impact	 on	 efforts	 to	 move	 towards	 global	 nuclear	
disarmament;	the	cost	of	the	Trident	replacement	programme;	and	alternative	paths	
between	a	 like-for-like	 replacement	 and	unilateral	 nuclear	 disarmament.	 I	 use	 this	
framework	 to	 begin	 discussing	 the	 domestic	 politics	 of	 Britain’s	 nuclear	 weapons	
system	below,	 addressing	 each	of	 these	 areas	 in	 turn,	 drawing	on	 complementary	
work	 and	 alternative	 viewpoints	 when	 appropriate	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 a	 rounded	
perspective	on	this	subject.74		
	
To	 begin	 with	 deterrence,	 as	 discussed	 above,	 the	 question	 of	 what	 ‘minimal	
deterrence’	means	for	the	UK	is	more	of	a	political	than	a	military	issue.	Indeed,	as	
Tony	Blair	 (2007:	636)	 stated	 in	his	memoirs,	Trident’s	utility	 in	 the	post-Cold	War																																									 																					
74	With	 regards	 to	 ‘enablers’,	 as	 I	 have	 touched	 upon	 the	 first	 and	 third	 of	 these	 above,	 and	 for	
reasons	 of	 space,	 I	 shall	 mainly	 focus	 on	 the	 second	 and	 fourth	 of	 these	 ideas	 here.	 Similarly	 for	
‘resistances’,	 I	 mainly	 focus	 on	 costs	 and	 public	 opinion,	 having	 discussed	 the	 UK’s	 disarmament	
obligations	and	alternatives	in	the	previous	section.	
	
	 294	
world	is	‘less	in	terms	of	deterrence,	and	non-existent	in	terms	of	military	use’.	As	he	
admitted,	what	matters	more	to	the	military	are	 ‘helicopters,	airlift	and	anti-terror	
equipment’	yet	giving	up	Trident	would	be	‘too	big	a	downgrading	of	our	status	as	a	
nation’.	 What	 was	 being	 implicitly	 acknowledged	 here	 is	 that	 the	 UK’s	 nuclear	
weapons	are,	and	always	have	been,	political	weapons	that	operate	on	the	domestic	
and	 international	 levels.	At	home	these	weapons	play	an	 important	 role	 in	helping	
leaders	to	unify	their	parties	and	the	nation	behind	the	idea	that	the	UK	is	a	major	
power,	 which—alongside	 the	 US—bears	 responsibility	 for	 deterring	 recalcitrant	
states	such	as	Russia,	requiring	the	maintenance	of	high	levels	of	defence	spending.		
	
The	 power	 and	 appeal	 of	 this	 narrative,	which	 has	 its	 roots	 in	 the	 UK’s	 victory	 in	
World	 War	 Two	 and	 the	 Cold	 War,	 means	 that	 nuclear	 possession	 continues	 to	
receive	strong	support	amongst	both	Conservative	and	Labour	voters	(Grice,	2016).	
The	 need	 for	 proponents	 of	 the	 bomb	 to	 maintain	 Cold	 War	 stereotypes	 and	 a	
pervasive	sense	of	international	tension	and	uncertainty	for	domestic	political	gain,	
was	recently	seen	in	former	Prime	Minister	David	Cameron’s	allegation	that	Labour	
leader	Jeremy	Corbyn’s	opposition	to	nuclear	deterrence	made	him	and	his	party	a	
‘threat	 to	 national	 security’	 (Stone,	 2015).	 Shadow	 Foreign	 Secretary	 Emily	
Thornberry	 (2017)	 responded	 to	 such	 rhetorical	 abuse	 by	 highlighting	 the	
Conservative	party’s	refusal	to	‘commit	to	the	principle	of	a	nuclear-free	world’	and	
‘ignore	 the	 issue	 of	 disarmament	 simply	 for	 short-term	 political	 gain’.	 Similarly,	
former	 Shadow	 Defence	 Secretary	 Clive	 Lewis	 (2016)	 argued	 that	 Prime	 Minister	
Theresa	May	has	used	Trident	‘not	as	a	military	weapon	aimed	at	deterring	enemies	
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overseas—but	as	a	political	weapon	aimed	at	her	party’s	opposition	at	home’. 
	 	
As	 Ritchie	 (Ibid:	 4,	 77)	 persuasively	 argues,	 given	 their	 political	 benefits,	 nuclear	
weapons	 thus	 today	 occupy	 a	 central	 position	 in	 the	 British	 ‘political-defence	
establishment’s’	self-image	as	a	'major	pivotal	power',	something	which	has	become	
embedded	over	time	and	 is	difficult	 to	dislodge.	Moreover,	as	Chalmers	 (1984:	52)	
and	Hennessy	 (2010:	 79)	 explain,	 Trident	 is	 seen	 by	 political	 elites	 as	 ‘essential	 in	
preserving	Britain’s	position	in	Europe’.		The	need	is	for	the	UK	to	be	on	a	par	with	
France	 and	 ‘a	 notch	 above’	 non-nuclear	 Germany	 and	 Japan,	 which	 the	 UK	 lags	
behind	in	terms	of	economic	strength.	In	the	minds	of	these	elites	a	non-nuclear	UK	
would	thus	not	be	able	to	pull	rank,	for,	as	John	McTernan,	a	former	special	adviser	
to	the	Blair	government,	put	it,	‘If	we	didn’t	have	Trident	we’d	be	Belgium’	(Ainslie,	
2012:	79).	
	
The	UK	is	also	believed	to	have	global	responsibilities	as	the	‘closest	ally’	of	the	US,	
requiring	a	sizable	military	budget	for	expeditionary	forces	capable	of	intervening	in	
crises	and	conflicts	around	the	world	(Ritchie,	2012:	77).	Given	that	one	of	the	key	
drivers	 of	 nuclear	 proliferation	 for	 weaker	 states	 is	 the	 threat	 of	 advanced	
conventional	 weaponry,	 British	 support	 for	 recent	 US	 aggression,	 for	 example	 in	
Yugoslavia,	Afghanistan,	and	Iraq,	should	be	seen	as	detrimental	to	the	prospects	for	
a	 NWFW.	 Thus	 if,	 as	 the	 Foreign	 and	 Commonwealth	 Office	 (2009:	 46)	 states,	
nuclear	 disarmament	 requires	 the	 ‘permanent	 reduction	 or	 elimination’	 of	 ‘long-
standing	political	 tensions’,	 then	the	UK	must	commit	 to	acting	 in	accordance	with	
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the	UN	 Charter	 regarding	 the	 use	 of	military	 force	 if	 it	 wants	 to	 be	 a	 responsible	
member	of	the	international	community	and	contribute	to	the	creation	of	a	NWFW	
as	part	of	its	dual	disarmament	responsibilities.		
	
Moving	on	to	the	submarine	industry,	Ritchie	(2012:	107)	argues	that	ten	companies,	
including	defence	giant	BAE	Systems,	form	a	lobbying	group	which	is	‘keen	to	secure	
contracts	 for	 a	 fleet	of	 new	 ‘Successor’	 submarines	 to	 replace	 the	 aging	Vanguard	
boats’.	 This	 coalition’s	main	 strength	 and	weakness	 is	 that	 it	 is	 in	 a	 co-dependent	
relationship,	 where	 it	 is	 the	 only	 supplier	 and	 the	 MoD	 is	 the	 only	 customer	 for	
submarines.	 Key	 to	 this	 situation	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 repeated	 government	
investigations—most	 recently	 the	 Trident	 Alternatives	 Review	 (2013)—have	
concluded	that	the	best	platform	for	the	UK’s	nuclear	weapons	are	ballistic	missiles	
on	SSBNs.	Moreover,	without	continual	orders	for	submarines	(including	the	Astute	
attack	submarines	preceding	Successor)	ensuring	a	regular	‘drumbeat’,	the	industry	
will	wither	away	as	core	skills	and	experience	go	elsewhere,	imposing	a	‘use	it	or	lose	
it’	imperative	on	the	political	executive	(Ritchie,	2012:	114).		
	
The	 other	 key	 industrial	 angle,	 which	 is	 of	 the	 utmost	 significance	 for	 Labour’s	
evolving	policy	position	on	Trident,	 concerns	 the	unions	 involved	 in	 the	submarine	
industry.	The	Financial	Times	(Hollinger,	2016)	has	claimed	that	35,000	jobs	directly	
or	 indirectly	 rely	on	 the	UK’s	 submarine	production,	whilst	Professor	Keith	Hartley	
(2012:	 4)	 estimates	 that	 ‘some	 26,000	 jobs’,	 some	 of	 which	 ‘are	 located	 in	 high	
unemployment	 areas’	 will	 ‘possibly’	 be	 supported	 by	 the	 Successor	 programme.	
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Thus	 even	 though,	 as	 Hartley	 states,	 there	 are	 often	 ‘alternative	 and	 more	 cost	
effective	methods	of	creating	UK	jobs’,	the	fact	that	these	jobs	currently	exist	means	
that	 the	nuclear	question	 is	a	battleground	 for	 the	 relevant	unions,	with	GMB	and	
Unite	in	particular	fighting	for	members.	
	
In	addition	to	the	‘enablers’	for	Trident	replacement	Ritchie	and	others	describe,	in	
order	to	fully	appreciate	the	explanatory	value	of	 institutional	democratisation,	 it	is	
necessary	to	outline	the	closed	process	by	which	UK	nuclear	weapons	decisions	have	
historically	been	taken.	For	example,	Oxford	Research	Group	(McLean,	1986:	90)	and	
Hugh	Miall	(1987)	showed	in	the	1980s	how	decisions	on	Britain’s	nuclear	weapons	
have	long	been	taken	by	a	tiny	elite	of	 ‘very	senior	Cabinet	ministers,	civil	servants	
and	service	chiefs’.	These	denizens	of	 the	permanent	bureaucracy	manage	nuclear	
weapons	systems	(for	example,	submarines,	warheads,	missiles),	which,	due	to	their	
technological	 sophistication	 are	 developed	 over	 decades,	 whilst	 elected	
representatives	are	in	office	for	much	shorter	lengths	of	time.	Moreover,	as	McLean	
(1986:	256)	states,		
	
any	new	administration	or	government	coming	to	power	has	to	take	account	
of	the	realities	of	the	status	quo.	These	realities	may	concern	funds	already	
committed,	unofficial	agreements	entered	into,	the	pressure	of	alliances,	the	
persistence	of	officials,	or	simply	the	lack	of	procedures	to	do	what	they	want	
to	do—but	they	are	so	real	that	they	have	left	election	manifestos	in	tatters.	
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The	history	of	the	Labour	party	provides	ample	evidence	for	these	claims.	The	public	
was	 led	 to	 believe	 before	 the	 1964	 election	 that	 the	UK’s	 nuclear	 force	would	 be	
scrapped	and	before	the	1974	election	that	the	UK	would	participate	in	multilateral	
disarmament	negotiations	and	not	modernise	 their	nuclear	arsenal.	 Such	promises	
were	discarded	or	watered	down	once	Labour	came	to	power	(Freedman,	1980:	87;	
Hennessy,	2010:	73;	Scott,	2006:	690;	Stoddart,	2012).	More	recently,	the	fact	that	
Labour,	 when	 in	 power,	 held	 parliamentary	 votes	 on	 Trident	 replacement	 and	
pledged	 that	 the	 Main	 Gate	 decision	 was	 the	 final	 decision	 point	 has	 given	 the	
impression	that	the	process	has	been	accountable	and	subject	to	democratic	checks	
and	balances.	In	reality,	reports	from	2004	and	2005	indicated	that	Blair	had	already	
decided	to	replace	Trident	with	a	new	system	(Ripley,	2004;	Brown,	2005).	This	was	
soon	followed	by	significant	sums	of	money	pouring	into	the	newly	privatised	Atomic	
Weapons	 Establishment	 (AWE)	 as	 up-to-date	 facilities	 were	 constructed	 and	
additional	staff	recruited	 in	order	to	keep	the	UK	up	to	date	with	US	technology	 in	
lieu	of	political	assent	to	build	new	warheads	(Ainslie,	2012:	76;	Ritchie,	2012:	106).	
Civil	society	groups,	such	as	Nuclear	Information	Service	(2017),	have	highlighted	the	
opaque	nature	of	AWE’s	work,	the	immense	costs	of	modernisation	escaping	public	
scrutiny	and	the	serious	safety	and	security	problems	at	its	various	sites.	Moreover,	
as	Ian	Davis	(2011:	3)	argues,	the	UK’s	submarine	procurement	process	has	also	been	
lacking	 in	 transparency.	Work	 on	 the	 Successor	 submarine	 programme	 to	 replace	
Trident	began	in	2008,	so	that,	for	Davis		‘by	the	time	of	the	anticipated	review	and	
vote	at	Main	Gate	it	may	already	be	too	late	to	consider	alternatives’.	
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It	is	also	useful	to	bear	in	mind	the	fact	that	Labour	has	historically	won	elections	on	
platforms	where	 ‘the	common	understanding’	was	 that	 it	would	abandon	the	UK’s	
nuclear	 weapons,	 when	 considering	 the	 oft	 cited	 claim	 that	 Labour	 lost	 the	 1983	
election	 to	 the	 Conservatives	 because	 of	 their	 staunchly	 unilateralist	 position	 on	
disarmament	 (Acton,	 2014:	 3;	 Lewis,	 2014;	 Scott,	 2006:	 689).	 In	 reality,	 as	 John	
Curtice	 (1989:	 157)	 explained,	 Labour’s	 unilateralism	 ‘was	 not	 apparently	 a	
significant	 reason	 for	 its	 electoral	 slide	 during	 the	 election	 and	 neither	 was	 the	
electorate	moved	 in	 a	 pro-nuclear	 direction.	 Rather,	we	 can	 see	 that	 the	 election	
period	saw	a	shift	of	support	towards	an	anti-nuclear	position	amongst	a	portion	of	
Labour’s	support’.	The	lesson	from	these	episodes	is	that,	when	it	comes	to	winning	
elections,	adopting	nuclear	disarmament	as	a	policy	 is	not	the	problem	for	political	
parties.	Rather,	as	 I	 shall	now	discuss,	 the	 real	 challenge	 is	how	to	build	a	popular	
movement	capable	of	challenging	 those	powerful	actors	and	 institutions	dedicated	
to	Britain’s	continued	possession	of	nuclear	weapons	and	how	to	create	a	political	
consensus	for	an	alternative	British	approach	to	defence	and	security.	
	
Regarding	 where	 the	 forces	 supportive	 of	 disarmament	 in	 Britain	 stand	 today,	 a	
survey	of	 contemporary	public	opinion	by	BASIC	 (Ritchie	&	 Ingram,	2013:	1)	 found	
that	the	population	‘remains	deeply	divided	on	nuclear	weapons	and	choices	around	
Trident	replacement’.	According	to	the	report	(Ibid),	 ‘polls	suggest	that	opinion	has	
moved	 towards	 relinquishing	 nuclear	 weapons	 after	 Trident	 when	 given	 a	 simple	
yes/no	 choice’	 and	 that	 opposition	 increases	when	people	 are	made	aware	of	 the	
cost	of	replacing	Trident.	The	recent	referendum	concerning	Scottish	independence	
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also	 highlighted	 the	 significant	 public	 opposition	 to	 Trident	 north	 of	 the	 border	
(What	Scotland	Thinks,	2014).	The	ruling	Scottish	National	Party	(SNP)	had	pledged	
to	make	nuclear	weapons	illegal	and	force	their	removal	from	the	Clyde	naval	base	
(Johnson,	2012),	which	some,	such	as	Vice-Admiral	 John	McAnally	 (2014),	believed	
would	 lead	 to	 Britain	 being	 forced	 to	 abandon	 its	 nuclear	 weapons	 for	 good,	
principally	owing	to	the	cost	of	relocating	Trident.	
	
Cost	has	historically	been	a	key	factor	for	Britain’s	nuclear	weapons	system	and	one	
which	decision-makers	have	been	keen	to	keep	hidden	from	the	public.75	Over	three	
decades	 ago	 Freedman	 (1980:	 139)	 pointed	 out	 that	 ‘consideration	 of	 the	 proper	
allocation	of	 scarce	defence	 resources’	 represented	 ‘the	most	 compelling	 strategic	
argument	against	a	nuclear	force’.	Today,	it	is	not	just	the	public	who	are	liable	to	be	
oppose	nuclear	weapons	spending	at	a	 time	of	deep	cuts	 to	education,	health	and	
welfare—the	armed	 forces	are	 reeling	 from	cuts	 to	 the	defence	budget	of	35%	by	
2018-19	compared	 to	 its	2010-11	 level	 (Corlett	&	Whittaker,	2014:	24).	Moreover,	
the	 Treasury	 stated	 that	 if	 the	MoD	wishes	 to	 replace	 Trident	 in	 2016	 it	will	 now	
need	to	pay	for	 it	entirely	from	its	own	funds,	without	the	Treasury	supplementing	
the	 defence	 budget	 has	 it	 has	 done	 in	 the	 past	 (BBC,	 2010;	 Ritchie,	 2012:	 153).	
Current	 spending	 projections	 for	 Trident	 replacement	 show	 that	 nuclear	 weapons	
will	therefore	eat	up	a	third	of	the	MoD’s	overall	annual	equipment	budget	for	about	
fifteen	years	 from	the	early	2020s	 (Chalmers,	2013	 ii:	12).	These	budget	 cuts	have	
																																								 																					
75	Peter	 Hennessy	 (2010:	 47)	 estimates	 that	 by	 the	 late	 1980s	 Britain	 had	 spent	 between	 £40-£50	
billion	on	its	nuclear	weapons.	
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led	 to	 senior	 military	 figures,	 particularly	 from	 the	 army,	 to	 express	 scepticism	
regarding	 the	 necessity	 of	 large-scale	 defence	 projects,	 which	 analysts	 such	 as	
Richard	 Norton-Taylor	 (2013)	 have	 interpreted	 as	 including	 Trident.76	Construction	
on	the	Royal	Navy's	‘largest	ever	submarine’,	named	HMS	Dreadnought—the	first	of	
four	 new	 submarines	 to	 carry	 the	UK's	 nuclear	weapons—began	 in	October	 2016.	
Yet	a	review	of	the	project	by	the	Infrastructure	and	Projects	Authority	(2016)	in	July	
2016	 found	 that	 it	 is	 ‘in	 doubt’	 and	 faces	 ‘major	 risks’,	 with	 ‘issues	 apparent	 in	 a	
number	of	key	areas’.	
	
Bearing	 in	 mind	 the	 growing	 criticism	 and	 questioning	 of	 Trident	 (and	 its	
replacement)	 within	 British	 society,	 it	 is	 perhaps	 understandable	 that	 the	 UK’s	
nuclear	allies—France	and	the	US—have,	in	recent	years,	privately	exhibited	concern	
that	 Britain	 is	 close	 to	 unilaterally	 disarming	 (Leigh,	 2010;	 The	 Guardian,	 2010).	
Indeed,	the	UK	has	sought	to	present	itself	as	‘the	most	forward	leaning,	progressive	
and	 transparent	 nuclear	 weapon	 state	 in	 the	 P5’	 (Harvey,	 2011).	 Despite	 this,	
supporters	 of	 Trident	 replacement,	 such	 as	 former	 Defence	 Secretary	 Sir	Malcom	
Rifkind,	appear	very	confident	of	the	Conservative	party’s	position.	As	Rifkind	(2014:	
7)	explains	with	regard	to	the	policies	of	the	main	three	parties	on	Trident	in	relation	
to	public	 opinion,	 the	 two	questions	 that	matter	 are	 ‘what	 the	public	 think	of	 the	
policies	 themselves’	 and	 ‘how	 the	 adoption	 of	 a	 specific	 policy	 might	 affect	 the																																									 																					
76	This	is	both	because	of	the	type	of	warfare	the	UK	and	its	allies	expect	to	be	engaged	in	in	future	
and	 the	 fact	 that	 being	 a	 nuclear	 weapon	 state	 and	 having	 a	 credible	 nuclear	 deterrence	 posture	
requires,	 in	 theory,	 sufficient	 conventional	 military	 power	 to	 ensure	 a	 proportionate	 ladder	 of	
escalation	leading	to	the	possibility	of	nuclear	detonation,	the	circumstances	of	which	are	always	kept	
ambiguous	(Street,	2015).	
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public’s	perception	of	their	party’.		
	
In	 summary,	 Rifkind	 draws	 several	 conclusions	 from	 the	 polling	 data.	 Firstly,	 the	
public	 is	 far	 more	 favourable	 to	 replacement	 than	 generally	 understood	 and	 the	
issue	 of	 Trident’s	 cost—which	 the	 public	 overestimate—is	 key.	 Furthermore,	 the	
issue	of	replacement	is	more	salient	and	sensitive	an	electoral	issue	for	Labour	and	
the	 Liberal	 Democrats,	with	 Conservative	 voters	 being	more	 supportive	 of	 Trident	
than	the	average	voter.	Whether	or	not	one	agrees	with	Rifkind’s	 interpretation	of	
the	data,	which	could	be	ascribed	to	wishful	 thinking	on	his	part,	 the	key	point	he	
makes	 is	 that	 if	 the	debate	about	 the	UK’s	nuclear	 future	 focuses	on	 the	 technical	
question	of	which	posture	or	platform	 is	best,	 then	 the	Conservatives	are	 likely	 to	
have	their	way.		
	
Supporters	 of	 disarmament	 therefore	 need	 to	 find	ways	 to	 clearly	 explain	what	 it	
means	for	the	UK	to	be	a	NWS	and	makes	the	issue	visible	and	relevant	to	people’s	
lives.	 Campaign	 groups	 such	 as	CND	 (2014)	 and	Global	 Zero	 (2014)	 have	begun	 to	
address	 this	 by	 highlighting	 how	 many	 schools	 and	 hospitals	 could	 be	 built	 if	
governments	 decided	 not	 to	 waste	 money	 on	 nuclear	 weapons.	 Such	 arguments	
have	 gained	 weight	 given	 recent	 estimates	 suggesting	 that	 the	 whole	 life-cost	 of	
Successor	may	be	over	£200	billion,	although	it	could	be	argued	that	even	this	figure	
does	not	reflect	the	wider	costs	of	the	UK	remaining	a	NWS	with	Trident,	given	the	
national	 need	 to	 maintain	 a	 viable	 submarine	 industry	 (CND,	 2016;	 Piper,	 2015;	
Street,	 2016).	 Similarly,	 the	 SNP’s	 case	 for	 removing	 Trident	 ‘weapons	 of	 mass	
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destruction’	from	Scottish	territory	and	waters	focused	on	cost,	but	also	that	Trident	
symbolised	 the	 ‘democratic	 deficit’	 whereby	Westminster	 imposed	 its	 policies	 on	
Scotland	(Scottish	National	Party,	2013).		
	
Elsewhere,	a	variety	of	UK-based	analysts	such	as	Professor	Malcolm	Chalmers	(2013	
i),	Andrew	Futter	(2016),	David	Hambling	(2016)	as	well	as	retired	Rear	Admiral	Chris	
Parry	(2015)	and	Lord	Des	Browne	(Watt,	2015),	alongside	Bryan	Clark	(2015)	in	the	
US,	have	variously	drawn	attention	to	 the	possibility	 that	submarines	will	 in	 future	
be	 much	 more	 vulnerable	 to	 cyber-attacks	 and	 detection	 by	 underwater	
technologies	 and	 that	 ballistic	missiles	 could	 even	 become	 obsolete.	 These	 points	
have	again	 led	 to	questioning	 concerning	 the	wisdom	of	 the	UK	building	 four	new	
SSBNs.	Yet	whilst	these	arguments	are	important	aspects	of	the	nuclear	debate,	it	is	
questionable	whether,	without	 a	 deeper	 appreciation	of	why	elites	 value	 the	UK’s	
nuclear	 status	 and	 fear	 losing	 it,	 disarmament	 advocates	 will	 be	 able	 to	 craft	
successful	political	strategies.	This	means,	for	example,	considering	and	providing	an	
alternative	 to	 the	broader	political	meanings	 and	 structures	within	which	 the	UK’s	
nuclear	 weapons	 are	 embedded,	 rather	 than	 just	 focusing	 on	 the	 weapons	
themselves.	
	
The	 political	 complexities	 of	 the	 nuclear	 debate	 were	 shown	 when	 the	 SNP	
committed	 itself	 to	 remaining	 in	NATO,	which	 raised	 the	 difficult	 question	 of	 how	
Scotland	 could	 reject	 Trident	 on	 the	one	hand	whilst	 accepting	membership	 of	 an	
alliance	with	a	nuclear	 first	 strike	at	 the	core	of	 its	military	 strategy	 (Carrell,	2012;	
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Whitaker,	2014).	The	 issue	of	how	a	non-nuclear	Britain	would	relate	to	a	nuclear-
armed	NATO	was	also	a	vexing	issue	for	the	Labour	party	under	Neil	Kinnock,	which	
was,	until	1989,	committed	to	unilateral	nuclear	disarmament	and	the	removal	of	US	
bases.77		
	
The	contradictions	within	Labour’s	position	could	not	be	sustained	and	led	the	party,	
after	 the	1987	election,	 to	 replace	unilateralism	with	multilateralism,	whereby	 the	
UK	 would	 only	 place	 its	 nuclear	 weapons	 in	 disarmament	 negotiations	 once	 the	
superpowers	were	ready	to	commit	to	abolition.	The	significance	of	this	move	was	
that	 Labour	 was	 not	 prepared	 to	 move	 towards	 the	 kind	 of	 neutralism	 that	 E.P.	
Thompson	 (1981:	 27;	 1987)	 understood	 nuclear	 disarmament	 to	 entail	 when	 he	
wrote	 of	 the	 need	 to	 end	 British	 subservience,	 by	 ‘shaking	 off’	 US	 hegemony	 and	
‘reclaiming	 autonomy’.	 Similarly,	 for	 the	 SNP,	 whilst	 the	 removal	 of	 Trident	
represents	independence	from	Westminster,	independence	from	Washington	and	its	
nuclear	 weapons	 policies	 means	 renouncing	 membership	 of	 NATO,	 which	 has	
hitherto	proved	unacceptable.		
	
The	UK	thus	remains	one	of,	if	not	the,	most	ardent	promoters	of	NATO,	with	most	
defence	and	foreign	policy	experts	seeing	it	as	an	essential	pillar	of	security	for	Euro-
Atlantic	 nations.	 Domestically,	 whilst	 vocal	 critics	 of	 the	 alliance	 exist	 within	 the																																									 																					
77	According	to	Len	Scott	(2006:	695),	Kinnock’s	rationale	for	British	disarmament	was	‘presented	as	a	
contribution	 to	 quantitative	 and	 qualitative	 improvements	 in	 NATO	 conventional	 defences’.	
Moreover,	the	UK	would	press	NATO	to	adopt	a	no	first	use	policy.	
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Labour	 and	 Scottish	 National	 parties,	 for	 the	 most	 part	 it	 retains	 strong	
parliamentary	support.	This	is	despite	evidence	showing	considerable	public	disquiet	
with	the	status	quo,	including	a	2015	YouGov	poll	(2015)	which	found	that	a	majority	
of	swing	Labour	voters	want	the	party	to	be	 ‘less	subservient	to	the	USA’,	not	 ‘get	
involved	 in	 American	 wars’	 and	 instead	 be	 ‘more	 positive	 about	 Britain’s	 role	 in	
Europe’.	 In	 response,	 Labour	 leader	 Jeremy	 Corbyn	 has	 argued	 that	 the	 alliance	
needs	 to	 be	 brought	 ‘under	 democratic	 control’	 and	 consider	 carefully	 future	
eastwards	expansion	(Simons,	2015).	
	
It	 is	worth	noting	 that	 in	an	article	 reflecting	on	 the	UK	government's	addiction	 to	
nuclear	weapons,	George	Monbiot	(2010)	argues	that	the	one	force	that	could	finally	
'kill'	Trident	is	the	US.	For	only	once	the	US	has	begun	to	dismantle	its	huge	nuclear	
arsenal	 and	 'ordered'	 the	 UK	 to	 follow	 suit	 would	 such	 disarmament	 occur.	
Recalcitrant	parliamentary	and	public	opinion	in	the	UK	thus	'counts	for	nothing'.	An	
alternative	to	waiting	for	orders	from	the	US	is	for	the	UK	to,	as	Mark	Curtis	(2003:	
436)	 argues,	 in	 a	 similar	 vein	 to	 Thompson,	 ‘withdraw	 its	 general	 backing	 for	
Washington	 and	 instead	 pursue	 a	 policy	 of	 strategic	 non-cooperation’.	 Such	 a	
seismic	 shift,	 replacing	 ‘a	 very	 well-entrenched,	 elitist,	 secretive	 and	 totalitarian	
domestic	 governance	 system’	 with	 a	 ‘genuine	 popular	 democracy’	 will,	 for	 Curtis	
(Ibid),	only	result	from	‘massive	public	pressure’.	
	
In	terms	of	the	potential	for	a	shift	in	politics	and	public	opinion	that	would	lead	to	
such	a	 transformation	 in	 the	UK’s	 international	policy,	a	2014	YouGov	poll	 (Raines,	
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2015)	found	that	a	majority	of	the	wider	public	thinks	that	the	UK	should	aspire	to	
be	a	 ‘great	power’	rather	than	accept	that	 it	 is	 in	decline.	61%	of	respondents	also	
thought	that	NATO	is	either	‘vital’	or	‘important’	to	UK	security.	A	larger	number	of	
respondents	thought	that	the	UK	should	have	closest	ties	with	the	EU	(30%)	rather	
than	the	US	(25%),	suggesting	the	European	dimension	of	the	alliance	may	be	more	
important	 to	 the	 public.	 Overall,	 such	 findings	 suggest	 that	 the	 first	 job	 for	 those	
seeking	 to	 develop	 an	 alternative	 to	 Britain’s	 current	 position	 is	 that	 they	 lead	 a	
public	 debate	 about	what	 type	of	 international	 behaviour	 and	 relationships	would	
align	best	with	the	values	and	goals	that	voters	most	care	about.	The	potential	to	do	
this	 is	 shown	 by	 Thomas	 Raines	 (2015:	 2),	 who	 points	 out	 in	 his	 study	 of	 British	
attitudes	 to	 international	 relations	 that	 the	 British	 public	 are	 more	 focused	 on	
security	questions	closer	to	home,	such	as	‘border	protection	and	counterterrorism’	
than	projecting	power	abroad.		
	
Elsewhere,	 the	 individuals	and	groups	working	 to	 increase	public	awareness	of	 the	
economic,	 environmental	 and	 political	 costs	 and	 risks	 of	 the	UK	 remaining	 a	NWS	
and	interventionist	military	power	support	such	a	democratic	process	by	opening	up	
British	 defence	 and	 foreign	 policy	 to	 some	 degree	 of	 transparency	 and	
accountability.	Yet	whilst	progress	has	been	made,	several	of	the	proposals	made	in	
the	 1980s	 by	 civil	 society	 to	 increase	 access	 to	 information	 and	 public	 and	
parliamentary	control	over	nuclear	weapons	have	still	yet	 to	be	realised	(Elworthy,	
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1989:	 175;	 Miall,	 1987:	 157).78	Such	 democratic	 accountability	 is	 essential	 if	 the	
requisite	pressure	for	nuclear	disarmament	and	a	sustainable	approach	to	security	is	
to	be	built	over	the	long-term	in	the	UK.	
	
Conclusion	
	
This	chapter	has	sought	to	assess	the	explanatory	power	of	both	the	mainstream	and	
realist	 and	 institutional	 democratisation	 perspectives	 on	 the	 causes	 and	
consequences	of	British	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament.	For	the	UK	case	study,	
the	 security	 model	 is	 valuable	 in	 explaining	 the	 wartime	 origins	 of	 the	 British	
decision	 to	 acquire	 the	 bomb,	 but	 cannot	 satisfactorily	 outline	 the	 domestic	 and	
international	 factors	 driving	 the	 UK’s	 current	 nuclear	 politics.	 For	 example,	 the	
security	 model	 focuses	 on	 external	 threats	 driving	 the	 UK’s	 continued	 need	 for	
nuclear	deterrence—such	as	those	emanating	from	Russia	and	other	so-called	‘rogue	
states’.	Yet	in	recent	years	the	UK	government	has	stated	that	it	does	not	perceive	a	
military	 threat	 to	 the	 UK	 from	 a	 major	 state,	 preferring	 to	 argue	 that	 future	
uncertainty	 necessitates	 maintaining	 the	 bomb	 as	 the	 ultimate	 insurance	 policy.	
Moreover,	the	UK	defence	and	foreign	policy	establishment	highly	values	its	nuclear	
																																								 																					
78	For	 example,	 Scilla	 Elworthy	 (1989:	 175)	 outlined	 a	 series	 of	 recommendations,	 several	 of	which	
require	 implementation	 today,	 including:	 i)	 the	need	 for	parliamentary	 committees	 to	be	given	 the	
necessary	powers	to	‘monitor	and	control	expenditure	on	nuclear	weapons	programmes’	before	key	
decisions	are	made	 ii)	 the	need	 for	 the	MoD	to	publish	annually	estimated	expenditure	on	 ‘specific	
types	of	research,	testing,	development,	pre-series	production	and	full	development’	iii)	the	need	for	
the	MoD	 to	 disclose	 ‘on	what	 basis	 it	 provides	 information	 to	 industry,	 and	 under	what	 clearance	
arrangements’.	
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status	 because	 it	 believes	 this	 elevates	 it	 beyond	 being	 another	 middle	 ranking	
power	as	well	as	offering	moral	and	political	support	to	the	US	in	its	management	of	
international	order.	However,	being	such	a	close	ally	of	the	US	brings	with	it	its	own	
dangers	so	that	London’s	propensity	to	support	Washington’s	military	interventions	
and	NATO	expansion	may	generate	a	scenario	whereby	UK	territory	or	interests	are	
threatened	 by	 nuclear	 attack—which	 is	 a	 strong	 but	 unspoken	 reason	why	 British	
defence	and	foreign	policy-making	elites	continue	to	believe	that	the	UK	must	persist	
in	practicing	nuclear	deterrence.	
	
The	security	model	also	has	little	to	say	about	the	important	domestic	factors	driving	
the	 UK’s	 continuing	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 the	 changes	 that	 need	 to	 take	 place	
within	 the	 UK	 for	 nuclear	 disarmament	 to	 become	 politically	 viable.	 Institutional	
democratisation	does	a	better	job	in	both	these	areas	by	highlighting	the	closed	and	
secretive	nature	of	UK	nuclear	weapons	decision-making,	how	this	connects	 to	the	
UK’s	sizable	‘warfare	state’	and	the	flaws	within	the	UK’s	liberal	democratic	model,	
and	 the	 impact	 that	 nuclear	 possession	 has	 had	 on	 the	 British	 polity	 and	 political	
discourse.	Institutional	democratisation	as	a	theory	of	political	change	also	helps	us	
imagine	a	path	by	which	the	UK	could	shift	its	defence	and	foreign	policy	away	from	
power	 projection	 and	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 towards	 a	 conventional	 and	 non-
offensive	 defence	 policy.	 By	 studying	 the	 domestic	 political	 scene,	 including	
industrial,	economic,	party	political	and	 factors,	as	well	as	public	opinion,	 it	 is	 thus	
possible	to	propose	how	these	might	develop	in	future	in	ways	that	support	nuclear	
disarmament	 action.	 For	 example,	 civil	 society	 has	 fought	 for	 decades	 for	
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information	to	be	in	the	public	domain	so	that	the	costs	and	risks	of	the	UK’s	nuclear	
arsenal,	 including	 safety	 and	 environmental	 issues	 surrounding	 AWE,	 are	 widely	
known.	Maintaining	work	of	this	kind	as	well	as	building	social	movements	advancing	
an	 alternative	 international	 policy	 and	 institutional	 democratisation	 could	 harness	
existing	public	enthusiasm	for	nuclear	disarmament	and	draw	in	new	supporters.	
	
Whilst	 it	 is	 therefore	 clear	 that	 there	 are	 significant	 barriers	 to	 institutional	
democratisation	 in	 the	 UK,	 including	 the	 grip	 the	 British	 guardianship	 has	 over	
nuclear	weapons	decision-making	and	the	UK’s	subordinate	relationship	to	the	US—	
particularly	 regarding	 international	 policy—the	 potential	 exists	 for	 civil	 society	 to	
deepen	British	democracy	and	transform	the	UK’s	international	posture	in	the	short	
to	medium	term	as	a	means	to	advance	the	cause	of	nuclear	disarmament.	Clearly,	
such	a	prospect	frightens	powerful	supporters	of	the	status	quo,	who	seek	to	paint	
their	opponents	as	threats	to	national	security.	Yet	large	sections	of	the	British	public	
favour	 scrapping	 nuclear	 weapons	 and	 the	 prospect	 of	 Trident’s	 removal	 from	
Scotland	remains	a	possibility	as	long	as	support	for	independence	remains	strong.		
	
What	should	also	be	clear	from	the	preceding	discussion	 is	that	 it	 is	highly	unlikely	
that	British	military	and	political	elites	will,	of	 their	own	accord,	 relinquish	nuclear	
weapons—as	proposed	by	 the	guardianship	 approach	 to	nuclear	 arms	 control	 and	
disarmament.	 British	 defence	 and	 foreign	 policy	 elites	 are	 so	 tightly	 bound	 by	
history,	 identity	 and	 established	 structures	 of	 power,	 including	 the	 nuclear	
relationships	 with	 France	 and	 the	 US,	 that	 the	 costs	 of	 relinquishing	 the	 political	
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power	vested	 in	Trident	are	too	great	for	them	to	contemplate,	whilst	the	political	
benefits	at	home	and	abroad	are	not	sufficiently	attractive.	At	the	same	time,	the	UK	
has	 come	 closest	 of	 the	 NWS	 to	 unilateral	 disarmament	 and	 the	 current	 Labour	
leadership	 is	 particularly	 comfortable	 with	 this	 notion,	 despite	 dissent	 within	 the	
party	and	 support	 for	nuclear	possession	by	 some	unions	and	 their	members.	 It	 is	
also	possible	that	significant	cost	escalation	for	the	Successor	programme,	industrial	
troubles	 and	 technological	 developments	 (including	 in	 cyber	 and	 underwater	
warfare)	may	 combine	 to	make	 current	 nuclear	 platforms	 (SSBNs)	 ineffective	 and	
vulnerable	 from	 both	 a	 political	 and	 military	 viewpoint,	 so	 that	 alternative	 policy	
options—including	disarmament—become	more	inviting	over	time.	
	
Leaving	such	technocratic	scenarios	aside,	British	nuclear	disarmament	would	likely	
only	 come	 about	 as	 a	 result	 of	 two	 different	 developments,	 which	 may	 be	
complementary	depending	on	how	they	emerge.	Firstly,	a	disarmament	initiative	led	
by	the	US,	for	example	on	a	multilateral	basis,	involving	Russia	and	with	Chinese	and	
French	support,	would	very	likely	lead	to	British	participation.	As	previously	outlined,	
popular	 struggle	 towards	 democratic	 control	 of	 state	 institutions	 in	 the	 US	 is	
essential	if	the	power	of	its	nuclear	weapons	establishment	is	to	be	challenged	and	
controlled	and	nuclear	weapons	delegitimised	pending	disarmament.	Secondly,	 if	a	
popular	domestic	movement	emerges	which	 is	 committed	 to	democratising	British	
institutions,	is	capable	of	challenging	the	power	of	defence	and	foreign	policy	elites	
and	 is	able	to	win	control	over	nuclear	weapons	decision-making,	 the	possibility	of	
irreversible	 disarmament	 measures	 being	 enacted	 becomes	 feasible.	 Such	 a	
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disarmament	process	would	also	require	an	alternate	vision	for	Britain’s	role	in	the	
world,	 so	 that	 collective	 and	non-military	 approaches	 to	 security—with	 a	 focus	on	
human	 rights,	 as	 well	 as	 conflict	 prevention	 and	 resolution—are	 prioritised	 and	
international	 law	 is	 adhered	 to	 regarding	 the	 threat	 or	 use	 of	 force.	 Whilst	 the	
difficult	 question	 of	 the	 UK’s	 relationship	 with	 NATO	 would	 need	 to	 be	 resolved,	
closer	 engagement	 with	 international	 institutions	 whose	 values	 accord	 with	 the	
vision	of	a	NWFW,	such	as	the	EU,	OSCE	and	UN,	could	assist	the	UK	in	making	the	
transition	to	FNWS	status.	
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Chapter	Six:	France	
	
Introduction	
	
This	 chapter	 assesses	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	 institutional	 democratisation	 and	
other	mainstream	and	realist	approaches	regarding	the	causes	and	consequences	of	
French	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 disarmament.	 As	 with	 the	 British	 case	 study,	 the	
chapter	 proceeds	 in	 several	 sections,	 beginning	 by	 comparing	 and	 contrasting	
different	 historical	 views	 on	 France’s	 nuclear	 experience	 since	 World	 War	 Two	
before	moving	on	to	discuss	modern	day	French	nuclear	politics.	Whilst	there	is	still	
a	significant	range	of	data	available	in	English	covering	French	nuclear	politics,	this	is	
less	than	for	the	UK	and	US	for	several	reasons.	These	include	the	language	barrier,	
the	limited	size	of	the	audience	for	this	subject	beyond	France	and	the	fact	that	for	
several	decades	 there	has	been	a	national	pro-bomb	consensus	 in	France—though	
questioning	of	France’s	nuclear	status	has	become	greater	in	recent	years.	For	these	
reasons,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	the	French	nuclear	arsenal	is	much	smaller	than	that	
of	 Russia	 and	 the	 US	 and	 the	 comparatively	 limited	 nature	 of	 France’s	 power	
projection	 capabilities—which	means	 that	 France	 does	 not	 play	 as	 great	 a	 role	 in	
other	state’s	strategic	calculus—this	chapter	is	shorter	than	those	on	the	UK,	US	and	
Russia.	 Having	 outlined	 French	 nuclear	 politics	 in	 this	 chapter,	 Chapter	 Eight	 then	
contextualises	 France’s	 responsibility	 for	 disarmament	 action	 alongside	 the	 other	
NWS	and	makes	appropriate	conclusions	and	recommendations.	
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The	first	section	of	this	chapter	summarises	the	mainstream	and	realist	approaches	
explored	in	Chapter	Two	in	relation	to	France’s	particular	experience	as	a	NWS	and	
assesses	 the	merits	 of	 the	 security	model	 as	 applied	 to	 France.	 This	 is	 principally	
done	by	placing	the	French	development	of	nuclear	weapons	within	the	context	of	
relevant	historical	events	from	the	mid	to	late	20th	and	early	21st	century—focusing,	
in	 particular,	 on	 the	 Cold	 War,	 where	 France	 positioned	 itself	 as	 a	 world	 power	
capable	of	deterring	any	threat	to	its	national	independence	and	security	by	virtue	of	
its	 nuclear	 status.	 I	 also	 explore	 other	 justifications	 for	 France	 retaining	 the	 bomb	
and	 arguments	 against	 disarmament	 made	 by	 prominent	 advocates	 of	 nuclear	
possession	in	relation	to	relevant	views	on	the	origins	and	meaning	of	the	Cold	War.		
The	 second	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 then	 assesses	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	
institutional	 democratisation	 regarding	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 French	
nuclear	possession	and	disarmament	by	developing	the	domestic	politics	model.	 In	
doing	 so,	 official	 justifications	 for	 France’s	 nuclear	 status	 are	 challenged	 and	 the	
limitations	 in	 the	mainstream	and	 realist	 literature’s	explanation	of	French	nuclear	
politics	 identified.	 A	 brief	 exploration	 of	 critical	 perspectives	 on	 the	 Cold	War	 and	
French	 global	 strategy	 is	 also	 presented	 to	 identify	 historical	 approaches	 that	
support	the	specific	claims	and	ideas	of	institutional	democratisation.	Previous	work	
focusing	on	France’s	domestic	nuclear	politics	 is	discussed	here	 in	order	 to	 specify	
the	 wider	 impact	 nuclear	 possession	 has	 had	 on	 the	 French	 polity,	 relate	 this	 to	
criticisms	of	France’s	record	as	a	liberal	democracy	and	its	maintenance	of	a	sizable	
and	 costly	 military	 establishment,	 and	 highlight	 existing	 scholarly	 arguments	
compatible	with	the	main	contentions	of	this	thesis.	As	we	shall	see,	the	French	case	
is	particularly	relevant	to	the	claims	made	by	institutional	democratisation	given	the	
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existence	of	what	several	scholars	refer	to	as	France’s	‘nuclear	monarchy’,	which	was	
initiated	 by	 President	 Charles	 de	 Gaulle	 and	 which	 has	 shaped	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
French	state	and	Presidency	to	this	day.		
	
Having	 provided	 this	 historical	 overview	 of	 the	 different	 approaches	 to	 French	
nuclear	 possession	 and	 disarmament,	 the	 third	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 goes	 into	
more	 detail	 concerning	 current	 obstacles	 to	 and	 opportunities	 for	 institutional	
democratisation	in	France	by	reviewing	modern	day	French	politics	in	relation	to	the	
nuclear	 question.	 A	 range	 of	 evidence	 is	 presented	 to	 show	 both	 how	 wide	 the	
democratic	deficit	is	in	France	and	the	extent	to	which	this	is	reflected	in	and	relates	
to	the	gap	between	French	public	opinion	on	nuclear	arms	control	and	disarmament,	
and	the	actions	of	elite	actors	and	the	French	government.	For	example,	the	French	
political	 establishment	 maintains	 an	 apparent	 consensus	 on	 nuclear	 policy	 that	
makes	 the	 prospects	 for	 French	 nuclear	 disarmament	 appear	 distant,	 particularly	
when	compared	to	the	UK.		
	
This	section	moves	on	to	consider	how	to	move	beyond	the	status	quo,	investigating	
what	France	can	do	to	advance	nuclear	disarmament,	nationally	and	internationally.	
For	example,	the	present	state	of	the	French	peace	and	disarmament	movement	and	
public	 opinion	 concerning	 France’s	 role	 in	 the	world	 is	 considered	 to	 explore	 civil	
society’s	 potential	 contribution	 to	 disarmament	 initiatives	 and	 how	 these	 may	
develop	and	be	strengthened	as	part	of	a	wider	democratisation	process.	Potentially	
conducive	 developments	 in	 international	 security	 that	 will	 support	 such	 domestic	
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political	 change	highlighted	 in	 the	expert	 literature	are	also	discussed,	 to	 illustrate	
how	 domestic	 and	 international	 nuclear	 politics	 interact.	 Given	 France’s	 role	 as	 a	
major	military	 power,	 arms	 exporter	 and	 ally	 of	 the	US	 in	managing	 global	 order,	
French	 nuclear	 disarmament—as	 part	 of	 a	 new	 approach	 to	 international	 policy	
prioritising	 human	 rights	 and	 international	 law—would	 likely	 have	 an	 important	
impact	 on	 both	Western	 and	 global	 nuclear	 politics	 as	well	 as	 enriching	 domestic	
freedoms	and	democratic	standards	in	France.	
	
6.1	Mainstream	and	realist	perspectives	on	the	causes	and	consequences	of	French	
nuclear	possession	and	disarmament	
	
Realist	 explanations	 of	 the	 French	 decision	 to	 develop	 nuclear	weapons,	 for	 Scott	
Sagan	(1996:	58,	76-77),	are	 ‘very	simple’	and	emphasise	the	military	threat	posed	
by	 the	 USSR	 from	 the	 1950s	 onwards	 as	 well	 as	 the	 reduced	 ‘credibility’	 of	 US	
extended	 deterrence	 guarantees	 following	 the	 USSR	 developing	 the	 ability	 to	
‘threaten	retaliation	against	the	United	States’.	As	Beatrice	Heuser	(1998:	77)	notes,	
President	 Charles	 de	 Gaulle	 is	 thus	 often	 lauded	 for	 ‘presiding	 over	 France’s	
acquisition	of	nuclear	weapons’,	which	 restored	French	 sovereignty,	 independence	
and	freedom	after	the	Nazi	occupation	in	World	War	Two.	According	to	the	security	
model,	 France’s	 desire	 to	 keep	hold	 of	 the	bomb,	 Sagan	 (Ibid:	 77)	 adds,	was	 then	
reinforced	by	the	experience	of	Suez	in	1956	when	Paris	had	to	‘withdraw	its	military	
intervention	 forces	 after	 a	 nuclear	 threat	 from	 Russia	 and	 under	 U.S.	 economic	
pressure’.	 By	 becoming	 a	 nuclear	 power,	 and	 thus	 a	 leader	 in	 global	 affairs	 once	
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more,	 France	would	 ensure	 the	 national	weakness	 displayed	 during	 this	 time	was	
never	repeated.		
	
Wilfrid	 L.	 Kohl	 (1971:	8)	highlights	other	 reasons	why	 influential	 groups	within	 the	
Fourth	 Republic—technocrats,	 military	 officers	 and	 politicians—pushed	 for	 the	
development	of	the	bomb,	ranging	from:		
	
France’s	declining	influence	in	NATO	and	the	frustrations	caused	by	the	loss	
of	her	colonial	territories	to	a	desire	for	the	modern	weapons	for	the	French	
army	to	restore	its	morale,	to	offset	the	effects	of	German	rearmament,	and	
to	diminish	France’s	dependence	upon	American	military	protection.	
	
France	would	thus	be	able	to	challenge	US	‘hegemony’,	rising	to	a	status	equal	to	the	
UK	 and	 above	 West	 Germany	 (Journe,	 2011:	 126;	 Tertrais,	 2004:	 61;	 Yost,	 2004:	
224).	The	French	leadership	role	in	Western	Europe	would	also	be	retained,	whilst	it	
strove	 to	 unify	 the	 European	 continent	 ‘from	 the	 Atlantic	 to	 the	 Urals’,	 promote	
détente	with	Communist	countries	and	secure	an	independent	position	for	Europe	in	
world	politics	(Kohl,	1971:	6;	Tertrais,	2004:	58).	
	
Supporters	of	France’s	nuclear	status	have	been	able	to	resist	calls	for	disarmament	
at	home	and	abroad,	observers	 such	as	Oliver	Debouzy	 (1995:	34)	and	Michael	M.	
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Harrison	 (1981:	 261)	 argue,	 because	 whilst	 the	 French	 left	 opposed	 the	 Gaullist	
vision	and	supported	nuclear	disarmament	 in	the	1960s,	since	the	1970s	there	has	
been	a	broad	national	consensus	in	favour	of	France’s	security	and	defence	policies,	
including	the	retention	of	nuclear	arms.	Heuser	(1998:	81)	therefore	usefully	points	
out	that,	in	response	to	claims	that	the	French	President’s	‘monopoly	control’	of	the	
bomb	was	‘illegitimate	because	anti-democratic’,	nuclear	enthusiasts	argue	that	the	
President	is	authorised	to	use	nuclear	weapons	as	an	enactment	of	the	popular	will	
in	national	elections.	
	
Following	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War,	 Yost	 (2004:	 209)	 claims	 that	 the	 French	
reconfigured	their	nuclear	forces	to	deter	two	different	threats,	posed	by:	i)	the	re-
emergence	of	a	major	state	(potentially	China	or	Russia)	ii)	a	regional	power	armed	
with	WMD.	 The	 focus	 on	 the	 latter	 led	 President	 Chirac	 (2001)	 to	 emphasise	 the	
need	to	destroy	the	‘political,	military	and	economic	power	centres’	of	an	aggressor,	
requiring	 France	 to	 acquire,	 as	 Yost	 (2004:	 218)	 puts	 it,	 a	 wider	 range	 of	 nuclear	
options	 ‘including	 more	 precise	 and	 more	 discriminate	 strike	 capabilities’	 which	
‘explicitly’	 lowered	the	threshold	for	use	(Journe,	2011:	141).	Elsewhere,	Libération	
explained	 that	 the	 aim	 of	 these	 new	 capabilities	 was	 to	 be	 able	 to	 ‘decapitate’	 a	
regime,	‘without	killing	millions	of	innocent	civilians’	(Acronym,	2006).	
The	 French	 2013	 Defence	White	 Paper	 (2013:	 73),	 described	 the	 nation’s	 nuclear	
weapons	policy	as	follows:		
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Our	 deterrence	 capability	 is	 strictly	 defensive.	 The	 use	 of	 nuclear	weapons	
would	 only	 be	 conceivable	 in	 extreme	 circumstances	 of	 legitimate	 self-
defence.	In	this	respect,	nuclear	deterrence	is	the	ultimate	guarantee	of	the	
security,	protection	and	independence	of	the	Nation’.		
	
This	statement	is	consistent	with	the	long-standing	French	concept	of	‘non-use’,	an	
idea	not	to	be	confused	with	no	first	use,	which	France	rejects.	Rather,	non-use	is	a	
means	 by	which	 the	 French	 government	 can	 deploy	 advanced	 nuclear	 capabilities	
whilst	 portraying	 its	 nuclear	 arsenal	 as	 an	 essential	 tool	 to	 prevent—rather	 than	
fight—wars.	Moreover,	 as	 Yost	 (2004:	 223)	 explains,	 non-use	 provides	 the	 French	
with	political	advantages,	such	as	being	able	to	remain	in	NATO	and	yet	independent	
from	it,	and	the	US,	 in	terms	of	nuclear	deterrence	strategy.	France	has	thus	never	
been	a	member	of	NATO’s	nuclear	planning	group	(NPG).79	
	
In	 recent	 times	 the	 French	 bomb	 has	 also	 been	 presented	 as	 vital	 to	 protect	 the	
nation’s	 ‘vital	 interests’,	 although	 as	 Yost	 (Ibid:	 219)	 points	 out,	what	 these	mean	
‘depends	on	the	President’.	For	example,	 former	President	 Jacques	Chirac	outlined	
his	belief	 that	 ‘the	 integrity	of	our	 territory,	 the	protection	of	our	population’	 and	
‘the	free	exercise	of	our	sovereignty’	were	at	the	core	of	France’s	vital	interests.	He	
later	 added	 that	 ‘safeguarding	 our	 strategic	 supplies’	 and	 ‘the	 defence	 of	 allied																																									 																					
79	According	to	NATO’s	website	(2010),	the	NPG	‘provides	a	forum	in	which	NATO	member	countries	
can	participate	in	the	development	of	the	Alliance's	nuclear	policy	and	in	decisions	on	NATO's	nuclear	
posture,	irrespective	of	whether	or	not	they	themselves	maintain	nuclear	weapons’.	
	 319	
countries’,	could	be	invoked	in	the	event	of	‘an	unbearable	act	of	aggression,	threat	
or	 blackmail	 perpetrated	 against	 these	 interests’	 (Acronym,	 2006).	 To	 imagine	 the	
emergence	 of	 an	 international	 political	 environment	 in	 which	 there	 is	 ‘no	
foreseeable	major	threat’	to	French	‘vital	 interests’	 is	thus	to	imagine,	according	to	
Tertrais	 (2009	 ii:	 4),	 a	 ‘profound	 transformation	 of	 international	 relations’	
approaching	some	sort	of	‘global	democratic	peace’	where	the	use	of	military	force	
is	constrained	by	international	law.		
	
In	terms	of	arms	control	and	disarmament,	the	French	government	claims	that	it	has	
a	 ‘unique,	 exemplary	 record	 in	 nuclear	 disarmament’	 and	 has	 taken	 ‘significant	
unilateral	 steps’	 to	 abide	 by	 its	 NPT	 commitments,	 both	 in	 terms	 of	 nuclear	 and	
general	 and	 complete	 disarmament	 (MDN/MAEE,	 2009).	 As	 proof	 of	 this,	 French	
officials	 cites	 several	 actions,	 including	 President	 Sarkozy’s	 announcement	 in	 2008	
of:	‘a	reduction	by	one	third	in	the	number	of	nuclear	weapons,	missiles	and	aircraft	
of	 the	 French	 airborne	 component’	 and	 the	 2008	 disarmament	 action	 plan	 it	
presented	 with	 European	 nations,	 endorsed	 by	 27	 EU	 Heads	 of	 State	 and	
Government	(Ibid).		
	
Given	 the	 importance	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 for	 France’	 Tertrais	 (2009	 i:	 16-23),	
therefore	posits	 that	some	sort	of	 ‘extraordinary’	 shift	 in	 the	 international	political	
environment	 would	 be	 required	 to	 could	 push	 France	 towards	 zero,	 so	 that	
disarmament	is	an	‘extreme	hypothesis’.	He	also	excludes	the	possibility	of	domestic	
political	 forces	 pushing	 for	 zero	 because,	 he	 argues,	 France	 ‘has	 never	 had	 a	
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significant	 anti-nuclear	 movement’	 (Tertrais,	 2007:	 261).	 Furthermore,	 today	 the	
Green	 party	 ‘is	 the	 only	 significant	 force	 calling	 for	 nuclear	 disarmament’	 and	 the	
French	 public	 is	 in	 favour	 of	 retaining	 a	 nuclear	 arsenal.	 Having	 reviewed	 three	
possible	 scenarios	 by	 which	 France	 might	 ‘reduce	 to	 zero’,	 Tertrais	 (2009	 i:	 19)	
concludes	that:	
	
the	only	 credible	 circumstances	where	 France	would	be	willing	 to	 seriously	
consider	the	global	abolition	of	nuclear	weapons	are	those	in	which	there	is	
no	 foreseeable	 major	 threat	 against	 its	 vital	 interests	 and	 those	 of	 its	
European	partners.	However,	it	would	be	difficult	for	Paris	to	stay	away	from	
a	coordinated	US-Russia-China	initiative	to	begin	negotiations	for	a	treaty	to	
eliminate	nuclear	weapons	from	all	nations.	
	
To	unpack	this	a	 little,	absent	domestic	political	pressure	altering	the	power	elite’s	
cost/benefit	analysis	 regarding	the	value	of	nuclear	weapons,	 they	will	continue	to	
be	 deployed	 to	 protect	 France’s	 ‘vital	 interests’.	 The	 needs	 of	 French	 national	
security	are	thus	an	unquestioned	constant,	so	that	nuclear	deterrence	is	justifiable	
and	pragmatic.	Such	security	first	 logic,	driven	by	a	belief	 in	French	exceptionalism,	
provides	a	useful	insight	into	how	France’s	establishment—at	the	helm	of	a	‘leading	
nation’	 with	 a	 ‘civilizing	 mission’—sees	 itself	 (Moran	 &	 Cottee,	 2011:	 344).	 It	 is	
therefore	posited	 that	France’s	nuclear	needs	will	only	diminish	when	other	 states	
act	 to	 ‘roll	 back’	 proliferation	 and	 Russia	 becomes	 a	 democracy	 ‘in	 the	 Western	
camp’.	 The	 continuation	 of	 US	 extended	 deterrence	 to	 Europe	 is	 also	 seen	 as	
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necessary	 to	provide	 the	 requisite	 security	guarantees	 (Tertrais,	2007:	269;	2009	 i:	
17).	 Alternatively,	 if	 the	 major	 nuclear	 powers	 delegitimise	 and	 relinquish	 their	
arsenals,	this	would	lead	to	‘strong	pressures	from	within	the	EU	for	France	to	follow	
suit’	 (Tertrais,	 2009	 i:	 18). 80 	The	 belief	 that	 the	 US	 and	 Russia	 have	 prime	
responsibility	for	moving	the	world	towards	zero	is	a	long-standing	French	position,	
alongside	 the	need	 for	 them	to	establish	 limits	on	defensive	systems,	 for	example,	
BMD	and	reductions	to	conventional	forces	(Yost,	1994:	266).	
	
6.2	 Critical	 perspectives	 on	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 French	 nuclear	
possession	and	disarmament		
	
This	 section	 follows	 Sagan	 (1996:	 77)	 in	 arguing	 that	 the	 realist	 understanding	 of	
French	nuclear	possession	outlined	above	‘does	not	stand	up	very	well	against	either	
existing	evidence	or	logic’.	The	reasons	why	the	security	model	is	insufficient	shall	be	
outlined	 below	 and	 institutional	 democratisation	 shall	 be	 explored	 as	 a	 means	 of	
providing	 an	 improved	 explanation	 of	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 French	
nuclear	 possession	 and	 disarmament.	 Supporting	 evidence	 for	 institutional	
democratisation,	 which	 focuses	 on	 French	 domestic	 politics,	 is	 strong	 and	 can	 be	
found	 in	 several	 scholarly	 and	 expert	 works.	 For	 example,	 whilst	 contemporary	
political	 analysts	 may	 disagree	 over	 whether	 France	 should	 continue	 to	 possess																																									 																					
80	It	is	fair	to	say	that	in	such	a	situation,	France	would	not	be	able	to	extract	any	of	its	usual	political	
leverage	from	possessing	a	nuclear	arsenal,	making	it	redundant.		
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nuclear	weapons	or	commit	to	disarmament,	there	 is	agreement	over	the	fact	that	
French	nuclear	weapons	decision-making	has	always	been	made	by	a	tiny	group	of	
officials,	 initially	technocrats	and	then	political	elites,	 for	whom	these	weapons	are	
of	supreme	importance.		
	
Bruno	 Tertrais	 (2007:	 257;	 2011)	 therefore	 observes	 that	 France	may	be	 ‘the	 only	
country	whose	political	system	proceeds	 from	the	possession	of	nuclear	weapons’.	
Tertrais	follows	Samy	Cohen’s	(1986)	description	of	France	as	a	‘nuclear	monarchy’,	
and	states	that	nuclear	weapons	policymaking	has	actually	become	more	centralised	
since	 the	 bomb	 was	 acquired.	 Meanwhile,	 Jean-Marie	 Collin,	 a	 researcher	 at	 the	
Group	for	Research	and	Information	on	Peace	and	Security,	has	stated	that	nuclear	
deterrence	 is	 ‘in	 the	 DNA’	 of	 France’s	 top	 political	 elites.	81	Elsewhere,	 Beatrice	
Heuser	 (1998:	 90)	 makes	 the	 complementary	 point	 that	 the	 bomb	 presents	 a	
unifying	 feature	 of	 national	 life	 in	 the	 French	 Fifth	 Republic	 as	 part	 of	 successive	
government’s	 ‘drive	 towards	 centralisation’.	 Securing	 a	 national	 consensus	 on	 the	
‘two	pillars	of	France’s	defence,	conscription	and	the	bomb’	was	therefore,	Heuser	
(Ibid:	91)	argues,	‘crucial	for	domestic	reasons’.	
	
As	previously	noted,	France’s	nuclear	arsenal—which	came	to	be	known	as	the	force	
de	frappe,	meaning	strike	force—is	strongly	associated	with	the	legacy	of	Charles	De	
Gaulle,	who	established	the	Fifth	Republic	and	was	its	first	President.	Endowed	with																																									 																					
81	Interview:	JMC	
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the	authority	to	use	nuclear	weapons	by	the	1958	Constitution,	De	Gaulle	dominated	
French	foreign	and	defence	decision-making	for	more	than	a	decade	(Tertrais,	2007:	
257).	 Yet	 Heuser	 (1998:	 98)	 provocatively	 argues	 that	 rather	 than	 De	 Gaulle’s	
acquisition	of	the	bomb	enjoying	popular	support,	during	his	presidency,	
	
the	 majority	 of	 the	 French	 population	 was	 against	 the	 development	 of	 a	
national	nuclear	 force,	 and	debates	 about	nuclear	weapons	 in	 the	National	
Assembly	 and	 in	 the	 press	 were	 heated.	 De	 Gaulle	 carried	 out	 his	 costly	
programme	against	formidable	opposition.	
	
Moreover,	 according	 to	Gabrielle	Hecht	 (1998:	 63)	 and	Hugh	Miall	 (1987:	 64),	 the	
key	decisions	allowing	the	French	to	test	a	nuclear	bomb	in	1960	were	taken	by	the	
Administrator	General	of	the	Commissariat	à	l'énergie	atomique,	Pierre	Guilliaumat	
in	the	1950s.82	Guilliaumat	pushed	for	the	production	of	weapons	grade	plutonium,	
seeing	the	CEA’s	work	as	a	symbol	of	‘technological	prowess’	and	a	means	by	which	
France	 could	 regain	 the	 ‘national	 radiance’	 it	 had	 lost	 following	 the	humiliation	of	
World	War	Two	(Hecht,	1998:	63).		
	
Crucially,	 the	 high	 degree	 of	 financial	 and	 political	 autonomy	 enjoyed	 by	 the	 CEA																																									 																					
82	The	CEA	was	 founded	 in	1945	as	a	state	agency	tasked	with	the	development	of	atomic	research	
and	 technology.	Notably,	Vernance	 Journe	 (2011:	128)	 takes	a	different	 view,	arguing	 that	 the	CEA	
were	 ‘strongly	 opposed	 to	 any	military	 use	 of	 nuclear	 energy’,	 and	 that	 it	was	 actually	 the	 French	
ministers	of	defence	and	atomic	affairs	who	made	an	early	push	for	the	bomb.	
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during	the	unstable	years	of	the	Fourth	Republic,	which	saw	twenty	prime	ministers	
come	 and	 go,	 meant	 that	 the	 decision	 by	 the	 French	 government	 to	 acquire	 the	
bomb	 in	 1960	 only	 ratified	 a	 pre-existing	 bureaucratic	 process	 (Hecht,	 1998:	 74;	
Hymans,	2012:	34).	Where	De	Gaulle	broke	with	the	previous	regime	and	made	his	
own	 mark,	 according	 to	 Kohl	 (1971:	 6),	 was	 in	 making	 France’s	 nuclear	 arsenal	
principally	a	 ‘political	 instrument	to	support	his	 independent	foreign	policies	which	
sought	to	change	the	European	and	international	system	and	France’s	role	in	it’.	To	
this	 extent,	 an	 approach	 to	 the	 French	 bomb	 informed	 by	 the	 principles	 of	
institutional	democratisation	is	able	to	accept	and	incorporate	the	idea	of	De	Gaulle	
seeking	 nuclear	 weapons	 for	 nationalistic	 reasons,	 but	 would	 also	 highlight	 the	
domestic	 political	 goals	 behind	 his	 and	 other	 elite’s	 decision-making.	 Thus,	 rather	
than	 the	bomb	 just	enhancing	France’s	political	and	military	position	within	NATO,	
De	Gaulle	 sought	 to	use	 the	new	 technology	 to	 restore	French	 ‘grandeur’,	both	 to	
prevent	France	moving	from	being	a	‘world	empire’	to	‘a	backward	colonized	nation’	
and	to	 inspire	and	unite	the	French	people	 in	support	of	a	revived	state	apparatus	
(Hecht,	1998:	62).		
	
However,	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	represented	a	‘critical	juncture’	for	French	elites	
as	 one	 of	 the	 main	 pretexts	 for	 substantial	 military	 spending	 and	 nuclear	
deterrence—the	Soviet	 threat	 to	Europe—disappeared	overnight	 (Marcussen	et	al,	
1999).	The	security	model’s	explanation	regarding	why	France	continued	to	possess	
nuclear	weapons	thus	faces	a	serious	challenge	here.	Yet,	as	Heuser	(1998:	127,	143)	
notes,	 France’s	 nuclear	 deterrence	 policy	 has	 historically	 been	 aimed	 ‘in	 all	
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directions	of	the	compass’	and	thus,	on	the	international	level,	related	to	long-term	
power	 balancing	 rather	 than	 ephemeral	 ideology.	 This	 includes	 ‘resisting	 the	
domination	of	 the	US’	which,	 she	 states,	 has	been	 seen	by	 ‘governments	 since	de	
Gaulle’	as	‘France's	principal	rival’.		
	
Yet	 France’s	 desire	 for	 greater	 European	 integration	 from	 the	 1980s	 onwards	was	
increasingly	 at	 odds	with	 its	 competitive	 ‘nuclear	 nationalism’	 and	 its	 relationship	
with	NATO	needed	to	be	resolved.	Proponents	of	the	nuclear	force,	such	as	Debouzy	
(1995:	37,	69)	 therefore	argued	 in	 the	mid-1990s	that	unless	France	rethought	the	
purpose	 of	 its	 nuclear	 weapons—for	 example,	 by	 giving	 it	 a	 ‘European	 role’,	
including	 cooperation	 with	 the	 UK	 and	 Germany	 to	 develop	 a	 new	 system	 of	
deterrence—that	it	might	‘slowly	fade	into	irrelevance’.	
	
Whilst	 France	 and	 the	 UK	 have	 become	 increasingly	 close	 partners	 in	 this	 field,	
leading	 to	 a	 2010	 treaty	 on	 nuclear	 cooperation,	 European	 states	 have	 indicated	
their	preference	for	the	security	guarantees	offered	by	the	US,	under	the	auspices	of	
NATO,	to	the	idea	of	relying	on	France	for	a	‘Europeanized’	nuclear	deterrent	(Sloan,	
1997).	At	 the	same	time,	EU	member	states	have	 in	 recent	years	also	developed	a	
Common	Foreign	and	Security	Policy	prioritising	non-proliferation	and	disarmament	
(Grand,	2010).	Despite	these	moves,	between	1995	and	2007,	under	the	Presidency	
of	 Jacques	 Chirac,	 nuclear	 weapons	 took	 on	 an	 enlarged	 role	 for	 France.	 Chirac	
restarted	 nuclear	 testing	 in	 1995,	 in	 the	 face	 of	much	 domestic	 and	 international	
criticism,	 including	 opposition	 from	 60%	 of	 the	 French	 public,	 before	 deciding	 to	
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ratify	 the	 CTBT	 in	 1998	 (Moran	 &	 Cottee,	 2011:	 347).	 Indeed,	 the	 French	
government’s	 approach	 to	nuclear	 tests	 reveals	much	about	 the	 attitude	of	 it	 and	
other	NWS	 to	 the	 CTBT	 and	 the	 idea	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	more	 generally.	 For	
example,	in	1994,	French	Prime	Minister	Balladur	said	that	the	CTBT	‘must	not	in	any	
way	envisage	the	elimination	of	nuclear	weapons	or	seek	to	undermine	the	status	of	
the	nuclear	powers’	(Jabko	&	Weber,	2007:	145).	
	
In	 terms	 of	 recent	 nuclear	 politics	 and	 the	 prospects	 for	 disarmament,	 Presidents	
Sarkozy	 (New	 York	 Times,	 2008)	 and	 Hollande	 (Le	 Monde,	 2012;	 NTI,	 2013)	
reiterated	the	need	for	nuclear	weapons,	the	former	describing	them	as	the	‘nation’s	
life	insurance	policy’	and	the	latter	as	both	a	‘protection	against	all	threats’	and	‘an	
element	 that	 fosters	 peace’.	 Despite	 this,	 several	 scholars	 have	 argued	 that	 the	
future	 of	 France’s	 nuclear	 status	 is	 in	 jeopardy.	 For	 example,	 Tertrais	 (2007:	 270)	
recently	 stated	 that	whilst	 France	will	 remain	 strongly	 committed	 to	 the	bomb	 for	
the	foreseeable	future,	this	direction	will	become	more	difficult	because	‘the	ability	
to	maintain	and	adapt	 the	French	deterrent	 is	weakening’.	He	 therefore	concludes	
that	 ‘serious	 political	 will,	 as	 well	 as	 significant	 resources	 human,	 technological,	
budgetary’	will	be	necessary	if	France	is	to	retain	its	nuclear	arsenal	(Ibid).	Similarly,	
Matthew	Fargo	(2012:	63)	has	written	that	the	British	and	French	nuclear	forces	can	
only	be	considered	as	‘specious	symbols	of	their	international	prestige,	vestiges	of	a	
bygone	era’,	whilst	Clement	Larrauri	(2014:	10)	posits	that	France’s	nuclear	arsenal	
has	become	‘less	and	less	close	to	the	population’s	fears,	pride	and	interest’	shifting	
from	being	‘an	ideological	product	of	consensus	to	a	passive	legacy’.	
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In	terms	of	domestic	social	and	political	forces	within	France	that	are	supportive	of	
nuclear	 disarmament,	 the	 lack	 of	 democracy,	 transparency	 and	 accountability	
surrounding	 the	 French	 nuclear	 weapons	 system	 from	 its	 birth	 has	 significantly	
hampered	public	awareness	and	engagement.	For	example,	former	French	defence	
minister	Paul	Quiles	(2010)	has	described	how	neither	the	French	parliament	nor	the	
mainstream	media	 have	 sought	 to	 engage	 in	 a	 serious	 debate	 concerning	 nuclear	
weapons.	 He	 thus	 proposes	 that	 a	 ‘fake	 consensus’	 exists	 regarding	 the	 force	 de	
frappe	given	that	the	issue	is	handled	with	‘silence,	approximations,	counter-truths,	
slogans,	 authoritarian	 arguments’,	 amounting	 to	 a	 ‘French	 fib’	 (Ibid:	 20).	 This	
assessment,	 whilst	 covering	 one	 policy	 area,	 nonetheless	 sits	 uncomfortably	
alongside	 evaluations	 provided	 by	 the	 Economist	 Intelligence	 Unit	 (2016)	 and	
Freedom	House	(2017),	which	find	that	France	generally	scores	highly	across	a	range	
of	indicators	concerning	democratic	standards	and	civic	rights.	
	
In	 terms	of	why	 the	 French	 ‘fib’	 exists,	Heuser	 (1998:	90-91)	highlights	 the	 French	
ruling	 elite’s	 ‘fear’	 of	 ‘strong	 popular	 disapproval’	 and	 ‘internal	 discord’	 given	 the	
nation’s	 ‘stormy	political	history’,	which	may	 lead	 to	a	diverge	between	 the	public	
and	the	President’s	‘will’.	In	order	to	explore	whether	such	a	divergence	exists	today,	
the	 next	 section	 discusses	 whether	 the	 French	 citizenry	 are	 more	 apathetic	 or	
disapproving	 concerning	 the	 bomb	 and	 what	 this	 means	 for	 the	 French	 political	
system—in	particular	the	Presidency.	For	example,	whilst	the	majority	of	the	French	
political	establishment	remains	firmly	wedded	to	nuclear	weapons,	there	are	some	
signs—such	 as	 recent	 support	 for	 nuclear	 disarmament	 from	 retired	 political	 and	
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military	officials,	civil	society	and	public	opinion—indicating	that	anti-nuclear	voices	
may	be	growing	louder	in	France.	
	
6.3	French	nuclear	politics	today	
	
Having	introduced	the	perspective	of	institutional	democratisation	in	relation	to	the	
history	of	the	French	bomb,	we	may	now	outline	a	fuller	analysis	to	explain	how	this	
concept	 applies	 to	 modern	 day	 French	 nuclear	 politics.	 For	 example,	 drawing	 on	
relevant	 scholarship	 and	 expert	 commentary,	 we	 will	 review	 the	 national	 and	
international	 political	 developments	 that	 could	 enable	 France	 to	 move	 towards	
nuclear	 disarmament	 over	 the	 medium	 to	 long	 term.	 Before	 discussing	 these	
processes,	it	is	crucial	to	emphasise	again	that	the	French	political	system	is	set	up	so	
that	nuclear	weapons	decision-making	 is	highly	 centralised	within	 the	office	of	 the	
President.	 Thus,	 when	 anyone	 describes	 ‘Paris’	 or	 ‘France’	 making	 a	 decision	 on	
nuclear	 weapons,	 they	 are	 really	 talking	 about	 a	 ‘power	 elite’	 comprised	 of	 ‘a	
handful	of	political	leaders	and	officials’	(Tertrais,	2007:	258;	Nectoux,	1986:	184).		
	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 Presidents	 have	 made	 their	 own	 mark	 on	 France’s	 nuclear	
weapons	 system,	 according	 to	 their	 own	 beliefs	 and	 interests,	 showing	 that	
unilateral	action	is	possible.	For	example,	President	Chirac	took	the	decision	to	close	
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and	 dismantle	 the	 Pierrelatte	 uranium	 enrichment	 plant	 in	 1996.83	Furthermore,	 a	
decision	 to	move	 to	 zero	would	 clearly	 require	Presidential	 acquiescence	or	 active	
support,	and	signify	a	 radical	change	to	the	political	structure	of	 the	Fifth	Republic	
given	that	any	President	who	made	such	a	move	would	be	divesting	their	office	of	
immense	physical	and	symbolic	power	built	up	over	several	decades.		
	
Domestic	opposition	to	any	disarmament	initiatives	would	also	likely	emanate	from	
powerful	 institutions	 with	 a	 stake	 in	 the	 nuclear	 weapons	 business,	 namely	 the	
‘nuclear	 community’,	 including	 the	 CEA,	 the	 ‘defence	 community’,	 including	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Defence	 and	 armed	 forces	 and	 ‘delivery	 systems	 manufacturers’	
(Nectoux,	 1986:	 154).	 To	 consider	 how	 these	 political	 processes—domestic	 and	
international—might	 lead	 to	 French	 nuclear	 disarmament	 is	 therefore	 to	 consider	
both	how	political	developments	and	pressure	might	alter	the	cost/benefit	analysis	
of	 the	small	group	that	controls	French	nuclear	weapons	decision-making	and	how	
the	French	political	system	might	 itself	change	as	a	result	of	the	process	 leading	to	
disarmament.		
		
Turning	to	the	prospect	of	changes	to	France’s	domestic	political	scene,	Jean-Marie	
Collin	has	proposed	 that	France	could	only	achieve	 the	complete	elimination	of	 its	
nuclear	arsenal	 ‘as	a	 result	of	parliamentary	pressure	and	public	opinion’.84	Yet,	as	
																																								 																					
83	Interview:	MT	
84	Interview:	JMC	
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previously	mentioned,	 proponents	 of	 disarmament	 such	 as	 Quiles	 (2010)	 and	 civil	
society	groups	such	as	Mouvement	De	La	Paix	 (2014)	have	drawn	attention	 to	 the	
‘fake	 consensus’	 on	 nuclear	 issues	 in	 France,	 which	 has	 been	 brought	 about	 by	 a	
system	 in	 which	 there	 is	 little	 opportunity	 for	 societal	 debate	 or	 parliamentary	
influence	 over	 nuclear	 weapons	 decisions.	 As	 Tertrais	 (2011	 ii)	 himself	
acknowledges,	 US	 support	 for	 the	 French	 nuclear	 programme	 was	 kept	 quiet	 in	
order	not	to	interfere	with	the	Gaullist	narrative	of	nuclear	weapons	being	a	symbol	
of	French	independence,	a	myth	widely	recognised	as	crucial	to	the	reconstruction	of	
France’s	identity	as	a	global	power	after	World	War	Two.		
	
In	terms	of	national	self-image	today,	most	of	the	political	establishment	takes	pride	
in	 France	 being	 a	 leading	 military	 power,	 remaining	 one	 of	 the	 world’s	 largest	
spenders	 on	 defence	 as	well	 as	 a	major	 arms	 exporter	 (SIPRI,	 2014	 i).	 As	 its	most	
recent	 Defence	 White	 Paper	 (2013)	 indicates,	 France	 sees	 itself	 as	 having	
responsibilities	 on	 several	 fronts,	 which	 require	 strong	 conventional	 military	
capabilities.	 France	 has	 sought	 to	 strengthen	 both	 NATO	 and	 the	 EU’s	 Common	
Security	 and	 Defence	 Policy,	 take	 an	 increased	 responsibility	 for	 security	 in	 Africa	
and	 ‘contribute	 to	 the	 stability’	 of	 the	 Middle	 East	 and	 Persian	 Gulf	 (Watanabe,	
2013).	According	to	opinion	polls,	recent	French	military	interventions	in	these	areas	
have	 received	 growing	 and	 majority	 public	 support,	 as	 has	 the	 idea	 that	 France	
continue	 to	 act	 forcefully	 on	 the	 world	 stage,	 which	 may	 be	 explained	 by	 deep	
anxiety	regarding	 Islamist	 terrorism	and	the	perceived	effectiveness	and	 legitimacy																																									 																																								 																																								 																																								 														
	
	 331	
of	 these	 actions	 (Chevalier,	 2011;	 Dinmore,	 2011;	 de	 Durand	 &	 Pertusot,	 2013;	
Dahlgreen,	2015).	
	
However,	 scholars	 also	 argue	 that,	 for	 French	 defence	 and	 foreign	 policy-makers,	
‘the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 symbolized	 the	 ultimate	 failure	 of	 the	 Gaullist	 and	
nationalist	nation	state	identity’	and	that	‘the	chapter	of	Gaullism	in	French	history	is	
now	closing’	(Marcussen	et	al,	1999:	630;	Zaretsky,	2010).	These	elites	have	instead	
adopted	a	European	 identity	 and	 closer	 integration	with	EU	partners,	 a	move	 that	
has	facilitated	a	return	to	NATO’s	military	command	structure—with	public	support,	
and	cooperation	with	the	UK	on	nuclear	weapons	(Crumley,	2009;	Moran	&	Cottee,	
2009). 85 	Yet,	 as	 described	 above,	 France	 has	 also	 sought	 to	 retain	 a	 strong	
conventional	 military	 profile	 leading	 to	 discontent	 in	 the	military	 (particularly	 the	
Army)	 and	 in	Parliament	 concerning	 the	 ‘heavy	burden	of	 nuclear	 expenses	 in	 the	
defence	budget’,	which	were	heightened	by	the	austerity	measures	taken	after	the	
2008	economic	crisis	(MacLachlan	&	Hibbs,	2006;	Tertrais,	2006;	Collin,	2013).	
	
These	post-Cold	War	trends	could	help	explain	why	one	recent	opinion	poll	indicated	
that	 the	 French	 public	 may	 be	 more	 opposed	 to	 nuclear	 possession	 than	 is	
																																								 																					
85	According	to	Bruno	Tertrais	(2012:	16),	as	well	as	financial	motives,	Paris	embarked	on	cooperation	
with	the	UK	as	it	is	‘interested	in	contributing	to	the	continued	existence,	solidity	and	independence	
of	another	European	nuclear	power’.	
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commonly	 thought	 (IFOP,	 2012).86	In	 addition,	 as	 Heuser	 (1998:	 89)	 points	 out,	
opinion	polls	 since	1980	have	 shown	 that	 large	 sections	of	 the	French	public	have	
been	‘opposed	to	the	use	of	nuclear	weapons	 in	defence	of	France,	even	if	 foreign	
forces	 were	 invading	 French	 soil’.	 Other	 forms	 of	 opposition	 to	 nuclear	 weapons	
came	 in	 the	 form	 of	 the	 2009	 statement	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 NWFW	 by	 former	 Prime	
Ministers	 Alain	 Juppe	 and	 Rocard,	 Former	 Defence	 Minister	 Alain	 Richard,	 and	
retired	 General	 Bernard	 Norlain	 (2009).	 However,	 some,	 such	 as	 Therese	 Delpech	
(2005)	 and	 Vernance	 Journe	 (2011:	 140),	have	 argued	 that	 these	 (and	 earlier)	
interventions	have	not	made	a	 significant	 impact	on	 the	public	or	 the	powers	 that	
be.87	This	may	be	because,	as	former	French	foreign	minister	Hubert	Vedrine	notes,	
that	the	French	public	‘do	not	follow	foreign	policy	very	closely’	and	that	those	issues	
which	do	resonate	 ‘come	down	to	a	few	images	and	symbols’	 (Ford,	2005).	One	of	
the	most	important	symbolic	moments	being	the	French	government’s	opposition	to	
the	invasion	of	Iraq,	which	corresponded	with	French	public	opinion	(Boston,	2003).	
	
Other	 groups	 that	 have	 become	 more	 active	 on	 nuclear	 issues	 include	
Parliamentarians	 for	 Nuclear	 Non-Proliferation	 and	 Disarmament	 (PNND).	 For	
example,	 in	May	 2014	 two	PNND	 (2014)	 representatives	 briefed	 France’s	National	
Assembly	Defence	Committee	on	the	‘economy	and	utility	of	nuclear	weapons,	the	
need	 to	 re-evaluate	 nuclear	 deterrence,	 and	 the	 universal	 obligation	 to	 achieve																																									 																					
86	According	to	the	IFOP	(2012)	poll	when	asked	‘are	you	in	favor	or	against	the	fact	that	France	might	
renew	and	modernize	its	atomic	weapons	(submarines,	missiles,	etc.)’,	64%	of	respondents	said	they	
were	against.		
87	Interview:	MT	
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nuclear	disarmament’,	 the	 first	 such	briefing	by	members	of	 civil	 society	 since	 the	
establishment	 of	 the	 Fifth	 Republic.	 Whilst	 this	 initiative	 is	 a	 small	 step	 it	 does	
correspond	 with	 the	 argument	 that	 domestic	 political	 pressure	 towards	 nuclear	
disarmament	will	 likely	 need	 to	 be	 part	 of	 a	 larger	 democratising	 force,	 given	 the	
lack	of	sustained	public	attention	given	to	this	issue.	For	example,	this	could	be	part	
of	 the	 more	 general	 decentralisation	 of	 decision-making	 on	 defence	 and	 foreign	
policy,	so	that	they	are	not	solely	based	in	the	Elysee	Palace.	
	
Such	 a	 wider	 democratic	 revival	 is	 also	 shown	 to	 be	 necessary	 judging	 by	 recent	
studies	 concerning	 the	 health	 of	 French	 democracy.	 For	 example,	 in	 2016	 the	
Economist	Intelligence	Unit	(2016)	downgraded	France	in	its	Democracy	Index	to	the	
status	of	a	 ‘flawed	democracy’.	 Problems	with	 the	French	political	 system	are	also	
shown	in	recent	polling	figures	from	Ipsos	which	found	that	‘only	8%	of	voters	have	
confidence	 in	 political	 parties,	 fewer	 than	 one	 in	 five	 trust	MPs	 and	 only	 28%	 the	
institution	 of	 parliament’	 whilst	 ‘nearly	 eight	 in	 10	 agreed	 that	 the	 system	 of	
democracy	 malfunctions	 in	 France	 as	 it	 isn’t	 representative	 of	 voters’	 ideas’	
(Nardelli,	 2015).	 Given	 such	 popular	 dissatisfaction	 with	 France’s	 current	 political	
model	and	ambivalence	regarding	nuclear	possession	and	use,	the	seeds	of	a	social	
movement	to	emerge	capable	of	implementing	institutional	democratisation—which	
may	directly	or	 indirectly	support	nuclear	disarmament—exists,	but	will	need	to	be	
carefully	cultivated	over	the	medium	to	long	term	if	the	many	obstacles	built	into	the	
French	 social	 and	 political	 establishment	 are	 to	 be	 successfully	 challenged	 and	
overcome.	
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Conclusion	
	
This	 chapter	 has	 explored	 different	 views	 on	 French	 nuclear	 politics	 in	 order	 to	
ascertain	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	the	mainstream,	realist	and	 institutional	
democratisation	 perspectives	 on	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 nuclear	
disarmament.	 Ultimately,	 for	 this	 case	 study,	 the	 security	 model	 has	 only	 limited	
value	 in	 explaining	 French	decision-making	 in	 this	 area	because	 the	 Soviet	 nuclear	
threat	was	 by	 no	means	 the	 only	 factor	motivating	 France’s	 pursuit	 of	 the	 bomb.	
Moreover,	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	 and	 improvements	 in	 relations	 between	 the	
West	and	Russia	opened	up	the	question	of	why	France,	 if	 the	security	model	was	
accurate,	should	keep	hold	of	its	nuclear	arsenal.	In	response,	supporters	of	French	
deterrence	argued	 that	France	and	 its	vital	 interests	continued	 to	 face	serious	and	
diverse	threats	from	abroad.	Some	also	argued	that	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	and	the	
move	to	European	integration	changed	France’s	political	and	security	environment	in	
a	fundamental	way,	so	that	the	original	Gaullist	design	for	the	bomb	as	a	revisionist	
tool	for	changing	the	European	and	international	system,	and	France’s	independent	
role	in	it,	had	been	superceded.		
	
French	 nuclear	 deterrence	 is	 thus	 now,	 according	 to	 its	 proponents,	 intended	 to	
contribute	 to	 the	 security	 of	 NATO	 and	 Europe	 through	 war	 prevention,	 whilst	
budgetary	 pressures	 and	 the	 desire	 for	 a	 fellow	NWS	 in	 Europe	 have	 also	 pushed	
France	 into	 nuclear	 cooperation	with	 the	UK.	 Yet	 despite	 their	 case	 for	 continued	
nuclear	possession	appearing	to	be	significantly	undermined	following	the	end	of	the	
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Cold	War,	 advocates	 of	 the	 bomb—such	 as	 Tertrais—appear	 not	 to	 be	 concerned	
about	the	near-term	prospects	of	French	nuclear	disarmament.	This	is	at	least	in	part	
because	 they	 believe	 that	 the	 elimination	 of	 the	 French	 bomb	would	 require	 far-
reaching	and	far-off	changes	in	international	politics	and	security	and	because	of	the	
limited	political	support	for	disarmament	that	exists	within	France.	
	
Whilst	 authors	 such	 as	 Tertrais	 take	 us	 further	 than	 most	 other	 mainstream	 and	
realist	authors	in	examining	how	domestic	and	international	politics	interact	to	drive	
French	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 stymie	 nuclear	 disarmament	 efforts,	 the	 analysis	
provided	by	institutional	democratisation	remains	valuable	in	helping	us	imagine	the	
circumstances	by	which	France	may	eventually	relinquish	the	bomb.	To	begin	with,	
focusing	on	the	domestic	front	allows	us	to	consider	the	political	aims	and	interests	
of	 French	 decision-making	 elites	 in	 relation	 to	 their	 acquisition	 of	 the	 bomb.	 For	
example,	 after	 the	 national	 trauma	 of	 World	 War	 Two,	 the	 leaders	 of	 the	 Fifth	
Republic	 sought	 to	 reestablish	 France’s	 position	 as	 an	 independent,	 sovereign	
nation—strategically	 separate	 from	 the	 US—and	 unite	 the	 nation	 behind	 the	
Presidency.	Nuclear	possession	was	seen	as	a	means	to	accomplish	all	these	goals—
despite	 significant	 public	 and	 party	 political	 opposition	 to	 the	 bomb.	Whilst	 some	
mainstream	and	 realist	works	consider	 these	ambitions,	 they	are	not	presented	as	
primary	factors	for	France	possessing	the	bomb,	but	rather	as	secondary	issues.	
	
Institutional	democratisation	does	a	better	job	here	by	emphasising	the	integral	role	
that	nuclear	possession	plays	 in	 the	French	political	 system—particularly	 the	office	
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of	the	President—as	summed	up	by	the	widely	accepted	concept	of	France	being	a	
‘nuclear	 monarchy’.	 Given	 the	 structural	 implications	 of	 the	 bomb	 for	 French	
governance,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 incrementalism	 proposed	 by	 the	 guardianship	
approach	 is	 insufficient,	 so	 that	 there	 will	 likely	 need	 to	 be	 significant	 political	
change	on	the	domestic	and	 international	 fronts	 if	 the	French	nuclear	arsenal	 is	 to	
be	eliminated.	The	concept	of	 institutional	democratisation,	as	applied	 to	 this	case	
study,	also	focuses	on	the	ideas	and	beliefs	of	France’s	power	elite,	the	majority	of	
whom	 believe	 that	 nuclear	 weapons	 continue	 to	 be	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 national	
security,	 helping	 to	 ensure	 continuity	 and	 stability—and	 thus	 prevent	 a	 return	 to	
political	turmoil—at	home.		
	
Financial	and	political	 resources	have	 therefore	been	made	available	 to	modernise	
and	optimise	the	force	de	frappe	to	ensure	its	deployment	for	the	forseeable	future.	
This	 continuity	 of	 French	 nuclear	 weapons	 policy	 also	 reflects	 the	 more	 general	
continuity	 of	 French	 national	 strategic	 culture	 as	 proposed	 by	 Heuser.	 French	
decision	makers	see	France	as	a	global	power	with	attendant	responsibilities	based	
on	 their	nation’s	 ‘vital	 interests’,	which	 require	 the	ability	 to	project	power	 to	key	
areas	 of	 the	world.	 But	 they	 also	 recognise	 the	 important	 role	 this	 grandiose	 self-
image	can	play	in	binding	the	nation	together	behind	the	President	given	his	or	her	
role	as	the	‘nuclear	monarch’.		
	
Warnings	that	France’s	nuclear	arsenal	may	fall	victim	to	structural	disarmament	or	
simply	 fade	 into	 irrelevance,	 would	 therefore	 appear	 to	 have	 been	 heeded	 and	
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addressed	by	 those	 interested	 in	 and	 responsible	 for	 its	 reproduction,	 though	 it	 is	
unclear	 for	 how	 long	 the	 French	 nuclear	 weapons	 complex	 can	 continue	 to	 be	
supported	given	its	size	and	expense.	Meanwhile,	the	pragmatic	changes	to	optimise	
France’s	 nuclear	 force,	 partly	 chosen	 and	 partly	 forced	 upon	 decision	 makers	 by	
circumstance,	were	sold	to	the	world,	rather	disingenuously,	as	examples	of	France’s	
commitment	 to	 disarmament.	 In	 addition,	 there	 are	 some	 signs	 of	 a	 growing	
questioning	of	France’s	nuclear	status	amongst	elites	and	the	public.	Given	France’s	
political	 system	 and	 its	 situation	 internationally,	 sincere	 French	 progress	 towards	
complete	nuclear	disarmament	in	the	long-term	would	therefore	likely	require	some	
combination	of	the	following:	substantially	increased	domestic	agitation,	focused	on	
improving	the	political	system’s	democracy,	transparency	and	accountability	in	order	
to	 initiate	 public	 and	 parliamentary	 engagement	 on	 nuclear	 issues;	 increased	
political	 pressure	 for	 France	 to	 commit	 to	 nuclear	 disarmament	 from	 its	 key	
European	partners	and	global	 civil	 society;	 improvements	 to	 international	 security,	
including	on	non-proliferation	and	regional	conflict	resolution;	further	reductions	to	
the	arsenals	of	Russia	and	the	US.	
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Chapter	Seven:	China	
	
Introduction	
	
This	 chapter	 examines	 institutional	 democratisation	 and	 other	 mainstream	 and	
realist	 approaches	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 explanatory	 power	 relating	 to	 the	 causes	 and	
consequences	of	Chinese	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament.	 As	with	 the	British	
and	 French	 case	 studies,	 the	 chapter	 proceeds	 in	 several	 sections,	 beginning	 by	
comparing	and	contrasting	different	views	on	China’s	nuclear	experience	 since	 the	
1960s	before	moving	on	to	discuss	modern	day	Chinese	nuclear	politics.	Whilst	there	
is	a	growing	range	of	data	available	in	English	covering	Chinese	nuclear	politics,	this	
is	 less	 than	 for	 the	UK	 and	US	 case	 studies	 for	 several	 reasons.	 These	 include	 the	
language	barrier,	the	limited	size	of	the	audience	for	this	subject	outside	a	specialist	
Chinese	and	Western	audience—in	addition	to	the	understandably	closed	nature	of	
this	 subject	 given	 Chinese	 authoritarianism.	 For	 these	 reasons,	 as	well	 as	 the	 fact	
that	the	Chinese	nuclear	arsenal	is	much	smaller	than	that	of	Russia	and	the	US,	and	
the	relatively	limited	nature	of	China’s	power	projection	capabilities	and	ambitions—
so	 that	 overall	 China	 plays	 a	 growing	 but	 still	 lesser	 role	 in	 most	 other	 state’s	
strategic	 calculus—this	 chapter	 is	 shorter	 than	 the	 US	 and	 Russia	 case	 studies.	
Having	 outlined	 Chinese	 nuclear	 politics	 in	 this	 chapter,	 Chapter	 Eight	 then	
contextualises	 China’s	 responsibility	 for	 disarmament	 action	 alongside	 the	 other	
NWS	and	outlines	appropriate	conclusions	and	recommendations.	
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The	 first	 section	 of	 this	 chapter	 examines	 the	mainstream	 and	 realist	 approaches	
explored	in	Chapter	Two	and	assesses	the	merits	of	the	security	model	in	relation	to	
China’s	 particular	 experience	 as	 a	NWS.	 This	 is	 principally	 done	 by	 placing	 China’s	
development	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 within	 the	 context	 of	 relevant	 historical	 events	
from	the	mid	to	late	20th	and	early	21st	century—focusing,	in	particular,	on	the	Cold	
War,	where	China	positioned	itself	as	a	regional	power	capable	of	deterring	threats	
to	its	national	independence	and	security	by	virtue	of	its	nuclear	status.		
	
It	is	important	to	note	upfront	that	the	evidence	for	institutional	democratisation	is,	
compared	to	the	other	NWS	case	studies,	 less	compelling	for	the	Chinese	example.	
This	 is	 firstly	 because	 the	 security	 model,	 as	 utilised	 by	 mainstream	 and	 realist	
works,	 explains	 how	 the	 perceived	 US	 threat	 both	 drove	 the	 Chinese	 decision	 to	
acquire	 the	 bomb	 and	 remains	 the	 primary	 driver	 of	 China’s	 deterrence	 strategy.	
Moreover,	unlike	Russia	and	the	US,	China	has	maintained	a	relatively	small	nuclear	
arsenal	 for	 several	 reasons,	 including	 Beijing’s	 hitherto	 limited	 international	
ambitions	and	resources	and	its	belief	in	minimal	deterrence	as	a	sufficient	defensive	
strategy.	This	meant	that	the	bomb	did	not	take	on	the	same	kind	of	significance	for	
Chinese	 elites	 and	 domestic	 politics	 as	 the	 other	 NWS,	 something	which	 can	 also	
partly	be	explained	by	Beijing’s	gradually	 less	hostile	attitude	to	the	US	and	retreat	
from	 a	 revolutionary	 international	 policy	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 Cold	 War	
(Horsburgh,	2015:	158).	
	
The	 second	 section	 then	 assesses	 the	 explanatory	 power	 of	 institutional	
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democratisation	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 Chinese	 nuclear	
possession	 and	 disarmament.	 In	 doing	 so,	 official	 justifications	 for	 China’s	 nuclear	
status	 are	 explored	 and	 the	 limitations	 in	 the	 mainstream	 and	 realist	 literature’s	
explanation	 of	 Chinese	 nuclear	 politics	 considered.	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 institutional	
democratisation	and	 the	domestic	politics	model	are	usefully	applicable,	 I	draw	on	
the	work	 of	 experts	 in	 Chinese	 nuclear	 history	 and	 politics,	 such	 as	 Jeffrey	 Lewis,	
Nicola	Horsburgh	and	others,	to	specify	the	wider	impact	nuclear	possession	has	had	
on	 modern	 China.	 More	 specifically,	 I	 introduce	 discussion	 of	 how	 domestic	 elite	
actors	 and	 groups	 shape	 Chinese	 defence	 and	 foreign	 policy,	 including	 on	 nuclear	
issues,	 to	 examine	 the	 barriers	 to	 institutional	 change	 pursuant	 to	 disarmament.	
Having	discussed	different	theories	of	Chinese	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament,	
the	third	section	of	 this	chapter	reviews	modern	day	Chinese	politics	 in	relation	to	
nuclear	matters	and	goes	 into	more	detail	concerning	the	current	obstacles	to	and	
opportunities	for	institutional	democratisation	in	China.		
	
7.1	 Mainstream	 and	 realist	 perspectives	 on	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	
Chinese	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament	
	
Mainstream	 and	 realist	 explanations	 of	 the	 origins	 of	 Chinese	 nuclear	 possession	
principally	 focus	 on	 external	 security	 challenges.	 Thus,	 as	 analysts	 such	 as	 Lu	 Hui	
(Wortzel,	2007:	28)	and	Scott	Sagan	 (1996:	58-59)	have	explained,	China	began	 its	
nuclear	programme	 in	 response	 to	nuclear	 threats	 from	 the	US	during	 the	Korean	
War	 and	 the	 later	 Taiwan	 Straits	 crisis	 in	 the	 mid-1950s.	 Elsewhere,	 Nicola	
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Horsburgh	 (2015:	 60)	 states	 that	 these	 factors	 led	 to	 ‘Chinese	 attitudes	 towards	
nuclear	 weapons’	 changing	 ‘dramatically	 in	 the	 early	 to	 mid-1950s’	 as	 Beijing’s	
‘technological	 weakness’	 was	 exposed	 by	 Washington’s	 ‘development	 of	 tactical	
nuclear	 weapons,	 the	 thermonuclear	 hydrogen	 weapon	 and	 the	 fusion-fission	
weapon’.	Around	this	time,	the	US	also	chose	to	deploy	its	tactical	nuclear	weapons	
to	bases	near	China,	‘in	South	Korea,	Taiwan,	Guam,	and	Hawaii’	(Ibid).	Moreover,	as	
Avery	 Goldstein	 (1992:	 494)	 notes,	 deteriorating	 Sino-Soviet	 relations	 during	 the	
1960s	increased	the	perceived	value	of	a	nuclear	arsenal	for	Beijing	because	of	the	
‘limited	value	of	China’s	conventional	deterrent’.	
	
In	 addition,	 Marshal	 Nie	 Rongzhen,	 the	 head	 of	 China’s	 science	 and	 technology	
complex	 from	 1958	 to	 1967,	 stated	 in	 his	 memoirs	 that	 China	 chose	 to	 develop	
nuclear	forces	over	conventional	weaponry	in	order	to	put	an	end	to	China’s	‘period	
of	 being	 bullied,	 humiliated	 and	 oppressed’	 (Lewis,	 2004:	 238). 88 	Importantly,	
Chinese	 strategists	 did	 not	 intend	 to	 use	 nuclear	weapons	 to	 intimidate	 or	 coerce	
others.	This	was	because,	according	to	the	strategic	thought	of	leaders	such	as	Mao	
Zedong	 and	 Deng	 Xiaoping,	 nuclear	 weapons	 were	 ‘paper	 tigers’	 which	 could	 not	
achieve	specific	military	objectives	during	wartime,	so	that,	as	Mao	once	said,	‘with	
																																								 																					
88	Christopher	P.	Twomey	(2006:	7)	 identifies	two	periods	where	China	felt	this	sense	of	humiliation	
and	 vulnerability	 to	 foreign	 nations.	 He	 describes	 how	 the	 first	 ‘100	 years	 of	 humiliation’	 period	
‘began	 in	 the	 late	Qing	Dynasty	 as	well	 as	 the	earlier	Warring	 States	period	 (475	B.C.	 to	 221	B.C.).	
Both	 these	 periods	 carry	 with	 them	 a	 clear	 lesson:	 a	 weak	 and	 divided	 China	 will	 be	 subject	 to	
substantial	 violence’.	More	 recently,	 following	 the	Opium	war	 in	 1841	 ‘China	was	 beset	 by	 a	wide	
range	of	invaders:	Britain,	France,	Holland,	Germany,	the	United	States,	the	Soviet	Union,	and—worst	
of	all—Japan’,	underscoring	this	feeling	of	weakness.	
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only	 atomic	 bombs	 and	 without	 people’s	 struggles,	 then	 atomic	 bombs	 are	
meaningless’	(Fravel	&	Medeiros,	2010:	58).		
	
Chinese	strategists	continue	to	view	the	threat	of	US	military	power—conventional	
and	 nuclear—as	 the	 main	 reason	 to	 possess	 nuclear	 weapons.	 Stability	 and	
continuity	 in	 the	 face	 of	 such	 external	 threats	 are	 thus	 among	 the	 key	 defining	
features	of	China’s	approach	to	the	bomb.	This	approach	has	also	been	informed	by	
the	Communist	Party	leadership’s	strategic	plans	and	insights	over	several	decades.	
As	noted	above,	China’s	aim	in	becoming	a	nuclear	power	was	to	break	the	US	and	
Soviet	 Union’s	 ‘great	 power	 monopoly	 on	 nuclear	 weapons’	 and	 avoid	 coercion	
(Ibid).	Indeed,	retired	Major	General	Pan	Zhenqiang	(2009:	33)	states	that	China	has	
always	 calibrated	 its	 nuclear	 posture	 in	 response	 to	 ‘the	 threat	 posed	 to	 it	 by	 the	
United	 States’	 nuclear	 strategy’.	 The	 key	 strategic	 factors	 for	 China	 today	 thus	
remain	 concern	 regarding	 the	 US’s	 presence	 in	 East	 Asia	 and	 its	 policy	 of	
containment.	Given	 the	US’s	 conventional	 superiority,	 China	 thus	 fields	 its	 nuclear	
arsenal	as	part	of	a	central	deterrence	strategy.	Yet	China’s	recent	moves	to	secure	
and	 seize	 territory	 in	 the	 South	 China	 Sea	 and	 the	 long-running	 dispute	 over	
Taiwan’s	status	have	also	taken	on	a	nuclear	aspect.	Analysts	such	as	Jing-Dong	Yuan	
(2009:	35)	have	therefore	noted	the	need	for	greater	dialogue	between	Washington	
and	 Beijing	 given	 the	 significant	 ‘misperceptions	 and	misunderstandings’	 between	
the	two	nations	concerning	nuclear	weapons,	deterrence	and	strategic	stability,	and	
how	these	issues	might	play	out	with	regard	to	regional	disputes.	
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Some,	 such	as	 James	Acton	 (2012:	40),	point	out	 that,	 today,	China	 looks	north	 to	
Russia	 and	 south	 to	 India	 regarding	 nuclear	 and	 other	 dangers.	 Others	 argue	 that	
China	does	not	see	Russia	as	a	threat,	but	rather	as	benign	and	a	partner	it	can	work	
with	 to	 counter	 the	 US,	 though	 China	 is	 concerned	 about	 possible	 US-Russia	
cooperation	on	BMD	because	of	Russia’s	ability	 to	monitor	Chinese	ballistic	missile	
launches	 (Hansell	 et	 al,	 2009:	 16).89	In	 addition,	 the	 reemergence	 of	 Japan	 as	 a	
regional	power,	which	is	remilitarising,	has	the	potential	to	build	a	nuclear	weapon,	
is	part	of	the	US’s	extended	deterrence	network	and	which	cooperates	with	the	US	
on	BMD,	is	of	particular	concern	to	Chinese	planners	(Kristensen	et	al,	2006;	Hughes,	
2009;	 Saalman,	 2011:	 35).	 Yet	 the	 fact	 remains	 that	 it	 is	 principally	 the	 US’s	
threatening	behaviour	and	its	array	of	technologically	advanced	military	capabilities	
that	 makes	 Chinese	 decision-makers	 consider	 the	 need	 for	 qualitative	 and	
quantitative	 improvements	 to	 their	 nuclear	 forces.90	The	 key	 question	 here	 is	 the	
survivability	 of	 China’s	 nuclear	 arsenal.	 In	 order	 to	 ensure	 a	 robust	 and	 survivable	
deterrent,	 China	 prioritises	 ambiguity	 and	 secrecy	 regarding	 its	 nuclear	 weapons	
system.		
	
Moreover,	as	Jeffrey	Lewis	(2004:	12-13)	notes,	China’s	‘force	deployments	and	arms	
control	behavior’	both	suggest	that	the	Chinese	leadership	is	convinced	that	‘even	a																																									 																					
89	Interview:	JA	
90	Examples	of	recent	US	actions	and	statements	which	have	caused	especial	concern	in	China	include:	
the	 1991	 Gulf	 War,	 the	 bombing	 of	 Yugoslavia	 in	 1995	 (including	 the	 destruction	 of	 the	 Chinese	
embassy	 in	 Belgrade	 in	 1999),	 the	 2002	Nuclear	 Posture	 Review	which	 named	China	 as	 a	 principal	
target	and	the	second	Gulf	War	in	2003	(Kristensen	et	al,	2006:	9;	Hansell	et	al,	2009:	2).	
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very	small,	unsophisticated	force	maintained	a	measure	of	deterrence	against	larger,	
more	 sophisticated	 nuclear	 forces’.	 Thus,	 since	 acquiring	 the	 bomb	 in	 1964,	 China	
has	continued	to	possess	only	a	small	number	of	nuclear	weapons,	which	have	been	
‘based	 largely	 on	 a	 single	 mode	 of	 delivery,	 kept	 off	 alert	 and	 under	 the	 most	
restrictive	declaratory	posture—a	categorical	no-first-use	pledge’	 (Lewis,	2009:	38).	
China	 thus	 invested	 significant	 sums	 in	 developing	 advanced	 military	 technology,	
though	 did	 not	 produce	 as	 many	 nuclear	 bombs	 as	 its	 ‘resources,	 material,	
manpower	and	industrial	capacity’	allowed,	because	its	leaders	believed	that	a	larger	
arsenal	would	not	enhance	deterrence	(Ibid:	239-240).	
	
Today	China’s	estimated	stockpile	of	250	warheads	is	thus	the	fourth	smallest	of	the	
NWS.	 China’s	 2010	 Defence	White	 Paper	 (2010:	 6)	 described	 how	 it	 ‘consistently	
upholds	 the	 policy	 of	 no	 first	 use	 of	 nuclear	weapons,	 adheres	 to	 a	 self-defensive	
nuclear	 strategy,	 and	 will	 never	 enter	 into	 a	 nuclear	 arms	 race	 with	 any	 other	
country’.	The	paper	goes	on	to	state	that	China	‘has	always	stood	for	the	complete	
prohibition	and	thorough	destruction	of	nuclear	weapons’.	Indeed,	a	set	of	proposals	
for	how	nuclear	disarmament	may	be	advanced	are	outlined,	beginning	with	Russia	
and	the	US,	who	‘bear	special	and	primary	responsibility’	for	this	task	given	the	size	
of	 their	 arsenals.	 China’s	 participation	 in	 ‘multilateral	 negotiations	 on	 nuclear	
disarmament’	will	then	occur	‘when	conditions	are	appropriate’.	Chinese	analyst	Wu	
Zhan	 has	 suggested	 that	 such	 conditions	 would	 include	 Russian	 and	 US	 nuclear	
arsenals	being	 reduced	by	90–95%,	plus	 an	end	 to	 testing	and	production,	 though	
this	 action	may	 only	 persuade	 China	 to	 agree	 to	 keep	 its	 arsenal	 at	 low	 numbers	
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(Saalman,	2009:	69).	
	
7.2	 Critical	 perspectives	 on	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	 Chinese	 nuclear	
possession	and	disarmament	
	
As	discussed	above,	the	evidence	for	the	security	model	concerning	the	causes	and	
consequences	 of	 Chinese	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 disarmament	 make	 it,	 for	 this	
study,	 the	 outlier	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 relative	 explanatory	 power	 of	 institutional	
democratisation.	At	the	same	time	however,	there	are	limits	to	the	mainstream	and	
realist	 explanations	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 Two	 that	 need	 to	 be	 recognised	 and	
engaged	 with.	 For	 example,	 the	 previous	 section	 showed	 that	 China—which	 has	
historically	seen	itself	as	the	superior	‘Middle	Kingdom’	and	regional	hegemon—had	
its	status	severely	downgraded	over	several	centuries.	Nuclear	possession	can	thus	
partly	 be	 explained	 by	 a	 desire	 for	 the	 recovery	 of	 national	 pride	 and	 regional	
leadership.	The	threat	posed	by	the	US	following	the	Chinese	Communist	Revolution	
in	1946,	needs	to	seen	in	relation	to	China’s	historic	sense	of	external	danger,	so	that	
there	was	no	security	dilemma	driving	the	Communist	leadership’s	acquisition	of	the	
bomb.	
	
In	 terms	 of	 evidence	 showing	 that	 institutional	 democratisation	 is	 of	 relevance	 to	
this	case	study,	we	need	to	draw	on	the	work	of	China	specialists	who	highlight	the	
political	 importance	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 for	 Beijing	 on	 the	 international	 and	
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domestic	levels.	For	example,	according	to	Jeffrey	Lewis	(2004:	239-240)	and	Nicola	
Horsburgh	(2015),	proponents	of	the	Chinese	nuclear	programme	in	the	1950s	and	
1960s	believed	that	the	pursuit	of	the	bomb	would	have	benefits	beyond	security.	In	
addition	to	uniting	the	country	behind	Beijing’s	rule,	the	bomb	would	help	develop	
China’s	economy,	science	and	technology	so	that	it	became	an	advanced	nation.	For	
Horsburgh	 (Ibid:	 75),	 Beijing	 therefore	 saw	 possession	 of	 the	 bomb	 as	 ‘crucial’	 in	
‘improving	 China’s	 legitimacy	 and	 prestige	 domestically,	 regionally,	 and	
internationally’.	 Such	 ‘imperatives’	 can,	 for	 this	 author,	 therefore	 be	 seen	 both	 in	
China’s	early	nuclear	efforts	and	the	more	recent	modernisation	of	its	military.		
	
In	 addition	 to	 applying	 institutional	 democratisation	 at	 the	 domestic	 level	 for	 the	
Chinese	case,	it	is	therefore	also	useful	to	consider	its	international	relevance	given	
Beijing’s	 foreign	 policy.	 For	 example,	 Shaun	 Breslin	 (2013:	 631)	 argues	 that	 ‘in	
China’s	 view,	 there	 is	 still	 a	 lot	 to	 be	 done	 before	 the	 institutions	 of	 global	
governance	 become	 truly	 representative	 and	 democratic’.	 Until	 international	
institutions	become	more	equitable,	China	will	thus	 likely	see	its	nuclear	arsenal	as	
an	important	way	of	retaining	a	seat	at	the	top	table	of	global	affairs.	
	
As	noted	in	the	previous	section,	China’s	nuclear	arsenal	has	been	subject	to	a	high	
degree	 of	 opacity,	which,	 the	 Chinese	 government	 argues,	 is	 vital	 to	maintain	 the	
strategy	 of	 deploying	 low	 numbers	 of	 these	weapons.	Nuclear	 secrecy	 is	 common	
across	 NWS,	 the	 difference	 with	 China	 being	 that	 it	 is	 an	 authoritarian	 one	 party	
state	without	 formally	 democratic	 institutions	 and	 an	 uninformed	 public	 on	 these	
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issues.	 Beijing	 is	 able	 to	 censor	 discussion	 of	 key	 issues	 pertaining	 to	 national	
security,	as	seen	with	the	recent	crisis	regarding	North	Korea’s	nuclear	programme	
where	the	BBC	(2017)	reported	that	Beijing	had	removed	the	search	term	‘hydrogen	
bomb’	from	popular	websites.	The	lack	of	a	free	press	or	political	opposition	in	China	
means	that	the	public	has	no	opportunity	to	play	a	role	in	nuclear	weapons	debates,	
which	 is	 conducted	 entirely	 behind	 the	 closed	 doors	 of	 an	 extremely	 secretive	
government	(Dumbaugh	&	Martin,	2009).	One	poll	conducted	by	the	People’s	Daily	
newspaper	states	that	‘51%	of	respondents	wanted	nuclear	disarmament	while	49%	
did	not’	(Qiang,	2009).	Yet	it	is	reasonable	to	question	how	representative	and	thus	
useful	such	polling	data	is	given	how	poor	the	condition	of	civil	liberties	is	in	China.	
National	decision-making	on	security	in	China	thus	remains	highly	centralised	in	the	
top	leadership	as	a	matter	of	course.	Yet,	according	to	one	Chinese	nuclear	expert	I	
spoke	 to,	 at	 higher	 levels	 of	 civil	 society,	 for	 example,	 in	 academia	 and	 specialist	
media—there	 does	 exist	 some	 critical	 discussion	 of	 nuclear	 issues	 and	 future	
strategy	 which	 can	 have	 an	 influence	 on	 the	 thinking	 of	 ministers	 (Zhang,	 2012:	
25).91		
	
Whilst	Chinese	nuclear	policy-making	is	thus	particularly	opaque	and	difficult	to	map	
(Hansell	 et	 al,	 2009:	5),	 it	 is	possible	 to	outline	 the	key	Chinese	 institutions	with	a	
stake	 in	 the	 nation’s	 nuclear	 weapons	 system.	 These	 are	 the	 Chinese	 Communist	
Party	 (CCP),	 the	 leadership	of	 the	People’s	Liberation	Army	(PLA)	and	the	defence-																																								 																					
91	Interviews:	RW;	TZ	
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industrial	and	scientific	 community	 (Gill	&	Medeiros,	2010:	130).	Although	political	
power	 in	 China	 has	 generally	 become,	 ‘diffuse,	 complex,	 and	 at	 times	 highly	
competitive’,	according	to	Kerry	Dumbaugh	and	Michael	F.	Martin	(2009:	2),	nuclear	
weapons	policy	has	remained	closed	and	rigid.	For	example,	Gill	and	Medeiros	(2010:	
130)	 argue	 that	 Chinese	 nuclear	 weapons	 decision-making	 has	 consistently	 been	
dominated	by	‘one	person	or	of	a	small	clique	of	key	political	individuals’,	including	
key	members	 of	 the	 Central	Military	 Commission	 of	 the	 CCP,	 which	 oversees	 the	
PLA.		
	
These	authors	also	suggest	that	the	 influence	of	the	PLA	over	 ‘the	formulation	and	
operationalization	of	 nuclear	 doctrine’	 and	 the	 ‘R&D	and	procurement	process	 for	
nuclear	weapon,	missile	and	command-and-control	systems’	has	increased	in	recent	
times	(Ibid:	151).	This	influence	is	also	likely	to	grow	as	China’s	nuclear	forces	expand	
in	 ‘size,	 technical	 sophistication’	 and	 ‘mobility’,	which	 has	 implications	 for	 nuclear	
weapons	 decision-making	 as	 ‘tensions	 could	 arise’	 between	 civilian	 and	 military	
constituencies,	 for	 example	 over	 doctrine	 and	 the	 size	 of	 China’s	 nuclear	 arsenal.	
Overall,	Gill	 and	Medeiros	 (Ibid)	 conclude	 that	Chinese	decision-making	on	nuclear	
weapons	 is	 ‘best	understood	as	being	under	civilian	control	but	 lacking	democratic	
accountability’.	Thus	increased	military	influence	over	the	future	direction	of	China’s	
nuclear	 arsenal	 may	 well	 make	 arms	 control	 negotiations	 in	 this	 field	 more	
challenging,	given	that,	as	the	authors	of	the	James	Martin	Center	report	(2009:	5)	
note,	the	Chinese	military	is	‘more	suspicious	of	nuclear	disarmament	concepts’.	This	
is	despite	the	fact	that	nuclear	weapons	have	significant	opportunity	costs	for	China,	
	 349	
given	its	high	levels	of	poverty	and	relatively	 low	spending	on	human	development	
priorities	such	as	health	and	education	(Page	&	Thakur,	2013:	7-8).	 In	terms	of	the	
prospects	 for	 institutional	democratisation	 for	 the	Chinese	case,	we	may	 therefore	
conclude	 that,	 in	 the	 short	 to	medium	 term,	 it	 is	 first	 necessary	 that	 China	 has	 a	
civilian	 rather	 than	 a	military	guardianship	 in	 control	 of	 nuclear	weapons	 policy	 if	
future	disarmament	action	is	to	be	possible.		
	
7.3	Chinese	nuclear	politics	today	
	
Having	 reviewed	 different	 theories	 concerning	 how	 and	 why	 China	 acquired	 the	
bomb	 as	 well	 as	 the	 barriers	 to	 Chinese	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 this	 section	 shall	
consider	the	state	of	Chinese	nuclear	politics	today.	In	doing	we	shall	further	assess	
the	 utility	 of	 institutional	 democratisation	 for	 providing	 insight	 and	 understanding	
into	 how	 China	 might	 commit	 to	 nuclear	 abolition.	 As	 discussed	 in	 the	 previous	
sections,	whilst	there	are	several	countries	of	importance	to	the	future	evolution	of	
China’s	nuclear	arsenal,	the	key	determining	factor	is	the	behaviour	of	the	US	and	its	
allies	 in	 East	 Asia.	 In	 addition	 to	 external	 influences,	 there	 are	 also	 important	
domestic	 factors—such	 as	 bureaucratic	 and	 political	 interests—driving	 China’s	
nuclear	weapons	decision-making.		
	
In	 recent	 years	 there	 have	 been	 several	 in-depth	 studies,	 of	 both	 Western	 and	
Chinese	origin—some	of	which	have	already	been	mentioned—which	shed	light	on	
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how	 the	 interaction	between	 these	 internal	 and	 external	 factors	 have	 created	 the	
Chinese	 nuclear	 weapons	 system	 as	 it	 is	 today.	 These	 studies	 provide	 important	
insights	 into	 the	 domestic	 and	 international	 political	 obstacles	 that	 need	 to	 be	
overcome,	and	 the	opportunities	 that	need	 to	be	 seized	upon,	 if	China	 is	 to	move	
towards	 nuclear	 disarmament.	 Studies	 of	 particular	 note,	 informing	 the	 discussion	
below,	 include:	 the	 James	 Martin	 Center	 for	 Nonproliferation	 Studies	 report	
Engaging	 China	 and	Russia	 on	Nuclear	Disarmament,	which	 includes	 contributions	
from	 several	 authors,92	Lora	 Saalman’s	China	 and	 the	U.S.	 Nuclear	 Posture	 Review	
and	retired	Chinese	Major	General	Pan	Zhenqiang’s	analysis	China’s	Nuclear	Strategy	
in	a	Changing	World	Strategic	Situation.	In	addition,	Shen	Dingli,	Bates	Gill	and	Evan	
S.	Medeiros,	and	Hui	Zhang	have	made	notable	contributions	to	this	debate.	There	is	
not	 space	 here	 to	 provide	 a	 full	 review	 of	 the	 increasingly	 rich	 literature	 on	 the	
necessary	conditions	for	Chinese	nuclear	disarmament.	Instead,	I	will	highlight	some	
of	the	most	prominent	issues	and	themes	raised	by	the	authors	mentioned	above.		
	
A	 useful	 point	 of	 departure	 for	 our	 discussion	 is	 Pan	 Zhenqiang’s	 (2009:	 30)	
observation	 that	 China	 ‘is	 not	 a	 nuclear	 weapon	 state	 in	 the	 traditional	 Western	
sense’.	This	is	because	China	does	not	see	nuclear	weapons	as	‘essential	instruments	
to	 help	 achieve	 political	 aims’,	 whereas	 the	 US	 and	 Soviet	 Union,	 used	 them	 to	
‘intimidate	 other	 countries	 or	 control	 their	 allies’,	 including	 through	 extended	
deterrence.	 The	 UK	 and	 France,	 meanwhile,	 saw	 nuclear	 weapons	 as	 a	 means	 of	
																																								 																					
92	Regarding	China,	these	include	Jing-dong	Yuan,	William	C.	Potter,	and	Cristina	Hansell,	Jeffrey	Lewis	
and	Lora	Saalman.	
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maintaining	 some	 semblance	 of	 a	 global	 outlook	 and	 thus	 influence,	 with	 both	
arsenals	linked	to	power	projection	and	overseas	intervention.	
	
Thus,	 whereas	 the	 four	 other	 NWS	 have	 seen	 nuclear	 weapons	 as	 a	 means	 of	
realising	their	global	political	ambitions,	China—as	a	much	weaker	power—has	had	
domestic	 economic	 development	 as	 its	main	 priority	 since	 the	 early	 1980s	 (Shen,	
2008:	642).	China’s	nuclear	 strategy	and	policy	 is	 therefore	 configured	 in	 line	with	
these	 ends.	 Until	 China’s	 global	 strategic	 position	 significantly	 changes,	 nuclear	
weapons	 will	 therefore	 continue	 to	 play	 a	 defensive	 role,	 requiring	 only	 a	 small,	
survivable	force.	For	example,	Liping	Xia	(2009:	87)	argues	that	in	order	to	meet	its	
national	 development	 objectives,	 China	 needs	 ‘a	 long-term	 peaceful	 international	
environment,	especially	stable	surroundings’	and	will	therefore	not	act	in	ways	that	
‘seriously	 disturb	 the	 current	 international	 economic	 and	 political	 mechanisms	
except	when	 its	 critical	 national	 interests	 are	 threatened’.	Moreover,	 according	 to	
the	US	Department	of	Defense	(2014),	China’s	need	for	international	stability	means	
that	it	will	‘avoid	direct	confrontation	with	the	United	States	and	other	countries’.	
	
If	 China	 were	 to	 act	 aggressively	 this	 would	 jeopardise	 its	 push	 to	 modernise,	
because	 it	 requires	 ‘extensive	 economic	 and	 technological	 cooperation	 with	 the	
outside	world,	both	with	its	neighbors	and	with	the	West’,	according	to	Tiejun	Zhang	
(2002:	84).	At	the	same	time,	China	is	currently,	as	Noam	Chomsky	argues,	‘seeking	
to	 break	 out’	 of	 the	 US’s	 ‘arc	 of	 containment	 in	 the	 Pacific’,	 which	 limits	 China’s	
‘control	over	 the	waters	essential	 to	 its	 commerce	and	open	access	 to	 the	Pacific’	
	 352	
(McNeill,	2014).	For	Rex	Li	(2003:	214),	Beijing	wants	to	escape	Washington’s	grip	so	
that	 it	 can	 ‘eventually	 become	 an	 economic	 superpower	 and	 a	 global	 strategic	
player’	capable	of	replacing	‘US	domination’	with	‘multipolarity’.	Coastal	areas	have	
thus	come	to	be	of	particular	strategic	importance	to	China	because	they	are	where	
its	main	economic	power	centres	are	concentrated	(Zhang,	2002:	85).	As	previously	
discussed,	 if	current	 tensions	are	to	dissipate,	 the	US	needs	to	therefore	recognise	
China’s	 interests	 in	the	region	so	that	key	disputes,	 for	example,	regarding	Taiwan,	
the	 Korean	 peninsula	 and	 territorial	 and	 maritime	 demarcation	 are	 resolved	 and	
sustainable	security	agreements	can	be	reached	(CSIS,	2013:	5).		
	
Without	such	agreements,	it	is	highly	unlikely	that	China	will	move	towards	nuclear	
disarmament.	This	is	because,	as	Saalman	(2009:	51)	highlights,	Chinese	analysts	see	
‘self-determination’	and	‘the	belief	that	disarmament	must	not	threaten	a	country’s	
independence,	 sovereignty,	 or	 security’	 as	 amongst	 the	 core	 principles	 guiding	
China’s	 approach	 to	 arms	 control	 and	 disarmament.	 Given	 that	 Beijing	 considers	
Taiwan	to	be	part	of	China,	rather	than	an	independent	nation,	nuclear	disarmament	
would	 compromise	 vital	 Chinese	 interests.	 This	 is	 because	 the	 fate	 of	 Taiwan	 is	
intertwined	 with	 both	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 CCP	 and	 US	 regional	 military	
commitments	 and	 is	 thus,	 according	 to	 analysts	 from	 the	 Center	 for	 Strategic	 and	
International	Studies,	the	area	where	nuclear	weapons	‘would	most	likely	become	a	
major	factor’	(Lieber	&	Press,	2009;	CSIS,	2013:	5).		
	
Additionally,	on	the	domestic	front,	if	China	is	to	transition	to	a	non-nuclear	identity	
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as	a	FNWS,	its	leaders	will	need	to	make	strides	in	delegitimising	nuclear	weapons	as	
a	 source	 of	 national	 self-esteem.	 This	 is	 because	 nuclear	 weapons	 compensate	
somewhat	 for	 its	 strategic	military	 imbalance	with	Western	powers	by	providing	a	
sense	of	pride	in	the	nation's	technological	prowess	(McLean,	1986:	188;	Zhenqiang,	
2009:	51).	According	 to	one	Washington-based	analyst	 I	 spoke	to,	China	also	 takes	
pride	 in	having	overcome	various	difficulties	 in	order	 to	achieve	 its	nuclear	 status.	
Yet	this	has	purposefully	been	a	quiet	type	of	pride,	which	has	not	translated	into	a	
deeper	 nuclear	 culture—potentially	 making	 the	 process	 of	 delegitimising	 nuclear	
weapons	easier.93	Moreover,	as	noted	above,	 the	 long-standing	diplomatic	 support	
China	has	given	to	nuclear	disarmament	and	a	global	ban	on	nuclear	weapons	may	
ease	an	eventual	transition	to	FNWS	status	(China	MFA,	2013).	
	
In	terms	of	domestic	political	changes	that	may	support	institutional	democratisation	
and	 smooth	 the	 path	 towards	 disarmament,	 Minxin	 Pei	 (2008;	 2013)	 argues	 that	
whilst	 the	CCP	 learned	 lessons	 from	the	 fall	of	 the	Soviet	Union	and	the	Tianamen	
Square	protests,	China’s	authoritarian	one	party	state,	 like	all	others,	has	a	 limited	
shelf	 life.	Moreover,	 China’s	 recent	 economic	 and	 social	 development	puts	 it	 ‘well	
into’	 a	 ‘zone	 of	 democratic	 transition’,	 so	 that	 democracy,	 he	 argues,	 could	 arrive	
through	several	different	routes.	Pei	(1995)	thus	identified	in	the	1990s	a	‘creeping	
democratization’	 taking	 place	 in	 China	 whereby	 the	 necessary	 ‘institutional	
foundations’	 are	 ‘slowly	 taking	 shape’.	 Indeed	 for	 Vladimir	 Frolov	 (2013),	 China	 is	
presently	‘more	democratic	than	Russia’	so	that	whilst	the	latter	is	‘faking	democracy																																									 																					
93	Interview:	JP	
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to	cover	up	an	emerging	dictatorship’	the	former	 is	 ‘evolving	 into	a	more	pluralistic	
system’.	 However,	 for	 Wei-Wei	 Zhang	 (2012:	 60),	 it	 is	 ‘unimaginable’	 that	 the	
Chinese	people	‘would	ever	accept’	a	‘multi-party	democratic	system’.	Thus,	as	with	
the	Russian	populace,	democracy	in	China	will	require	the	Chinese	people	to	develop	
into	an	active	and	engaged	citizenry	with	an	enlarged	social	consciousness.	Clearly,	
any	 such	 internal	 transformation	 will	 benefit	 from	 a	 stable	 regional	 security	
environment,	both	 so	 that	 civilians	 rather	 than	 the	armed	 forces	can	exert	 control	
over	key	policy	areas	and	to	enable	military	restraint—including	on	nuclear	issues.	
	
Conclusion	
	
This	chapter	has	sought	to	assess	the	extent	to	which	 institutional	democratisation,	
in	 comparison	with	other	 established	 theories,	 provides	 insight	 and	understanding	
into	the	causes	and	consequences	of	Chinese	nuclear	possession	and	disarmament.	
Ultimately,	 for	 the	 Chinese	 case	 study,	 the	 security	 model	 is	 persuasive	 when	
outlining	 the	 origins	 of	 China’s	 nuclear	 weapons	 programme.	 For	 example,	 China	
acquired	its	nuclear	weapons	to	both	counter	the	threats	and	coercion	it	faced	from	
the	US	 since	 the	 1950s	 and	 put	 an	 end	 to	 China’s	 long	 history	 of	 humiliation	 and	
oppression	 from	outside	 forces.	China’s	nuclear	weapons	 system	was	 then	 shaped	
by	 factors	 including	 the	 top	 leadership’s	 assessment	 of	 trends	 in	 international	
security,	resource	constraints	and	the	need	for	domestic	economic	development.		
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The	 utility	 of	 the	 domestic	 politics	 model	 can	 be	 seen	 when	 China’s	 pride	 in	 its	
possession	 of	 the	 bomb	 is	 taken	 into	 account.	 Over	 time,	 bureaucratic	 and	
institutional	 interests	 thus	 found	 it	 useful	 to	 maintain	 the	 nation’s	 nuclear	 status	
because	 the	 CCP	 gained	 legitimacy	 from	 having	 re-established	 China	 as	 a	 regional	
power.	 The	 limited	 nature	 of	 China’s	 strategic	 ambitions	 during	 the	 Cold	War	 and	
focus	 on	 internal	 development	 is	 also	 reflected	 in	 the	 restrained	 character	 of	 its	
approach	to	nuclear	weapons,	including	its	minimum	deterrence	policy.	
	
To	 a	 significant	 extent,	 mainstream	 and	 realist	 approaches	 are	 also	 persuasive	 in	
identifying	the	international	security	requirements	for	nuclear	disarmament.	Despite	
the	political,	scientific	and	technological	benefits	of	attaining	nuclear	status	for	the	
CCP,	Chinese	nuclear	possession	does	not	therefore	seem	to	play	as	important	a	role	
in	the	nation’s	political	system,	economy,	society	and	elite	identities	when	compared	
to	NWS	with	 similarly	 sized	nuclear	arsenals—such	as	France	and	 the	UK.	Thus,	as	
General	 Pan	 Zhenqiang	 pointedly	 observes,	 because	 China	 has	 avoided	 using	 the	
bomb	to	 further	 its	 international	political	aims,	 it	 ‘is	not	a	nuclear	weapon	state	 in	
the	traditional	Western	sense’.	
	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 because	 China—like	 Russia—is	 a	 regional	 hegemon	 seeking	
independence	 from	Western	 containment,	 it	 does	 highly	 value	 its	 nuclear	 arsenal,	
albeit	in	a	different	way	to	Moscow.	This	is,	again,	primarily	because	of	the	historic	
restraint	 shown	 by	 China,	 which	 led	 to	 it	 developing	 a	 relatively	 modest	 and	
defensively	 focused	nuclear	 force.	 In	 terms	of	 disarmament,	 Chinese	 restraint	 and	
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disarmament	 rhetoric	 may	 thus	 facilitate	 an	 easier	 path	 to	 eventual	 abolition.	
However,	 given	 that	 China	 is	 an	 authoritarian	 one-party	 state,	 it	 is	 also	 clear	 that	
there	 are	 greater	 barriers	 to	 institutional	 democratisation	 than	 for	 the	 liberal	
democracies	 that	 are	nuclear	possessors,	 so	 that	whilst	 it	 could	play	 an	 important	
role	in	realising	disarmament,	democratisation	is	likely	to	take	longer	to	develop.	
	
In	 order	 for	 China	 to	 eventually	 move	 towards	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 it	 is	 first	
necessary	for	 it	 to	continue	with	 its	policy	of	nuclear	restraint	and	to	resist	 further	
building	 up	 its	 arsenal.	 The	 potentially	 escalating	 confrontation	 with	 the	 US	 and	
other	powers	in	the	Asia-Pacific	region	endangers	this	and	requires	attention	at	the	
highest	 levels	 so	 that	 the	 two	 nations	 can	 achieve	 a	 political	 settlement.	
Furthermore,	 Chinese	 analysts	 have	 presented	 a	 range	 of	 concerns	 and	 proposals	
that	 need	 to	 be	 addressed—principally	 by	 the	 US,	 but	 also	 the	 other	 NWS	 and	
Japan—if	 China	 is	 to	 cooperate	 on	 any	 process	 focused	 on	 nuclear	 reductions	 or	
disarmament.	Absent	international	cooperation	focused	on	making	progress	in	these	
areas	 there	will	 be	 little	 incentive	 for	 China’s	 political	 leadership	 to	 alter	 its	 long-
standing	 approach	 to	nuclear	 policy,	 especially	 given	 that	 the	domestic	 public	 and	
civil	 society	 debate	 on	 this	 issue	 that	 currently	 exists	 is	 far	 from	 being	 forceful	
enough	to	make	the	CCP	reassess	their	options	and	change	course,	despite	any	signs	
of	liberalisation	that	some	analysts	may	have	detected.	
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Chapter	8		
Realising	NWS	nuclear	disarmament	through	institutional	democratisation	
	
The	 preceding	 chapters	 of	 this	 study	 identified	 the	 need	 to	 improve	 upon	
mainstream	 and	 realist	 theories	 of	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 disarmament	 by	
introducing	 the	 concept	 of	 institutional	 democratisation.	 In	 order	 to	 assess	 the	
explanatory	power	of	institutional	democratisation	in	comparison	to	existing	theory,	
these	 approaches	 were	 then	 discussed	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 five	 NWS	 case	 studies	
through	an	exploration	of	the	relevant	historical	record	and	expert	thought.	Overall,	
it	 was	 found	 that	 the	 emphasis	 of	 mainstream	 and	 realist	 theories	 on	 external	
security	 threats	 as	 being	 the	 primary	 factor	 driving	 NWS’s	 initial	 acquisition	 of	
nuclear	weapons	has	limited	value,	being	more	relevant	to	some	NWS—particularly	
Russia	 and	 China,	 for	 example—than	 others.	 Moreover,	 mainstream	 and	 realist	
theories	 cannot	 account	 for	 the	 important	 domestic	 political	 factors	 driving	 the	
pursuit	and	subsequent	development	and	evolution	of	the	bomb	in	each	NWS	over	
time.	 Crucially,	 mainstream	 and	 realist	 theories	 are	 also	 unable	 to	 provide	 a	
compelling	 account	 of	 how	 nuclear	 disarmament	may	 be	 achieved	 and	 sustained,	
including	what	political	 forces	will	be	required	to	realise	NWS’s	transition	to	FNWS	
status.	
	
In	 contrast,	 institutional	 democratisation	 is	 able	 to	 explain	 key	 aspects	 of	 nuclear	
possession	and	disarmament	for	the	US,	Russia,	the	UK	and	France,	with	China	as	a	
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lesser-included	 case.	 This	 is	 primarily	 because	 this	 approach	 provides	 insight	 and	
understanding	 into	 the	 domestic	 drivers	 of	 both	 the	 origins	 of	 nuclear	 acquisition	
and	 the	 development	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 over	 time.	 Furthermore,	 institutional	
democratisation—as	 a	 theory	 of	 political	 change—improves	 upon	mainstream	and	
realist	 theories	 by	 identifying	 the	 key	 political	 obstacles	 to	 nuclear	 disarmament,	
principally	 at	 the	 domestic	 level	 but	 also	 internationally,	 and	 how	 these	 may	 be	
overcome	 through	 liberal	 and	democratic	 reforms.	 It	 is	 also	 important	 to	mention	
that	 institutional	democratisation	does	not	 reject	 the	security	model’s	 insights	 into	
the	drivers	of	nuclear	acquisition	and	possession,	but	seeks	to	add	to	and	 improve	
upon	them	where	appropriate.	
	
Whilst	 the	 case	 studies	 in	 Chapters	 Three	 to	 Seven	 discussed	 these	 different	
theoretical	 approaches	 to	 understand	 nuclear	 politics	 in	 and	 between	 NWS,	 it	 is	
necessary	to	provide	an	overview	of	how	the	NWS	relate	to	one	another	as	a	group	
and	 also	 to	 place	 the	 NWS	within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 global	 nuclear	 order.	 This	 is	
necessary	 to	 both	 understand	 how	 this	 group	 and	 this	 order	 operates	 and	might,	
together,	be	transformed	in	ways	supportive	of	nuclear	disarmament.	This	is	briefly	
done	in	this	chapter	to:	i)	show	how	the	domestic	politics	of	and	strategic	decisions	
made	by	NWS	affect	each	other’s	approach	to	nuclear	choices	ii)	produce	ideas	and	
strategies	 concerning	 how	 the	 elimination	 of	 nuclear	 arsenals	might	 be	 advanced,	
focusing	on	 the	 concept	of	 institutional	 democratisation	as	 it	 applies	 to	principally	
the	national,	but	also	the	international	level.	
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This	 chapter	 addresses	 these	 questions	 by	 first	 reviewing	 possible	 actions	 and	
processes	 supportive	 of	 institutional	 democratisation	 in	 the	 NWS—involving	 the	
state,	 civil	 society	 and	 the	 public,	 for	 example—and	 how	 these	 responses	may	 be	
developed	 to	 realise	 the	 proposed	 disarmament	 measures.	 The	 second	 section	
considers	 where	 the	 political	 will	 for	 these	 changes	 might	 come	 from,	 by	
summarising	the	primary	obstacles	to	and	opportunities	for	nuclear	disarmament	in	
and	between	NWS,	as	outlined	in	Chapters	Three	to	Seven.	Overall,	the	discussion	is	
informed	 by	 the	 principles	 on	 which	 institutional	 democratisation	 is	 based	 i.e.	
democracy,	transparency	and	accountability—which	are	essential	for	the	creation	of	
effective	 and	 legitimate	 processes	 and	 structures	 and	 if	 timely	 progress	 is	 to	 be	
made	on	eliminating	nuclear	weapons	in	and	between	NWS.	
	
8.1	Institutionalising	civilian	and	democratic	control	over	nuclear	weapons	systems	
at	a	national	level	
	
Our	previous	discussion	has	shown	that	nuclear	disarmament	at	 the	national	 level,	
as	with	the	transition	to	denuclearisation	at	the	regional	and	international	levels,	will	
look	 different	 and	 feel	 different	 for	 each	 of	 the	 NWS	 given	 the	 singular	 nature,	
including	 the	 nuclear	 and	 political	 histories,	 traditions	 and	 institutions,	 of	 each	 of	
these	 states.	 For	 example,	 the	 far	 greater	 scale	 of	 the	 Russian	 and	 US	 nuclear	
arsenals	and	their	supporting	political,	military	and	 industrial	 infrastructure,	means	
that	 the	task	of	moving	to	FNWS	status	will	be	a	much	bigger	societal	undertaking	
for	these	two	states	than	for	China,	France	and	the	UK.	On	the	other	hand,	as	Justin	
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Alger	and	Trevor	Findlay	 (2009:	11)	point	out,	 France,	Russia,	 the	UK	and	US	have	
experience	of,	and	previously	paid	for,	developing	the	facilities	to	dismantle	the	first	
generation	of	their	nuclear	weapon	systems	that	they	can	draw	on	in	future.94		
	
Therefore,	at	 the	 same	 time	as	being	aware	of	 the	differences	between	NWS,	 it	 is	
also	important	to	recognise	the	commonalities	between	these	states,	both	because,	
unlike	the	vast	majority	of	NNWS,	their	polities	have	been	shaped	in	significant	ways	
by	the	possession	of	nuclear	weapons	and	because	of	the	types	of	activities	involved	
in	the	process	of	eliminating	nuclear	arsenals.	As	discussed	above,	nuclear	weapons	
systems	are	 able	 to	exist	 and	be	 reproduced	because	political	 actors	 in	 each	NWS	
have,	 over	 several	 decades,	 developed	 highly	 secretive	 and	 autocratic	 institutions	
that	protect	these	weapons	from	popular	social	and	political	control.	The	citizens	of	
NWS	 thus	 share	 the	 challenge	 of	 how	 they	 can	 develop	 governance	 processes,	
appropriate	 to	 their	 particular	 circumstances,	 that	 will	 allow	 nuclear	 weapons	
systems	to	be	controlled,	and	their	salience	reduced,	pending	their	elimination.	This	
challenge	may	be	eased,	for	example,	through	NWS	(and	other	state	and	non-state	
actors)	 exchanging	 and	 sharing	 knowledge	 and	 ideas	 on	 disarmament	 practices,	
whilst	 safeguarding	 against	 proliferation	 by	 restricting	 access	 to	 sensitive	
information.		
																																									 																					
94	Alger	 and	 Findlay	 (2009:	 13)	 also	 suggest	 that	 the	G8’s	Global	 Partnership	Against	 the	 Spread	 of	
Weapons	and	Materials	of	Mass	Destruction	could	provide	financial	assistance	to	any	NWS	unable	to	
cover	the	costs	of	nuclear	disarmament.		
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From	a	political	point	of	view,	transitioning	towards	FNWS	status	and	implementing	
phased	 disarmament	 measures	 will	 thus	 require	 NWS	 to	 develop	 new	 political	
processes	 based	 on	 the	 principles	 of	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 to	 ensure	
civilian	and	democratic	control	of	these	weapons.	It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	
specifically	 democratic	 processes	 may	 be	 less	 important	 for	 Chinese	 nuclear	
disarmament	on	a	domestic	level,	given	the	hitherto	restrained	nature	of	its	nuclear	
weapons	system	as	well	as	China’s	non-expansionist	strategic	culture	and	the	greater	
immediate	 importance	 to	 China	 of	 a	 stable	 and	 non-threatening	 security	
environment.	Notwithstanding	the	particular	nature	of	the	Chinese	case,	 it	remains	
the	fact	that	each	NWS	must	move	towards	a	setup	whereby	the	domestic	political	
conditions	 that	 allow	 nuclear	 weapons	 to	 flourish	 are	 no	 longer	 present,	 or	 have	
been	dramatically	 reduced.	 In	 this	sense,	 institutional	democratisation	 can	be	seen	
as	a	way	to	solve	the	domestic	political	issues	created	by	NWS	nuclear	disarmament.	
It	is	therefore	necessary	and	useful	to	give	a	sense	of	the	specific	practical	ideas	and	
processes	supportive	of	NWS	 institutional	democratisation	that	may	be	adopted	by	
scholars	and	policy	professionals	working	in	this	field.	
	
i)	Measuring	democracy	and	the	benefits	of	nuclear	disarmament	
	
As	 discussed	 in	 Chapters	 Three	 to	 Seven,	 mainstream	 analyses	 and	 indexes	 of	
democratic	 standards	 and	 civil	 liberties	 in	 NWS	 do	 not	 take	 into	 account	 the	
domestic	 political	 impact	of	 nuclear	possession.	 Yet,	 as	we	have	 seen,	 the	nuclear	
revolution	 established	 highly-centralised	 nuclear	 weapons	 decision-making	
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processes	 in	each	NWS	as	part	of	military	and	political	establishments,	which	 then	
became	embedded	in	each	polity	over	time,	impairing	the	knowledge	of	citizens	and	
preventing	their	involvement	in	a	key	area	of	national	policy.	Whilst	the	implications	
of	 this	 institutional	 development	 differs	 for	 each	 NWS,	 for	 example,	 being	 more	
significant	 for	 the	 three	 Western	 liberal	 democracies	 than	 the	 two	 authoritarian	
states,	 and	 according	 to	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 nuclear	 arsenal,	 the	 importance	 of	 this	
subject	 requires	 further	 investigation	 to	 ascertain	 the	 impact	 on	 governance	 and	
have	this	reflected	in	methodologies	assessing	the	health	of	a	state’s	democracy.	
	
Measuring	what	 it	means	 for	 a	 state	 to:	 i)	 possess	 nuclear	weapons	 ii)	maintain	 a	
sizable	 military	 establishment	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 state’s	 regime	 type	 and	 democratic	
performance	could	potentially	be	done	by	 introducing	what	Richard	L.	Merritt	and	
Dina	 A.	 Zinnes	 (1993:	 213)	 refer	 to	 as	 a	 ‘multi-dimensional’	 indices	 to	 categorise	
regime	type.	This	model,	based	on	the	work	of	Ted	Gurr,	Keith	 Jaggers	and	Will	H.	
Moore	 (1990),	 utilises	 several	 indicators	 to	 rank	 countries	 on	 ‘two	 0	 to	 10	 point	
scales,	 one	 for	 institutionalized	 democracy	 and	 another	 for	 institutionalized	
autocracy’	 so	 that	 ‘a	 country	may	 thus	 rank	high	on	one	and	 low	on	 the	other…or	
rank	the	same	on	both’.	It	is,	unfortunately,	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study	to	apply	
this	 model	 to	 the	 NWS	 in	 order	 to	 rank	 them	 in	 terms	 of	 democracy	 and	
authoritarianism.	However,	given	the	difficulty	in	defining	what	democracy	means	in	
practice	 and	 the	 failure	 of	 mainstream	 methodologies	 to	 consider	 the	 impact	 of	
nuclear	possession	and	military	establishments	on	domestic	political	practices,	such	
a	multi-dimensional	approach	could	provide	a	useful	way	to	improve	future	studies.	
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Including	such	factors	may	also	bring	more	scrutiny	to	bear	on	the	otherwise	often	
invisible	 and	 unknown	 areas	 of	 a	 nation’s	 political	 life	 and	 show	 how	 nuclear	
disarmament	and	demilitarisation	might	act	 to	 improve	the	democratic	process	 for	
nuclear	possessors.	Moreover,	improving	the	accuracy	of	measuring	regime	type	has	
implications	 for	political	and	 IR	 scholarship,	given	 the	prominence	of	 ideas	 such	as	
Democratic	 Peace	 Theory,	 as	 understood	 by	Mearsheimer	 and	Waltz,	 discussed	 in	
Chapter	 Two.	 For	 example,	 identifying	 the	 power	 and	 influence	 of	 military	 and	
nuclear	establishments	in	the	three	NWS	that	are	formally	liberal	democracies	allows	
us	 to	 differentiate	 them	 from	 other	 states	 with	 apparently	 similar	 regime	 types.	
Developing	 such	 differences	 in	 categorisation	 may	 then	 help	 us	 explain	 why	 one	
otherwise	‘democratic’	state	engages	in	conflict	more	or	less	than	another	over	time.	
	
ii)	Implementing	policies	supportive	of	institutional	democratisation	in	NWS	
	
In	 the	 1980s	Hugh	Miall	 (1987:	 157-158)	 proposed	 a	 series	 of	 possible	 short-term	
measures	 that	 governments	 could	 take	 in	 support	 of	 moves	 towards	 nuclear	
disarmament.	As	well	as	being	compatible	with	institutional	democratisation,	several	
of	 these	proposals	 remain	 relevant	 today,	particularly	given	 the	 fact	 that	all	of	 the	
NWS	are	either	in	the	process	of	modernising	their	nuclear	arsenals,	or	plan	to	do	so	
over	 the	 next	 few	 decades.	 They	 include:	 i)	 greater	 democratic,	 including	
parliamentary	 powers	 to	 control	 spending	 and	 procurement	 decisions	 on	
conventional	 and	 nuclear	 weapons	 ii)	 passing	 laws	 to	 prevent	 representatives	 of	
nuclear	weapons	laboratories	and	arms	manufacturers	from	participating	in	nuclear	
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weapons	 decision-making	 iii)	 breaking	 up	 bureaucratic	 power	 that	 could	 resist	
popular	 disarmament	 initiatives	 by,	 for	 example,	 rotating	 officials	 to	 other	
departments	iv)	exerting	greater	political	control	over	nuclear	weapons	laboratories	
to	prevent	new	weapons	research	and	development	v)	upgrading	the	status	of	arms	
control	 and	 disarmament	 within	 government,	 for	 example,	 foreign	 ministries	 to	
assess	 the	 impact	 of	 new	 weapons	 on	 ‘existing	 and	 potential	 arms	 control	
agreements’.		
	
In	 addition	 to	 such	bureaucratic	 and	parliamentary	measures,	 the	 centralised	war-
making	 powers	 of	 the	 executive,	 which	 reach	 their	 zenith	 in	 the	 NWS’s	 ‘nuclear	
monarchies’,	also	need	to	be	restrained,	alongside	the	salience	of	nuclear	weapons	
being	 reduced	 in	 national	 security	 policies,	 for	 example,	 as	 proposed	 by	 Kennette	
Benedict	in	relation	to	the	US	(Ploughshares	Fund,	2016).	Supportive	developments	
in	 the	 domestic	 sphere	 will	 be	 enhanced	 by	 progress	 made	 at	 the	 regional	 and	
international	 level,	 for	 example,	 involving	 conflict	 resolution	 and	 cooperation	 on	
arms	control	and	disarmament,	although,	as	has	been	previously	outlined	and	which	
shall	be	discussed	further	below,	these	levels	have	varying	degrees	of	importance	for	
each	NWS’s	 attitude	 towards	 disarmament	 given	 these	 nation’s	 different	 strategic	
circumstances.		
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iii)	Improving	public	understanding	of	nuclear	weapons	and	disarmament	issues	in	
NWS	
In	order	for	citizens	and	decision-makers	in	NWS	to	have	a	rounded	understanding	of	
these	issues,	the	practicalities	of	nuclear	armament	need	to	be	considered	alongside	
the	costs	and	benefits	of	disarmament.	This	is	necessary	if	an	NWS	government	is	to	
develop	a	well-informed	 range	of	policy	options	 that	 can	be	properly	 assessed,	by	
their	 strengths	 and	weaknesses,	 in	 national	 political	 debates.	 As	 previously	 noted,	
the	 size	 of	 NWS’s	 disarmament	 task	 will	 be	 firstly	 affected,	 according	 to	 Findlay	
(2003),	by	the	degree	of	irreversibility	that	is	deemed	necessary,	for	example,	in	the	
eyes	of	 the	 international	community,	 if	a	NWS	 is	 to	become	a	FNWS.	The	required	
level	of	disarmament	will	naturally	affect	how	long	it	takes	and	how	much	it	will	cost	
to,	 for	example,	decommission	relevant	weapons	and	equipment,	dispose	of	 fissile	
material,	 convert	 or	 scrap	 supporting	military	 and	 industrial	 facilities	 and	monitor	
and	 verify	 (through	 unilateral	 and	 multilateral	 measures)	 these	 processes.	 In	
addition,	if	a	speedier	disarmament	process	is	required	this	will	likely	escalate	costs.	
Notwithstanding	 the	 ‘paucity	 of	 data’	 concerning	 the	 costs	 of	 eliminating	 nuclear	
weapons,	 largely	 due	 to	 the	 classified	 or	 inaccessible	 nature	 of	 much	 relevant	
information—including	 for	 previous	 dismantlement	 efforts	 involving	 nuclear	
weapons	and	facilities—Alger	and	Findlay	(2009:	1)	make	the	important	observation	
that	such	costs	‘pale	in	comparison	to	the	financial	burden	of	deploying,	maintaining	
and	upgrading	nuclear	arsenals	in	perpetuity’.	
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Improved	 understanding	 and	 communication	 to	 key	 audiences	 (for	 example,	
communities	involved	in	or	 living	near	to	nuclear-related	facilities	and	trade	unions	
involved	 in	 relevant	 production)	 of	 the	 practicalities	 of	what	 nuclear	 disarmament	
entails,	 would	 benefit	 from	 studies	 being	 undertaken	 on	 the	 options	 involved	 in	
eliminating	 nuclear	 arsenals,	 for	 example,	 defence	 diversification	 and	 who	 should	
pay	 for	 the	 different	 parts	 of	 the	 process.	 For	 example	NWS	will	 need	 to	 conduct	
studies	costing	the	dismantlement	of	their	own	arsenals,	while	multilateral	bodies—
Alger	 and	 Findlay	 (Ibid:	 2)	 suggest	 the	 IAEA	 or	 a	 future	 ‘Nuclear	 Disarmament	
Commission’—will	 have	 to	 provide	 resources	 for	 multilateral	 monitoring	 and	
verification.	 At	 present	 amongst	 NWS,	 civil	 society	 groups	 in	 the	 UK,	 including	
Scottish	 CND	 (Ainslie,	 2012:	 i),	 Nuclear	 Education	 Trust	 (2012)	 and	 the	 Nuclear	
Information	Service	 (Burt,	2016),	and	 in	 the	US,	 including	Stephen	Schwartz	of	 the	
Brookings	 Institution	 (2008),	 as	 well	 as	 Susan	 Willett	 (2003)	 for	 the	 UN’s	
Disarmament	Research	Institute,	have	undertaken	the	most	detailed	studies	of	this	
type,	research	that	needs	to	be	more	widely	disseminated	and	expanded	across	all	
NWS.	This	 is	particularly	necessary	in	relation	to	local	community	groups	and	trade	
unions,	both	to	alleviate	their	concerns	regarding	their	jobs	and	skills	and	to	increase	
their	 participation	 in	 developing	 alternatives	 to	 nuclear	 weapons-related	 work	 as	
part	of	a	wider	conversion	of	industry—away	from	military	production	and	towards	
civilian	goods	and	services.	
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8.2	Where	will	the	political	will	for	nuclear	disarmament	action	come	from?	
	
In	 terms	of	 the	existing	and	potential	 sources	of	cooperative	and	progressive	NWS	
action	 on	 nuclear	 disarmament	 that	 might	 take	 forward	 the	 proposals	 outlined	
above,	Chapters	Three	to	Seven	of	this	study	looked	in	detail	at	the	key	question	of	
whether	 the	 requisite	 political	 energy	 might	 derive	 from	 small	 groups	 of	 political	
elites—as	 per	 the	 guardianship	 model—or	 from	 broader	 social	 movements—as	
suggested	 by	 institutional	 democratisation.	 Overall,	 the	 historical	 record	 proves	
former	Swedish	Prime	Minister	Olof	Palme	correct	 in	his	assessment	that	 'It	 is	very	
unlikely	 that	 disarmament	will	 ever	 take	 place	 if	 it	must	wait	 for	 the	 initiatives	 of	
governments	and	experts.	 It	will	only	come	about	as	the	expression	of	the	political	
will	 of	 people	 in	 many	 parts	 of	 the	 world'	 (ElBaradei,	 2008).	 Palme’s	 insight	 is	
corroborated	by	the	preceding	analysis	of	the	politics	of	the	NWS’s	nuclear	weapons	
systems	 showing	 that	 NWS	 military	 and	 political	 elites	 and	 the	 institutions	 they	
inhabit	 and	maintain	have,	 in	 general,	 acted	as	 the	principal	barrier	 to	meaningful	
progress	on	nuclear	disarmament.		
	
For	example,	France	and	the	UK	are	part	of	a	'P3'	grouping,	led	by	the	US,	which	co-
operates	 at	 a	 high	 level,	 including	 through	 working	 together	 on	 nuclear	 weapons	
development	 (albeit	 on	 a	 bilateral	 rather	 than	 trilateral	 basis)	 and	 policy.	 The	
leaderships	of	the	P3	see	nuclear	weapons	as	symbolic	of	their	nation’s	world	power	
status	 and	 at	 the	 apex	 of	 their	 global	 power	 projection	 capabilities.	 Chinese	 and	
Russian	elites	also	see	nuclear	weapons	as	necessary	for	access	to	the	top	table,	but,	
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given	 their	 relative	 conventional	 military	 weakness	 and	 much	 more	 modest	
ambitions	compared	 to	 the	US,	 their	nuclear	 strategies	principally	 focus	on	central	
deterrence	 and	 regional	 influence	 to	 ensure	 regime	 survival	 and	 national	
sovereignty.	
	
The	key	point	here	is	that	the	wider	character	of	Western	NWS’s	defence	and	foreign	
policy,	characterised	by	the	‘control	paradigm’,	needs	to	change	if	nuclear	weapons	
are	to	be	delegitimised	and	disarmament	(and	all	 this	entails	politically)	embraced,	
with	 nuclear	 and	 other	 offensive	 forms	 of	 power	 replaced	 by	 conventional	 and	
defensive	 capabilities.	 This	 in	 turn	 requires	 domestic	 political	 movements	 with	
positive	non-nuclear	visions	for	national	security	and	the	strategies	and	strength	to	
implement	 them	 over	 the	 long-term.	 Such	 popular	 movements	 are	 especially	
necessary	 in	the	US	given	the	great	size	of	 its	nuclear	weapons	complex	which	will	
take	many	 years	 to	 dismantle	 and	 the	 need	 for	 China	 and	Russia	 to	 be	 convinced	
that	 the	 US	 is	 committed	 to	 and	 will	 not	 deviate	 from	 demilitarisation	 and	
disarmament	 so	 that	 international	 order	 is	 reformed	 on	 a	 more	 equitable	 and	
cooperative	basis.		
	
Yet,	as	discussed	in	Chapters	Three	to	Seven,	significant	political	obstacles	currently	
exist	preventing	a	democratic	transition	supportive	of	nuclear	disarmament	in	each	
NWS.	For	example,	Tariq	Ali	(2015)	has	observed	that	in	recent	years	France	and	the	
UK	have	been	ruled	by	an	‘extreme	centre’,	made	up	of	political	parties	with	largely	
indistinguishable	 platforms	 that,	 in	 Peter	 Mair’s	 (2006)	 words,	 preside	 over	
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‘hollowed	 out’	 democracies.	 In	 the	 US	meanwhile,	Max	 Blumenthal	 (2010)	 argues	
that	 the	Republican	party	has	been	 ‘shattered’	 following	 its	 capture	by	 the	 radical	
right,	with	the	Democrats	now	forming	the	moderate	right.	Western	political	classes	
are	 thus	disconnected	 from	 the	 citizenry	 and	becoming	 ‘appendages	of	 the	 state’,	
whilst	the	citizenry	have	lost	faith	in	and	abstain	from	electoral	politics	(Mair,	2006).	
There	 are	 clear	 echoes	 of	 the	 West’s	 predicament	 in	 Russia’s	 own	 ‘managed	
democracy’	and	the	role	the	United	Russia	party	plays	as	an	outgrowth	of	the	state,	
balancing	 the	 interests	 of	 oligarchs	 and	 rallying	 the	 population	 around	 the	 flag	 in	
times	 of	 crisis.	 Meanwhile,	 power	 in	 China’s	 one	 party	 state	 is	 becoming	 more	
centralised,	as	new	leader	Xi	 Jinping	 ‘steps	forward	as	the	strongman	who	defends	
the	PRC’s	 Leninist	 form	of	bureaucratic	 state	 capitalism’,	 in	 the	words	of	 Jonathan	
Fenby	(2015).		
	
In	response	to	the	perceived	failure	of	these	political	systems	as	well	as	a	mounting	
distrust	 in	 elites,	 populist	 and	 nationalist	 movements	 have	 risen	 in	 recent	 years	
espousing	putatively	anti-elitist	and	anti-establishment	politics.	This	has	been	seen	in	
the	 US	 with	 Donald	 Trump,	 in	 the	 UK	 with	 UKIP	 and	 Jeremy	 Corbyn’s	 Labour,	 in	
France	with	the	Front	National	and	Russia	with	Alexei	Navalny	of	the	Progress	Party.	
Such	groups	need	 to	be	 treated	on	a	 case-by-case	basis	 as	not	 all	 promote	 values	
and	 policies	 compatible	 with	 institutional	 democratisation	 and	 all	 it	 entails	 for	
disarmament.	 Indeed	some	of	 these	movements	either	directly	propose	or	contain	
prominent	elements	enthusiastic	about	maintaining	or	 increasing	military	spending	
based	on	a	belief	in	maximising	national	power	and	an	appeal	to	unions	and	workers	
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in	 relevant	 industries.	 Furthermore,	 leaders	 and	 movements	 from	 an	 apparently	
progressive	 social	 democratic	 tradition,	 such	 as	 US	 Presidential	 candidate	 Bernie	
Sanders,	may	 still	 be	 in	 favour	 of	 US	 power	 projection	 and	 the	maintenance	 of	 a	
strong	 military	 establishment.	 Given	 the	 fact	 that	 nuclear	 disarmament	 requires	
democracy	and	demilitarisation—at	home	and	abroad—to	be	prioritised,	emergent	
progressive	political	movements	will	therefore	need	to	be	persuaded	or	pressured	to	
adopt	 and	 maintain	 such	 principles,	 where	 they	 are	 not	 already	 established,	 by	
activists	inside	and	outside	of	these	groups.		
	
Disarmament	by	other	means?	Financial,	safety	and	technological	factors		
	
Absent	the	development	of	popular	movements	within	NWS	focused	on	and	capable	
of	achieving	disarmament	 in	the	near	term,	 it	 is	 important	to	note	the	 impact	that	
financial,	 safety	 and	 technological	 factors	 have	 on	 nuclear	 weapons	 systems.	 For	
example,	 the	 cost	 and	 time	 overruns	 endemic	 to	 hi-tech	 military	 systems,	 the	
difficulty	 of	 maintaining	 core	 industrial	 skills	 related	 to	 nuclear	 weapons,	 the	
numerous	 safety	 and	 security	 incidents	 nuclear	 weapons	 are	 prone	 to	 and	 the	
possibility	that	submarines	or	even	ballistic	missiles	may	be	made	obsolete	by	future	
technological	developments,	could	together	mean	that	the	costs	and	risks	of	nuclear	
weapons	become	so	great	that	nuclear	disarmament	becomes	the	pragmatic	choice	
for	NWS	decision-makers.	Notwithstanding	the	fact	that	NWS	governments	have	and	
will	take	steps	to	mitigate	these	problems,	their	cumulative	impact	certainly	makes	
the	process	of	reproducing	nuclear	weapons	systems	much	more	challenging.		
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At	 present	 the	 bureaucratic	 and	 technological	 momentum	 driving	 the	 nuclear	
enterprise	in	NWS	seems	capable	of	responding	to	threats	to	its	future,	although	one	
cannot	be	certain	that	this	will	always	be	the	case.	 In	any	case,	these	financial	and	
technical	problems	are	interesting	to	consider	in	terms	of	what	the	domestic	causes	
of	disarmament	might	be	and	how	they	differ	in	terms	of	what	disarmament	would	
then	mean	 in	 terms	of	 its	political	 consequences.	To	give	one	example	of	 this,	 if	 a	
future	UK	government	framed	its	decision	to	disarm	as	a	normative	choice	then	this	
would	 very	 likely	 lead	 to	 problems	 for	 its	 relationship	 with	 France	 and	 the	 US,	
particularly	 if	 London	 then	 called	 on	 Paris	 and	Washington	 to	 eliminate	 their	 own	
arsenals	 because	 these	weapons	were	 now	 seen	 as	morally	 unacceptable.	 Leaked	
diplomatic	cables	published	in	2010	illustrated	this	dynamic,	with	Paris	in	particular	
objecting	to	moves	by	then	Prime	Minister	Brown	and	President	Obama	to	question	
the	legitimacy	of	nuclear	arms	(The	Guardian,	2010).		
	
Contrast	 this	 awkward	 situation	 with	 one	 where	 London	 framed	 a	 unilateral	
disarmament	 decision	 as	 a	 pragmatic	 technocratic	 choice	 based	 on	 cost	 grounds,	
with	the	resources	from	nuclear	weapons	being	diverted	to	conventional	 forces—a	
stance	 which	 the	 UK’s	 NATO	 allies	 would	 be	 much	 more	 understanding	 of	 and	
comfortable	with.	A	technocratic	disarmament	scenario,	whilst	still	of	great	moment,	
would	also,	potentially,	minimize	the	impact	on	an	NWS’s	bureaucratic	and	political	
structures	compared	to	a	normative	scenario,	as	decision-making	elites	would	likely	
seek	to	maintain	their	institutional	power	and	realise	their	traditional	strategic	aims	
(for	 example,	 the	 P3’s	 control	 paradigm)	 using	 other	 means.	 In	 any	 case,	 a	
	 372	
technocratic	 disarmament	 scenario	 is,	 at	 present,	 only	 plausible	 for	 France	 and,	
probably	 to	 a	 greater	 extent,	 the	 UK,	 given	 these	 nation’s	 economic	 and	 political	
situations.	 For	 Russia	 and	 the	 US,	 whilst	 technocratic	 concerns	 are	 of	 high	
importance	with	 regards	 to	 the	 future	 functioning	 of	 their	 nuclear	 arsenals,	 these	
weapons’	political	and	strategic	value	outweighs	such	concerns	for	decision-making	
elites.	 As	 for	 China,	 a	 technocratic	 disarmament	 scenario	 is	 currently	 implausible	
given	 that	 Beijing	 is	 increasing	 its	 nuclear	 weapons	 budgets	 and	 technological	
competence,	branching	out	into	new	platforms	and	delivery	systems.	
	
Thus,	 notwithstanding	 the	 current	 democratic	 malaise,	 the	 fact	 remains	 that	 the	
best-case	scenario	would	be	for	sufficient	political	pressure	to	eventually	develop	so	
that	 each	 NWS	 takes	 unilateral	 steps	 supportive	 of	 disarmament	 that	 are	 not	
dependent	 on	 reciprocation	 from	 other	 NWS	 and	 that	 are	 in	 line	 with	 their	 NPT	
obligations.	These	steps	variously	include	ratification	of	the	CTBT	and	FMCT,	security	
assurances,	 no	 first	 use	 declarations,	 ending	 horizontal	 and	 vertical	 nuclear	
proliferation	 (including	 to	 other	 NWS	 and	 NAS)	 and	 stockpile	 reductions.	 Yet	 any	
unilateral	moves	 are	 currently	 treated	 as	 politically	 unacceptable	 by	Moscow	 and	
Washington,	 with	 the	 numbers	 game—covering	 warheads	 and	 delivery	 systems—
having	particular	symbolic	importance,	whereby	each	wants	to	prevent	quantitative	
inferiority	 for	domestic	political	as	much	as	 international	strategic	 reasons.	Beijing,	
London	 and	 Paris	 meanwhile	 argue	 that	 they	 have	 exercised	 restraint	 and	 either	
reduced	 their	 nuclear	 forces	 after	 the	 Cold	War	 or	 kept	 them	at	 low	numbers,	 so	
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that	 they	 will	 need	 to	 see	 substantial	 movement	 from	 the	 big	 two	 before	 they	
commit	to	further	reductions	or	capping	their	nuclear	arsenals.	
	
Differentiating	NWS	responsibility	for	nuclear	disarmament	
	
As	previously	 noted,	 in	 order	 to	 look	beyond	 the	numbers	 game	and	 consider	 the	
politics	of	nuclear	weapons	in	the	round,	it	needs	to	be	accepted	that	each	NWS	has	
a	 dual	 disarmament	 responsibility.	 This	 means	 that	 in	 addition	 to	 having	 an	
obligation	to	achieve	national	nuclear	disarmament,	each	NWS	also	has	an	obligation	
to	act	 in	ways	supportive	of	a	NWFW,	thereby	encouraging	other	NWS’s	efforts	 to	
move	 to	 zero.	 A	 key	 issue	 here	 is	 how	 best	 to	 designate	 NWS	 in	 terms	 of	 their	
relative	power	and	the	structural	nature	of	their	relations.	For	example,	mainstream	
analyses	split	the	NWS	into	two	main	categories	with	Russia	and	the	US	as	the	‘big’	
nuclear	powers	and	China,	France	and	the	UK	as	 the	 ‘small’	nuclear	powers.	Given	
the	size	of	their	arsenals,	Russia	and	the	US	have	thus	for	several	decades	borne	a	
special	responsibility	for	creating	a	NWFW.		
	
Whilst	Russia’s	strategic	power	dramatically	declined	following	the	end	of	 the	Cold	
War,	 along	 with	 its	 ability	 to	 bargain	 with	 the	 US,	 China’s	 rising	 economic	 and	
military	 strength	 drew	 it	 into	 an	 unstable	 ‘great	 power’	 dynamic	 of	 cooperation,	
competition	and	potential	conflict.	Today,	as	Acton	(2011:	23)	argues,	 if	Russia	and	
the	 US’s	 reductions	 are	 to	 continue	 beyond	 New	 START	 they	 want	 to	 see	 China,	
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France	and	the	UK	join	them	in	a	multilateral	process	before	they	reach	the	level	of	
the	big	two.	Whilst	China’s	nuclear	arsenal	remains	small	and	has	not	developed	the	
same	 level	 of	 technical	 sophistication	 as	 the	US	 and	Russia,	 the	 potential	 for	 it	 to	
improve	 both	 quantitatively	 and	 qualitatively	 concerns	 planners	 in	 Moscow	 and	
Washington.	For	example,	Acton	(2012:	38)	points	out	that	‘the	downward	trajectory	
of	 the	American	 and	 Russian	 arsenals	 risks	 colliding	with	 the	 upward	 trajectory	 in	
China,	 India,	 and	Pakistan’.	Acton	 therefore	proposes	 that	 ‘the	 future	evolution	of	
the	world’s	nuclear	arsenals	will	depend	principally	on	the	interactions	of	five	states’	
which	‘form	two	triangles’,	so	that	‘the	first	consists	of	the	United	States,	Russia,	and	
China;	the	second:	China,	India,	and	Pakistan’.	The	key	point	being	made	here	is	that	
the	process	of	reducing	the	big	arsenals	of	the	US	and	Russia	beyond	a	certain	level	
is	now	connected	to	regional	powers	with	smaller	arsenals,	 thus	making	the	whole	
process	much	more	complicated	given	the	number	of	actors	involved.	Moreover,	by	
this	analysis	France	and	the	UK—the	former	imperial	powers—play	a	peripheral	role	
as	their	nuclear	weapons	are	seen	by	Russia	as	‘extensions	of	the	US	arsenal’.	
	
Scholars	 such	 as	 Acton	 (2011),	 Malcolm	 Chalmers	 (2012)	 and	 the	 Deep	 Cuts	
Commission	 (2014)	have	 therefore	 recently	 investigated	 the	political	 and	 technical	
conditions	that	would	allow	the	US	and	Russia	to	move	to	 low	numbers	of	nuclear	
weapons,	so	that	NPS	arsenals	contract	and	converge	at	a	minimisation	point,	from	
which	the	more	difficult	move	to	zero	might	be	made.	Whilst	there	is	much	merit	in	
these	 proposals,	 the	 key	 issue	 remains	 how	 the	 political	 will	 allowing	 them	 to	 be	
implemented	may	be	summoned.	The	main	weakness	of	 these	studies	 is	 that	 they	
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share	a	guardianship	 theory	of	political	change	that	 is	embedded	within	the	status	
quo	 whereby	 think-tanks,	 in	 close	 proximity	 to	 governments,	 make	
recommendations	 to	bureaucratic	 and	political	 elites.	 The	aforementioned	authors	
thus	do	not	seek	to	criticise	the	undemocratic	nature	of	Western	NWS,	discuss	the	
limited	sovereignty	of	France,	Germany	and	the	UK	under	US	hegemony	or	imagine	
how	Western	NWS’s	political	systems	might	be	changed	as	in	the	past,	for	example,	
through	 domestic	 pressure	 and	 reforms.	 Such	 democratic	 developments	 are	
disallowed,	 presumably,	 for	 being	 idealistic	 or	 naïve.	 Yet	 ultimately	 what	 is	 really	
idealistic	 and	 naïve	 is	 to	 believe	 that	 significant	 improvements	 to	 major	 power	
relations	and	progress	on	nuclear	disarmament	can	be	made	without	the	arrival	of	
domestic	political	forces	capable	of	exercising	control	over	US	and	Western	defence	
and	 foreign	policy	 so	 that	 it	 is	 put	on	a	 responsible	 and	 sustainable	path	over	 the	
long-term.		
	
Returning	to	Palme’s	point	concerning	‘the	political	will	of	people’	around	the	world,	
thus	leads	us	to	observe	that	citizens	of	NWS	have	a	particular	responsibility	to	take	
political	 action	 that	 reduces	 the	 salience	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 in	 their	 nation’s	
security	policies	and	that	supports	their	other	disarmament	obligations.	Just	looking	
at	 the	 size	 of	 Russia	 and	 the	US’s	 nuclear	 arsenals	may	 lead	one	 to	 conclude	 that	
citizens	of	 these	nations	have	a	particularly	great	 responsibility	here.	Yet,	 it	 is	also	
clearly	necessary	to	be	realistic	about	the	ability	of	citizens	in	different	countries	to	
take	 meaningful	 political	 action	 given	 the	 level	 of	 freedom,	 including	 basic	 civil	
liberties	 such	 as	 free	 speech,	 in	 their	 country.	 If	 this	 proposal	 is	 accepted	 as	
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reasonable,	 given	 the	 oppressive	 nature	 of	 the	 Russian	 state	 and	 Russia’s	 relative	
military	weakness	on	the	one	hand	and	the	US’s	more	open	and	liberal	society	and	
military	 superiority	 on	 the	 other,	 it	 follows	 that	 US	 citizens	 have	 the	 greatest	
responsibility	 to	 move	 their	 nation	 towards	 nuclear	 disarmament	 and	 actions	
supportive	of	a	NWFW.		
	
Although	there	is	not	space	here	to	fully	outline	the	types	of	actions	that	US	citizens	
could	 take	 towards	 fulfilling	 these	 responsibilities,	 this	 thesis	 has	 found	 that	 a	 key	
first	 step	 for	 individuals	 and	 groups	 will	 be	 to	 understand	 the	 wider	 political	
meaning,	and	thus	the	causes	and	consequences,	of	nuclear	disarmament	if	they	are	
to	 develop	 effective	 political	 strategies	 and	 tactics	 in	 the	 short,	medium	 and	 long	
term.	 Providing	 a	 precise	 assessment	 of	 how	wide	 the	 gap	 is	 between	where	US-
oriented	civil	society	groups	(whose	work	has	relevance	to	nuclear	disarmament,	as	
understood	by	this	thesis)	are	today	in	terms	of	their	political	analysis	and	strategies,	
and	the	position	these	groups	need	to	be	in	to	form	a	movement	capable	of	enacting	
the	 requisite	 social	 and	 political	 transition	 required	 by	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 is	
beyond	 the	 scope	of	 this	 study.	However,	 based	on	 the	 findings	presented	 above,	
which	took	into	account	the	main	groups	working	on	nuclear	issues,	alongside	wider	
progressive	 movements,	 including	 anti-war,	 environmental,	 peace	 and	 groups	
working	for	economic	and	social	 justice,	 it	 is	possible	to	draw	the	 initial	conclusion	
that,	 US	 nuclear	 weapons	 and	 disarmament	 policy	 is	 not	 a	 high	 salience	 issue	 at	
present	for	most	of	US	civil	society	and	there	is	not	a	coherent	and	cohesive	strategy	
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or	movement	 of	 the	 kind	 that	 could	 exert	 the	 requisite	 pressure	 required	 for	 the	
necessary	institutional	changes.	
	
In	 addition	 to	 looking	 at	 the	 political	 health	 of	 pro-disarmament	 groups	 on	 a	
domestic	 level	 it	 is	also	necessary	to	 look	at	the	 international	 level.	For	example,	a	
2008	opinion	poll	conducted	 in	twenty-one	states	around	the	world,	 found	that	 ‘in	
20	countries,	large	majorities—ranging	from	62%	to	93%—favoured	an	international	
agreement	for	the	elimination	of	all	nuclear	weapons’	(World	Public	Opinion,	2008).	
Yet,	 as	 Lawrence	Wittner	 (2010:	7)	explains,	despite	 the	majorities	 in	 favour	of	 an	
international	ban	on	nuclear	weapons,	‘such	a	ban	was	“strongly	favoured”	by	only	
20%	of	those	polled	in	Pakistan,	31%	in	India,	38%	in	Russia,	39%	in	the	United	States	
and	 42%	 in	 Israel.’	 He	 therefore	 concludes	 that	 ‘it	 appears	 that	 today’s	 public	
opposition	 to	 nuclear	 weapons,	 although	 widespread,	 does	 not	 always	 run	 very	
deep.’	One	might	apply	Wittner’s	analysis	to	today’s	political	situation	given	that	at	
the	 United	 Nations	 in	 July	 2017,	 122	 nations	 voted	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 treaty	 banning	
nuclear	weapons,	yet	in	the	short-term	at	least	it	is	uncertain	how	much	chance	this	
treaty	 has	 of	 being	 implemented	 given	 the	 opposition	 of	 NPS	 (Sample,	 2017).	
Advocates	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 whether	 in	 national	 or	 international	 groups,	
therefore	find	themselves	in	a	difficult	strategic	situation.	
		
The	main	challenge	such	groups	face	is	how	they	can	pressure	NWS	governments	to	
fulfill	their	legal	obligations	to	disarm	whilst	not	being	able	to	purposefully	draw	on	
compelling	and	active	public	support.	Such	a	means	of	pressure	and	influence	has,	in	
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the	past,	been	of	great	importance—such	as	in	the	1980s	when	fear	of	nuclear	war	
was	 a	 key	 factor	 in	 the	 nuclear	 disarmament	movement	 reaching	 the	 peak	 of	 its	
powers.	 Yet	 several	 of	 the	 activists,	 officials	 and	 scholars	 I	 spoke	 to	 for	 this	 study	
agreed	 that	 this	 sense	 of	 fear	 dissipated	 following	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War,	
significantly	 reducing	 the	 salience	 of	 nuclear	 issues	 for	 citizens. 95 	Today,	 most	
nuclear	 disarmament	 campaigners	 are	 still	 based	 in	 Western	 nations	 where,	 for	
reasons	 of	 history	 and	 the	 relative	 freedom	 of	 their	 societies,	 there	 is	 greater	
potential	 to	 reach	and	organise	people	around	these	 issues.	Yet	such	groups	often	
have	 limited	 resources	 and	matters	 pertaining	 to	 nuclear	 weapons	 generally	 tend	
not	 to	 be	 amongst	 people’s	 political	 priorities.	 Moreover,	 prominent	 recent	
initiatives	 such	 as	 the	 humanitarian	 approach	 and	 ban	 treaty	 proposal	 provides	 a	
universal	moral	and	juridical	response	to	the	illegitimate	power	of	nuclear	weapons	
yet	this	approach	may	be	criticised	on	the	grounds	that	it	tends	not	to	look	beyond	
the	 weapons	 themselves	 and	 provide	 a	 political	 analysis	 of	 the	 causes	 and	
consequences	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 regarding	 institutional	 power	 and	
democratisation,	 for	 example.	 The	 need	 to	 differentiate	 between	 NWS	 based	 on	
their	 relative	 strategic	 power	 and	 thus	 their	 responsibility	 for	 disarmament	 is	 also	
not	 considered—a	 gap	 in	 the	 disarmament	 debate	 and	 these	 group’s	 political	
strategies	that,	owing	to	insufficient	space	here,	will	need	to	be	addressed	in	future	
studies.	
	
																																								 																					
95	Interviews:	JA;	PB;	JG;	NH	
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Conclusion	
	
This	 thesis	 has	 explored	 the	 politics	 of	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 disarmament,	
examining	 the	 current	 debate	 on	 this	 topic	 amongst	 academics,	 campaigners,	
officials	and	the	public	as	well	as	utilising	insights	gained	from	interviews	with	a	wide	
range	of	practitioners.	This	was	primarily	done	 in	order	 to	develop	an	original	and	
compelling	political	analysis	that	can	explain	the	current	disarmament	 impasse	and	
construct	 a	 credible	 theory	 of	 abolition	 to	 inform	 progressive	 unilateral	 and	
multilateral	disarmament	action	in	and	between	NWS.		
	
In	order	 to	do	this,	before	exploring	 the	particularities	and	practicalities	of	nuclear	
disarmament	 as	 it	 applies	 to	 NWS,	 Chapter	 One	 began	 with	 a	 more	 general	
investigation	 of	 the	 different	 ways	 that	 nuclear	 disarmament	 has	 been	
conceptualised	 and	 justified.	 On	 a	 technical	 level	 it	 was	 found	 that	 nuclear	
disarmament	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 learning	 process,	 which	 builds	 on	 existing	
knowledge	 through	 several	 phases	 of	 elimination	 covering	 relevant	 capabilities,	
including:	i)	restraint	ii)	elimination	iii)	maintaining	zero.	As	NWS	pass	from	restraint	
to	 elimination	 towards	 FNWS	 status	 so	 the	 requirements	 of	 disarmament	 will	
become	 more	 onerous,	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 necessary	 resources	 and	 the	 degree	 of	
intrusion	necessary	to	verify	dismantlement	of	nuclear	capabilities.		
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It	was	also	 found	 that	 the	political	process	 that	will	 facilitate	and	evolve	alongside	
the	 legal	 and	 technical	 instruments	 and	 knowledge	 required	 for	 nuclear	
disarmament—in	particular	 for	China,	Russia	and	 the	US—will	 last	 several	decades	
and	 therefore	 require	 close	 cooperation	 between	 NWS	 to	 provide	 focus	 to	
disarmament	and	ensure	other	political	developments,	such	as	regional	conflict,	do	
not	 derail	 the	 process.	 In	 addition,	 the	 more	 stable	 and	 peaceful	 regional	 and	
international	politics	 are,	 the	better	 for	disarmament	efforts	which	need	 time	and	
space	so	that	the	philosophy	of	common	security	becomes	embedded	 in	the	social	
and	 political	 life	 of	NWS.	Assuming	 the	 disarmament	 process	 goes	 ahead	 at	 some	
level,	 as	 it	 develops	 the	 degree	 of	 international	 cooperation	 and	 type	 of	 political	
structures	 necessary	 to	 achieve	 and	 lock	 in	 zero—including	 the	 extent	 to	 which	
power	needs	to	be	centralised	at	the	international	level	given	the	dual-use	nature	of	
the	nuclear	fuel	cycle—will	become	increasingly	clear.	
	
In	terms	of	how	nuclear	disarmament	has	been	justified,	this	chapter	discussed	what	
was	termed	the	disarmament	first	approach,	which	has	historically	been	advocated	
by	 nuclear	 abolitionists	 from	 both	 NPS	 and	 NNWS.	 Overall,	 what	 is	 most	 notable	
about	 disarmament	 first	 and	 what	 also	 distinguishes	 it	 from	 other	 approaches	
reviewed	 in	 Chapter	 Two,	 is	 that	 nuclear	 disarmament	 is	 seen	 as	 desirable	 both	
because	 it	will	eliminate	something	negative	and	morally	repugnant	from	domestic	
and	international	society—nuclear	weapons—and	because	this	endeavour	will	bring	
the	 universal	 benefits	 of	 peace	 and	 social	 justice	 to	 humanity.	 The	most	 powerful	
and	compelling	aspect	of	disarmament	first	is	thus	its	normative	and	transformative	
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vision	for	humanity,	spanning	national	boundaries,	which	has	captured	the	minds	of	
concerned	 citizens	 across	 the	 world,	 inspiring	 them	 to	 create	 a	 ‘world	 nuclear	
disarmament	movement’.		
	
Disarmament	 first’s	 strength	 as	 a	 response	 to	 the	 problem	 posed	 by	 nuclear	
weapons,	and	their	unprecedented	concentration	of	destructive	power,	is	therefore	
that	its	absolute	rejection	of	nuclear	weapons—while	apparently	simple—provides	a	
universal	 appeal	 to	 people’s	 common	 sense	 of	 justice	 which,	 if	 accepted,	 is	 far-
reaching	in	its	implications	for	how	society	should	be	ordered.	Moreover,	in	its	more	
radical	 forms,	disarmament	 first	provides	a	 response	 to	power	 that	would	 rupture	
the	 prevailing	 paradigm	 of	 achieving	 order	 through	 military	 dominance	 and	
represent	a	historic	break	in	the	pattern	whereby	state	security,	controlled	by	elites,	
is	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 political	 organization	 and	 planning	 by	 democratising	 decision-
making.		
	
Disarmament	first	thus	presents	a	theory	of	political	change	focused	on	the	need	for	
popular	 struggles	 that	 can	 dismantle	 illegitimate	 power	 structures	 supporting	 and	
reproducing	 nuclear	 weapons	 to	 be	 developed	 in	 nuclear	 possessors—particularly	
the	Western	NPS.	Given	 the	 strengths	 of	 the	 case	presented	by	disarmament	 first	
concerning	how	and	why	abolition	might	be	achieved,	 it	was	initially	proposed	that	
this	 study	should	consider	how	to	adapt	and	update	 the	 theory	of	political	 change	
embedded	 in	 this	 approach,	 as	 utilised	 in	 the	 disarmament	 movement’s	 1980s	
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heyday,	and	assess	how	it	may	be	applied	to	the	technologically	advanced	strategic	
environment	of	today	and	the	particular	political	circumstances	of	each	NWS.		
	
These	 insights	 regarding	 how	 nuclear	 disarmament	 has	 been	 conceptualised	 and	
justified	 raised	 the	 question	 of	 whom	 and	 by	 what	 means	 nuclear	 disarmament	
might	 be	 taken	 forward	 in	 each	 NWS	 and	 the	 opportunities	 for	 and	 obstacles	 to	
political	change	that	pro-disarmament	actors	and	groups	face.	Given	that	these	are	
in	part	 speculative	questions	concerning	political	 transformations,	 it	was	necessary	
to	 consider	 what	 types	 of	 existing	 knowledge	 might	 provide	 insight	 and	
understanding	 in	 this	 area	 and	 what	 new	 ideas	 and	 information	 were	 required.	
Having	 identified	 the	 four	 areas	 of	 nuclear	 knowledge	 concerning	 NWS	 that	were	
within	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 study	 to	 review,	 namely:	 i)	 nuclear	 possession	 ii)	 nuclear	
restraint	iii)	nuclear	arms	control	iv)	nuclear	disarmament,	Chapter	One	then	briefly	
considered	 how	 the	 more	 practical,	 technical	 and	 pro-disarmament	 literature	 on	
nuclear	issues	relates	to	debates	concerning	political	theory.		
	
The	main	 points	made	 here	 concerned	 the	 fact	 that	 political	 theory,	 in	 particular	
international	 relations	 theory—for	 example,	 from	 the	 dominant	 realist	 school—
includes	 influential	 and	 widely-respected	 discussions	 of	 nuclear	 possession	 and	
disarmament.	Thus	a	study	such	as	this,	which	seeks	to	examine	the	political	causes	
and	consequences	of	NWS	nuclear	disarmament,	needs	to	engage	with	the	 leading	
scholars	in	this	field,	both	to	assess	the	strengths	and	weaknesses	of	their	work	and	
to,	where	appropriate	and	necessary,	respond	to	their	criticisms	of	and	opposition	to	
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nuclear	 disarmament.	 It	 was	 therefore	 necessary	 to	 provide	 a	 fully	 rounded	
discussion	of	 the	nuclear	debate	and	 identify	 ideas	and	approaches	 in	 the	existing	
literature	 that	 would	 support	 the	 development	 of	 a	 speculative	 theory	 of	 nuclear	
disarmament.		
	
Chapter	 Two	 took	 on	 this	 task	 by	 exploring	 existing	 approaches	 to	 nuclear	
possession	 and	 disarmament	 in	 mainstream	 and	 realist	 thought	 and	 scholarly	
critiques	of	realism.	These	included	works	that	more	or	less	strongly	support	nuclear	
possession	 and	 object	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 for	 various	 reasons.	
Having	reviewed	the	range	of	perspectives	on	the	nuclear	revolution—most	of	which	
primarily,	 if	 not	 exclusively,	 focus	 on	 the	 international	 security	 implications	 of	 the	
bomb—I	 identified	 several	 significant	 gaps	 and	 problems	 in	 the	 thinking	 of	 the	
constituent	authors	on	nuclear	and	security	issues,	including	disarmament.		
	
For	 example,	 according	 to	 scholars	 such	 as	 Mearsheimer,	 Glaser,	 Waltz	 and	
Schelling—who	strongly	criticise	or	oppose	nuclear	disarmament—a	disarmed	world	
would	be	more	unstable	than	a	nuclear-armed	world,	may	increase	the	probability	of	
nuclear	 conflict	 and	 is,	 in	 any	 case,	 improbable	 given	 the	 various	 obstacles	 to	
international	 cooperation.	 Others	 argue	 that	 nuclear	 disarmament	 involving	 the	
great	 powers	 would	 generate	 security	 dilemmas,	 leading,	 for	 example,	 to	
conventional	arms	races	given	the	difficulty	of	differentiating	between	defensive	and	
offensive	 weaponry	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 states	 can’t	 be	 certain	 about	 each	 other’s	
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intentions.		
	
Whilst	 these	 concerns	 and	 objections	 have	 some	 merit,	 they	 are	 not	 sufficiently	
powerful	 to	 demolish	 the	 case	 for	 nuclear	 disarmament.	 This	 is	 firstly	 because,	 as	
even	 those	 mainstream	 and	 realist	 scholars	 who	 strongly	 support	 nuclear	
possession—including	 Mearsheimer—note,	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 be	 certain	 at	 this	
stage	 in	 history	 either	 of	 the	 impact	 that	 the	 nuclear	 revolution	 has	 had	 on	
international	 relations	 or	 that	 these	 impacts	 have	 been	 beneficial	 in	 terms	 of	
strategic	 stability.	 The	 fact	 that	 those	 objecting	 to	 nuclear	 disarmament	 on	 the	
grounds	that	 it	would	 lead	to	unacceptable	 levels	of	 instability	cannot	prove	that	a	
nuclear	armed-world	is	more	stable	and	less	 likely	to	create	nuclear	conflict	should	
lead	us	 to	question	 the	veracity	of	 their	argumentation.	When	we	do	so,	as	 in	 the	
case	 of	Mearsheimer	 and	 others,	 such	 as	 O’Hanlon,	 who	 advocate	 a	 security	 first	
approach	to	arms	control	and	disarmament,	we	find	that	the	‘stability’	they	refer	to	
principally	 concerns	 the	 narrow	 aims	 and	 interests	 of	 the	US	 and	 its	 allies,	 rather	
than	any	universal	conception	of	security.	Yet	US	national	security	goals	defined	by	
elite	decision-makers	are,	alone,	not	a	legitimate	basis	on	which	to	make	judgments	
concerning	whether	nuclear	disarmament	is	desirable	or	realisable.	Rather,	because	
this	 subject	 is	 of	utmost	 concern	 to	 the	 security	of	both	 the	entire	US	populace—
and,	for	that	matter,	the	world—we	need	to	find	an	alternate,	 legitimate	means	of	
making	judgments	and	decisions	on	nuclear	issues.	
		
Secondly,	 regarding	 the	 question	 of	 the	 security	 dilemma	 and	 the	 barriers	 to	
	 385	
international	cooperation,	including	on	disarmament,	it	was	found	that	the	security	
dilemma	 concept	 has	 limited	 explanatory	 utility	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 geopolitical	
situation	 involving	 NWS	 today.	 This	 is	 firstly	 because,	 as	 explored	 in	 detail	 in	
Chapters	 Three	 to	 Seven,	 NWS	 have	 developed	 domestic	 bureaucracies	 with	 a	
permanent	interest	in	nuclear	possession.	The	continuity	of	inherently	conservative	
defence	establishments	thus	protects	nuclear	weapons	from	external	changes,	even	
ones	 of	 great	 historical	 significance,	 such	 as	 the	 end	of	 the	Cold	War.	 In	 addition,	
China	and	Russia	are	clear	about	 the	strategic	power	and	 intentions	of	 the	US	and	
thus	 are	 not,	 at	 the	 highest	 levels,	 engaged	 in	 a	 dilemma	 of	 interpretation	 and	
response.	This	is	because	elite	actor-coalitions	in	China	and	Russia	have,	in	response	
to	perceived	US	 aggression,	 containment	 and	expansion	 since	 the	end	of	 the	Cold	
War,	 reached	a	consensus	 regarding	 the	US’s	hostile	 intentions	 that	connects	with	
their	 historical	 sense	 of	 vulnerability	 to	 external	 threats	 and	which	 presents	 them	
with	a	strong	justification	for	maintaining	the	bomb.		
	
Thirdly,	 cooperation	 with	 disarmament	 is	 an	 approach	 that	 seeks	 to	 solve	 the	
problems	of	arms	control	and	disarmament	at	the	international	 level,	through	elite	
level	 diplomacy.	 The	main	 problem	with	 this	 approach	was	 summarised	 by	 Albert	
Einstein	when	 he	 noted	 that,	 ‘we	 can't	 solve	 problems	 by	 using	 the	 same	 kind	 of	
thinking	we	used	when	we	created	them’.	Cooperation	with	disarmament	is	thus,	in	
its	 present	 guise,	 necessary	 (for	 example,	 given	 the	 political	 and	 technical	
requirements	of	abolition	 identified	 in	Chapter	One)	but	 insufficient	as	a	 theory	of	
nuclear	disarmament.	This	 is	primarily	because	 its	analytical	 focus	 remains	 in	 large	
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part	on	 international	 security	and	utilises	a	guardianship	approach	 to	arms	control	
and	disarmament,	so	that	whilst	domestic	politics	and	questions	of	democratisation	
are	 sometimes	 noted,	 they	 are	 under-specified.	 It	 is	 therefore	 necessary	 to	 look	
elsewhere	for	the	sources	of	political	will	that	will	sustain	international	cooperation	
pursuant	to	nuclear	disarmament.	
	
Given	 the	 strengths	 and	 weaknesses	 of	 the	 three	 approaches	 to	 nuclear	
disarmament	 reviewed	above,	 it	 is	possible	 to	propose	 that	an	alternate	approach	
which	 incorporates	 the	 strengths	of	cooperation	with	disarmament,	with	 its	 realist	
grasp	of	how	a	state’s	geostrategic	power	might	be	ordered	and	disarmament	first,	
with	 its	 powerful	 normative	 appeal	 and	 universally	 applicable	 principles,	 would	
potentially	 constitute	 a	 very	 fruitful	way	 for	NWS	 to	 achieve	a	 sustainable	nuclear	
disarmament	process.	However,	gaps	remained	in	terms	of	the	need	to	update	the	
disarmament	first	approach	in	relation	to	the	current	state	of	NWS	nuclear	politics,	
particularly	on	the	domestic	level,	in	order	to	identify	the	sources	of	political	will	that	
can	sustain	NWS	cooperation	supportive	of	disarmament.		
	
I	 therefore	 proposed	 that	 a	 new	 approach	 is	 needed,	which	 I	 termed	 institutional	
democratisation,	 to	 build	 on	 insights	 from	 global	 governance	 and	 civil	 society	
literature	 as	 well	 as	 social	 and	 political	 theory,	 for	 example,	 regarding	 domestic	
explanations	of	nuclear	acquisition	and	what	a	normative	theory	of	political	change	
supportive	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	 requires.	 The	 main	 political	 implications	 of	
institutional	democratisation	explored	throughout	this	thesis	are	thus	based	on	the	
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idea	 that	 the	 nuclear	 revolution	 has	 a	 second	 meaning	 that	 is	 not	 sufficiently	
explored	 in	 the	 existing	 mainstream	 and	 realist	 literature.	 This	 second	 meaning	
concerns	the	domestic	political	 impact	of	NWS	acquiring	and	developing	the	bomb	
and	 thus	 what	 eliminating	 nuclear	 weapons	 will	 entail	 for	 NWS	 on	 the	 domestic	
economic,	social	and	political	front.		
	
Institutional	 democratisation	 can	 thus	 be	 summarised	 as	 the	 idea	 that	 the	
democratic	 deficit	 in	 the	 five	 NWS—including	 crucially	 the	 United	 States	 given	 its	
singular	influence,	power	and	global	reach—needs	to	be	addressed	in	order	for	there	
to	 be	 any	 prospect	 of	 NWS	 nuclear	 disarmament.	 In	 rebalancing	 the	 focus	 of	
analyses	 of	 the	 politics	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	 from	 the	 international	 to	 the	
domestic	level,	institutional	democratisation	also	engages	with	the	problems	of	how	
anarchy	 may	 be	 mitigated	 or	 overcome	 and	 how	 future	 international	 institutions	
supportive	 of	 disarmament—including	 the	 more	 distant	 prospect	 of	 world	
government—may	 avoid	 descending	 into	 tyranny	 by	 ensuring	 just	 and	 equitable	
relations	through	popular	engagement	and	participation	in	decision-making.		
	
With	regard	to	the	problems	posed	by	anarchy,	institutional	democratisation	focuses	
on	 the	 domestic	 sources	 of	 international	 cooperation	 and	 obstruction	 regarding	
nuclear	arms	control	and	disarmament	efforts.	The	argument	here	is	that	there	are	
significant	constituencies	 that	exist	within	NWS	supportive	of	nuclear	arms	control	
and	disarmament,	yet	the	authoritarian	politics	and	democratic	deficit	that	variously	
exists	 within	 each	 NWS	means	 that	 citizen	 preferences	 on	 nuclear	 issues—where	
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identifiable—are	 mostly	 not	 reflected	 in	 government	 policy.	 The	 potential	 for	
international	 cooperation	 pursuant	 to	 nuclear	 disarmament	 (again,	 particularly	 in	
the	US)	thus	exists	but	is	not	being	realised,	often	because	of	domestic	bureaucratic	
and	political	obstruction	in	NWS	as	well	as	these	government’s	wider	strategic	goals.	
Moreover,	 the	 secrecy	 and	 misinformation	 surrounding	 nuclear	 issues,	 often	
purposefully	 fed	 by	 pro-nuclear	 governments	 and	 their	 supporters,	 has	 led	 to	 the	
publics	 of	 NWS	 being	 misled	 regarding	 the	 actual	 costs	 and	 risks	 of	 nuclear	
possession.	 Thus,	 where	 the	 costs	 and	 risks	 of	 maintaining	 and	 modernising	 the	
bomb	 are	 known,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 support	 for	 nuclear	 disarmament	will	 increase—
which	again	highlights	the	need	for	institutional	democratisation.		
	
Having	provided	this	initial	assessment	of	mainstream	and	realist	thought	regarding	
the	nuclear	revolution,	Part	Two	of	the	study	focused	on	showing	how	 institutional	
democratisation	 adds	 value	 to	 the	 existing	 literature	 regarding	 the	 causes	 and	
consequences	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament	 for	 each	 NWS.	 To	 repeat	 the	 point	 made	
above,	 the	 challenge	 here	 was	 that	 explaining	 the	 causes	 and	 consequences	 of	
nuclear	 possession	 is	 much	 more	 straightforward	 than	 imagining	 the	 causes	 and	
consequences	of	NWS	disarmament.	Any	theoretical	 ‘test’	 in	the	 latter	area	 is	thus	
based	 on	 far	more	 limited	 data	 and	 is	 thus	 inevitably	 incomplete	 and	 speculative	
since	it	covers	something	that	has	and	is	not	happening.		
	
Despite	the	challenges	involved	in	this	endeavor,	I	have	argued	that	it	is	possible	to	
make	headway	 in	 this	area	 to	provide	 some	meaningful	 insight	and	understanding	
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into	 NWS	 nuclear	 disarmament.	 In	 order	 to	 do	 this,	 Chapters	 Three	 to	 Seven	
provided	a	set	of	five	in-depth	case	studies	of	the	nuclear	weapons	systems	for	each	
of	the	NWS	in	order	of	their	acquiring	the	bomb:	US,	Russia,	UK,	France,	China.	Over	
these	 case	 studies,	 the	 initial	 assessment	 provided	 in	 Chapter	 Two	 regarding	 the	
gaps	and	problems	with	the	mainstream	and	realist	literature	was	confirmed,	as	was	
the	 potential	 contribution	 of	 institutional	 democratisation	 to	 the	 nuclear	 debate.	
This	is	primarily	because	it	was	found	that	whilst	the	security	model	does	a	good	job,	
in	some	cases,	of	explaining	the	 international	security	causes	and	consequences	of	
NWS	nuclear	acquisition	and	development,	it	still	only	provides	a	partial	picture.	The	
key	point	here	is	that	without	a	full	grasp	of	why	NWS	seek—and	then	continue	to	
possess	and	develop—the	bomb,	it	is	not	possible	to	identify	the	politics	of	nuclear	
disarmament	for	each	NWS.	
	
Before	 further	 outlining	 the	weaknesses	 of	mainstream	and	 realist	 thought	 in	 this	
area	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 acknowledge	 where	 these	 approaches	 are	 valuable.	 For	
example,	 through	 focusing	 on	 the	 international	 security	 aspects	 of	 nuclear	
acquisition,	realist	thought	impresses	upon	us	the	different	external	security	threats	
motivating	Russia	 and	China,	 in	 particular,	 to	 seek	 and	maintain	 possession	of	 the	
bomb.	Moreover,	in	terms	of	the	international	security	changes	required	for	nuclear	
disarmament,	 realism	 reminds	 us	 that	 it	 is	 not	 reasonable	 to	 argue	 that	 NWS	
disarmament	 or	 a	 NWFW	 will	 be	 the	 same	 world	 as	 today,	 just	 without	 nuclear	
weapons.	 US	 military	 power	 in	 Europe	 and	 East	 Asia	 is	 perceived	 as	 a	 threat	 to	
Russian	and	Chinese	sovereignty	and	drives	decision-makers	in	Moscow	and	Beijing	
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to	rely	on	nuclear	deterrence	to	ensure	regime	survival	and	protect	their	interests	at	
home	 and	 in	 their	 near	 abroad.	 Rather	 than	 dismissing	 mainstream	 and	 realist	
approaches	 for	 their	 flaws	 and	 scepticism	 regarding	 disarmament,	 institutional	
democratisation	 thus	 seeks	 to	 build	 on	 and	 incorporate	 the	 valuable	 insights	
provided	by	such	approaches	where	appropriate	and	necessary.	
	
The	 fact	 remains,	 however,	 that	 there	 are	 clear	 problems	 with	 mainstream	 and	
realist	 approaches	 that	 must	 be	 recognised.	 For	 example,	 despite	 being	 able	 to	
identify	past	and	present	international	security	challenges	associated	with	the	bomb,	
the	 security	 model	 cannot	 fully	 explain	 two	 aspects	 of	 nuclear	 politics:	 i)	 the	
continued	 possession	 and	 development	 of	 the	 bomb	 over	 time	 ii)	 nuclear	
disarmament.	This	 is	 firstly	because	mainstream	and	 realist	 thought	 strongly	 tends	
to	 focus	only	on	 the	 international	 rather	 than	both	 the	domestic	and	 international	
political	 significance	 of	 the	 bomb,	 including	 the	 impact	 nuclear	 possession	 has	 on	
NWS’s	political	 structures	 and	practices.	 Secondly,	mainstream	and	 realist	 thought	
often	 exhibits	 a	 pessimistic	 attitude	 towards	 political	 change,	 so	 that	 nuclear	
possession	 is	 seen	 as	 inevitable	 and	 disarmament	 unrealisable,	 despite	 the	
significant	 levels	of	domestic	and	 international	public	support	 for	abolition	and	the	
potential	 for	 social	 movements	 to	 achieve	 progressive	 shifts	 in	 policy.	 Where	
mainstream	and	realist	studies	do	propose	arms	control	and	disarmament	steps,	for	
example,	as	part	of	the	guardianship	model,	these	are	thus	generally	based	on	the	
assumption	 that	 the	 political	 energy	 for	 action	 will	 emerge	 from	 existing	 power	
structures	and	primarily	involve	international	diplomacy.	
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However,	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 the	 guardianship	 theory	 of	 political	 change	
misunderstands	the	full	implications	of	nuclear	disarmament,	which,	because	of	the	
second	meaning	of	the	nuclear	revolution,	fundamentally	involves	a	transformation	
in	 the	domestic	and	 international	politics	of	NWS.	Moreover,	 it	 is	 improbable	 that	
left	 to	 their	own	devices,	 the	powerful	people	controlling	 the	bomb	will	dismantle	
and	surrender	the	institutional	power	that	they	and	their	predecessors	have	built	up	
over	 decades,	 even	 if	 some	 among	 them	 do	 not	 believe	 in	 nuclear	 deterrence	 or	
value	 the	 bomb	 as	 highly	 as	 during	 the	 Cold	 War.	 The	 weight	 of	 the	 status	 quo	
manifested	in	the	permanent	bureaucracies	reproducing	the	bomb,	and	the	aversion	
to	being	seen	as	responsible	for	relinquishing,	what	is	believed	to	be,	a	crucial	aspect	
of	national	power	 thus	prevents	NWS	political	 leaders	 from	making	any	 significant	
steps	towards	zero.	
	
It	therefore	may	be	optimistic	yet	still	reasonable	to	believe	that	existing	elites	and	
institutions,	 via	 the	 guardianship	 model,	 may	 gradually	 enact	 more	 enlightened	
policies	 of	 arms	 control,	 non-proliferation	 and	 restraint,	 for	 reasons	 of	 ‘strategic	
stability’—as	has	sometimes	been	done	in	the	past	following	international	conflict	or	
crises—or	in	response	to	cost	pressures	or	technological	developments.	What	is	not	
reasonable	 or	 realistic,	 firstly,	 is	 to	 believe	 that	 business	 as	 usual	 can	 continue	
without	a	high-salience	and	more	dangerous	nuclear	order	emerging	as	permament	
bureaucracies	 in	 NWS,	 characterised	 by	 continuity	 and	 seeking	 to	 maintain	 and	
expand	 their	 power,	 seek	 to	 optimise	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 nuclear	 arsenals	 by	
producing	ever	more	advanced	and	potentially	 threatening	weaponry.	At	the	same	
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time,	 such	 complex	 modernisation	 efforts	 are	 increasingly	 costly	 and	 difficult—
particularly	for	the	US	and	Russia—requiring	advanced	industrial	skills	and	significant	
resources,	which	may	act	as	a	brake	on	the	speed	with	which	these	systems	can	be	
successfully	deployed.		
	
Given	 the	 limitations	 of	mainstream	 and	 realist	 thought	 in	 this	 area,	 the	 value	 of	
institutional	 democratisation	 can	 be	 seen	 in	 its	 ability	 to	 fill	 in	 the	 gaps	 regarding	
why	states	acquire	the	bomb,	explain	the	particular	ways	in	which	states	develop	the	
bomb	 and	 consider	 how	 states	 may	 eliminate	 the	 bomb—by,	 in	 the	 latter	 case,	
providing	a	viable	theory	of	political	change.	 Institutional	democratisation	does	this	
by	bringing	in	important	domestic	factors	such	as	the	weight	of	history,	scientific	and	
technological	 prestige	 as	 well	 as	 the	 economic	 and	 political	 benefits	 of	 nuclear	
possession	and	development	and	how	these	take	root	in	NWS	over	time.		
	
In	terms	of	specific	findings	for	the	five	NWS,	the	conceptualisation	in	Chapter	Two	
of	nuclear	weapon	systems	as	fundamentally	incompatible	with	democracy	because	
shrouded	 in	 secrecy,	 with	 decisions	 regarding	 their	 development	 and	 use	
concentrated	 in	 small,	 closed,	 elite	 groups	 at	 the	 top	 of	 state	 hierarchies,	 were	
confirmed	 in	 the	 NWS	 case	 studies.	 The	 political	 and	 strategic	 circumstances	 and	
mindsets	of	World	War	Two	and	 the	early	Cold	War	 informed	 the	early	 growth	of	
these	institutions,	with	huge	military	establishments	being	maintained	in	the	US	and	
Russia,	and	to	a	lesser	extent,	the	UK	and	France.	As	noted	above,	these	institutions	
were	powerful	and	resilient	enough	to	ensure	the	survival	of	the	bomb	following	the	
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end	 of	 the	 Cold	 War,	 when	 the	 principal	 justification	 for	 Western	 nuclear	
possession—the	 threat	 of	 international	 revolution	 posed	 by	 the	 Soviet	 Union—
disappeared	overnight.	Today,	to	different	degrees	and	in	different	ways	(with	China	
more	 of	 an	 exceptional	 case	 given	 its	 history	 of	 restraint	 and	 focus	 on	 national	
development)	 the	 nuclear	 weapons	 systems	 of	 NWS	 are	 thus	 out	 of	 complete	
political	 and	 even	 human	 control,	 given	 the	 domestic	 momentum:	 including	
economic,	bureaucratic	and	technological	factors,	driving	modernisation.	
	
In	 terms	 of	 the	 civilian	 and	 democratic	 control	 of	 nuclear	 arsenals,	 whilst	 formal	
democratic	 channels	 for	 setting	 the	 parameters	 of	 and	 influencing	 policy	 remains	
present	in	the	US,	including	through	Congress,	this	is	less	the	case	in	France,	where	
the	 acquisition	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 was	 tied	 up	 with	 the	 development	 of	 the	
Presidency	 during	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 Fifth	 Republic	 and	 the	 search	 for	 a	
renewed	‘grandeur’	after	WW2.	Indeed,	the	US	Congress	provides	more	checks	and	
balances,	including	the	power	of	the	purse	and	greater	freedom	of	information	than	
the	 British	 and	 French	 parliaments.	 The	 UK	 meanwhile,	 with	 its	 history	 of	 anti-
nuclear	activism,	is	perhaps	the	state	that	has	come	nearest	to	abolition,	as	no	other	
Western	NWS	has	come	close	to	electing	a	party	promising	unilateral	disarmament	
in	 its	 election	 manifesto.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 as	 the	 British	 Labour	 party	 was	
unilateralist	 and	 committed	 to	 leaving	 NATO	 in	 the	 early	 1980s,	 the	 Soviet	 Union	
under	Gorbachev	took	on	the	power	of	the	military-industrial	complex	and	reshaped	
security	 policy	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 deep	 cuts	 to	 nuclear	 forces	 took	 place	 and	
abolition	was	 put	 on	 the	 table	 as	 a	 serious	 option.	 Yet	 the	 Reagan	 administration	
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chose	 to	 maintain	 the	 US’s	 quest	 for	 global	 hegemony	 and	 nuclear	 superiority,	 a	
project	taken	up	by	each	successive	administration.	The	end	of	the	Cold	War	thus	did	
not	 lead	 to	 disarmament	 and	 a	 peace	 dividend	 but	 NATO	 expansion	 and	 a	
restructured	nuclear	weapons	complex	capable	of	targeting	emerging	threats	to	the	
US	in	developing	nations	as	well	as	traditional	opponents.		
	
Elsewhere,	Chinese	planners	have	historically	seen	a	much	more	limited	role	for	the	
bomb	 than	 the	 other	 NWS	 given	 their	 focus	 on	 central	 deterrence,	 economic	
development	and	pursuit	of	a	non-expansionist	grand	strategy.	This	restraint,	whilst	
currently	being	tested	by	US	containment	and	the	regional	ambitions	held	by	some	
in	Beijing,	suggests	that	official	Chinese	support	for	abolition	is	more	than	rhetorical	
so	that	China	would	be	more	receptive	to	a	disarmament	process	begun	by	the	US	
than	 France	 or	 Russia,	 whose	 military	 and	 political	 establishments,	 for	 unique	
historical	 and	 strategic	 reasons,	 have	 a	 deeper	 and	more	 symbiotic	 attachment	 to	
the	bomb	and	the	culture	of	nuclear	possession.	
	
Having	shown	the	explanatory	power	of	 institutional	democratisation	regarding	the	
politics	 of	 NWS	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 disarmament	 in	 Chapters	 Three	 to	 Seven,	
Chapter	 Eight	 then	moved	 on	 to	 consider	 the	 political	 implications	 of	 institutional	
democratisation,	 to	show	 its	value	as	both	a	critical	approach	and	problem-solving	
tool.	This	was	done	over	two	main	areas,	including	a	review	of	possible	actions	and	
policies	 supportive	 of	 disarmament	 that	 could	 be	 taken	 and	 enacted	 by	NWS	 at	 a	
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national	level,	and	an	assessment	of	the	state	of	pro-disarmament	political	forces	in	
each	NWS	in	relation	to	NWS’s	dual	nuclear	disarmament	responsibilities.	
	
With	 regards	 to	 the	 specific	 practical	 ideas	 and	 processes	 supportive	 of	 NWS	
institutional	 democratisation	 that	 could	 be	 taken	 forward,	 three	 areas	 were	
highlighted:	 i)	 the	 need	 to	 develop	 measurements	 of	 authoritarianism	 and	
democracy	 in	 NWS	 that	 reflects	 the	 costs	 and	 risks	 of	 nuclear	 possession.	 This	 is	
necessary	 in	 order	 to	 both	 better	 appreciate	 the	 political	 benefits	 of	 nuclear	
disarmament	and	more	accurately	define	a	state’s	regime	type	ii)	the	need	for	NWS	
to	 implement	 progressive	 policies	 at	 a	 governmental	 level	 to	 ensure	 that	 nuclear	
weapons	are	 subject	 to	democratic,	 transparent	and	accountable	processes	 iii)	 the	
need	to	improve	public	understanding	of	nuclear	weapons	and	disarmament	in	NWS	
as	 a	 means	 of	 developing	 greater	 popular	 engagement	 with	 and	 participation	 in	
decision-making	on	security	issues.	
	
Based	 on	 this	 study’s	 claim	 that	 each	 NWS	 has	 a	 dual	 responsibility	 for	 nuclear	
disarmament,	 covering	 action	both	 at	 a	 national	 level	 and	 an	 international	 level—
that	 supports	 other	 NWS	 taking	 action	 to	 disarm—the	 second	 section	 of	 Chapter	
Eight	 then	 considered	 the	 current	 health	 of	 pro-disarmament	movements	 in	 each	
NWS	 and	 globally	 to	 assess	 the	 potential	 for	 action	 supportive	 of	 institutional	
democratisation	to	be	realised	in	the	near	term.	With	regard	to	the	strength	of	the	
global	 nuclear	 disarmament	movement,	 it	was	 found	 that	 the	 campaign	 groups	 in	
Europe	and	North	America	which	arose	in	the	1980s	calling	for	disarmament	were	of	
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a	far	greater	size	and	more	wide	ranging	and	radical	in	their	politics	than	most	of	the	
disarmament	movement	of	 today—including,	 for	example,	a	better	appreciation	of	
the	 structural	 and	 economic	 aspects	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 systems.	 The	 decline	 in	
activism	and	shift	in	political	focus	coincided	with,	and	was	likely	a	result	of,	the	co-
option	of	 the	more	mainstream	and	conservative	wing	of	 the	peace	movement	by	
the	 political	 establishment	 in	 the	 US,	 the	 overall	 decline	 in	 genuinely	 left-wing	
politics	from	the	mid-1980s	onwards,	the	perceived	reduction	in	the	nuclear	threat	
following	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Cold	War	 and	 the	 focus	 of	 progressive	 groups	 on	 other	
issues	that	were	seen	as	more	pressing.	
	
The	case	for	supporters	of	nuclear	disarmament	today	to	focus	primarily	on	the	US	is	
thus	a	strong	one	given	its	power	and	the	fact	 its	behavior	has	a	decisive	influence	
on	 all	 nation’s	 nuclear	 weapons	 decision-making.	 In	 addition,	 because	 all	 NWS	
governments	 need	 to	 be	 persuaded	 or	 pressured	 to	 realise	 their	 dual	 nuclear	
disarmament	 obligations,	 pro-disarmament	 campaign	 strategists	 need	 to	 think	
carefully	about	where	they	devote	resources	and	how	they	frame	the	issue	so	that	
Western-centric	 perspectives	 do	 not	 predominate.	 In	 considering	 this	 we	 must	
recognise	that	some,	perhaps	the	majority,	of	those	who	spend	most	time	working	
for	 NWS	 nuclear	 disarmament	 do	 so	 from	 within	 the	 NWS	 of	 which	 they	 are	
citizens—principally	the	UK	and	US—but	also	across	Europe,	Japan	and	Australasia.	
	
The	reason	for	doing	so	seems	clear	and	practical,	individuals	and	NGOs	are	far	more	
likely	 to	 be	 able	 to	 influence	 decision-makers	 if	 they	 are	 citizens	 of	 that	 nation	
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through	 established	 processes	 of	 accountability.	 Clearly,	 prevailing	 political	
conditions,	 for	 example,	 levels	of	democracy	and	 freedom	 in	each	NWS	will	 affect	
how	easy	 or	 hard	 it	 is	 to	 do	 this.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 citizens	 and	 groups	
working	 in	 nations	 which	 are	 relatively	 more	 liberal,	 democratic	 and	 secure,	 in	
particular	the	UK	and	US,	with	France	a	lesser	included	case,	have	greater	access	to	
resources	and	channels	of	influence	than	those	living	under	less	democratic	or	free	
regimes	such	as	China	and	Russia.		
	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recognise	 that	 the	 lack	of	 an	effective	 review	
process	in	western,	formally	democratic	NWS	and	the	lack	of	public	accountability	of	
those	 shaping	 nuclear	 decisions,	 offers	more	 similarities	 than	 differences	with	 the	
process	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 decision-making	 in	 Beijing	 and	 Moscow’s	 more	
authoritarian	 regimes.	 This	 raises	 the	 question	 of	 how	 influential	 individuals	 and	
groups	outside	of	the	upper	echelons	of	the	bureaucratic,	military	and	political	elites	
can	 be	 even	 within	 relatively	 free	 societies	 with	 at	 least	 formally	 democratic	
institutions,	 such	 as	 the	 US.	 Moreover,	 whilst	 research	 conducted	 in	 several	
democracies,	 including	 in	Europe,	Japan	and	the	US,	 found	that	where	anti-nuclear	
weapons	 public	 opinion,	 protest	 and	 civil	 society	 activism	exists,	 it	 has	 exerted	 an	
influence	on	the	degree	and	type	of	action	taken	by	governments,	it	must	be	also	be	
recognised	 that	 the	 deep	 secrecy	 surrounding	 nuclear	 weapons	 systems	 and	 an	
often	supine	media	has	clearly	acted	as	a	brake	on	the	level	of	public	engagement	in	
and	action	on	these	matters.	
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Such	 findings	 go	 some	 way	 to	 explaining	 why,	 despite	 nuclear	 disarmament	
advocates	 in	 the	 West	 campaigning	 for	 decades	 on	 this	 issue,	 nuclear	 weapons	
systems—and	 the	 institutions	 that	 produce	 and	 run	 them—have	 remained	 so	
resilient	to	outside	pressure	and	why,	as	several	leading	disarmament	activists	have	
attested,	 there	has	been	a	 turning	away	by	 the	public	 from	nuclear	 issues,	despite	
pro-disarmament	views	remaining	widespread.	In	addition,	if	citizens	of	NWS	cannot	
meaningfully	 influence	 their	 own	 nation’s	 nuclear	 weapons	 decision-making,	 then	
what	does	 this	mean	 for	 citizens	of	other	nations	who	wish	 to	 change	 the	nuclear	
weapons	 policies	 of	 NWS?	One	might	 initially	 and	 reasonably	 speculate	 that	 their	
potential	 influence	 would	 be	 significantly	 weaker	 given	 that	 decision-makers	 are	
more	responsive	to	the	demands	of	their	own	citizenry.		
	
However,	 it	 is	 also	 reasonable	 to	expect	 that	 the	answer	 to	 this	question	will,	 as	 I	
mentioned	above,	also	depend	upon	the	nature	of	the	relationship	between	the	two	
nations	involved.	For	example,	the	more	powerful	a	nation	or	group	of	nations	is,	the	
easier	it	will	be	for	them	to	influence	the	behavior	of	an	NWS,	or	for	that	matter,	an	
NNWS.	Following	this	logic,	we	may	expect	that	the	ability	of	citizens	and	civil	society	
groups	 to	 influence	 the	 behavior	 of	 other	 nations	 will	 increase	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
power	of	the	nation	in	which	they	undertake	political	action.	To	complete	this	line	of	
reasoning,	depending	on	their	relative	freedom	and	access	to	resources,	the	citizens	
of	NWS	 themselves	 have	 a	 special	 responsibility	 to	 ensure	 that	 their	 governments	
realise	 their	 dual	 obligations	 to	 achieve	 national	 nuclear	 disarmament	 and	 act	 in	
ways	supportive	of	a	NWFW.	
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I	have	therefore	argued	that	the	political	analysis	of	nuclear	weapons	and	what	the	
bomb	means	in	terms	of	domestic	and	international	power,	which	developed	out	of	
the	struggles	against	the	bomb	in	the	1980s,	should	be	revived	today	and	applied	by	
disarmament	advocates	 to	 the	contemporary	strategic	environment.	There	 is	great	
potential	 here	 for	 peace	 and	 disarmament	 activists	 to	 link	 up	 with	 campaigners	
working	in	other	related	progressive	political	fields,	such	as	conflict,	climate	change	
and	development	to	develop	a	radical	critique	of	power	and	propose	short,	medium	
and	 long-term	 measures	 supportive	 of	 a	 transition	 to	 more	 equitable	 and	 just	
societies.	Indeed	it	is	likely	that	movements	with	a	wider	social	base	and	goals,	which	
can	draw	on	greater	public	support	and	resources,	will	be	essential	if	economic	elite	
domination	 and	 cultures	 of	 militarism	 are	 to	 be	 replaced	 with	 democratic,	
participatory	economic	and	political	systems	capable	of	demilitarising	NWS.		
	
In	 terms	of	 the	 limitations	 of	 this	 thesis,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	necessarily	 speculative	
and	 thus	 incomplete	 nature	 of	 the	 study,	 time	 and	 space	 places	 inevitable	
restrictions	on	 the	areas	which	 I	have	been	able	 to	provide	 in-depth	 investigations	
of.	The	first	area	to	highlight	in	this	regard	concerns	the	politics	of	the	global	nuclear	
disarmament	 movement.	 This	 includes,	 for	 example,	 how	 movements	 might	 be	
organized	to	respond	to	the	power	embedded	in	nuclear	weapons	systems	and	how	
demographic	trends	may	interact	with	future	possibilities	for	nuclear	disarmament,	
for	example,	concerning	whether	younger	NWS	citizens	who	did	not	experience	the	
Cold	 War	 may	 be	 less	 supportive	 of	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 more	 amenable	 to	
disarmament.	 	Partly,	 this	 is	a	 result	of	 the	 limitations	of	 the	data	 in	 this	area.	For	
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example,	 public	 opinion	 data	 on	 nuclear	 issues	 varies	 significantly	 in	 terms	 of	
consistency,	scope	and	quality	across	NWS—with	far	more	information	available	for	
the	UK	and	US—whilst	useful	assessments	of	the	recent	impact	of	advocacy	efforts	
in	this	field	are	few	and	far	between.		
	
Secondly,	 there	 was	 not	 space	 to	 closely	 consider	 important	 issues	 such	 as	 the	
connection	 between	 the	 politics	 of	 civil	 nuclear	 energy	 and	 nuclear	 weapons	
production,	the	potential	for	NWS	to	move	to	recessed	or	virtual	nuclear	arsenals	as	
an	 intermediate	 step	 on	 the	 path	 to	 abolition,	 or	 possible	 future	 military	
technological	 advances	 (for	 example,	 cyber	 and	 underwater)	 and	 the	 implications	
these	might	have	for	nuclear	weapons	systems	and	proliferation.	Thirdly,	the	theory	
of	 nuclear	 disarmament	 for	 NWS	 developed	 here,	 focused	 on	 institutional	
democratisation,	 did	 not	 consider	 the	 previous	 examples	 of	 voluntary	 or	 enforced	
disarmament	 involved	 the	 former	 Soviet	 states,	 Iraq	 and	 Libya.	 In	 terms	 of	 future	
studies,	 it	would	be	possible	to	apply	the	methodology	utilised	 in	this	thesis	to	the	
aforementioned	 questions	 in	 order	 to	 consider	 the	 politics	 of	 a	 NWFW,	 but	
potentially	 disarmament	 involving	 other	 WMD,	 such	 as	 chemical	 and	 biological	
weapons	 and	 conventional	 weaponry.	 The	 challenge	 of	 developing	 new	 and	
sustainable	 multilateral	 agreements	 governing	 fissile	 material	 and	 related	military	
capabilities	would,	in	particular,	benefit	from	further	study.		
	
Fourthly,	I	was	not	able	to	specify—for	example,	according	to	the	particular	political	
circumstances	 of	 each	 NWS—the	 precise	 degree	 of	 institutional	 democratisation	
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required	for	each	NWS	in	order	to	move	towards	and	achieve	a	sustainable	nuclear	
disarmament	 process.	 Future	 studies	 might	 look	 at	 this	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 balance	
between	 civilian	 and	 popular,	 participatory	 involvement	 in	 defence	 and	 foreign	
policy	 decision-making	 and	 acceptable	 levels	 of	 involvement	 by	 the	 military	 and	
established	guardianship.	Answers	to	this	question	may	only	become	clear	over	time	
as	the	disarmament	process	unfolds,	and	in	relation	to	another	issue	which	I	touched	
on,	 but	 could	 not	 explore	 in	 depth—namely,	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 NWS	 military	
establishments	need	to	adopt	non-offensive,	defensive	postures	and	demilitarise	so	
that	the	threat	or	use	of	force	are	delegitimised	as	instruments	of	state	policy.	
	
Fifthly,	 I	was	not	able	to	provide	in	Chapter	Eight	a	full	summary	of	the	regional	or	
international	 politics	 of	 nuclear	 possession	 and	 disarmament	 and	 implications	 of	
institutional	democratisation	for	NWS	as	I	would	have	liked	to.	For	regional	nuclear	
politics,	this	could	have	covered	how	NWS	relate	to	their	neighbours,	for	example,	in	
Europe	and	East	Asia	in	particular,	and	institutions	such	as	the	EU,	NATO	and	SCO	as	
well	 as	 what	 alternative	 security	 and	 political	 arrangements	might	 be	 required	 in	
future	if	nuclear	disarmament	is	to	be	realised.	At	the	international	level,	as	noted	in	
the	Introduction	to	this	study,	I	chose	not	to	incorporate	an	in-depth	analysis	of	the	
global	 politics	 of	 nuclear	 disarmament,	 including	 the	 NAS	 (DPRK,	 India,	 Israel	 and	
Pakistan)	and	 the	nuclear	capable	 states.	Whilst	 I	did	discuss	how	the	dynamics	of	
international	nuclear	politics	relate	to	NWS	in	the	case	studies,	this	could	have	been	
explored	further	when	summarising	relations	in	Chapter	Eight.	In	addition,	it	was	not	
possible	 to	 include	 a	 discussion	 of	 how	 the	 responsibility	 gap	 in	 NWS	 nuclear	
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disarmament	 might	 be	 addressed.	 This	 topic	 could	 be	 explored	 in	 future	 by	
developing	an	appreciation	of	each	NPS	and	NNWS’s	relative	strategic	power,	across	
the	qualitative	and	quantitative	range	of	military	capabilities	and	the	doctrines	that	
guide	 them	 and	 how	 these	 capabilities	 and	 doctrines	 interact	 and	 affect	 each	
possessor’s	security	and	threat	perceptions.		
	
To	conclude,	one	of	the	main	implications	of	this	thesis	for	future	studies	of	nuclear	
disarmament	 is	 for	 practitioners	 working	 on	 nuclear	 issues	 from	 different	
backgrounds	 to	 listen	 and	 learn	 from	 one	 another	 in	 order	 to	 break	 out	 of	
established	 and	 limited	 ways	 of	 thinking.	 For	 example,	 it	 is	 a	 mistake	 for	
disarmament	 campaigners	 to	 treat	 nuclear	 weapons	 solely	 as	 abhorrent	 societial	
artefacts	and	not	 consider	 the	 insights	 concerning	conventional	 capabilities,	 threat	
perceptions	 and	 elite	 understandings	 of	 national	 security	 across	NWS	provided	 by	
mainstream	studies.	 It	 is	also	a	mistake	to	 ignore,	as	some	mainstream	studies	do,	
the	structures	of	undemocratic	economic	and	political	power	within	which	nuclear	
weapons	 are	 embedded,	 the	 institutional	 analyses	 of	 liberal	 and	 left-wing	 authors	
and	the	vital	role	of	popular	movements	in	nuclear	disarmament,	both	past,	present	
and	future.		
	
In	terms	of	the	future	of	nuclear	disarmament,	there	is	a	strong	case	to	be	made	that	
the	politics	of	nuclear	weapons	and	climate	change	 in	particular	should	be	seen	as	
the	 politics	 of	 survival.	 Without	 the	 emergence	 of	 strong	 and	 diverse	 popular	
movements,	 particularly	 in	 the	 US	 and	 its	 allies,	 to	 increase	 pressure	 for	
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disarmament	 action	 and	 eventually	 preside	 over	 state	 institutions	 to	 control	 the	
power	 of	 nuclear	 weapons	 pending	 their	 elimination,	 the	 prospects	 for	 scientific	
societies	to	continue	existing	and	provide	decent	lives	for	people	over	the	long-term	
may	fast	diminish.	This	study	has	found	that	the	type	of	politics	that	will	allow	NWS	
to	 achieve	 nuclear	 disarmament	 is	 therefore	 universal,	 moral	 and	 democratic.	 To	
ensure	 humanity’s	 common	 security	 and	 survival,	 citizens	 across	 the	 world	 must	
come	 together	 to	 ensure	 that	 such	 principles	 guide	 NWS’s	 economic	 and	 political	
decision-making	 at	 a	 fundamental	 level,	 a	 process	 that	 necessitates	 institutional	
democratisation.	
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